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ABSTRACT:

MERCHANTS IN THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE
Jane Sancinito
Campbell Grey
Merchants in the Later Roman Empire is an analysis of the social and economic
lives of merchants, traders, and artisans in the 2nd to 4th centuries. It focuses, in particular,
on the strategies adopted by merchants participating in small-scale local and regional
trade and argues that concerns about social status were the primary determinants of
merchant behavior. It expands the traditional application of New Institutional Economics
to include informal and social institutions and considers how social norms limited and
shaped merchant economic behavior. In doing so, the project moves discussions about the
Roman economy away from the effect of the power, and particularly the institutional
power, of the state toward a more dynamic model that accounts for the effect of
interpersonal relations on the economy. Merchants in the Later Roman Empire argues
that the Roman Empire rarely intended to regulate merchant activity in a comprehensive
way and was more concerned with maintaining the status quo through its legislation and
taxation. It contends that merchants engaged with the state at local levels where personal
connections were critical. These ties were structured along similar lines to those between
merchants and their peers, competitors, and customers—in short, to the connections they
had with individuals throughout their communities. Taking reputation as its focus, this
project argues for the institutional power of social norms in merchant social and
economic life and analyzes the strategies used by merchants to present and advance
themselves. Merchants invested heavily in their reputations and attempted to display their
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contributions to society, their good characters, and their success in business. These efforts
were costly and every form of self-representation relied heavily on the disposition of the
audiences to which they were directed. Merchants in the Later Roman Empire considers
both the projection and the reception of reputation to conclude that these social norms
constrained merchant actions in ways that limited their indiscriminate pursuit of profit but
also generated economic opportunities by fostering trust and reducing market volatility.
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INTRODUCTION:
ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν καπήλους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μέτροις κακουργοῦντας, οἷς ὁ βίος ἐστὶν
αὐτόθεν ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας, μισεῖτε καὶ κολάζετε· τὴν δὲ πόλιν, εἰ δόξει περὶ
τοὺς ἐπαίνους τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν πανουργεῖν καὶ τὰς δωρεὰς καπηλεύειν, οὐκ
αἰσχυνεῖσθε, παλίμβολα καὶ παλίμπρατα ποιοῦσαν τὰ σεμνά; καὶ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο
ἐνθυμεῖσθε ὅτι μηδὲ τοῖς καπήλοις μηδεὶς ἔτι ῥᾳδίως πρόσεισι, παρ᾿ οἷς ἂν
πονηρὰ ᾖ τὰ μέτρα;
But, those merchants who cheat in their measures, whose life, the very nature of
their business, depends upon base gain, you hate and punish; but if the city will
gain the reputation of being a villain concerning the commendations of good men
and selling honors, will you not feel ashamed that it is making sacred awards
untrustworthy and subject to repeated sale? And do you not spare a thought for
this—that nobody will ever again willingly have dealings with merchants whose
measures are dishonest?
—Dio Chrysostom, Orationes, 31.37-38

Cohortamur ergo omnium devotionem, ut res constituta ex commodo publico
benignis obsequis et debita religione teneatur, maxime cum eius modi statuto non
civitatibus singulis ac populis adque provinciis, sed universe orbi provisum esse
videatur, in cuius perniciem pauci atmodum desaebisse noscantur, quorum
avaritiam nec prolixitas temporum nec divitiae, quibus studuisse cernuntur,
mitigare aut satiare potuerunt.
Therefore, we urge the loyalty of all people that a matter constituted for the public
good be observed with willing obedience and due care; especially since in such a
statute provision has been made, not for single states and peoples and provinces,
but for the whole world, to whose ruin a few people are known to have raged
excessively, whose avarice neither the extent of time nor the riches for which they
are seen to have striven could lessen or satisfy.
—Edict of Maximum Prices, lines 145-153

More than 200 years separate these texts, yet they both concern the very same
issue: the fraught position of merchants in the Roman world. Merchants, κάπηλοι for Dio,
and the pauci for Diocletian and the Tetrarchs, who elsewhere refer to them as
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venditores,1 are both a problem and a tool. For Dio, merchants are a dishonest and greedy
group, but they are useful for comparison. He clarifies the deceitfulness of the decision of
the Rhodians to re-inscribe statue bases by drawing a parallel to the work of
untrustworthy merchants who cheat in their measures and who seek out profits over
honor. For the Edict, merchants are avaricious, but they are a useful scapegoat. Not only
are merchants and their greed the cause of high prices throughout the Empire, and
consequently the whole world, but they are also the source of a more pernicious moral
degeneracy that threatens the ruin of the Empire.
These kinds of claims about merchants are ubiquitous at every level of the social
spectrum. They are as common in graffiti as they are in legislation, and they reflect a set
of stereotypes that Dio believes to have serious economic consequences, for who would
“ever again have dealings with merchants whose measures are dishonest?” Diocletian and
the Tetrarchs hope to contain merchants, to restrict their dealings and to call upon the
loyalty of citizens to enforce the rule of law and the standards of morality.
But where, in all this, are the merchants themselves? Their voices are absent here,
as they are in so many texts, and their agency, in so far as it is visible at all, is presented
as being essentially detrimental to society. Their choices, and by extension their
existence, make matters worse. Moreover, what do these texts mean by merchants?
Buying and selling, exchange, is central obviously, but what of crafting or laboring,
transporting or serving? The details, as it were, are not essential to these authors’
purposes. Dio seeks to shame the Rhodians by comparing them to those whom they hate
and punish, while the Edict seeks to aggrandize the power of the emperors and lay claim

1

Edict, line 122
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to the absolute influence of the imperial government by placing blame on the shoulders of
merchants whom they elsewhere call hostes,2 enemies of the state itself.
The perspectives offered by these texts can be productively supplemented by
those of merchants, who are hardly silent figures in our extant record, and who did not
accept their role as scapegoats and negative exempla passively. Roman merchants,
moreover, operated not only under the watchful eye of the state and elite authors, but also
under the eyes of their peers and customers. These perspectives are also critical for
understanding of the role of merchants in the social and economic world of the Roman
Empire. Though many of these points of view preserve something of the negative
stereotypes that are central to the passages above, they also leave a record of merchants’
pride in their work, their positive roles in society, and the networks of acquaintance,
friendship, and business that linked merchants inextricably to their communities.
This dissertation seeks to get behind these stereotypical and biased accounts to
analyze the social and economic world of merchants in the later Roman Empire. It
contends that merchants operated in face-to-face communities, and that they leveraged
social capital and status to generate economic opportunities for themselves. Status and
power dynamics arranged all kinds of Roman communities. Social and political structures
gave elites and state officials forms of authority over merchants, but this project will not
assume the absolute primacy of these forces. Rather, it will present the power of the state
and elites as merely one influence on merchant decision making among many others. It
will argue that merchants had agency in and of themselves, and that their will, as
individuals and as collectives, had the power to direct the course of their social and
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economic lives. Further, this project argues that the very phenomenon that Dio describes,
the decision that buyers could make to avoid a merchant who had cheated them before,
was a major influence and institutional limit on the decision-making processes of
merchants, traders, and artisans. Merchants were careful to protect their social standing,
and they acted in full knowledge of the potential consequences of being seen to conform
to the negative stereotypes that circulated about them.

“Law Constituted for the Public Good”: The State and the Roman Economy:
Diocletian and the Tetrarchs claim a great deal in the course of the preface to their
Edict of Maximum Prices. In just the passage above they assert their right to loyalty,
willing obedience, and due care, while elsewhere they profess to be “protectors of the
human race,” and to be the arbiters of what constituted justice.3 They assert all this
through their control of the rule of law, which has long been understood to have been the
exclusive province of Roman emperors. The rhetoric of passages like this one have
encouraged this view, as well as a scholarly preference for texts like the Edict, which
place the Emperor and the Roman state, at least in theory, at the center of the Roman
social, and especially economic, world.4 The law of the Empire, supported by the
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Edict, Preface, Line 25
For the use of the Edict, See: Allen, “How Prosperous Were the Romans? Evidence from Diocletian`s
Price Edict (301 AD).”;Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma, “The Value of Labour: Diocletian’s Prices Edict”;
Wallace, Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian; Frézouls, “Prix, Salaires et Niveaux de Vie:
Quelques Enseignements de l’Edict Du Maximum (I)”; Frézouls, “Prix, Salaires et Niveaux de Vie:
Quelques Enseignements de l’Edict Du Maximum (II).” For the role of the state more generally: Lo Cascio,
“The Role of the State in the Roman Economy: Making Use of the New Institutional Economics”; Lo
Cascio, “The Early Roman Empire: The State and the Economy”; Letki, “The State Factories (Fabricae)
during the Time of Tetrarchy”; Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 B.C.-A.D. 400).”
Pace, Bang, “Trade and Empire”; Broekaert, “Tied Down, Wings Cut? The Relation between the State and
the Navicularii during the Later Roman Empire.”
4
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coercive powers of the state, is often taken, axiomatically, as the force that drove the
economy through state demand and the enforcement of contracts.
This is true of much of both current and historical scholarship on the Roman
economy. Though the roots of this scholarship run deep, through more than a century of
discussion and debate, the work of the last three decades, in particular, has placed the
state and its structures at the very center of the discussion. The historiography of this
approach is complex, but it is worth exploring in detail, the better to understand the
direction that scholarship has taken in recent years and to see how this project will build
upon that work.
The study of the ancient economy is generally traced back to an origin point the
mid-19th century. At that time, debates about the relative primitivism or modernism of the
ancient economy were central and sharply divided the field, which alternately posited the
primacy of the small, self-sufficient, household economy, or that of a vibrant,
interconnected, market economy.5 At the turn of the century, driven especially by the
work of Michael Rostovtzeff, scholars gradually developed a tenuous consensus on a
modernist approach that argued, among other things, that there were clear and explicit
parallels between the ancient and medieval economic worlds.6 The state was already
central in this work, and Rostovtzeff conceived of the Roman government as a motivation
for trade, either through its expansionist tendencies, which brought in wealth through the

These opposing positions are now generally considered to be “upheld” by Finley, The Ancient Economy.,
on the household end of the spectrum, and Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman
Empire., on the market side, though neither is a 19th century contributor. Saller, “Framing the Debate over
Growth in the Ancient Economy.”rightly critiques this and offers a good summary of the earlier literature.
See also Drexhage, Konen, and Ruffing, Die Wirtschaft des Römischen Reiches (1.–3. Jahrhundert), chap.
1 for a good summary of the historiography of the field. Though questions have shifted, we still see strong
proponents of a modernist, market economy, e.g. Temin, The Roman Market Economy.
6
Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire.
5
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acquisition of land and slaves, or through its taxation, which led tax farmers to invest
their profits both domestically and abroad.
Despite the rhetorical force of the modernist position, divisions persisted in the
scholarship, and important work was being done elsewhere in the field, primarily by Max
Weber in the 19th century and Karl Polanyi in the 20th.7 The work of both these authors
suggested the need for greater analysis of the structures of ancient societies in relation to
the economy. Both Weber and Polanyi hoped to shift the debate away from the binary of
primitive or modern, as well as away from the teleologies that those positions both
assumed. Instead, they advocated for analyses that included an understanding of how
status, in Weber’s case, and “embeddedness,” in Polanyi’s, effected the structure of
premodern economies. Neither approach sought to prioritize the state over other
structures, and their positions would be brought to the fore in the influential work of
Moses Finley in the 1970s.
In his Ancient Economy, Finley took the Polanyian notion of an embedded
economy seriously.8 In adopting Polanyi’s perspective, Finley also adopted explicitly
neoclassical economic conceptions of rationalism, and he used these to argue that, at least
as we understand it today, there was no economy in the ancient world, merely a
collection of status-based interactions that necessitated exchanges and the movement of
goods. By Finley’s conception, an economy could not, and did not, exist without an
awareness of that economy. Furthermore, the economy of the ancient world was so
embedded into the social structures of antiquity as to be invisible, even to those carrying

7
8

Weber, Economy and Society; Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man.
Finley, The Ancient Economy.
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out what might be called economic actions. Within the social and cultural context of
antiquity, there was no understanding of economic activity as being different from any
other kind of action, thereby making “economy” a functionally unhelpful analytical
category.
This was a provocative correction to the course of scholarship, and particularly to
the simmering primitivist-modernist debate.9 The Ancient Economy raises points that are
still essential, particularly that the context of the social world can and should change how
we apply our methodological frameworks, and that there is a place for ancient
understandings of the economy in our modern analyses. As we will discuss below, these
points are ones that are essential to the approach of this project, and that are necessary for
the study of Roman merchants in particular.
Nevertheless, the Finleyan premise, that there can be no economy without a
contemporary understanding of economy, did not sit well with the field, nor has this
claim gone unchallenged. The numerous editions of The Ancient Economy, along with
reviews and responses,10 amply demonstrate the struggle that the field has had with
Finley’s contentions. Major, and valid, objections were raised to Finley’s rejection of
archaeological evidence, which demonstrates, in both volume and purpose, that an
economy did exist in the ancient world. Furthermore, critiques were levied by others who
saw in Finley’s work what Ian Morris has called the problem of “oversocialization.”11 By
this reading, which has been adopted by Keith Hopkins, among others, Finley has greatly
See Morris, “Foreword”; Saller, “Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy.” for
assessments of The Ancient Economy’s impact.
10
Reviews: Chambers, “Review of The Ancient Economy”; Pleket, “Review of The Ancient Economy”;
Frederiksen, “Theory, Evidence and the Ancient Economy.” Critical for placing The Ancient Economy in
context is Morris, “Foreword.”
11
Morris, “Foreword,” xxvii–xxix.
9
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underestimated the scale of the economy by focusing too exclusively on the role of
society.
In many ways, the efforts to critique Finley by this line of argument have
developed into the current approach to the study of the ancient economy, and, in
particular the Roman economy.12 Led by Hopkins and his model of the structure of the
Roman imperial economy, and especially of growth in that economy, scholarly debate
has effectively returned to the one of economic performance, the same issue that was an
essential part of the early primitivist-modernist debates.13 Hopkins was eager to develop a
model that, while it aligned with some elements of Finley’s “new orthodoxy,”14 could
also account for economic change over time, most especially the growth and decline seen
in the evidence for the Roman imperial economy. Hopkins’ tool in this effort was a
comprehensive model of the economy that placed the state, its needs and structures, at the
center of economic activity.15 By his understanding, the Roman state was the engine that
drove the economy and motivated economic exchange as small-scale agriculturalists
labored to pay rents and taxes in coined money, which the state then paid to its military,
whose soldiers spent it in local markets, buying produce from small-scale agriculturalists,
and beginning the cycle again.

Morris, xxiv. notes the lack of interest in Finley’s arguments among Greek economic historians. This is a
point of divergence in the historiography of this field, though the field has largely reintegrated through the
adoption of New Institutional Economics in the last few decades.
13
Morris, Saller, and Scheidel, “Introduction,” 5. These debates has also not completely disappeared, not
only do they still simmer beyond much of current scholarship, but they are also still explicitly used, e.g.
Jacobsen, Primitiver Austausch oder freier Markt?
14
Hopkins, “Introduction,” xi.
15
Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 B.C.-A.D. 400)”; also see: Hopkins, “Models,
Ships and Staples.” which addresses some of the initial critiques of the “Taxes and Trade” model.
12
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Scholarly engagement with this model, which has included both elaboration and
attempts to refute it,16 have leaned hard on quantification and especially on fitting
together, or demonstrating the lack of fit between, the evidence and the model. Again,
performance, growth, and particularly the state has been central in these analyses, and,
armed with the underlying assumption that the state drove trade, the field was able to
raise, and offer answers to, important questions about demography, quality of life, and
consumption, among many other issues.17
Simultaneous with this move in the field of the ancient, and specifically Roman,
economic history,18 the methodological approach of New Institutional Economics was
being steadily adopted from the late 1980s on, especially among economic historians of
the Medieval period.19 This social-scientific approach grew out of the work of Douglass
North and Oliver Williamson,20 who saw deficiencies in standard institutional theory, and
particularly felt that it was possible to reconcile traditional institutionalism with
neoclassical economics.21 Like traditional institutionalism, New Institutional Economics
(hereafter NIE) posits the existence of institutions, regularities in exchange that provide
structure and predictability in the marketplace. These institutions limit economic choices
and provide a series of incentives and disincentives for certain behaviors, making some

Saller, “Framing the Debate Over Growth in the Ancient Economy”; Silver, “The Rise, Demise, and
(Partial) Rehabilitation of the Peasant in Hopkins’ Model of Roman Trade and Taxes.” See also Zelener,
“Market Dynamics in Roman North Africa.” for a sample attempt at refutation via specific evidence.
17
Bowman and Wilson, Quantifying the Roman Economy. offers a collection of some of the directions.
See: Wilson and Bowman, Trade, Commerce, and the State in the Roman World. for current bibliography.
18
Morris, Saller, and Scheidel, “Introduction,” 6.
19
Highly visible in e.g. Persson, An Economic History of Europe; Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the
Medieval Mediterranean.
20
Also Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”; Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost.” though Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies. coins the term.
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more costly, either in terms of actual finances or in terms of social status. NIE, however,
differs from traditional institutional economics in its belief that institutions can
complement neoclassical economic theory. Fundamentally, the NIE framework achieves
this reconciliation by offering an explanation of why rational economic agents do not
always seek to maximize their profit. It contends that sometimes it is more attractive for
economic actors to accept less profit in exchange for security or predictability.
Yet, institutions require enforcement methods, which are generally understood to
be either the state and its laws or more abstract social norms and conventions. The
former, the state and legal regulation, aligned well with the research interests of Roman
economic historians, and NIE began to find its way into work on the Roman world in the
1990s and early 2000s.22 This has continued in recent years with the incorporation of NIE
into major works such as the Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World.23
These works continue to prioritize the power of the state and its laws to limit economic
choices and provide structures. They seek to determine whether law and other institutions
fostered or inhibited economic growth, and whether those institutions led to a more
equitable distribution of wealth or concentrated it more intensely in the hands of a few.
Essentially, they seek to answer questions about what these institutions did, and who
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benefited from them, working from the assumption that they did something and benefited
someone.24
Even as scholarship on the ancient economy develops new models, moving away
from Hopkins,25 it continues to present the state, the power of emperors like Diocletian
and the force of his laws, as the impetus behind the economy. This has become
foundational to the field, to the extent that its fundamental assumptions have found their
way into the majority of literature, not only on the subject of the economy itself, but also
into the scholarship on Roman merchants, a traditionally small, but recently growing subfield of primarily social history. Here, legal status, imposed by the state onto merchant
populations, has generally been taken as an essential feature. It is visible as early as John
D’Arms, whose Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome, is, in many ways, the
genesis moment for the study of the social lives of merchants.26 In D’Arms, legal status is
the primary metric for determining which people are able to engage in trade, and under
what circumstances. The law of Rome did not permit senators to trade directly, which
was a catalyst for agent-based trading on their behalf,27 especially by freedmen, whose
own legal status of dependency on their former masters structured their economic, as well
as their social, lives.
Though scholarship on merchants did not expand greatly following the work of
D’Arms, the same frameworks of legal status were still apparent in the resurgence of
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interest in tradesmen that grew in the 1990s and the 2000s.28 These works, discussed
more fully below, were interested primarily in collegia and other kinds of trade-related
associations. Legal status was often central to these discussions, and most made some
mention of how the state attempted, or at least wished to, regulate these collectives.29
Some in this period dealt more specifically with single merchants, or merchants without
ties to collegia. Joshel, for example, placed emphasis on legal status, and particularly
servitude or freed-status, and the impact that this had on society and economic activity.30
This work was part of a trend to redress a scholarly gap in dealing with marginal actors in
the economy,31 and especially women, slaves, and freedmen, whose legal status restricted
their economic opportunities, and who had not been thoroughly studied prior to Joshel
and others.
While the field’s interest in these topics has waned somewhat in recent years, the
2010s have brought forth several monographs dealing directly with, or implicitly
featuring, the role of the state in the social lives of merchants. Sarah Bond’s Trade and
Taboo, in particular, has considered how the extant laws affected the social and economic
choices of merchants, beyond the status of freedom or servitude, and connected many of
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the points made in the economic literature to the social worlds of those who practiced
“disreputable” professions, and were legally restricted in a variety of ways.32
These works have been essential to the development of this project, yet, as Miko
Flohr recently put it in his The World of the Fullo:
“it may be suggested that, in many respects, the differences between slaves,
freedmen, and freeborn fullers in the practical autonomy they enjoyed on the shop
floor may have been relatively limited. In other words, in discussing dependency
and autonomy… the legal status of fullones in itself is not necessarily of key
relevance.”33
This conclusion flies in the face of much of the historiography of the Roman economy
and its actors, but, while it only refers to the experience of a single group of
professionals, it does seem to touch on something that is present in our evidence, namely
that the sources of traditional authority, and especially the state, were often not able to
exert their will exactly or evenly. In some cases, as with Flohr’s fullones, merchants were
able to ignore issues of legal status or authority, and operated primarily among
themselves, according to their own metrics of social and economic status.34 At other
times, merchants actively resisted pressure put on them from these sources, while at still
other times, they were willing to negotiate. They did so particularly with the state, which,
despite its claims to power, was dependent on merchant labor to transport grain to Rome,
among many other kinds of vital supplying. Whatever their approach, merchants, either
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individually or as a collective, retained agency, and were hardly novices at working their
way through, around, and under the radar of state systems.35
The negotiation between the state and its laws, on the one hand, and the agency of
both citizens, in general, and economic actors, in particular, on the other hand, is an issue
that has not, thus far, been central to the work of scholars of the Roman economy.36
There is, however, room to accommodate this in our understanding, provided we begin to
shift our attention away from the only merchants who have commonly appeared in this
literature. In the work of historians of the Roman economy, merchants have generally
appeared in one of two major ways: either as agents of the state’s will, who were locked
into contracts that determined all their economic choices, or as petty traders whose
economic activities were so limited as to be invisible in our source material.37 In both
approaches, the agency of merchants remains as invisible as it is in the passages of Dio
and Diocletian, and it is commonly only a limited set of merchants—those who were
involved in state-employed, long-distance, and large-scale trade—who make any
appearance in this scholarship at all.
This is a direct consequence of the visibility of such merchants in our sources.
These merchants were the ones who were the most likely to utilize state structures, and
thus appear within state generated documents. They were also more likely to be wealthy,
and thereby possess the means to promote themselves in lasting ways, to build
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monuments and set up inscriptions. This has justified their prioritization, and somewhat
circularly defended the argument that Roman merchants operated under a state that
controlled merchants. However, there are serious reasons to doubt the typicality of such
individuals. In fact, this challenge has been raised in recent years in the monumental
work of Horden and Purcell.38 Their Corrupting Sea draws from a different strand in
economic literature, explicitly following the Annales School in its adoption of a longue
durée vision of Mediterranean social, environmental, and economic history. Their work
has called for a greater emphasis on the small-scale trader, who operated without
substantial intervention from the state and whose considerations were essentially those of
immediate economic need, the mitigation of risk, and, most critically for this project and
its aims, the development and maintenance of social status.
To access the social and economic lives of merchants of this kind, we must ask
different questions of our sources and develop an approach that does not give immediate
priority to the state and its institutions above those of the community and its social norms.
Rather than continuing to argue for the primacy of the state in economic activity, we must
start from the merchants themselves, and ask questions about what the world looked like
from their perspective, rather than from above or even below.

“Merchants Whose Measures Are Dishonest”: The Social World of Roman
Merchants:
As the discussion above has suggested, the state and its institutions have become
central to the way in which the Roman economy is discussed. Though this approach has
prioritized some evidence that need not be taken as typical and led to some conclusions
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that overrepresent a portion of the economic picture, there is room to correct course
within the current approaches. In particular, as has been noted in some of the most recent
work on merchants and trade,39 there is great potential within the framework of NIE.
Though this methodology has been used to prioritize the state, it need not be utilized in
that way. In fact, a small contingent of recent work has risen to this challenge,
considering how trade was conducted in a world of imperfect information under a state
that often exercised only imperfect control.40
NIE, as it has been both developed and most commonly applied, relies upon the
notion of institutions that regulate economic behaviors and incentivize certain choices,
while making others less attractive. This regulation and series of incentives is generally
taken to require enforcement from a force external to the economic actor. As North has
put it:
“[institutions] entail enforcement either of the self-enforcing variety, through
codes of behavior, or by third party policing and monitoring. Because ultimately a
third party must always involve the state as the source of coercion, a theory of
institutions also inevitably involves an analysis of the political structure of a
society and the degree to which that political structure provides a framework of
effective enforcement.”41
As can be seen in this extract, North, automatically assumes that it must be the state and
its powers of coercion that will enforce institutions. Yet, before he dives into this
approach, he acknowledges the possibility of what he calls self-enforcing institutions,
motivated by codes of behavior.
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This is the dynamic at play in Dio’s admonishment of the Rhodians. Dio notes
that basic codes of economic behavior, in fact the same kind of economic rationalism that
forms part of the foundation of NIE itself, will compel a buyer to avoid a merchant who
has cheated them in the past. The state does not compel this action, nor does it encourage
the natural inverse, where a merchant would choose not to use dishonest measures, even
if such an action would increase his or her profits, out of fear of being caught and
exposed and/or in the hope of securing business in the long-run. The motivation, the
enforcement, to borrow North’s terminology, is self-generated by economic actors, both
buyer and seller, who understand the social and economic conventions that govern this
interaction. While the state might offer a standard measure, or even, at times, employ
officials to check measures in the marketplace, it was not a matter of enforcement or
coercion that most powerfully dictated the course of the exchange and future exchanges,
but social pressure not to appear dishonest or to allow oneself to be duped by returning to
a dishonest seller.
North, and by extension NIE, call these kinds of institutions self-enforcing, as
they assume that the rational actor will choose to obey them him- or herself. However, in
what follows we will call institutions that relied on social norms “informal.”42 This
terminology allows us to avoid the messy issue that North’s “self-enforcing” implies,
namely that social pressure was always an internal force, one which the actor felt and
chose to obey of his own free will. This point of view creates a binary, with “self” on one
side and a “third-party” on the other. North’s “third-party” is always the state, but in the
ancient world, the third party might be a number of different people or groups whose
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judgment put institutional pressure on a merchant, despite the fact that they lacked the
authority of the state. The label of “informal” offers more flexibility in considering how
institutions might function and who might wield them.
Furthermore, this phrasing is intended to juxtapose these institutions with the
“formal” institutions of the state, and particularly law, but to create, not a binary, but a
spectrum along which we may plot many different kinds of institutions. This will enable
our analysis to proceed without the presupposition of the primacy of formal institutions,
but rather to place formal institutions into dialogue with more informal ones, and to see
which institutions acted as a limit on merchant choices, when and in what contexts. This
broadens our possibilities for investigation, and greatly enhances the utility of NIE for the
study of the ancient world, where we can see evidence of a wide range of possible
institutions but do not always have an equally powerful state.
In pursuit of this goal, this dissertation builds on scholarship that has developed
from the study of Roman voluntary associations, and particularly of collegia. Like
Roman economic history, this field has a long historiographical tradition, dating back into
the 19th century,43 but it is one that has experienced radical shifts since the 1990s. The
most influential voice in the field has been that of Onno van Nijf, whose Civic World of
Professional Associations in the Roman East paved the way for a thorough
reconsideration of the social role that voluntary associations played.44 Van Nijf’s major
contribution was the redirection of the field away from the study of the formal structures
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within, and the distinctions between, various types of associations, and toward an
understanding that collegia, and their parallel, but differently named counterparts, served
a variety of purposes simultaneously. Van Nijf argued persuasively for the necessary
interconnectedness of religious, social, and economic purposes in associations, and for
avoiding approaches that attempt to disentangle these threads.
The effect of this monograph was an explosion of output in this field that has
spread out in numerous productive directions. Scholars have incorporated van Nijf’s
position to consider how social and economic activities affected religious organizations,
and may have made them more appealing to prospective members.45 Others have looked
at sub-groups within associations, considering the role of family or apprenticeship
networks within and across collegia,46 while others have looked at the social and
economic implications of activities that associations were commonly known to indulge
in, such as feasting.47 General accounts of various kinds of associations now approach the
issue in the way that van Nijf has proposed,48 leading to several recent contributions that
have greatly advanced even this productive scholarship by adding in consideration of
institutional limits within associations that restricted social and economic actions.49
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These works have undertaken two lines of argument that are essential to this
project. First, they have started their inquiries asking questions about merchants from a
peer-to-peer perspective. While they have noted the subtle shifts of power and influence
within the groups they have studied, they have approached their subjects with the
assumption that it is possible to learn something about merchants from the context of
merchants acting with and among a group of colleagues, families, neighbors, and friends.
From this point of view, it is possible to determine the extent to which the state and
forces outside of the merchant community affected those within it. While this project will
demonstrate the fundamental interconnectedness of Roman economic actors and their
wider communities, it will adopt this approach as a means of getting behind the
stereotypes that circulated about merchants.
Secondly, these works have also adopted a form of NIE methodology that closely
aligns with the model of informal-formal institutions outlined above.50 They have
considered how informal, social institutions, like honor and shame, limited merchant
choices, particularly in the setting of associations. They have been concerned with how
merchant groups enforced certain codes of conduct and prevented members from
undertaking certain anti-social behaviors that threatened group unity.51 The enforcement
methods of groups represent a kind of midpoint in the spectrum of institutional formality,
where the group possessed powers of coercion, free of the state and generated by peers
for peers. Their institutions may be recorded in various ways, and clear punishments may
be outlined, but, beyond that pseudo-legal formality lay the social pressures of
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maintaining status and respect among one’s colleagues as well as developing a reputation
within the community that would be economically useful both within and outside its
confines. The arguments of this scholarship, most recently and persuasively considered
by Cameron Hawkins for the urban merchants of Rome and Philip Venticinque for
Egyptian guilds, have opened up new possibilities for applying these approaches even
beyond the realm of associations.
Similarly, these methods can also be applied to merchants who operated outside
of collegia. Once again, we can see the validity of this course of investigation in Dio’s
words to the Rhodians. He fears they will gain a reputation of “being a villain,”
πανουργεῖν, and that this will hurt them in the future by eroding the trust that men put in
the sincerity of the city’s praise. He expects them to feel shame for their actions, and,
anticipates that they will alter their current course of action to save their good name. Dio
compares the Rhodians to merchants, and we may assume that he would chasten the
dishonest merchant in much the same way: in cheating in their measures, they would gain
a reputation for dishonesty, and with a reputation for dishonesty, no merchant could
expect to be successful in his business, for who would return to a merchant who cheated
in their measures?
Hawkins has already argued for the importance of reputation among members of
professional associations,52 but Dio’s comments do not explicitly or implicitly imagine a
merchant in one of these groups. Rather, Dio supposes a lone merchant, acting in the
marketplace, who nevertheless might be undone by his reputation for dishonesty.
Reputation was a powerful institution within the Roman context, and it was one that was
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understood to be particularly important for merchants. For this dissertation, reputation is
an invaluable entry point into the social and economic lives of merchants, for
understanding how an informal institution could exert pressure on retailers, transporters,
artisans, and service providers, and shape the economic landscape at every social and
economic level.

“The Very Nature of their Business”: Merchants in the Later Roman Empire:
In approaching merchants in the Roman Empire, it is important to establish
parameters for definition, scope, and evidence. This is especially true in a project that
does not intend to utilize structures or categories provided by the Roman state as its
starting point. Yet, even if its intent were to do so, the law of the Roman Empire does not
provide a clear delineation of what constituted a merchant, and what did not. The Prices
Edict, as an example, describes merchants as venditores, literally sellers, but immediately
follows that label with emptores, buyers, by which the Edict seems to mean trading
middlemen, rather than actual consumers.53 Already this complicates matters,54 and the
situation grows no clearer within the long lists of the Prices Edict, which include
references to the buying and selling, not only of goods, but also of labor and services,
performed by artisans and craftsmen, as well as specialists in writing or instruction.55 The
Edict is more comprehensive than most other Roman legislation, and it is hesitant to limit
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itself to the restriction of any single kind of merchant, or to define that category for itself
or others.
This dissertation will take a broad definition of “merchant,” not through any
confusion over what constituted one, but from a desire to include the great variety of
activities that rightfully belong in this category. In what follows, a merchant will be
defined as “one who creates a moment of exchange.” This definition includes anyone
who, as a whole or even a part of their livelihood, sold some kind of goods or service.
Thus, this dissertation will, at times, consider the social and economic lives of everyone
from small-scale agriculturalists, marketing their excess produce or selling their labor, to
large-scale shipping magnates, hauling thousands of measures of grain across the
Mediterranean or beyond. Within the category of merchant will be those who produce
and sell crafts of various kinds, those who transport the products of others, exchanging
primarily with wholesalers and retailers, and those who provided services, such as
changing money, or sold their skills such as writing or legal knowledge. It includes both
those with a definable profession that seems to have been theirs for a lifetime, as well as
those whose work was variable, seasonal, or otherwise contingent upon specific
circumstances.
This definition, “one who creates a moment of exchange,” is intended to cover
those who bartered their goods or services, as well as those who used money, and it
encompasses all those who traded commercially, whether occasionally, periodically, or
regularly. The flexibility inherent in this definition is designed to expand our view to the
maximum, including anyone who needed to make any one of a shared set of common
economic choices, such as when to go to market, what price to charge for goods or labor,
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with whom to trade and under what circumstances. These choices presented challenges,
but they were challenges faced by all merchants. Some were better equipped than others
to meet them, possessing more material security or better information, but, being faced
with the same struggles, the same institutional limits, it is the contention of this
dissertation that they developed similar strategies to lead successful, or at least
economically viable, lives.
This definition is, intentionally, maximal in its scope. It has intended to capture
producers of non-agricultural goods, service providers, retailers and wholesalers, who are
a motley assortment of figures. The borders around them may be somewhat permeable, in
that it is easy for a buyer in one context to turn around and become a seller in another. A
consumer quickly becomes a retailer if there is sufficient incentive to sell something they
have, but this role can be evanescent, and they can easily slip back out of it. Middlemen
traders constantly occupy a role as both buyer and seller simultaneously, shattering any
imagined binary between the two. Yet merchants are connected by the shared moment of
exchange, where they become active figures, offering, cajoling, bartering, and selling.
This moment requires that they adopt a set of strategies, either practiced with constant
use or learned by observation from the other side of the exchange, to resolve the
challenges mentioned above. The moment of exchange is not linked to specific
circumstances of time or place but can happen casually or within highly formal and
structured contexts, at a taberna over drinks or in a contract with the state, but all share
some essential concerns and some plausible strategies.
Yet this dissertation takes not just those who initiated economic exchange as its
subject, but specifically those who did so within the confines of what this project calls
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“the later Roman Empire.”56 These qualifiers set both chronological and geographical
limits to this work that have important ramifications for both the source material used and
the conclusions that this dissertation will reach. This dissertation considers the years 100
to 400 CE. The boundaries of this period are somewhat flexible to accommodate a few
exceptional sources of evidence,57 but in the main, the focus is placed on merchants in the
2nd through the 4th centuries CE. These centuries have been, historically, considered to be
a period of great transition. Politically, the period spans the shift from the Principate to
the Dominate, including the political upheavals traditionally known as the “crisis of the
third century.”58 In terms of religion, this period oversaw not only the rise of Christianity,
but also its adoption as a state-sponsored faith. Among both social and economic
historians, it is commonplace to argue that that major changes were taking place in this
period, visible in signs such as the dramatic debasement of Roman coinage,59 changes to
the taxation system,60 the threat and actualization of foreign invasions recorded in the
dwindling numbers of literary records,61 and major shifts in the archaeological record,
including fortification and retrenchment.62
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While this project does not intend to engage in the debate surrounding these
changes and what they might mean for Roman social and economic life, it does
intentionally straddle this period with the underlying intention of determining if there
were any substantial changes in merchant experiences or strategies as a consequence of
these shifts, and particularly in light of market volatility, which is commonly seen as a
feature of the economy of the Roman Empire.63 It finds, on the whole, a high level of
continuity in merchant self-presentation across this period, as well as a set of strategies
that merchants seem to have used even beyond these chronological bounds. While the
political, social, and economic contexts of other periods are undoubtedly as important to
merchants in those times as those same factors are to traders in the Roman Empire,
preliminary soundings into earlier and later periods have suggested that merchants had
long faced, and continued to face for centuries after, similar kinds of challenges.
Consequently, it is possible that they would responded to those challenges in similar
ways. Though beyond the scope of this project, the work of this dissertation suggests that
its principal conclusions could have relevance for the study of merchants both before and
after the later Empire.
The Empire itself forms the geographical extent of this project. Earlier scholarship
on merchants has generally restricted its inquiries to a specific geographical area, most
often some part of Italy, but occasionally Egypt.64 There are rich concentrations of
sources in these places, but the similar conclusions reached by these studies make it
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apparent that the experiences of merchants in these places, their challenges and strategies,
were largely congruent with one another. While merchants might trade in different goods
or be visible to us through different kinds of evidence, it seems that they were subject to
similar institutional limits and developed similar methods, despite the distances that
separated them.
Thus, the merchants of the entire Roman Empire are subjected to analysis in this
dissertation. Consideration has been made throughout for potential variations that might
have occurred based on region or on factors such as urban or rural settings, but this
dissertation will argue that, on the whole, the experiences of merchants were more
influenced by the extent and influence of their social network than they were by the place
they lived in. Not only has this project found that potentially untypical regions, such as
Roman Egypt, provide evidence for merchants operating under fundamentally similar
sets of challenges and adopting parallel strategies to their peers across the Empire, but
evidence from the corpus of late antique Jewish texts, compiled in Palestine, Egypt, and
Babylon, has also suggested that the boundaries of the Roman Empire may draw artificial
lines around the experience of ancient merchants, broadly understood. Thus, while this
dissertation limits itself to evidence from within the territorial confines of the Empire,
this project has opened up potential avenues for approaching the ancient world,
understood more broadly.
These temporal and geographical bounds place constraints on the evidence
available for consideration, and the extracts of Dio and the Prices Edict with which we
began this introduction demonstrate some of the challenges that the source material poses
for our study. While we are provided with a wealth of sources both created by and clearly
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about merchants, we lack a full narrative of a merchant’s social or economic life that we
may take as a prototypical, or even a test, case. The evidence we do have comes to us in a
variety of ways, through many different types of media and accidents of preservation.
Each type of evidence, as well as each individual text or object, comes with interpretative
challenges and unique biases, but simultaneously offers us different perspectives that
greatly enhance our understanding of the central challenge: understanding merchant
activity and its reception. These sources, which range in material from archaeological
sites to papyri, from literary texts to stone reliefs, from wall-paintings to inscriptions,
allow us to reconstruct what merchants were doing, along with some of the reasons why.
Each of these types of evidence comes with different interpretative challenges and
limitations. Texts and material culture require different approaches that take into
consideration not only the circumstances and motivations surrounding their creation, but
also the history of their preservation or recovery. It is worth noting some of these
challenges here, though these issues are addressed throughout the project. First, the
literary texts analyzed in this dissertation come from a broad range of contexts and
genres, including orations, novels, letters, and theological texts. Each of these categories,
along with others, are driven by the needs of their authors and fit into constraints
proscribed by the audience’s expectations. These expectations allow us, in some cases, to
take anecdotal evidence pertaining to merchants from works of fiction, especially when
the anecdote refers to merchant activity in passing, rather than as part of the main
narrative of the text, which is more likely to be presented in humorous, satirical, or
hyperbolic ways. When merchants are found at the fringes of such texts, they are more
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likely to reflect a plausible world that helped the audience to suspend their disbelief.65 In
other texts, the challenge is more often assessing the author’s rhetorical intentions to
determine where merchants fit into largely arguments or discussions. This is especially
true of anecdotes from orations and from theological texts, where merchants are seldom
central, but are commonly presented as examples to further the author’s argumentative
point. These are often stereotypical, and their similarities to other texts allows us to locate
their perspective and understand how this view of merchants developed.
Second, papyri and inscriptions offer us access to a different set of authorial
voices but come accompanied by different challenges. The most obvious of these is the
tendency toward fragmentation and lacunae. Partial records pose a challenge to
interpretation, and it has been necessary, throughout this project, to either rely on or
challenge the interpretations of the textual editors. Both papyri and inscriptions also come
with material considerations. Beyond a text, which is accompanied by its manuscript
tradition, papyri and inscriptions may be tied to a specific geographical context. Ideally,
this context is archaeological and systematic, but preservation is not always so clear.
Many inscriptions come without such information, making it difficult to tie their content
to a particular place and time.
This remains true of the material evidence used in this dissertation, our final
category. This is broadly taken here to include monuments, vessels, wall-paintings,
buildings, and mosaics, all of which are similarly tied to an archaeological context in an
ideal world. These contexts allow us to place merchants, or their goods, in specific places

As argued in Millar, “The World of the Golden Ass”; Verboven, “A Funny Thing Happened on My Way
to the Market: Reading Petronius to Write Economic History.”
65

30
and to say something about the material that supported (or gave lie to) the claims they
made about their personal prosperity. Without these contexts, we rely on what we can
glean of the choices merchants made in selecting particular images or objects to represent
them or serve their needs. This is a subjective process that requires significant work to
place objects alongside valid comparanda for which we have more information.
All these types of evidence, as well as the forms of self-presentation that they
represent are, of necessity, locked into their specific and limited temporal and geographic
contexts, and these are critical to our readings, even if we do not have all the details for a
particular case. Few sites offer a broad enough sampling of evidence to permit us to make
generalizing statements about merchants as a group, either by our definition,66 or by
contemporary understandings. The few places that deviate from this, sites with
remarkable preservation such as Pompeii or the detailed records that have been found in
Egypt, have been regularly presented as, at least potentially, atypical of social and
economic life in the broader Roman world. Whether our evidence comes from these
places, or from elsewhere, most often it illuminates the actions or character of a single
merchant at a single point in his or her life. Commonly, the evidence leaves us without
recourse even to further details about that life, let alone a broader understanding about
Roman merchants.
Nevertheless, these disparate attestations do offer some cases that seem to be
parallel and provide some hope that we can extrapolate from their unique details to a
more general set of circumstances and approaches. Lest we succumb to wishful thinking,
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it is critical to establish a set of plausible options for Roman merchants in their social and
economic lives, and to present the specific actions of individuals as, in all probability,
common strategies adopted by merchants among a much broader set of possibilities.
These strategies are selectively, not comprehensively, addressed in this dissertation so
that we may delve deeply into those which are best attested to assess the extent to which
those strategies were the most commonly adopted.
Since, theoretically, a merchant might choose to do anything in response to a
given situation, it is important to establish where the bounds of possibility lay in Roman
social and economic activities. In part, this dissertation approaches this challenge through
the collection of a wide variety of evidence, from which it is possible to extract similar
strategies, but this project also relies on a careful examination of merchant anxieties to
help delineate the possible and the impossible. Sources that betray the worries of
merchants can demonstrate for us where the lines fell between typical actions, those that
were unusual but acceptable, and therefore risky, and those which transgressed major
social norms. In some cases, it is not merchants, but elite authors, like Dio or Diocletian,
who seem to be attempting to set up the boundaries that would limit merchant choice, and
we must question the extent to which their perspective was able to shape the norms of a
social and economic group to which they did not belong. Their anxieties developed for
different reasons than those of merchants but may have been felt within merchant
communities through structures of patronage or local administration.
In some cases, we may triangulate these perspectives with merchant anxieties, as
well as with the informal and formal limits suggested by NIE, thereby bridging gaps
between the social worlds of elite authors and the experiences of merchants, artisans, and
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tradesmen. In other cases, we can occasionally supplement our understanding with
recourse to more general statements from Roman popular culture: the record of graffiti,
educational material, books of common sayings, and even anecdotes drawn from novels
and drama. These sources offer us a context from which we may determine actions that
may have transgressed, and those which seem to fit into societal expectations.
Much of the time, the texts do not align neatly, thereby offering us a window into
the broader set of possibilities available to merchants, or to instances where merchants
faced remarkable, or even unique, challenges. These cases are among the most
fascinating and generate the most potential for future work. Parallels in texts lead us
toward a model of the optimal career for a Roman merchant, the one that made the best
use of social norms and social capital to maximize profit and economic success, but
discontinuities rightly remind us of the diversity of merchant experience and of the
creative problem-solving strategies that were necessary throughout the social and
economic lives of Roman merchants.

Chapters:
In structure, the dissertation falls into two complementary halves. In the first half,
as a means of addressing the current scholarship on the Roman economy and the role of
merchants within that economy, the relationship between the Roman state and merchant
actors is put to the fore. The fundamental questions of these chapters are: did state, or
formal, institutions place limits on merchant life in the later Empire, and, if so, to what
extent, under what circumstances, and how? Variations on these questions have been
posed by others, but have rarely been addressed from a point of neutrality, asking if they
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did exist or occur, but, rather, have been drawn from the assumption that they did, with
the only major dispute being “by which mechanism(s)?”
From this perspective, it is possible to examine state and formal institutions and to
determine the true limits of their efficacy, and, critically, their intentionality. The first
chapter begins this process by addressing the notion of a “strong state” in the later
Empire, through the lens of a set of legislation that has been interpreted as the systematic
regulation of merchant ship captains by the state. As legislation is commonly presented as
the means through which the state limited economic choices and activity, it is critical that
this class of evidence be examined on its own terms. The chapter deconstructs the notion
of systematic legislation preserved in and through the compilation of the Theodosian
Code, and thus dismantles the idea that the state intended, or was able, to bind ship
captains to hereditary service to the Roman annona.67 Rather, the chapter reveals that,
through at least the 4th century CE, merchants retained significant agency in their
relationship with the state and worked for the annona by choice. They did so on their
own terms because of the specific privileges that that work granted them, and even
worked to defend their privileges from others who sought to usurp them.
The second chapter looks more closely at intentionality in state economic activity
using a case study on price fixing in the later Roman Empire. By looking at the
legislation surrounding prices, and the reactions to those laws from state officials,
contemporary historians, and hostile witnesses, it is possible to reconstruct the
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circumstances in which the laws were issued, and how they were both received and
implemented. Looking, in particular, at the Edict of Maximum Prices, we can see how the
law was not necessarily designed to be the optimal means of resolving the pressing issue
of inflation, but rather how its rhetoric was intended to present the role of the emperor as
a benevolent protector. These laws, as well as others before and after the Tetrarchy,
promulgate an idea of the emperor as a guardian not just of the Empire’s prosperity and
security, but of its moral well-being. Merchants are an essential tool in conveying that
message, as they were used as a scapegoat for both economic instability and moral
degeneracy. Blaming merchants, and especially their greedy nature, was already an
essential part of Roman culture, and greed was a particularly common accusation.
Yet, as the case of the Edict of Maximum prices shows, this rhetorical position,
with the emperor stationed as the protector of the people against the threat of greedy
traders, was only as powerful as the intermediaries who passed it along and the audiences
that received it. The evidence demonstrates that many provincial governors neglected to
transmit the full intentions of legislation, sticking to the main provisions without copying
out the justifications, which hindered imperial will being fully communicated. In the
unusual cases where these justifications did reach the population, the claims made did not
go uncontested. Particularly in the 4th century, hostile, Christian authors strongly
contested imperial claims to goodness, and they broadcast their doubts to their
congregations and beyond.
The problem of transmission of imperial intentions is elaborated upon in the third
chapter, when the focus turns to local law and its enforcement. In particular, this chapter
addresses the position of merchants vis-à-vis the state through a close examination of the
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law and practices around customs and tolls. As merchants traveled with goods to sell,
they crossed numerous borders and encountered specific, hyper-local laws that regulated
the cost of their transit. These laws do not immediately align with imperial laws on these
matters and suggest that the legal landscape of the Roman Empire was a pluralistic one,
where practice thoroughly trumped any theoretical imperial will.
These local laws were established and enforced by officials who operated within
small communities, and whose influence was stronger, within that limited sphere, than
that of the distant imperial state. These local officials were the face of the state for the
merchants who worked in the area, and the relationship between customs officers and
traders was hardly an impersonal one. Whether the interactions took on a friendly cast, as
is suggested in some of the sources, or were hostile and predatory, as is evident in other
cases, it is clear from our evidence that it was through the development and improvement
of these ties that many merchants were able to make their living.
While the power dynamics between officials and merchants established
boundaries that limited certain merchant behaviors, the need to establish positive
relationships was not exclusive to merchants approaching the customs house. In fact, the
authority held by officials may well have been less influential on merchants than that
exerted by local elites, who appear even in Roman legal documents as individuals who
attempted to circumvent state prohibitions by exercising their power at local and regional
levels. Patrons of this kind would have been useful to merchants, as they could assist
their navigation of state systems, as well as bolstering their position within the local
community. Though these ties required social and economic services, they may have
generated more income and security than they cost.
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Nevertheless, this view continues to perpetuate top-down models that are not
necessarily accurate reflections of the experiences of Roman merchants. As our evidence
demonstrates, even without such local elites, merchants needed to secure positive
relationships with a wide range of peers, competitors, and customers. These connections
could be and were developed without the influence of state or elite powers, as merchants
moved through, as well as lived and worked in, communities in the Mediterranean world.
Neighbors, friends, business partners, and family all exerted influence on merchants and
constituted a major portion of their social worlds. Merchants considered how their actions
would affect those around them, and how their behaviors would be interpreted by them.
Social status within small, interpersonal communities was often a central concern for
traders who sought to secure economic advantages in the long- and short-term.
In the second half of this dissertation, the social and economic influence of
informal institutions becomes the focus, and the social and economic landscape is
analyzed without placing the state at a position of central influence on merchant
strategies. Informal institutions created significant structures for economic activity,
whether or not that activity involved the state, and constrained the choices available to
merchants. Due to the great number of potentially crucial institutions, some of which
have been considered by other scholars already, the second half of this dissertation takes
the institution of reputation as its focus. Reputation is an institution that limited merchant
choices in both the short- and long-term. It is one that actively engaged the community as
judges of words and actions, as well as as transmitters of information about those
behaviors. As a result, reputation is an institution that requires an audience, and the larger
the audience, the more pronounced that reputation can be. To have no reputation is to be
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a friendless stranger, whereas to have a well-known reputation implies either fame or
notoriety, but always suggests a robust, if not necessarily friendly, social circle.
Within the Roman world, reputation was recognized as a powerful institution. Not
only do merchants, and others, commonly refer to their hope that they will have a good
and lasting reputation, but, by utilizing references to reputation in popular and
educational media from the Roman world, it is possible to demonstrate that reputation
was considered an essential tool, especially in economic circumstances. A good
reputation was understood to have concrete financial benefits, while a bad reputation
could severely restrict economic opportunities.
Chapter four analyzes the reputation strategies of individual merchants to assess
which they chose to use, and what essential facets of their character they hoped to
transmit and preserve. The latter is important, because much of our evidence for the
reputation of Roman merchants is found in funerary contexts, where it is posthumous
reputation that is preserved. Rather than generating a reputation for the deceased, these
attestations, mainly funerary reliefs and inscriptions, present the summary of a
merchant’s life, including the features that they or their heirs felt were the most vital.
Many of the inscriptions stress two elements in particular: first, the position of the
deceased as an important contributor to his or her community. Though that community
may be the family of the deceased or a wider collection of friends, neighbors, and peers,
it is common for merchants to make an attempt to locate their lives within a larger social
circle in their funerary monuments. Second, major emphasis is placed on the moral
goodness of their characters. Honesty and trust are traits that are particularly common,
not only because they were useful characteristics for traders, but also because they were a
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response to a specific set of accusations that were commonly leveled against merchants in
Roman society. Both of these elements are strong indicators of the posthumous
reputations that merchants hoped to preserve. In relation to both their personal and
business reputation, merchants endeavored to show that they were neither isolated nor
morally flawed. This preserved a positive vision of themselves that, whether or not it
helped their heirs in continuing their business, nevertheless allows us to trace continuities
in self-representation from our more limited corpus of evidence for living reputation.
Though this body of data is sparser, the chapter examines several useful examples
that show merchants using similar techniques in their lifetimes as in their funerary
monuments. One feature shared by both living and posthumous reputation strategies is an
emphasis on place. Place is an essential tool for merchants as it both generates a
community for the merchant, their neighbors in that space, and is a means for preserving
memory once a merchant has died. Space, particularly as part of a landscape, analyzed in
this chapter through the theoretical lens of Lefebvre’s “representational space,” retains
associations in the minds of those who move through it and live in it.68 Roman merchants
knew this by experience, and ultimately harnessed it as a means of describing their
reputation. By connecting themselves to a particular place they adopted its associations
and meanings and availed themselves of the memories of those who lived there, turning
those people into evidence for their good reputation.
The fifth chapter moves from individual merchants to consider groups of
merchants and the strategies that they adopted when acting collectively. This transition
permits us to see how extra resources could affect reputation strategies, and how group
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dynamics influenced merchant decision making. Groups were usually committed to the
achievement of some common goal or set of goals. Among Roman merchants, this often
combined the development of social ties with the creation of economic opportunities and
is often visible through donations to the community made by the group.
These projects not only reveal how merchants collaborated, but also how they
responded to the stereotypes that circulated about them. In the Roman world, these
stereotypes circulated at numerous levels of society, and, by the imperial period, they had
taken on a fixed shape that cast merchants as dishonest opportunists who took advantage
of their customers, their communities, and each other. This perspective requires
significant cognitive dissonance, as merchants were both an abstract “group” that the
community could stereotype and specific individuals with personalities that neighbors,
friends, kinsmen, and even acquaintances knew. While the generic merchant might be
greedy and antisocial, the specific merchant was likely to be a friend or colleague, a
familiar face and a useful contributor to society.
In their reputation strategies merchant groups sought to differentiate themselves
from these stereotypes, presenting themselves as exceptions to the rule by displaying
their public mindedness, their responsibility and trustworthiness within the community of
merchants, as well as by advertising the well-regulated groups to which they belonged.
These groups made their rules a matter of public record and used them to protect the
reputation of the group against any embarrassment or betrayal by individual members. As
the chapter concludes, groups not only provided opportunities for merchants to engage in
reputation strategies that they could not afford or display on their own, groups also had
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their own reputations that were protected by placing institutional limits on the choices of
their members, who obeyed its rules in order to secure the benefits of membership.
In the sixth and final chapter, attention is turned to the dissemination of
reputation. Though this matter is discussed, indirectly, in earlier chapters through the
consideration of the various forms of media that individual merchants and merchant
groups used to display their reputations, in this chapter the issue is addressed through the
close study of two means through which reputation spread: letters of recommendation
and introduction, on the one hand, and gossip, on the other. These two means allow us to
juxtapose one written and one oral context in which information about reputation
changed hands. Through them we may analyze what means of communication was useful
for what kinds of information. Letters of recommendation and introduction, a common
tool for facilitating travel for merchants and for extending social networks among
tradesmen, were essential for spreading positive reputations for merchants operating in
new places. Though the forms of these letters were, to an extent, predetermined, these
documents provided mobile tradesmen with a piece of their good name from home
through the triangulation of a reputable colleague’s words, the reception of the new host,
and the words and actions of the merchant himself.
However, letters were designed to be read by and circulate within a relatively
small audience and were most effective when they were supplemented by conversation
that spread reputation through further social and commercial networks. The oral
communication of this information was often casual gossip, conversations that spread
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information about a person behind his or her back.69 This gossip was not necessarily
malicious; it was often undertaken as a matter of course by merchants and other
community members who shared information as it seemed relevant or interesting. At
times, these conversations spread reputation information unevenly or unpredictably, and
there was a tendency for negative information to outstrip the spread of positive data,
because negative details were more sensational and often appeared more useful, warning
others against involving themselves with bad members of the community. Nevertheless,
gossip was a tool that helped to construct the community as well as inform it. Gossip
assisted the development of trust among traders and their communities by providing
opportunities for individuals to choose those with whom they would to share information,
and those who would be kept in the dark.
However, despite its utility, and like many of the aspects of merchant life
discussed in this project, gossip was associated with strong and pervasive moral
connotations. Our sources are clear, even as they themselves gossip, that gossiping was
bad. Merchant activities fall into a similar category: even as they engaged in exchanges,
they acknowledged that people who engaged in exchange were bad. The moral landscape
of the Roman world is never far from the surface in our sources, whether they come from
merchants or from their elite contemporaries. Being, and being perceived as, a good
person, not merely a good, or successful, merchant, was central to their motivations, and
it is evident throughout their activities. This dissertation notes the moments of cognitive
dissonance present in our sources and argues that these moral concerns were normative in
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the social world of Roman merchants. More than that, they were institutions that shaped
the merchant experience, determining which strategies they chose to pursue, which
constituted a worthwhile, and which a worthless, risk.
As the following discussion shall demonstrate, merchants acted as the result of a
careful calculation that balanced the needs of risk reduction and profit with those of
social status and the presentation of moral virtues. As this dissertation argues, neither
financial gain nor social position was perceived as more practical by Roman merchants.
Both were equally necessary. To be a good and successful Roman merchant, one had to
be a good and successful person.
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CHAPTER 1: Un-tying Roman Merchants
This chapter presents a first challenge to the generally-held assumptions about the
role of merchants in the Roman economy, particularly questioning the power and control
of the state and its often-presumed enforcement capabilities. Its approach is, at its
broadest, institutional, with the attendant belief that the state, its laws and magistrates,
was an agent in the economic landscape that imposed limits upon economic behavior. It
will, however, assert that merchants, as individuals and as collectives, were also agents,
and that their actions also served to constrain and structure the economic world in which
they operated.
More particularly, the chapter addresses a common hypothesis about merchants in
the Roman economy. It seeks to refute the teleological argument that the Roman state
was inexorably becoming a controlling, dominant force that could and did impose its will
on the economy and society. It will do so by joining a growing number of scholars who
seek to dismiss the outdated concept of “tied professions.” The examination of this longstanding error in the reading of the legal sources will focus primarily on the legislation
surrounding the navicularii, ship captains, and their service to the annona, the grain dole.
This group has consistently dominated the discussion around “tied professions” due to the
large number of laws preserved, and the supposed importance of the group in the
economy as a whole. The discussion here will cover not only the laws themselves, but
also the contention that they represent the interconnected and dependent components of a
single, articulated system through which the state sought to control the economy and
society. This chapter will argue that this belief cannot be sustained from the evidence we
have in the legal codifications of Theodosius and Justinian.
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When the argument for this system has been dismantled, it will be argued that the
force of these laws was expressed unevenly. Merchants could, depending on their
personal status or geographical location, utilize an array of options for negotiating with
the state to secure better treatment. Evidence shows that those who contracted with the
state jealously guarded the privileges they received in return for their service and readily
navigated the legal world, both as it was written and as it was enforced by local officials.
Finally, this chapter will contend, drawing on the arguments of Peregrine Horden
and Nicholas Purcell,70 that the long survival of the “tied professions” hypothesis is the
result of the undue focus by scholarship on “high commerce:” long-distance, highvolume trade that is characterized by its relationship with the state and its mechanisms.
State trade, generally, has been too dominant in analyses of the economy, and little
consideration has been given to “low commerce:” short-haul, small-volume trade. This
trade is, on the whole, more characteristic of exchange in the Mediterranean world, and
the experiences of these merchants is more reflective of the majority than the relatively
privileged few who operated the Roman grain fleet. It is by adding the perspectives of
smaller-scale traders in this chapter and in those that follow, that we will create a more
accurate reading of merchant activity that may, eventually, clarify existing models of
Roman social and economic life.
Of course, the petty trader and the merchant tycoon are extremes at the end of a
long and multi-faceted spectrum.71 At the individual level, it is often difficult to identify
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where a merchant belongs along the line. The matter is complex and made more so by the
fact that it was in the interest of merchants to present themselves as more successful than
they truly were, as part of a bid for social prestige and to “fake it” until one “made it.”
Evidence shows that, at least periodically, merchants tried to co-opt the privileges the
state granted to the more elite members of the navicularii. However, these men were
clearly not employed by the state, and have been assumed to be less commercially
successful than their state-employed peers. Yet, they were, apparently, indistinguishable,
from true navicularii. They performed the same or similar duties, but never enjoyed
formal contracts with the state.
From an institutional perspective, these merchants flaunt the limitations of our
categories. This was a population of free merchants whom the state struggled to track,
and, importantly, tax. Consequently, though we know of their existence, and may make
some deductions about their social and economic lives, we struggle to find them in the
legal sources that dominate this discussion. By refocusing our attention on small-scale
trade, cabotage or exchanges in local markets, we can begin to define the ways in which
the state engaged with trade, find more of the merchants along the spectrum whose work
was not immediately visible to Roman officials, and avoid making assumptions about the
state and its will.

The Historiography of Tied Professions:
The bibliography that defines and utilizes “tied professions” as a central or even
ancillary part of commerce in the later Roman Empire is vast and the development of the
“tied professions” hypothesis has been an international effort. The following synthesis
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can do little more than sketch the broad outline of this idea’s trajectory. It has interwoven
itself into some major debates in the field. It is prevalent in discussions about the legal
and practical functioning of the annona but features in larger discussions about the nature
of the Roman economy, the role of the state in that economy, and the history of collegia
as an institution.
The complexity of the issue has led to several major points of contention. First,
the exact mechanism by which professions became hereditary. This debate centers on the
burden of the munus, the legal obligation that this service was believed to be, and
whether that burden lay on a merchant’s property, and therefore his son’s inheritance, or
in his person, as a social, economic, and legal status akin to slavery. Second, the exact
definition of, and delineation between, collegia and corpora is contested. These seem to
have been two different, though similar, institutions that appear to have categorized
merchants and defined their relationship with the state.
In the following lines, I will lay out two extremes that illustrate the main trends of
the current debate. On the one hand, there are those who believe that merchants in the
later Roman Empire were bound to their professions. These merchants and their children
were tied to specified, obligatory, and hereditary services to ensure that the state was
always provided with the goods and services it required. Furthermore, in this case,
imperial laws are read as a kind of social engineering, which created a structured class
system that solidified over the course of the later Empire. On the other hand, a number of
scholars now believe that this was not the case, and that the laws are concerned, first and
foremost, with ensuring that these services were performed, regardless of how they were
fulfilled or by whom. In this case, merchants were not hereditarily bound to complete
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services, but they were responsible for seeing that they were performed by someone, as
and when the state was able to enforce the law. As a result, it was possible to pass
munera on to non-family members, or to be excused from duties on the grounds of
poverty or having left a profession.
The former extreme originates in the late 19th century,72 in the work of Jean Pierre
Waltzing, who argued strongly that merchants were bound to their professions, that their
sons were compelled to inherit their father’s profession, and that navicularii were bound
to render, in perpetuity, services to the Roman annona.73 He proposed a gradual
development from collegia to corpora, but conceived of state control of the latter as
absolute.74 Waltzing believed not only that all shippers and bakers were bound to serve
the state, but that, by extrapolation, the terms applied to the corpora of these professions
could be applied to other kinds of business, so that gradually the state came to control all
trades, whether it was directly related to state needs or not. The argument was an
influential one, and while most have accepted some nuance to the original thesis, the
position of many scholars may be traced back to Waltzing’s comprehensive treatment of
professional organizations and his masterful presentation and interpretation of the
sources.
His position has been adopted by many scholars since the completion of his multivolume work in 1900.75 Michael Rostovtzeff, for example, echoed Waltzing in his belief
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in tied professions but attributed the changes in the status of navicularii and others to
Aurelian, rather than to Constantine, connecting what he called the “nationalization of the
associations” with the growing militarization of the imperial administration and
Aurelian’s increases to the annona in Rome. He saw the origins of these changes in the
Severan period, and, though he believed that the militarization was ultimately temporary,
he stated that the provisions first put in place for the supply of Rome were “doubtless”
extended to other major cities and eventually to the whole empire.76 Rostovtzeff, like
many others, sought to refine Waltzing, and placed the greatest emphasis, not on whether
Waltzing was right or wrong, but rather on when and exactly how his hypothesized “ties”
were instituted.
One of the greatest defenses to date of the position has been made by A. H. M.
Jones in his article, The Caste System in the Later Roman Empire.77 In this article, Jones
argued for the full stratification and fossilization of late Roman society, though he made
allowances for regional variation, the most significant of which was the absence of
hereditary guild membership in Constantinople.78 Jones, however, linked tied professions
into a number of large, complex debates, and equated the service of navicularii and
pistores, bakers, with that of both decuriones and coloni. Equating the position of
tradesmen with local magistrates and agricultural workers continues to be a common
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practice, even among those who doubt the existence of compulsory professions,79 and it
is perhaps the greatest legacy of Jones’ reading of the sources.
His other major contribution was the first reference to a problem that ultimately
underpins the entire issue. Faced with evidence of the Roman government periodically
needing to enlist new navicularii and other professionals into its corpora, Jones notes that
the state had an ongoing problem when it came to enforcing its will upon merchants.
Some professions, he claims, and contrary to his over-arching theory, were probably
never compulsory. For other professions, their relative liberty fluctuated over the period,
while, for others, service was compulsory, but loopholes, legal or otherwise, were used to
escape the financial or physical duties.80 In response to this problem, Ramsay MacMullen
proposed rampant bribery as a possible explanation for how so many were able to evade
these responsibilities.81 He imagined that wealthy benefactors paid off officials to ignore
the fiscal responsibility of their clientes, and identified this as a major benefit to traders
who acquired patrons in the late Roman period.
While this position has some support in the legal evidence, as we will discuss
below, Jones attributed this same flexibility in tied professions to minimal bureaucratic
institutions, insufficient registrations for changes of profession, and a limited number of
civil servants charged with keeping records. This is an issue to which we must return,
since there is, as A.J. Boudewijn Sirks has noted,82 a contradiction here: on the one hand,
Jones insists that the Roman state used its power to tie men to their professions, yet, on
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the other hand, Jones himself recognizes that they lacked the power to tie men to their
professions.
This paradoxical interpretation of the evidence largely escaped scholarly notice in
the years following Jones’ article. Moses Finley, who is generally dismissive of the
importance of trade, included tied professions as, “the irresistible end of a long
development” in Roman trade.83 His view cemented the idea in Anglophone scholarship
and the work of the 1980s reflected his endorsement of the hypothesis. However, one of
the most recent and powerful defenses of the idea came in Lietta De Salvo’s masterful
work on the corpora naviculariorum.84 The penultimate chapter tackles the issue of tied
trade specifically and it is clear that, fundamentally, she remains a supporter of
Waltzing’s position on the development of corpora.85 However, she also argues that the
munus, the duty to the state, was borne by both the shipper’s property and his person.
Thus, she maintains that if a navicularius sold his property, he could pass the munus to
another person, but that the munus was also a hereditary burden that automatically passed
to one’s heirs.86 Her reading of the sources is careful and productive, but she is unable to
offer an explanation for the frequent repetition of promises and prohibitions in many of
the legal sources, a feature that is inextricably linked with the paradox appearing in
Jones’ work. She does not treat issues of enforcement at all, thereby undercutting an
otherwise magisterial treatment of the topic.
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Despite these defenses, resistance to the “tied professions” hypothesis has been
growing in strength in recent years, among both legal and economic historians. The first
objections were raised in the 1960s and 1970s, when a handful of scholars began to
dismantle the argument piece by piece. They showed that service was not compulsory in
the 4th century CE, either in the eastern or western Mediterranean, and that literary, as
opposed to legal, evidence shows that individuals remained free to choose their
profession even after the legal codes were promulgated.87 Yet, in many ways, the debate
shifted in the 1980s as a growing number of scholars noted that the city of Rome was
supplied with grain primarily by private, rather than state-employed, shippers. 88 These
efforts were primarily focused upon the state of affairs in the early Empire, but their
arguments paved the way for the later period, when it became increasingly clear that all
those private, unaffiliated merchants could not have been instantaneously absorbed into
the institutional and legal control of the late Roman state, nor was there a clear trajectory
over the High Empire of merchants slowly ceding their liberties.
The most prolonged and powerful argument made against tied professions has
come from Sirks, who, in 1993, building on his analysis of the annona in his Food for
Rome, published an article questioning the compulsory nature of guild membership and
proposing that the concern of the state had always been the securing of tax contributions,
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munera, rather than any kind of social organization or regulation.89 His article was a
detailed attack on tied professions as a concept, and like Jones, he chose to break down
not only the experience of shippers and bakers, but also the ties that supposedly bound
decuriones and coloni. Sirks concluded that the earlier interpretations could not stand,
given the contradiction present in Jones’ article and based on the objections raised by
other scholars. In his view, the state did not attempt to form a hereditary class of shippers
but sought to close a series of loopholes and to expand categories to identify new people
who were eligible to fulfill duties to the state. He notes that this was an evolution from
earlier forms of taxation but contends that it lacked any particular aim to limit social
mobility or cause shifts in profession. As Sirks puts it, “the criteria for imposing public
obligations…left professions as such outside the public law sphere.”90
While Sirks’ position rightly liberates merchants from the state’s intentional
regulation, his view replaces the contradiction of tied professions that is implicit in Jones’
and, ultimately, Waltzing’s perspective, with an identical contradiction about taxation.
Sirks attributes to the state, not a desire to tie merchants to service, but a desire to close
loopholes in the tax code. In either case, the state’s intentions remain at odds with its
inability to enforce its will.91 Sirks does not offer any explanation for such consistent
failure.
In itself, this failure is neither surprising, nor particularly problematic. However,
Jones, Sirks, and others, fall into this paradoxical trap because they presuppose that the
Sirks, “Did the Late Roman Government Try to Tie People to Their Profession or Status?”; Sirks, Food
for Rome.
90
Sirks, “Did the Late Roman Government Try to Tie People to Their Profession or Status?,” 174.
91
An issue also raised in Horstkotte, Die “Steuerhaftung” im spätrömischen “Zwangsstaat.” who is
skeptical about the accuracy of state assessment and exaction of taxes. His answer is, rightly, to contest the
assumed “strength” of the Roman state.
89

53
state had engineered and intended to implement a consistent policy. This perspective is
only possible through one particular reading of the sources, which is discussed, and
critiqued, in detail below.
Sirks’ work was largely concurrent with that of De Salvo, and their two
statements on the issue, both of which are equally tenable if we accept the assumption of
the state’s continual strength and legal consistency, have largely stifled further
discussion. Scholars have continued to follow the side they prefer, asserting its position
as basic fact, without reassessing the nature of the sources.92 It is only in the last few
years that attention has again been brought to “tied professions” through the work of
Wim Broekaert. In a series of articles published adjacent to his prosopography of
shippers and other merchants,93 Broekaert has reopened the question, hoping to find a
compromise between the two positions. He follows Sirks in taking strong issue with the
idea that the state intended to tie merchants to their professions, but favors the
evolutionary growth of corpora favored by De Salvo and dating back to Waltzing.94 His
compromise is a plausible one, taking the best of the conflicting perspectives, but it
cannot resolve the contradiction of a state that legislated one thing, but seems only to
have been able to enforce something else entirely.
In fact, a number of problems remain unsolved in the literature cited in this
survey, as well as in the field at large. Each is related to a slightly different facet of the
issue, but it will be the work of the rest of this chapter to address them through the
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primary sources. First, it will be vitally important to address the notion that underpins
much of the debate: the nature of the “system,” “policy,” or “consistency,” of Roman
legal thought and practice. Next, it will be necessary to examine the forms of interaction
between merchants and the state, as a means of discussing the range of, and constraints
upon, merchant activity. Finally, we must address the contradictions mentioned above
and provide some resolution to the paradox of the power and simultaneous inefficacy of
the Roman state.

System and Sources:
Much of the debate has circled around, and been supported by, the notionally
comprehensive Roman legal system. The institution of law is taken to be highly
influential in the Roman world and to have served as a powerful constraint on economic
behaviors, among many others. This institution is, generally speaking, believed to be
supported by some kind of consistent imperial policy on, among many other topics, the
issue of state-sponsored trade and transportation. This opinion is drawn, in the main, from
the abundant source material, which professes itself, in its form and its contents, to be an
efficacious and complete rendering of Roman law.
In general, the sources for the “tied professions” hypothesis come to us via the
two major legal codifications of the 5th and 6th centuries, the Codes of Theodosius and
Justinian, while much of the relevant legislation seems to originate in the reign of
Constantine, if not even earlier. The time between initial promulgation and codification,
as well as the editorial processes involved in creating the Codes, present us with
interpretive challenges, and scholars of these sources have addressed them with far
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greater nuance than many of the economic historians drawing upon them. In an ongoing
debate about the Codes, the same issues about policy and intentionality have arisen that
we see raised in the “tied professions” scholarship. In that case, the question of how to
interpret the act of codification is central, and it is through this means that we can find
resolution for the “tied professions” debate.
For the Codes, there is a central methodological challenge to reading and
interpretation: should we read them as a single text or as a collection of context-specific
fragments? In the Codes, the laws generally come to us with a date and record of where
the emperor was when he issued the ruling. The Codes themselves do not explain the
purpose of this information and it leads us to pressing questions: do we view the
Theodosian Code, or indeed the later Justinianic, as a systematization of knowledge,
effective from the moment of publication, or was it a reflection of earlier practices that
were being presented through the selection of the letters and edicts that were still in force
or best reflected that practice? Alternately, if we believe that this was an artificial
exercise that generated law as much as it recorded old legislation, can we say that
anything in the Codes was systematic or comprehensive in the earlier period, or are our
interpretations limited to the moment a law was passed? Did those laws remain in force
for the years following or were they rescued from true- or near-oblivion by the
publication of the Codes? These questions have not been central to the study of the
navicularii, though they have been at the heart of recent debates about the Theodosian
Code’s creation.95
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Sirks has also been a major force in this discussion, arguing for a systematic legal
policy reflected in the collection of the texts and arguing, throughout his work on the
debate over tied professions, for a single, powerful Law on the subject following the
creation of corpora, which he dates to the reign of Trajan. Sirks believes that this Law
was well-regulated and preserved by the state at official archives, from which legal
experts were able to draw the sources for the Code.96 John Matthews has taken up the
counterpoint, arguing for a less systematic collection of texts for the Code, involving the
law being recovered from numerous local legal archives, and accordingly for a more
context-specific interpretation of the law.97
Though the debate has not, as yet, reached scholarly consensus, the key text for
understanding the organization of the texts in the Theodosian Code is the Gesta Senatus
that recorded its commissioning.98 As Honoré has argued, the initial project of the Code
was intended to create a comprehensive collection of all law, both obsolete and current,
from both the eastern and western Empires.99 This project involved collecting laws from
across the Mediterranean and placing them together into a single, thematically organized
text that would serve as a scholastic legal reference.100 A secondary task was set to clean
up the collection at a later point in order to create a final Code that lacked
inconsistencies, contradictions, repetitions, or obsolete texts. This goal was never
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realized, and, as Honoré has put it, the Theodosian Code consequently “organized no
system” of Roman law.101
The implications of this lack of system have not yet been explored for Roman
merchants, but a related debate has arisen in the discussion of the status of coloni, whose
condition has long been treated as comparable to that of navicularii.102 In a detailed and
persuasive study of the sources regarding coloni and of the historiographical treatment of
that group, Cam Grey proposed that the sources preserved in the Theodosian and
Justinianic Codes could, at best, be taken as periodic legislation on the subject of these
and other rural labor forces. By examining the contexts of time and place provided in the
Code, he read each law as an individual legislative moment, rather than the chapter in the
Code as a single comprehensive view of the matter. His treatment of the material argued
against the idea that coloni were bound to the land itself, and posited that the legislation
was entirely focused around the payment of dues inherent in the origo.103 Sirks’ response
attempted to reassert the ties on coloni, but ultimately conceded that the code represents a
systematizing moment, the product of Justinian’s vision for Roman law, rather than a
system that existed from the earliest text through to the moment of publication104
Though the Justinianic Code is a very different document from the Theodosian, it
seems that there may be room for reevaluating both legal collections as the product of
particular systematizing moments,105 and the sources in both texts that relate to the
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navicularii stretch from Constantine in the Codes, and even further back in the Digest. It
is unclear the extent to which any of these laws were simultaneously enforced. The
repetition of key points, most especially the continuation of privileges and exemptions for
those serving the state, suggest that the law was in some senses cyclical, with earlier laws
fading from use, only to have their contents reasserted later, by an emperor who was
addressing a similar problem, or who hoped to present themselves in the same way as an
earlier ruler.106 However, it is genuinely not certain whether the laws that originate in
different reigns worked together at any point prior to the codifications.
Furthermore, the format of the Theodosian Code suggests that in any year
between the earliest and the latest text, it should be possible to construct the law as it was
in that moment, with all earlier texts still in effect, and the later ones not yet conceived.
However, such a reading ignores the geographical context, which shows that the
emperors contacted specific magistrates with specific sections of the law referring to
specific issues.107 It is believed that these were imperial responses, not spontaneous
distributions of the law, which suggests that local circumstances generated the need for
laws to be sent, rather than the existence of an imperial opinion that emperors and their
staff were eager to disseminate. As a result, the law is a fragmented matter, one that only
gains focus at the moment of codification, and which, in all likelihood, bears only a
restricted relationship to the realities of practice prior to that moment, or potentially even
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after depending upon how easily accessible the new codification was.108 Rather, we
should imagine the law to have been a fluid matter, with clarity sometimes requested in
reference to a given case, and with the greatest clarity about it originating from the
courtroom, where the law was available in its enforced, rather than codified, state.
The implications of this for our interpretation of the law for the navicularii are
serious. The field has argued about the earliest moment for the creation of corpora, with
dates ranging from the reign of Trajan to Constantine, with a general consensus that there
was a logical order to the laws regarding the privileges and responsibilities of shippers
reflected in the Theodosian Code. Yet, in applying Grey’s reading for coloni and Sirks’
concession, we see that what we have is, at best, a moment of collection in the reign of
Theodosius, another, more comprehensive, effort to systematize in the reign of Justinian,
and, prior to that point, only a series of disconnected legal statements. These were often
repetitive and speak to specific moments or circumstances that prompted an imperial
pronouncement. If we also accept Matthews’ interpretation of the creation of the Code,
we also have to contend with local provincial law, for which we have even less
systematic attestation, as a defining feature of the legal system.
This reading is clearest when we examine the texts that were actually gathered
into the Theodosian Code. Of the thirty-eight laws that constitute the heading de
naviculariis, fourteen contain specific or general (re)assurances to shippers that their
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rights and privileges were inviolate. These texts range in date from Constantine to
Arcadius and Honorius within our period, with high concentrations of texts in those
reigns, and with numerous gaps in between. The repetitions here are critical, as they offer
us a view into how the state viewed its own policies and its efficacy. Each of these texts
is clear that the privileges of shippers are to be protected, and that they arise from a long
tradition, usually attributed to laws of Constantine in the Theodosian Code, of which the
latest law is merely a reassurance.
The laws are rarely explicit about the purposes of these repetitions. In a
systematic legal system that was truly building upon the foundations of previous laws,
this duplication of material should have been unnecessary. We have only one example in
the laws relating to navicularii of an explanation for the repetition of subject matter,
coming from a novel of Theodosius concerning the size of ships transporting grain for the
annona:
Semina ferendi leges fragilitas humani generis subministrat, repetitio vero legum
nostrae est humanitatis indicium, si quidem, cum priorum aculei adversus
temeratores earum sufficerent corrigendos, admoneri tamen per legis
repetitionem delinquentes volumus quam poenas exigi delictorum. Ideo calcatam
legem, quae de navigiis non excusandis olim fuerat promulgata, suggestione tuae
sublimitatis edocti humanis sensibus saluberrima repetere scita conpellimur ac
iubemus, nullam navem ultra duorum milium modiorum capacitatem ante felicem
embolam vel publicarum specierum transvectionem aut privilegio dignitatis aut
religionis intuitu aut praerogativa personae publicis utilitatibus excusari posse
subtractam. Nec si caeleste contra proferatur oraculum, sive adnotatio sive sit
divina pragmatica, providentissimae legis regulas obpugnare debebit.
The frailty of the human race provides the opportunities for producing laws, but
the repetition of laws is a sign of our humanity. Accordingly, although the stings
of earlier acts against violators of the law were sufficient for correcting them,
nevertheless we want people who are committing a crime to be warned by the
repetition of the law, rather than for penalties to be exacted for crimes committed.
Therefore, informed by the suggestion of your splendor that the law has been
trampled upon, the law which had once been promulgated concerning the ban on
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excusing ships, we are compelled by our human feelings to repeat the most
beneficial ordinances, and we order that no ship beyond the capacity of two
thousand measures before successful unloading or before the transportation of
public materials can be excused from public uses either by the privilege of rank or
regard for religion or the prerogative of any person. Not even if an oracle from
heaven be produced against it, whether it may be a note or divine advice, should
one oppose the regulations of a most provident law.109
The law is explicit that the purpose of repetition is to offer a reminder, a gentle warning
born of imperial “humanity,” rather than any kind of admission of the failure of earlier
law. Yet, the law identifies two categories of individuals for whom these laws are
applicable: in the first case, “violators,” who have already been corrected, and in the
second case, those who “fall short,” and seem to have escaped the force of the first law or
have been slow to comply with it. It is not perfectly clear how they have done so since
the law is described as having been effective in its original intentions. Though the law
attempts to disguise the fact, it is clear that this law is operating on one level rhetorically,
where it claims universal and limitless efficacy, and on another in reality, where matters
seem to have been very different. This latter context is often no longer extant in the
preservation of the Codes, leaving us to reconstruct these details from the few clues still
available.
The internal evidence of the law strongly suggests that the earlier decree had lost
its force and been “trampled upon.” Theodosius was cleverly having it both ways,
managing to offer a “new” law, but one which only reinforced earlier laws, in this case
primarily a law of Honorius and Arcadius that was also concerned with the size of ships
serving the annona.110 The content is almost identical, but, by this law, Theodosius can
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present himself as gently correcting the people and upholding the customs of his
predecessors, while actually trying to enforce a law that has fallen into disuse and that, if
enforced, would secure a greater supply of grain for the state.
The repetition of laws concerning the privileges and responsibilities of
navicularii, while less explicit about their purpose at the meta-level than this law of
Theodosius, nevertheless presents the central feature of the issue clearly. The earliest
laws on the subject are those of Constantine, which generally concern themselves with
assuring that navicularii, regardless of rank, will be given exemption from public duties.
For example, the first of these laws, CTh 13.5.5, is particularly focused on protecting
shipmasters from predatory civil servants, harbor masters and toll collectors, and
clarifying that the exemption extends to taxation in kind and in gold and silver,
collationes and oblationes, so that they can better perform their duties to the annona.111
Later laws refer back earlier ones, thereby building a case for the precedent of each
action, and often implying or stating outright, that the old law continues to be in force.
New laws are presented as adding some novel feature which operates in accordance with
the spirit of the old legislation.
Thus, Valentinian and Valens appealed to “the statutes of the ancients” in a law of
369,112 in which they reassert that, even if shippers should gain some new status, they
were to remain responsible for their duties to the annona, and, together with Gratian, they
issued an appeal to refill the guild of the navicularii in 371, claiming that they acted,
“according to the tenor of the law that was given by the divine emperor Constantius.”113

111

CTh 13.5.5 (Rome, September 18, 326 CE).
CTh 13.5.12 (Trier, May 14, 369 CE).
113
CTh 13.5.14 (Rome, February 11, 371 CE), iuxta eum tenorem, quem a divo principe constantio datum.
112

63
In both cases, the emperors were eager to point to earlier imperial exempla as they
attempted to resolve new problems.114 For these laws, the problem most clearly seems to
have been a slow draining of the guild of the navicularii, the result, perhaps, of death
without heirs, the advancement of individuals to higher rank, or simple evasion.
Theodosius highlights this in his law, where he specifically lists the ways in which one
may not be excused from duties, up to and including an “oracle from heaven.” As Sirks
has described, there were many real and imagined loopholes left by the earlier legislation,
where provisions had not been made to account for accidental or intentional evasion of
duties.115
Still, many of the laws do not seem to be closing loopholes or adding any
innovative step. As in the novel of Theodosius, they merely repeat the provisions of
previous legislation. This is clearest in a pair of laws of Honorius and Arcadius,
promulgated four years apart, which simply reiterate that the rights of shippers remain
inviolate. The first, from 400 CE, was sent to the proconsul of Africa, and states briefly:
venerandae urbis intuitu naviculariis privilegia certa delata sunt, quae
quicumque temerare temptaverit, nostra auctoritate propositam multam lege
inferre cogatur.
In regard for the venerable city, certain privileges have been conferred upon
shipmasters; anyone who has attempted to violate them, must be forced by our
authority to bear the penalty proposed by law.116
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The second, from 404 CE and sent to the Praetorian Prefect, is slightly more expansive,
and allows some room for the emperors to change their minds, but ultimately covers the
same point:
universa, quae consultis nostris vel decretis illustris praefecturae indulta sunt
naviculariis, si nulla melior utiliorque sententia commutavit vel auctoritas
sanctionis infregit, firma servari decernimus.
We declare those things that have been granted by our decisions to the
shipmasters or by the decrees of the illustrious prefecture to be preserved as
universally valid, if no better and more useful opinion has changed them or no
authority of law has infringed upon them.117
Despite slight differences in terminology, “privilegia,” in the former, and “quae…
indulta sunt,” in the latter, and in focus, the former dealing more with those who would
infringe upon rights and the latter additionally asserting the right of the emperor to
change his mind,118 these laws do fundamentally the same thing: both seek to reassert the
privileges of shippers.
The fact that both are necessary is worthy of more attention. It is assumed, in the
systematic understanding of Roman jurisprudence, that the emperor’s word was law, and
that it applied everywhere with equal force. Yet, in this case, the same emperors clearly
issued two separate laws, rather than a single text, and sent it to two different magistrates.
Even if we lacked the address and dates, the differences in the wording of the laws
reveals that these were two distinct pieces of legislation, though they pertained to the
same subject. These magistrates may have solicited the opinion of the emperors on the
matter, a plausible scenario, given that this was a relevant issue for the proconsul of
Africa, a province which produced a great deal of grain for the annona. Alternately, the
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emperors may have issued this as a reminder to the magistrates, having received some
reason to believe that shippers were being denied these privileges, or the emperors may
have, for motivations that we now cannot access, been proactive in this case and sent
these laws out without an impetus that came from the provinces.
Whatever the circumstances, and whether the laws were sent to resolve the same,
or different, problems, it seems that the emperors did not expect the praetorian prefect to
have had knowledge of, or access to, the law they had sent to Africa. Despite the
important position of the prefect in the city of Rome, where we would expect a major
legal archive to be available,119 he does not seem to have had a clear sense of what laws
operated where. This was evidently not a system that spread information evenly and these
laws appear to have been shared according to logic that is now inaccessible to us. That
only these two magistrates received this law, bearing in mind the vicissitudes of the
compilation process, hints that there was a reason why they were sent, but it is unclear
whether they were prompted by a request of some kind or by some imperial reasoning we
cannot reconstruct now.
In the edited product of the Theodosian Code, the laws look like an expression of
a singular state policy, but imperial intentions, if any existed at all, cannot be tracked
beyond a single reign. Even in cases where repetition occurs, each of the laws list
specifics that reflect, in all likelihood, some of the substance of the requests for clarity
that the emperor and his staff had originally received. Most of the laws in the Code are
individual responses, crafted to fit circumstances about which we no longer have details.
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While emperors built on the precedents of some of their predecessors, and used similar
means to dispense law, the coherence of the Code is manufactured product of a later
period. The legislation it preserves did not anticipate eventual juxtaposition with other
related texts, nor did it refer to earlier exempla with the belief that magistrates would
have had the full history of imperial law on the subject to hand. Rather, in isolated cases,
the emperor wanted laws to act as an emblem of his own respect for his predecessors.
The Code was the product of editing that crafted a hodgepodge of legal actions into a
comprehensible whole. The editors also invented categories of similar material that may
or may not have reflected the emperor’s original intent.
As a result, talking about a system of Roman law, as it existed prior to the
codifications, offers us little in the way of interpretive tools. Our evidence contradicts
such an interpretation, which has particular consequences for the merchants who actually
transported grain for the annona. Most especially, since we cannot suppose an empirewide institution of law operated with equal efficacy everywhere, we must look at the
individual and local circumstances of the use of law as an institution if we intend to
determine how merchants, traveling through the Mediterranean, were affected by legal
constraints.

Agency in State Employment:
Without a systematic legal policy on the part of the state, the specifics of place
and time are vital factors in understanding the applicability and the use of law. Local law,
legislation that was issued by municipal or regional powers without reference to imperial
laws, and local enforcement of imperial law will be central to the next two chapters of
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this dissertation, but in this context, it is important to examine two cases that demonstrate
how merchants engaged with an imperial law that could and did shift over the course of
time and relative to their own location. In these cases, it is clear that the state did not
dictate to these traders, and that, in fact, it did not necessarily grasp the full range of
purposes that the law was being put to by those people. For merchants, law was a tool, a
way of gaining and vigorously protecting rights that they could use to their economic
advantage. In actuality, these examples are powerful arguments against the notion that
merchants were “bound,” since the evidence demonstrates that those working for the state
were very much able to negotiate their rights. Despite the rhetorically powerful language
that the laws used, claiming that the state held merchants to their munus, the evidence
strongly suggests that traders saw the munus as perhaps a small price to pay for other
advantages.120 Furthermore, when the bargain swung too drastically in favor of the state,
they were prepared to object and demand a renegotiation of terms. Finally, while the laws
of the Theodosian Code imply that many were trying to evade the munus, evidence from
local contexts actually suggests that there was some competition to get access to state
contracts, especially among wealthy traders who were already operating similar trade
routes.
Given the particularly complex circumstances surrounding the text, it will make
the most sense to continue looking at evidence from the Theodosian Code before moving
on to other laws, though, of the cases we will examine, it is, chronologically, among the
latest evidence we will consider. It is also necessary at this time to question the extent to
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which merchants were aware of the contents of the Code or of the earlier laws that were
compiled into it.121 While many who engaged in trade had no reason to cultivate
knowledge about the laws contained in the Code, the internal evidence of the Theodosian
Code shows that the corpora of the navicularii, at least, were keenly aware of the
imperial laws concerning their rights. Nevertheless, as far as we can say from our
evidence, their knowledge of law was selective, limited to the precedents and legislation
that concerned their business, though it seems to have been fairly comprehensive within
that sphere. Given their specialized knowledge, it is possible that their understanding of
the law included texts and precedents that were not selected for inclusion in the
Theodosian Code. The evidence seems to suggest that some groups of traders even
maintained private legal archives, holding copies of earlier laws that they could muster to
support their arguments and defend their interests.
Indeed, CTh 13.5.16, a law of Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius, dated to 380
CE, was addressed to the Corpora Naviculariorum, in response to a letter they wrote to
the emperors. The law begins like many others collected in this portion of the Code,
reaffirming the rights of shippers:
delatam vobis a divo Constantino et Iuliano principibus aeternis equestris ordinis
dignitatem nos firmamus. quod cum ita sit, si quis contra interdicta
innumerabilium sanctionum corporali vos iniuria pulsare audeat, digna
expiatione est luiturus ausum inmanis admissi, apparitione quoque sua ultimo
supplicio deputanda, cuius monitio hanc debet sollicitudinem sustinere, ut iudices
prava forsitan indignatione succensos ab illicitis tempestiva suggestione deducat.
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We confirm the honor of the equestrian order that was given to you by the eternal
emperors, the divine Constantine and Julian. Since this is the case, if anyone
should dare to strike you unjustly, contrary to the prohibition of countless laws, he
will atone for the outrage of that immense crime with a fitting punishment, and
his staff will be condemned to the ultimate punishment, whose warning ought to
check this anxiety, so that, perhaps, by timely advice, he may lead judges who are
roused with vicious indignation away from criminal acts.122
The law shares the appeal to precedent seen in the laws above, referring to the legislation
of Constantine and Julian. The law of Julian may be another text gathered in the
Theodosian Code, 12.5.9, which refers specifically to immunity from violence, but we
have no corresponding law of Constantine preserved in the Code relating to this issue.
Additionally, it is clear here, as in many of the other laws, that magistrates are being
admonished to adhere to these laws and to provide protection to navicularii. Despite
these similarities, it also adds several specific provisions that are novel and unique to this
law. These must reflect the requests that were made in the original letter from the guild.
Huic illud additur, ne, qui certum ordinem ex nostra definitione retinetis, ulli vos
alteri hominum generi haerere vereamini nec timeatis vos civitatium municipibus
innecti. ex nullo itaque nexu, nulla causa, nulla persona decurionum vos obsequia
contingent, cum praesertim priscis constitutionibus, quarum series orationis
paginis antelata est, magis illud invaluisse perhibeatis, ut plerumque et
ordinarios curiales naviculariorum sibi necessitas vindicaret.
Quod vero ad negotiationis commodum advehendasque merces spectat ac
respicit, in eo sollers cura competentium iudicum providebit, ut optentu nominis
vestri non passim ac sine consideratione negotiatorum lateat inmunitas nec ipsi
dudum delati beneficii privilegiis fructuque fraudemini.
To this the following is added, that you who hold a certain rank in accordance
with our classification shall not fear that you will be joined to any other group of
men, nor shall you be afraid of becoming bound by the citizens of your
municipalities. Thus, the duties of decurions will not pertain to you, not because
of any bond, cause, or person, especially since you maintain that this has been
validated by ancient constitutions, a list of which has been prefixed to the pages
of your prayer, rather it is generally the case that even the necessary curial
services of shipmasters would even vindicate ordinary decurions.
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Truly, as for that which pertains and relates to the convenience of business and
transporting merchandise, the expert care of competent judges will provide so
that, by using your name as a pretext, the immunity of tradesmen will not lie
hidden everywhere without consideration nor will you yourselves be defrauded of
the privileges and products of benefits formerly granted to you.123
The law specifically refers to the documents that were sent by the guild to the emperors,
which included references to earlier laws, “ancient constitutions,” that the corpora
believed would act in support of their case. This is a major point in favor of the
interpretation of Matthews since it is unclear whether the emperor himself had these
constitutions to hand. Rather, it seems that these shippers maintained an archive of
relevant material on their own or had access to some local collection of laws that they
could access and copy to support their request for aid.
The specifics of their original letter are difficult to reconstruct, but it seems that it
had roughly three parts. First, they seem anxious to have protection from violence under
the law, as was appropriate to their status as members of the equestrian rank, and
consequently as honestiores.124 There is no elaboration in the text, but, based on the
imperial response, it seems that their complaint was leveled against magistrates
employing some form of corporal punishment, and the blame, according to the emperors,
lay as much with their staff as with the officials themselves. Laying blame on the staff of
an official is a common rhetorical stance in the legislation and it was a tactic that served a
dual purpose, both allocating blame with likely culprits, administrators who were
invested in local communities and who were more likely to have vested interests in the
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success or failure of particular local individuals, and partially or totally exculpating the
imperially appointed magistrates.
The second complaint is the one for which evidence was offered, that navicularii
were not to be forced to perform the munera of decuriones. This may have been the cause
of tensions between shippers and officials, who felt that, as men of some means,
navicularii were prime candidates for enrollment in the curia. The shippers are able to
provide adequate evidence that they were protected from this duty, demonstrating their
familiarity with imperial law and its rhetoric, but also their ability and willingness to use
it to their advantage. Based on the record of the Code, they were in the right. They were
not required to add to their burden of munera through service as decuriones. However, it
is probable that some shippers were less able to muster the law in their own defense than
others, and that the law was not always so clearly on their side.
The final element of this letter demonstrates what some of these other shippers
may have done. The navicularii seem to have complained that their privileges were being
claimed by those who had no right to them, that some were claiming membership in the
guild, or, more accurately, were “using [its] name as a pretext,” optentu nominis. As a
result, immunity from munera was being claimed by those who did not hold the rights,
or, perhaps even more irritating for the navicularii, the status that accompanied the
service of the navicularii.
These interlopers will be of great interest to us shortly, but for now it is important
to note how these guild members had crafted their message for maximum effect. They
leveraged their status as equestrians and respectable men at multiple points, first in
defense of their persons against violence, and then later in defense of their relative social
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elevation against the unworthy. The law hints that they blamed bad magistrates, probably
their local officials, for their troubles, and showed, through the legislation they appended,
that those men had acted in ignorance, or willful defiance, of the law of the Empire. The
constitutions they selected, copied, and sent were undoubtedly chosen with some care, to
best support their case, and were based on the most accurate and up to date knowledge
they had about the law. This recourse to law was available to them because they were a
guild of some standing and, indeed, their access to the opinion of the emperors was likely
based on their personal and collective status. While rescript evidence demonstrates that
imperial law was, as least to some degree, available to all citizens of the Empire,125 the
guild of shipmasters was a group that merited a long and detailed response.126 Their
service was of great importance to the state, especially in the feeding of its largest cities.
Their complaints were consequently significant enough to concern major officials. The
guild was knowledgeable enough about the law, it seems, to recognize a need to collect
and store relevant legal precedents and was significant enough to address the emperors
and receive a thorough response to their concerns.
There are two, complementary processes at work in this legislation. On the one
hand, the law is clearly a pronouncement from the emperors that was designed to respond
to the issue at hand. At the same time, it was also making an appeal to earlier imperial
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precedents, leaning on the antiquity of earlier law and the divinity of those emperors. As
we have seen above, this was a favored rhetorical strategy of imperial law, not only did it
give emperors the appearance of being dutiful followers of their illustrious forebears, but
it also created layers of history that made the law appear to be an inevitable reality that
could not be challenged. The text supports this, with its reference to the interdicta…
innumerabilium sanctionum that, collectively, constituted the reason why the navicularii
were to be protected. The rationale for obedience to the law is not the fear of force,
though force ultimately will be applied to punish the magistrate and his staff as
“atonement,”127 but rather compliance will come from the collective rhetorical weight of
generations of imperial statements on the matter. Those statements justify this imperial
pronouncement and legitimize a legal status quo that the emperors claim to be
maintaining, even as they are dealing with new, possibly even unique circumstances.
On the other hand, we can see from the framing of the imperial response that the
navicularii had couched their request for protection in terms selected to appeal to
imperial interests and were so successful in that aim that their efforts are still visible
through the layer of imperial rhetoric. The law called the attack on the navicularii a
“monstrous crime,” inmanis admissi, phrasing that could have easily come from the
navicularii themselves and concludes with a recognition of the “advantages of business,”
negotiationis commodum advehendasque merces, which also suggests that the navicularii
have been clever in their request. These are not the advantages to the navicularii in their
private affairs, which certainly motivated their initial plea, but the advantages to the state
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when the privileges they granted were only open to those who served the state. Others
were responsible for other types of munera, as well as vectigalia and other duties owed to
the state, and if these other merchants and shippers passed themselves off as navicularii,
convincing state agents that they too had immunitas, the state lost that potential income.
The “real” navicularii of the guild knew the threat that this loss posed to the state and
seem to have included reference to this to bolster their case. At the very least, they used
language that could be read both ways, implying the mutual threat of such figures to the
state and to themselves.128 Protection of the rights of navicularii was likely cast, and then
understood and repeated back, as a protection of the state’s own interests.
Nevertheless, the existence of such traders, those who, through the scale of their
work, personal or professional appearance, or some other metric, were able to convince
authorities that they were contracted navicularii, belies the “tied professions” hypothesis.
Some merchants, clearly, were not bound to their trade at all. Not only were they not
registered as navicularii, but they actively sought to co-opt the privileges of that group,
while still transporting private grain shipments. These “free agent” traders have not
escaped the notice of those that support the hypothesis, as we have noted above,129 but
these scholars have persisted in arguing that the hereditary status did exist for some
shippers, and that there were no means for merchants to leave the corpora
naviculariorum. Though the repetition of laws asserting that navicularii could not take up
other munera in order to evade their shipping duties suggests that they did attempt to
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leave, and were, perhaps, even successful. However, in other cases, it seems that there
was no particular reason for successful merchants to try to leave the corpora, since this
arrangement with the state seems to have favored merchant businesses. In the final
example of this section, we will look, not at merchants who attempted to leave the
corpora, but at merchants who contracted with the state and retained a great deal of
power and agency in that relationship. For these merchants, it was better to renegotiate
the deal they had than to branch out on their own and adopt some other kind of
relationship with the state.
The editorial processes of the Codes, as well as the absence of a copy of the
original request of the navicularii, leaves us to reconstruct the original actions of traders
that prompted official responses. However, some cases offer better opportunities than
others to piece together the sequence of events that led to the promulgation of a law. One
of the best and most frequently discussed, is a law preserved on a small fragmentary
bronze that relates to the transportation of grain for the annona.130 The document,
hereafter the “Arles-Beirut inscription” for convenience, is likely to be a law of the early
3rd century,131 though many of the details surrounding its purpose, internal references,
and provenance remain unresolved issues.132 It records a law that was written in response
to a letter from the five corpora naviculariorum of Arles. The law reveals a great deal
about the mechanics of shipping for the annona at this time, particularly the oversight
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and regulation of the weight of grain shipped, but, for our purposes, it is the actions of the
shippers that are the most interesting feature of the document.
[I]ULIANUS NAVICULARIIS
[MAR]INIS ARELA[T]ENSIBUS QUINQUE
[C]ORPORUM SALUTEM.
[QUI]D LECTO DECRETO VESTRO SCRIPSERIM
PROC(URATORI) AUG(USTORUM DUORUM), E(GREGIO) V(IRO) SUBI- 5
CI IUSSI. OPTO FELICISSIMI BENE VALEATIS.
E(XEMPLUM) E(PISTULAE)
EXEMPLUM DECRETI NAVICULARIORUM MARINORUM ARELATENSIUM QUINQUE CORPORUM ITEM EORUM QUAE APUT ME ACTA
10
SUNT SUBIECI ET CUM EADEM QUERELLA LATIUS PROCEDAT CETERIS ETIAM IMPLORANTIBUS AUXILIUM AEQUITATIS CUM QUADAM DENUNTIATIONE CESSATURI PROPEDIEM OBSEQUI
SI PERMANEAT INIURIA, PETO UT TAM INDEMNI15
TATI RATIONIS QUAM SECURITATI HOMINUM
QUI ANNONAE DESERVIUNT CONSULATUR,
IMPRIMI CHARACTERE REGULAS FERREAS ET
ADPLICARI PROSECUTORES EX OFFICIO TUO IUBEAS QUI IN URBE PONDUS QUOD SUSCE20
133
PERINT TRADANT.
(Claudius J)ulianus to the navicularii marini of the five corpora of Arles,
greetings! What I wrote, after reading your decree, to …, the egregius, procurator
of the Augusti, I have commanded, and to be added below. Fortunate people, may
you prosper.
Copy of the letter.
I have added a copy of the decree of the navicularii marini of Arles belonging to
the five corpora and likewise (a copy) of the documents from the court case
conducted before me. And should the same dispute continue further, and the other
(navicularii) appeal to justice with what amounts to a formal complaint that they
will soon cease to comply with their obligations, if the injustice continues, I
request that provision be made for both a guarantee against financial loss in the
books and for relief of the people providing services for the annona, and that you
order the marking of an indelible scale on the (inner sides of the) ship, and that
escorts from your staff be provided, who will hand over (details of) the cargo
weight that they loaded.
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(J)ulianus, believed now to be Claudius Julianus, the prefect of the annona under
Septimius Severus and Caracalla, writes here to report that he has heard a case based on
events that had been set into motion by the navicularii of Arles. These shippers had
issued a decretum to the procurator, whose name is lost to us.134 This decretum may be
synonymous with the “formal complaint,” mentioned in the law, and was a statement that
included the threat of stopping shipment if some solution to the problem was not found.
The conflict seems to have arisen over the weight of cargo, mentioned in the final
lines of the inscription. It is likely that the conflict was over discrepancies in weight
between loading and unloading, in which situation a navicularius, if his cargo came up
short of the amount loaded, was presumed to have stolen a portion of the state’s grain and
was made to pay for the shortfall. Sirks suspects, plausibly, that the staff of the
procurator, or the procurator himself, tended to record higher weights at loading,
enriching themselves in the process, but passing the burden of payment on to the
navicularii.135 The navicularii were in an unfortunate position, attempting to prove that
they had not stolen grain, but equally unable to demonstrate why the weight should have
been listed as higher. The prefect of the annona’s intervention was vital in this instance
since the procurator seems to have been at the heart of the dispute and therefore could not
offer unbiased judgment.
As in the law mentioned above, it seems that the navicularii framed their petition
in terms that the state would understand, in that they appeal to aequitas, justice or
fairness, and made their request with reference to their service to the annona. We cannot
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be certain, but (J)ulianus’ reply also includes a reference to the injustice of the current
system, which seems likely to have been part of the original letter. This would parallel
the reference to violence in the law of 380 CE and establish a pattern of navicularii being
subject to treatment that they knew themselves to be exempt from, even if other kinds of
merchants were not.136 Of course, the position of the navicularii is not to be accepted at
face value. The parallels between this inscription and the law of 380 CE hint that there
was a rhetorical motif of claiming to be put-upon, treated unfairly, and otherwise
harassed. While Bang has argued that such predation was commonplace, and there is
evidence to support his view,137 it is only reasonable to assume that, in an effort to be
heard and have their concerns taken seriously, shippers were willing to embellish their
case.
Whatever the truth of the matter, navicularii were at a disadvantage in their
dealings with officials. Magistrates were the embodiment of the law, the agents of its
practical enforcement, and shippers were often without recourse in the heat of the
moment when disputes arose. Nevertheless, they were not without the means to be heard,
at least after the fact. Not only, as in this case, could they issue a request for legal
intervention from a higher official, but they could, clearly, act in a corporate fashion to
amplify their request. The navicularii of Arles are known from numerous inscriptions,138
and, generally, the individuals of those inscriptions are identified as members of a single
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corpus.139 It is therefore remarkable that in this case, where clearly the navicularii
believed they were being treated unfairly, these five groups joined together to make a
collective statement defending their common interests.
(J)ulianus calls that statement a decretum, a decree, rather than a letter or petition,
which suggests that he took their complaints seriously.140 Further, his comments imply
that the actions of these particular corpora were especially influential. Jean Rougé has
argued that these corpora were the largest and likely the most important in the city of
Arles.141 The threat of this group’s displeasure or disobedience was correspondingly a
real and serious one. They were not only able to withhold their service, to “cease to
comply with their obligations,” a topic to which we will return in the following chapter,
but seemed to have the influence to inspire similar disobedience in others, since the letter
explicitly refers to the actions of ceteris, presumably other, non-state-affiliated
shipmasters, who complained of similar things.142 Thus, the merchant community was
able not only to speak to the state in ways that were recognized, heard, and responded to,
but it also spoke to itself in dialogues that are more difficult to trace but remain,
evidently, influential. Together, traders possessed power, and their work for the state was
so vitally necessary that the threat of withholding their service was one that not only went
without punishment from the state—this inscription offers no consequences for
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disobedience, for example—but also was met with conciliatory language and a possible
resolution to the matter.
The prefect took care to resolve this complaint. The inscription offers real
protection to shippers, a reliable record of the weight of the cargo and a supervisory
official who would travel with the grain to witness that all was fair and above-board.
While these men probably came from the office of the procurator and may have been
some of the same people who were originally cheating the navicularii, this document
provided shippers with a protection against loss, and put a greater onus on the state to
prove that fraud had occurred, rather than forcing shippers to demonstrate that it had not.
For the state, it was worthwhile to make this concession to merchant needs, to prevent
any disruption in the grain supply that might lead to civil unrest,143 as well as to present
themselves, rhetorically, as the source of justice and fairness when it came to responding
to the needs of important interest groups. The provision of a law on the subject cost the
state nothing, but might have significant real-world consequences, if merchants used it
correctly and local agents complied with its terms. Merchants had entered into a dialogue
with the state and had received assurances that could greatly improve their condition and
protect their business interests. The state had won itself goodwill from these corpora at
minimal cost to themselves.
The inscription of these assurances constituted a body of evidence that merchants
could attempt to utilize in the future, parallel to the archive of legislation that the guild
would use in its petition to the emperor in 380 CE. The reply of the prefect became, or
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was added to, a corpus of legal material that could be called upon by the navicularii of
Arles. Great debate has surrounded how the inscription from Arles reached Beirut,144 but
it is possible that the inscription was placed within a ship, to be easily accessible should
someone question the new procedures for weighing cargo, given that the law was issued
in Arles and would not necessarily have reached Syria before the first of the grain ships.
However, the inscription traveled, this law could have been used as a traveling reference
in future instances of conflict with authorities.145 It was an acceptable solution; one that
restored a peaceful, or at least less-tense, relationship between shippers and the state.
Consequently, these two laws show what initiative and agency looked like among
merchants, and how those who worked in state-organized trade were able to request
amendments or accommodations from the state. Imperial magistrates received and issued
serious responses to these requests and used the apparatus of Roman law to provide
merchants with the protections that would induce them to continue to serve the annona.
In and of themselves, these inducements erode the claims of the “tied professions”
hypothesis. Merchants serving the annona clearly were in a contractual relationship with
the state, one that could be renegotiated between the parties. There is no evidence to
suggest, as the title of Jones’ article implies, that the state envisaged a status that applied
to all professionals, or that there was a successful program to compel the obedience of
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merchants. Rather, there were sporadic and irregular laws promulgated, and the state,
striving to find merchants to meet its most basic needs, was forced to hear merchant
voices. Traders could, within limits, negotiate their position, and demand that certain
kinds of privileges and protections be offered or enforced. For the later period, it seems
that the most vital provisions had already been secured, so merchants of the 4th century
did not need to complain about systems of weights and measures, but they remained
jealous guardians of their status and financial interests, which were increasingly viewed
as interconnected.

The Paradox of Control:
The question remains, if merchants retained agency in their relationship with the
state, what can we do with the paradox presented in Jones and reframed in Sirks? In their
views, there is a contradiction in which the state both did something, controlled merchant
professions or collected taxes, and did not do it, was frequently unable to manage
merchants or failed to enforce taxation. The elements of the argument needed to defeat
this paradox have been laid out above, but must be reassembled now, particularly in light
of how we have discussed the question of the relative systematization of Roman law.
The paradox has its two components: first, that the state possessed the power and
the resources to regulate trade, and, second, that the state was unable to do so, and did not
possess that power. In both parts, the ability of the state is intertwined with its intent, and
thus with what might be called its “policy” toward commercial activity and its agents. As
argued above, “policy” is not easily discernible from the evidence of the legal codes and
it is likely that there was little-to-no systematized legal intention that transcended the

83
reigns of individual emperors. Furthermore, we have argued above that the law was not
being enforced as fastidiously in practice as the state was issuing it. Emperors issued
“new” law in rhetorically powerful statements that lay claim to authority, but the frequent
repetition of the same imperial pronouncements time after time, as well as the appeals
from navicularii concerned for their own interests, reveals that the application and
enforcement of the law left much to be desired.146
Thus, it is making a strong claim to assert that the state possessed the power to
control commerce. Rhetorically, this is certainly the way that matters were presented. It
was widely known that the emperor’s legal efficacy was, in theory, limitless, that his
word was law and was to be treated as such in courts all over the empire. He claimed this
authority and, while he might appeal to further sources of authority, such as his
predecessors or to abstractions of justice and beneficence, he was always within his rights
to demand that his commands be carried out without question. These rhetorical claims
were powerful in themselves and led to real life consequences. The very fact that
navicularii appealed to state officials for assistance in the resolution of their problems, or
to negotiate their rights, demonstrates that they recognized the authority of the state.
However, the rhetoric could only carry the law so far, and there were limits to its
practical efficacy that must be considered. Enforcement of the law was uneven and
contingent upon factors that the emperor and his legal advisors could not control even
had they attempted to. Local practices, whether they arose from traditional habits or from
interpersonal interactions, tended to supersede the letter of the law. The navicularii of

146

Assuming that enforcement of the law was the primary aim in issuing it, which does not have to be the
case. See chapter two for this argument in the case of the Edict of Maximum Prices.

84
Arles experienced the habit of state officials who made it their practice to prey upon
shippers, while the guild in 380 CE struggled to compete with fellow merchants who took
advantage of the provisions of the law. The circumstances are different, and we might
easily imagine dozens or hundreds of other times and places where practice deviated
from the legal specifications in one way or another. The state could react to these
irregularities when they were reported, but, in all likelihood, remained in ignorance of
many others.
Furthermore, this ignorance was probably not accidental. To actively control
commercial activity, to enforce even commercial law alone, would have required a
bureaucratic force that the Roman Empire never employed in its whole history. 147 Sirks
has already argued that it was not the state’s intention to regulate trade, that the state was
engaged in a reactive process that was mostly driven by the reports and requests of lower
magistrates or citizens.148 The state claimed the authority to control trade rhetorically, but
relied on the power of that rhetoric, as Clifford Ando would say, on the “consensus” of
the ruled, to see to it that the law was adhered to and that truly flagrant deviations were
reported, censured, and, in some cases, punished. 149
This was, however, not “systematic” legal practice so much as it was a balance
struck between rhetoric and practical efficacy. Each emperor could claim that their will
was law and that the Roman state was governed by good laws but could also leave
responsibility for enforcement in local hands, who would be, to an extent, tacitly
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expected to apply it flexibly. Sirks’ claim that the laws regarding navicularii were
systematic and designed to regulate against loopholes in the state’s tax policy cannot be
correct in face of the repetition and contradictions that even the edited codifications
preserve.150 In the period before the codifications, the law, in practice, was limited by
what legislation individuals could summon to their cause, as evidenced by the
proliferation of rescripts from this earlier period. Merchants and shippers knew this and
acted to retain and present the law in the light that was most beneficial to their case. The
law was produced piecemeal by the state, as needed and requested without reference to
how one law would influence others, and it was used in the same way according to the
demands of individual cases and circumstances.
The terms of the paradox are thus each problematic. Both portions are somewhat
true, while both are also somewhat false. The state was not without influence over
commerce, and did issue laws that offered, alternately, restrictions and privileges for
some members of some trades, but its efforts were not systematic, extensive, or evenly
enforced. Thus, the state’s inability to control commerce is not a condemnation of the
efficacy of the imperial system, but a reality of the ways in which it chose to operate.
While it is right to emphasize the agency of merchants and their ability to negotiate with
the state, it is not an accurate reflection of this relationship to say that either side was
consistently able to enforce its will perfectly. Both sides were in dialogue, directing the
regulation of commerce in ways that ultimately provided some benefits to both.
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Merchants were not tied to their professions. Some were employed by the state
and assumed a set of restrictions, responsibilities, and privileges attached to a government
contract. Others did so through the mediation of an association that they joined, which
increased the merchant’s ability to negotiate and reduced their personal risk in ways that
will be discussed in chapter five. Whatever the means, these were bonds that benefited
the merchant as well as the state, and they were never fixed in stone. The relationship
between these merchants and the imperial government was flexible and the assumption of
perfect state control ossifies and reifies the law in a way that does not correspond with
what we see merchants doing in practice. The terms of the contract of the navicularius
were adhered to as long as they were acceptable to both sides, and they could be
renegotiated when they were not. The state could, theoretically, dictate terms to
merchants, but, in practice, merchant service was sufficiently valuable to the state that it
was in the imperial interest to hear traders’ complaints and offer them real incentives to
continue working for the annona.

“High Commerce” and Free Traders:
The agency of these merchants is important, as is noting the flexibility of their
relationship with the state. Both are topics that will be expanded upon in coming
chapters. However, it is necessary for us to broaden our perspective to include the great
diversity of merchant activity in the Roman Empire, and to question the typicality of
state-employed traders. As Jean-Paul Rey-Coquais has noted, speaking about the
navicularii of Arles, “Ces armateurs étaient des riches et puissants, appartenant ou liés à
de grandes familles,” these [ship] owners were rich and powerful, belonging or related to
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important families.151 In general, the navicularii that legal sources are concerned with are
those who were engaged in large-scale trade, and were able to do so through their
substantial wealth, with which they built large ships, underwrote risky ventures, or even
hired others to perform their annona duties for them. Their work was undeniably that of a
merchant, but the scale was substantially greater than that of many of their peers.
Horden and Purcell, in their monumental Corrupting Sea, refer to this kind of
trade as “high commerce,” and rightly note that a preponderance of modern scholarship is
dedicated to this kind of exchange, rather than to smaller-scale, “low commerce.”152 They
argue, convincingly, that the focus on “high commerce” distracts from patterns of
exchange that transcend the typical periodization of antiquity and that characterize the
Mediterranean world more generally over a long period of time. They are explicit that
“high” and “low” should not be read as a binary, into which we may fit every example of
trader from antiquity, but that these are extremes along a spectrum, and one which may
not be only limited to those poles, since this divide encompasses not only the scale of
trade, but also the distances traveled. While it makes sense that our shippers for the
annona transported many measures of grain over a long distance by sea, and for small
traders to carry smaller quantities of goods to their local markets, more regularly, there
will have been dealers in luxuries traveling long distances to bring a small number of
expensive goods to the correct buyers, and agriculturalists selling the produce of an entire
harvest to a wholesaler at the equivalent of their garden gate.
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The picture is, and should be, complex, but the point made by Horden and Purcell
is that we cannot afford to focus exclusively on the largest, and loudest, traders found in
our record, despite the difficulties in spotting the local, small, and “low” trader. Hopkins,
D’Arms, and others have noted that traders were typically poorer men, and that even
those engaged in the trade of luxuries had to carefully balance their costs in order to make
a profit.153 Consequently, most merchants were not those trading at a huge scale for the
annona, and those traders who most easily escape our notice are the ones whose
experiences are likely the more typical. As the following chapters will clearly
demonstrate, their interactions with the state, with each other, and with their customers
will be the best metric for merchant experiences in the later Roman Empire, and their
strategies for social and economic success will be the most illuminating.
This is as true of grain merchants as it is of sellers of other types of goods. Lionel
Casson has argued persuasively that, for the early imperial period, we must imagine a
small army of private merchants transporting grain without any reference to, or contract
with, the state.154 These merchants shipped grain that was sold to Romans who did not
qualify for the annona, or for whom the annona was insufficient. Clearly, beyond such
men are those who provided grain to cities that did not have a dole, which included the
vast majority of urban centers. Casson’s evidence comes primarily from Pompeii, where
a number of records have been preserved of the transactions of such merchants,155 but for
the later period we can also supplement the existence of vacui, men who held no
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obligation to fulfill a munus. Though these individuals were already noted as exceptions
to the “tied professions” hypothesis by Francesco De Robertis, their role in the grain
trade has not been sufficiently noted thus far.156 These men must have participated in a
broad spectrum of exchanges, from those trading grain across the Mediterranean to those
selling their produce to their neighbors at a local market.
Unaffiliated traders remained well into the 4th century, a fact that has been noted
by Sirks and Ramon Teja, among others.157 The law of 380 CE, discussed above,158
provides its own evidence of this, since the navicularii are able to say that their rights
were being claimed by traders who had no right to those privileges. Gratian, Valentinian,
and Theodosius state that they do not want these exemptions to be available passim,
everywhere, which implies the commonness of non-affiliated traders who might wish to
take advantage of the ease with which they might be confused with state ship captains.
The choice to assume the identity of a state-affiliated navicularius may have been an
appealing deception to a free trader. Though there were risks to this ploy, not least being
the confiscation of goods should merchants be caught transporting cargo without paying
vectigalia fees, the possibility of avoiding all such duties as a “fake” navicularius would
have been tempting. Posing as a navicularius when not contracted with the state was,
strictly speaking, illegal, but we can assume that not all those who claimed these
privileges fully understood that they were in the wrong. On both sides of the divide, state
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official and shipper, there may have been misunderstandings about a particular
merchant’s status under the law.159 Imperial law, at least rhetorically, took these
distinctions seriously, but it is unclear to what extent these were truly worries in reality.
Many who operated at a similar scale of trade would have been visibly indistinguishable
from one another, and officials had only their experience, the reputation and, ultimately,
the word of the merchant himself from which to judge. In the day to day operations of the
empire, the distinction may, ultimately, have been less important than the smooth
collection of taxes and vectigalia, imperfect as that system may have been.160
Some traders, obviously, could not be confused with the wealthy ship owners to
whom the majority of this legislation applied, but, though their experiences would be
different from those of the elite traders, their lives nevertheless provide us with important
evidence for the study of the economy and the social worlds of the Roman Empire.
Waldemar Ceran has done some preliminary work, through the corpus of John
Chrysostom, to argue that free traders, large and small, made rational decisions in pursuit
of profit, and that those decisions colored both economic and social situations.161 On a
larger scale, this dissertation will work to identify other factors that provided institutional
constraints on merchant activity, and will not limit that inquiry to those traders who
operated for the state. Though the state offered some constraints that affected all
merchants, many only engaged with the state through its mechanisms for the collection of
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taxes, tolls, and duties, and otherwise they exercised their professions without reference
to what the state dictated.
Evidence for such merchants appears frequently, but across disparate sources.
They generally seem to have operated inland or at less important ports and traded either
in goods that the state did not need, or in quantities small enough to be useless to the
supply of the Empire. As the following chapters will argue, the state generally allowed
such merchants to operate unchecked, intervening primarily as a reactive process when
magistrates or citizens called imperial administrators to step in, a model that is visible in
the laws discussed above, where merchants requested judgment from the state in conflicts
that they could not resolve alone, or within their local communities.
Given the relative rarity of legal documentation of such matters,162 it seems likely
that most merchants were able to mediate their conflicts privately, through networks of
peers or patrons, or by only appealing to levels of government at the local level. Many
merchants carried out their business without any reference to the shifts in imperial
administration that occur within the period. This quantitative imbalance, between the
merchants most frequently studied and the unknowable number of those who operated in
the Roman Empire, has been noted by Hopkins, among others, though often with a
certain amount of pessimism about our ability to redress the inequity.163 We are without
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numbers to make statistical calculations to say how many merchants worked for the state
and how many operated independently, but we are not without evidence for both the
plentiful supply of free merchants and the ways in with they conducted their social and
economic lives.
It is these numerous unaffiliated merchants operating in the economy, as well as
the abundant evidence for the reactiveness of the Roman government that argues most
strongly against the hypothesis of “tied professions.”164 That merchants were free to
conduct and choose their professions demonstrates the weakness of the original position
of Waltzing. The limited efficacy of imperial regulations discussed above begins to
demonstrate something that Sirks has noted and that the next two chapters will expand
upon: that the state did not intend to regulate commerce in this way and it was unlikely to
be economically beneficial for them to do so, as that variety and intensity of regulation
would have required a larger bureaucracy than state finances could bear to support.165

Conclusions:
Thus, merchants in the later Roman Empire worked both for and independent of
the state. We can no longer sustain the position that the Roman government compelled
all, or even a majority, of traders, shippers, or merchants to work exclusively and
hereditarily for the annona, even in the later Empire. Many individuals operated outside
of state structures and are representatives along the spectrum of Horden and Purcell’s
“high” and “low commerce”. Those within the state’s employ retained the ability to
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negotiate or, at times, evade their contracted duties with the state, which, as we will argue
in the following chapter, was as much a sign of the state’s limited desire to enforce its
law, as it was of its practical ability to do so. The agency of merchants working for the
state has been under-estimated in previous studies, even among those scholars who have
supported their legal freedom, and the evidence of the legislation makes it clear that
navicularii, as representatives of merchants more generally, were savvy in their
utilization of state institutions. They knew the law as it pertained to their professions and
status, including its loopholes. They were also willing to defend their rights and
privileges, even withdrawing from business if necessary, as the shippers of the ArlesBeirut inscription threatened.
The following chapters will continue to look at the effects of state institutions on
Roman merchants, unfettered by the assumption that those institutions were based on
state dictates and merchant obedience. In the next chapter, we will begin to unpack the
effects of state intervention into trade that was not tied to the annona through the lens of
price-fixing legislation. This will give us a greater insight into the intentions of state
institutions and on the practical impact of law on private merchants. In the third chapter,
we will look at truly small-scale trade to investigate the operation of local exchange
under the law that local officials enforced, moving toward an examination of how state
institutions functioned in face-to-face communities.
Together, these chapters will liberate merchants from readings of the sources that
reinforce the teleological failure of free commerce in the late Roman Empire, and from
interpretations that prioritize the position of elite merchants over those of the poor-tomiddling merchants. The state engaged with, and its institutions effectively constrained,
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some merchants more than others, but the agency of merchants is visible at all levels and
does not disappear over the course of time.

95
CHAPTER 2: Intervention into “Low Commerce”
The Roman state never was able to exercise perfect control over the work done by
merchants within its borders. Long-distance, high-volume trading received most of the
state’s attention, but even in those cases the focus of its efforts was to secure supplies for
Rome and other capitals, rather than to regulate trade for its own sake. Intervention into
commerce, at all scales, was sporadic, yet it is clear from our evidence that the state did
intervene, and that the existence and action of the state did have tangible effects on
merchant lives. However, the exact impact of that intervention remains unclear,
particularly at local and regional levels. Further, the intentions of these interventions must
be judged, since the traditional view of these actions has assumed that the
pronouncements of the state were put into practice more or less exactly as they were
written. In this chapter, we will assess a pattern of erratic intervention that, if applied
perfectly, would represent a great infringement upon merchant autonomy and the
operation of a free market: price fixing. Within this greater category, special attention
will be paid to the example of Diocletian's Edict of Maximum Prices, which, I will argue,
needs to be reassessed in light of its impact on merchants, rather than as a source of
economic policy or raw, quantitative data.
The purpose of this chapter is to present an alternative means of viewing state
intervention through price fixing. Economic intervention will be shown to have been
undertaken, not as a form of economic policy or to express the economic power and
centrality of the state, but as a rhetorical position generally resting on imperial
benefaction at the core: to control prices was to propose a socio-moral standard which
was guarded by the imperial person. I will argue that, while intervention into “low”
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commercial activity did happen, in practice it was a mediated process, so that imperial
pronouncements, complete with their moral force, reached merchant populations only
after they had been translated by regional or local officials who had a closer
understanding of how and in what ways law could be imposed.166

Price Fixing:
The Roman Empire provides evidence of a long string of periodic, unsystematic
attempts to control the level of prices. These attempts date back at least to the reign of
Tiberius and have, as their general target, the restriction of the cost of food stuffs in
specific locations, most often major, urban centers.167 There were practical reasons for
this focus: price fixing served as a means for the state to limit its own expenses,168 was a
means of demonstrating authority in the marketplace, and, perhaps most importantly,
price fixing reduced the risk of riots that followed high prices on bread and staple
grains.169 These riots, or, rather, the threat of riots, were a common occurrence in urban
life, tied in with an economic landscape that included volatile prices,170 environmental
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instability,171 and a tendency toward hoarding among those who sought to use the market
to their own advantage.172 The annona was one means of staving off these outbursts of
public displeasure, but, since this institution generally only applied to bread, and was
only available to a fraction of the population,173 the cost of grain, wine, oil, and other
staples remained a concern.
Placing limitations on prices was adopted as the standard response by imperial
and regional officials, and was, at times, requested by crowds of hungry citizens. These
requests are complicated, as Erdkamp has argued.174 Not only was there the matter of
genuine hunger at stake, exacerbated, frequently, by food crises,175 but there were also
moral and pseudo-moral issues at play in the regulation of prices.176 These tended to
surround issues of hoarding, where, at least in common perception, though goods were
available, they were purposefully withheld by those with means, aggravating high prices
and turning misery to the advantage of the wealthy. Hoarders sought personal gain by
slowly selling off their stockpiles and kept prices high through control of the supply.
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Price fixing, it was believed, forced hoarders to sell, since they could not profit from
holding onto goods. The intervention of the state, then, was a positive step, but one that
was implicated in questions surrounding morality and the just treatment of social and
economic inferiors. It was, in the view of the urban populace with whom this legislation
was primarily concerned, the duty of the state, and of patrons, generally, to provide for
those under their authority.177
References to high prices are numerous in our sources and are almost always
accompanied by some measure of blame attached to them. Julian found the crowd in the
theater of Antioch chanting, “Everything plentiful; everything dear!”178 along with
demands to control the individuals who were driving up the cost, while the evidence of
the Tosefta prohibits hoarding with the explicit reasoning that to do so “spoiled” or
“cursed” the prices.179 Erdkamp makes the point, to which this chapter will return, that if
prices were high, there was almost always someone who could be blamed for making
them so, be it authorities, landowners, or merchants.180 It is unlikely coincidental that
Julian gathered just these groups when deciding what measures to take to constrain prices
in 362 CE. He knew, as did the people of Antioch, that responsibility would be assigned,
rightly or not, to one or the other of these groups.181 His own public record of his actions,
the Misopogon, shows a desire to protect himself from blame and to implicate as many
groups as possible, in the event that his measures failed.
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Food stuffs are generally central to price fixing, since the consequences of failing
to regulate these prices could lead to violent, at times deadly, outcomes. This violence
was often directed against state officials and elites, those deemed by the populace as most
empowered to resolve injustices. Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius of Tyana records several
attempts made on the lives of officials that were prevented by the wandering sage, while
Dio Chrysostom records that he himself was the target of violence because of his
perceived wealth in another time of crisis.182
However, prices were also, rarely, fixed on non-food items. The best-attested
example is that of Marcus Aurelius, controlling the prices to be paid for gladiators.183 The
law is exceptional in many respects. Of all known examples of price fixing under the
Empire, its geographical scope seems to have been the largest, with fragments of the
inscription recording the law being discovered in both Spain and Asia Minor, and with
the internal evidence demonstrating that the law had special significance for Gaul as
well.184 The distance between these points hints at applicability that spanned the whole of
the empire, more even than that achieved by Diocletian’s Prices Edict.185 Yet, as
ambitious as it appears to have been, Marcus Aurelius’ law did not control the prices of
the market, but rather those paid by imperial priests putting on gladiatorial fights as part
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of their official duties. The law, as written, forgave vectigalia, customs duties,
traditionally levied on gladiators and paid by lanistae, gladiator trainers or dealers. By
cutting these taxes, the state declared that it was justified to establish a rubric of prices
that merchants, whether lanistae or others, were to adhere to in their sales.186 The detailed
reasoning put into the legislation is untypical. By comparison, we are told that
Commodus, only a few years after this, “ordered a reduction of prices [on crops], the
result of which was an even greater scarcity.”187 The Historia Augusta, which is our
principle source for this episode, is not concerned with legislative detail in this passage,
since the mention of the prices is mainly part of the greater narrative to illustrate
Commodus’ cruelty. We are told that Commodus put to death and confiscated the
property of, “those who...were plundering the food supply.”188 Despite the difference in
the narrative’s purpose, there seems to have been no plan in place to incentivize lower
prices, as there was in Marcus Aurelius’ case. Instead, an order was made and expected to
be met with compliance.
This kind of demand is by far the more typical form of price fixing, not only in
narrative sources, but even in legal evidence. Yet, as common as these orders are, the
results were not generally positive, as the example of Commodus shows. Though we do
not always have evidence to present us with the outcome of price fixing, when we do it is
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generally this: “even greater scarcity,”189 “a curse on the prices,”190 “much bloodshed,”191
and “corn sold secretly in the country.”192 The risks of price fixing and the tendency
toward failure were well-known in antiquity. Ammianus Marcellinus provides the most
thorough caution:
Inter praecipua tamen et seria illud agere superfluum videbatur, quod, nulla
probabili ratione suscepta, popularitatis amore vilitati studebat venalium rerum,
quae non numquam secus quam convenit ordinata inopiam gignere solet et
famem.
Nevertheless, among these important and serious matters, he seemed to be acting
to no purpose in that, without any justifiable reason, but from a love of popularity,
[Julian] desired a reduction of the prices of goods for sale, which sometimes,
when it is not arranged properly, is accustomed to case scarcity and famine.193
Ammianus’ doubts about Julian’s sincerity are of interest,194 and are a point to which we
will return, but here it is notable that Ammianus is perfectly aware of the consequences of
price fixing. Though the examples of consequences listed above are separated by time,
place, and even literary tradition, it is clear that those lessons had not been consigned to a
distant past, but remained in the minds of ancient authors, as well as, in all likelihood,
their educated readers. Ammianus claims it was possible for price fixing to work but adds
the strong proviso that such matters must be ordinata, regulated properly, in order for
them to succeed.
As Corcoran has noted, Julian, by his own account and by that of other witnesses,
tried his best to regulate his price fixing measures.195 Like others before him, his
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legislation was met with lack of cooperation and hoarding, but he reports that he
imported additional grain to the market to help increase supplies,196 and Libanius reports
that the emperor met with a small army of people who had power over prices: farmers,
artisans, shopkeepers, and elites.197 Despite these efforts, there seem to have been
extenuating circumstances that prevented Julian's success. Socrates of Constantinople
records that Julian’s presence in the city along with a large army strained the market.198
Additionally, Julian’s grain imports were probably used as an excuse to hoard, since it
was believed that the new grain would make the market volatile for a time.199
These efforts, and challenges, have been noted, but the failure of these measures
has been central to the discussion about them, rather than the perspective and intentions
of ancient actors. This is particularly evident in the discussion regarding Diocletian's
Edict. Though the Edict lacks some of the surrounding evidence that makes the case of
Julian easy to expand upon, economists have fixated upon the example of Diocletian as
both typical and exceptional. The length of the Edict, along with its long preface, make it
tempting, but, even more than the text itself, the argument about the viability of price
fixing thrives on Lactantius, who gleefully reports the failure of the Edict.200 Lactantius’
account is brief, and worth viewing in its entirety:
Haec quoque <quomodo> tolerari possunt quae ad exhibendos milites spectant?
Idem insatiabili avaritia thesauros numquam minui volebat, sed semper
extraordinarias opes ac largitiones congerebat, ut ea quae recondebat integra
atque inviolata servaret. Idem cum variis iniquitatibus immensam faceret
196
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caritatem, legem pretiis rerum venalium statuere conatus est; tunc ob exigua et
vilia multus sanguis effusus, nec venale quicquam metu apparebat et caritas
multo deterius exarsit, donec lex necessitate ipsa post multorum exitium
solveretur.
Can even these things be tolerated which they try for maintaining the soldiers?
This same Diocletian, through his insatiable greed, never wanted his treasuries to
be diminished, but he was constantly amassing extraordinary riches and largess so
that his stores might remain whole and inviolate. He also, when by various crimes
he caused an immense rise in prices, he promulgated a law to set the prices of
goods for sale. Then much blood was shed over small and cheap goods, and
nothing appeared for sale because of fear, and the prices became much more
harmful, until the law, after many had been killed, was repealed from necessity.201
Diocletian is presented here as greedy, and his measures to control prices as ruinous. As
with Ammianus’ opinion about Julian, Lactantius believes that Diocletian’s actions are
founded upon his desire for self-aggrandizement and enrichment. In both cases, price
fixing seems to have been understood to be about the emperor and his character at least as
much as it was about economic intervention.

Moral Legislation and the Unity of Empire:
This point has largely escaped modern commentators. Though they note, rightly,
the physical and generic differences between the Prices Edict and other Tetrarchic laws,
as well as those between the Edict and other price fixing measures, the continuity
between these measures regarding issues of morality has not found a place in the
discussion. Instead, the failure of the Edict has been central, which places scholarship in
the awkward position of having to assume that Diocletian, Julian, and others did not
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understand the consequences of their actions, did not understand the economy, and did
not adequately prepare for the interventions they wanted to make into market activity.202
Rather than this negative line, it seems more profitable to follow the moral tone
presented by contemporaries of the laws, particularly considering the ancient discussion
which surrounded these measures. In the case of the Prices Edict there is also sufficient
evidence within the Edict to show that morality was also on the mind of the Tetrarchs.
The most prominent theme of the preface to the Edict is not inflated prices, or even the
legislation being put into effect. Rather, the text is preoccupied by the threat that avaritia,
greed, poses to the safety and moral wellbeing of the state.203 The term appears eight
times,204 and is particularly associated with merchants, venditores…emptoresque,205 who
are possessed by a greedy madness that made these men forget their duty to the empire,206
and particularly to the military.
As a response to the situation, Diocletian and the Tetrarchs appear as guides
through the moral crisis. They style themselves parentes of the whole world, a Roman
world united by the list of goods that follow the preface, which include beer from Gaul
and Egypt,207 wool from Mutina and Laodicea,208 and saffron from Arabia and Africa.209
The inclusion of some of the more specialized goods, as well as some strange absences,
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have motivated scholarly examinations of the prices given for goods and labor, the
closeness of these prices to an imagined late antique reality, and of the methods that
might have been used to generate the list,210 but they have not yet addressed the rhetorical
ploy at use here: the Tetrarchs, led by Diocletian, are presenting themselves as the moral
protectors of the Roman Empire through their effort to fix prices.
The claim is a bold one, but it is grounded upon the Edict itself. The document
reaches its conclusion with the request that all people act in “willing obedience” with, “a
law constituted for the public good,” and specifically undertaken for the betterment of,
“the whole world,” universo orbi.211 It is a passage that attracted the attention of Clifford
Ando, who has used the section to argue that the Edict, along with similar legislation,
acted as a call to the citizens of the empire to participate in a consensus of the Roman
state, and as evidence that the emperors acted out of at least a rhetorical concern for the
well-being of the people.212
In light of the claims that the Edict itself is making to its scope and intent, it is
clear that the Edict should not be read merely as another piece of a greater economic plan
orchestrated by the Tetrarchs. The genre, content, and reception are all demonstrably
different from the contemporary changes being made to tax and monetary law. To start,
as Corcoran and others have rightly noted, the length of the Edict is its own impressive
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statement.213 Unlike other laws, this document has a lot to say for itself. Corcoran has
compared the extended lists with inscriptions pertaining to customs and tolls but was
unable to find a parallel for its expansive preface.214 I suggest that this lack of parallel
may originate from a desire to find a similar document from among examples of
economic reforms. Diocletian’s own economic legislation certainly does not provide a
comparable decree and other economic reforms are generally matter of fact in their
presentation of law.215 Corcoran, however, began to branch out in his pursuit of a similar
preface, looking at the Damascus incest edict and a letter to the Manichees as
comparanda.216
Though Corcoran noted the discrepancies in scale between these texts and the
Edict, it seems clear from his analysis that the preamble should be much more closely
aligned in genre and content with religious or moral legislation than economic laws. In
this effort, we are under-supplied with primary evidence, with so many of the decrees
against the Christians and similar documents no longer extant, but there is some reason to
suspect that the Edict fits in with a class of legislation that shared a universalizing
tendency and was grounded upon the presentation, or creation, of a moral standard,
whether positive or negative.

213

Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs, 205; Giacchero, Edictum Diocletiani et Collegarum de pretiis
rerum venalium in integrum fere restitutum e Latinis Graecisque fragmentis, 132. both refer to the Edict as
the “queen of inscriptions”
214
Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs, 220.
215
Cope, “Diocletian’s Price Edict and Second Coinage Reform in the Light of Recent Discoveries”;
Sutherland, “Diocletian’s Reform of the Coinage”; Bruun, “The Successive Monetary Reforms of
Diocletian.” Most of the reforms lack even an extant decree, let alone a statement of the extent preserved in
the Edict of Maximum Prices.
216
Corcoran p. 207; incest edict, coll. 6.4; letter to the Manichees Coll. 15.3

107
MacMullen has already begun to make this point, by discussing the Edict in light
of imperial propaganda. He associates the rhetoric of morality in the Edict with a
movement in the third century to identify and root out vices in the population, to clarify
the repellant nature of crimes that would be punished legally, while also condemning
them in explicitly moral tones.217 His description closely and intentionally mirrors the
ways in which religious legislation of the period is often discussed: Christianity was a
threat to the Roman status quo because it threatened the equilibrium between gods and
men and the favor that Rome had long experienced from the divine. Other crimes also
upset this balance and are particularly relevant in the face of political and economic
unrest. MacMullen eventually defines the Edict in a particularly helpful way, as a
“hortatory law text.”218 It is a useful category because we can begin to fill it with other
examples, despite our fragmentary record, which can help us to see the ways in which the
Edict was building upon earlier legislation.
MacMullen has already pointed out the statements of the panegyrics of the 4th
century, which praise emperors for instituting “new laws to control mores.”219 These, and
legislation echoing similar sentiments, seem to originate, as a type, in the early third
century. The fragment of the Constitutio Antoniniana, which emphasizes the majesty of
the Roman people and offers thanksgiving for Caracalla’s survival following the
conspiracy of Geta, hints that it may have belonged in this category. It was a text that
presented not only a new legal definition of status, but also one that attached moral
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significance to that status.220 Romanitas, we must remember, was a category laden with
moral meaning and one that was linked with certain kinds of behavior. The Constitutio,
like the Edict, treads the line between religion and morality on the one hand, and tax and
citizenship law on the other. These two sides are not necessarily in tension, as has been
noted by scholars previously,221 and we should not dismiss the legal validity of the
reform because there was a “propagandistic” message being conveyed at the same time. It
is clear, from both the text of the Constitutio and the contemporary description of it by
Cassius Dio that it was understood to have both forces.222 It was a statement of imperial
power over personal identity, economy, and politics as well as a dictate about legal status.
The argument has already begun to be made that the Constitutio has both
economic and religious elements working concurrently, most notably by Lukas de
Blois,223 who has maintained that the Constitutio should be considered as a forebear of
the religious legislation of Decius, a comparison also found in Noethlichs, among
others.224 De Blois’ point is explicit: both Decius’ decree and the Constitutio Antoniniana
were unifying legislation, urging the entire empire to participate in a common religious
act. James Rives has echoed this sentiment,225 while Decius’ decree may be linked to
anti-Christian sentiments, it does not have to be exclusively tied to that issue. The decree
strove to unite the empire around a universal religious and moral center, the practice of
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sacrifice and the physical demonstration of proper loyalty.226 This unity was made clearer
through the presentation of an “Other”: those who practiced improper sacrifice and were,
fundamentally and visibly, disloyal and threat to the state.
However, there was a positive vision for this center as well. These texts imagined
proper loyalty being displayed through common practice, typically voluntarily, 227 but
Rives is right to form the parallel between Decius’ decree and tax collection.228 The same
mechanisms were at play bureaucratically: receipts were given and participation was
compulsory. Taxation is, similarly, a unifying undertaking, shared by everyone, even if it
was a common burden. Whether it was religious or economic behavior, unity was
achieved through common experiences, under the auspices of a state that was, at least
rhetorically, both the agent responsible for creating, and the guardian of, a unified
Empire.
It is into this framework that Diocletian’s Edict may be placed.229 The Edict is a
perfect example of compulsory participation in an empire-wide effort tied into the
promotion of a universal moral standard. In this case, it was ostensibly intended to curtail
the freedom of greedy merchants and lower prices for all citizens, and particularly those
in need, with the ideal example presented as soldiers.230 As with the unity presented as
arising from a common religion, the example of the military is hardly accidental. The
Edict presents the soldiers as working tirelessly following orders to defend the state. The
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earliest lines stress that peace has been won with “much sweat,” which can only be
identified as coming from the military, who successfully secured the borders of the
empire against foreign threats.231
Though obviously coming from a very different perspective, Lactantius’
complaints demonstrate the acceptance of this portion of the Edict’s position. Lactantius
states: Haec quoque <quomodo> tolerari possunt quae ad exhibendos milites spectant,
“Can even these things be tolerated which they try for maintaining the soldiers?” While
Lactantius continues on to turn the issue of morality against Diocletian, throwing avaritia
back in the emperor’s face, the issue of the military, and its protection, is rhetorical
territory that he cedes.232 The Edict presents this point as a fundamental common ground.
It operates on the assumption that the necessity of caring for the army was a belief that
would be shared by all citizens, and it knows that few, if any, would side with merchants
over soldiers. Morally, the latter were, mostly, above suspicion,233 while the former were
believed, by general consensus, to be greedy, self-interested, and outside the normal
boundaries of Roman mores through a construction of a stereotype that included
foreignness, immorality, and a suspicious lack of community.234
It is in light of these kinds of moral judgments, which often transcend the texts
themselves, that we can return to the skepticism that Ammianus had about Julian’s

231

Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs, 212.
This line has been emended numerous times, as it has been deemed inappropriate for the historical
context, however, it is not unbelievable that Lactantius should allow this much to Diocletian, following the
civil and foreign wars of the previous fifty years and his own knowledge of the conflicts that led to the end
of the Tetrarchy. Christensen, Lactantius the Historian, 16ff. argues for Lactantius’ full awareness of this
historical context.
233
With some notable exceptions, such as Malalas 12.38, and, of course, depending on whose perspective
is taken, see: Bang, The Roman Bazaar, 229–38.
234
See chapter five for a full discussion of this collection of stereotypes.
232

111
legislation at Antioch and Lactantius’ firm belief that Diocletian was only attempting to
enforce maximum prices to support his own greed. Both of these perspectives are
revealing of an important element of the reception of legislation: no one asks if a ruler
“means” his legislation about taxation; no one is concerned about the sincerity of an
emperor’s regulation of the military. Both contemporaries and historians place these
kinds of laws in a different category from the Edict. Tax law, military reform, and most
legislation, in general, does not adopt a stance of moral superiority or demand any kind of
social or cultural adjustment. As a result, there is no equivalent statement of doubt about
imperial intentions. Yet, we see these same concerns raised about the Constitutio
Antoniniana that we see with the Prices Edict. Cassius Dio states that, though it seemed
that Caracalla was honoring the Roman people by adding new citizens, the edict was, in
fact, entirely about taxation.235 Dio undercuts the message that the emperor was spreading
and states that, in his view, this law was about greed, rather than honor.
Dio and Ammianus, if not Lactantius, had little reason to be concerned about the
“real” reasons for other kinds of imperial legislation. Similarly, the emperors did not need
the kind of rhetorical posturing that is evident in the preface to the Edict and among other
kinds of hortatory legislation. The, at times dramatic, justifications of these kinds of laws
anticipate the push back they often received and seek to broadcast sincerity in a way that
is not necessary in other contexts. In each case, there was a goal to the legislation beyond
the moral, but the emperors were careful to stress the latter far more than the former

Cassius Dio, Epitome of Book LXXVIII, 9.4, “This was why he made all the people in his empire Roman
citizens; nominally he was honoring them, but really to increase his revenues, since foreigners did not have
to pay most of these taxes.”
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because their aims were of importance for practical or propagandistic reasons, or, in
many cases, both.

Rhetoric Translated:
The question remains: if the Edict was meant to present a moral message, and
assert the moral authority of the emperors, as well as trying to enforce a new rubric for
prices, how were those intentions translated in practice? Lactantius’ report about the
failure and repeal of the Edict looms large at this moment, as does Ammianus’ view of
the futility of price fixing. However, in the case of the Edict we have several small
glimpses into the process whereby the rhetoric of the Edict was repackaged for its main
audience, the provinciales of the empire.236
The epigraphic transmission of the Edict has received a lot of attention. Crawford
termed the Edict “Diocletian’s jigsaw puzzle,”237 and the effort to reconstruct its details
from fragments spanning two languages and more than forty locations have produced a
text that is itself open to interpretation at many points.238 The promulgation of the Edict
in Latin and its subsequent translation, in some locations, provides us with one entry
point into understanding the text’s reception. There are several impulses we may see on
the part of the agents of the state here, and it is worth working through each in turn.
First, there are the locations that promulgated the Edict in the form in which it
was issued. Six locations preserved the preface and the prices of the Edict in the original
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Latin without any translation.239 There is no evidence to suggest that the people of these
cities had any particular facility with Latin, leaving us to question how accessible the
Edict was for most of the population. Of course, we must be mindful of oral transmission,
public announcements and word-of-mouth reporting, but a publicly inscribed document
in a language known only by a few does not lend itself to consumption, even in a
predominantly oral culture.240 Whoever was responsible for the inscriptions was likely
more concerned with transmitting the exact word of the emperor and inscribing its
massive extent than with how it would be received. This was an impulse that was
grounded well in the reality of Roman law, where the word of the emperor held special
status, but this form of the inscription was unlikely to have communicated that word
particularly effectively.
Four additional locations, all in mainland Greece, provide the text of the preface
in Latin, but translate the list of goods into Greek.241 This seems a functional
compromise, leaving the possibility that an educated, or determined, reader could delve
into the message of the emperor, but that the general population could use the list as a
public reference, regardless of their fluency in Latin. Similarly, three other sites provide
Greek translations of the goods with a translation of the first, explanatory line of the list
into Greek: [Τί]νας τιμὰς ἑκάστου εἴδους ο[ὐδ]ενὶ ἐξέσται ὑπερβαίνειν ὑποτέτακται,
“The prices for individual items which may be exceed by no person are listed below.”242
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This translation does not provide any mention of penalties, which are included in the
preface, not the main text, but stresses the importance of obedience with these prices,
which is a practical approach to the Edict: its most important features are transmitted in
an accessible language and the rest was deemed functionally irrelevant. Details could
wait until infractions were reported.
Interestingly, and finally, fragments of Greek translations of the list of goods
have been found at a further seventeen locations, without evidence of an explanatory
heading of any kind. While it is possible that, in many of these cases, this is an accident
of preservation, it is possible that these communities transmitted the details of the Edict
orally, with the inscribed list serving as a reference, rather than a full record of the law. It
remains unclear to us how the meaning of the list was transmitted. It is possible that an
underlying oral culture in Roman law circulated the details, that the Edict was announced
in some public fashion and word of mouth carried its provisions, more or less accurately,
through the community. This process would have led to the use and reuse of the law, both
in contexts for which it had been intended, as well as in situations that the state could not
have anticipated. Alternately, the details may have been kept by officials, who revealed
penalties and provisions as they deemed fit as a means of displaying their authority over
the marketplace.
Whatever the case, these differences are reflective of an administrative reality:
local practice and enforcement was diverse and somewhat unpredictable. For the
emperors, this meant that their intentions were often only realized if local officials saw
fit. In many of the inscriptions of the Edict, Diocletian’s message about avarice and his
accusations against merchants were not available to the general population. The
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justifications and moral urgings were received by officials, who sometimes decided that
these points did not have to be included in the public inscription.
These officials were local figures who, perhaps, had a more practical approach to
what could be enforced in reality or had an interest in transmitting the law in a particular
way to serve personal interests or simply to save time. Translation into Greek in primarily
Greek-speaking areas was one means of ensuring that the message was heard, but the
translation was only the first level of mediation, which was often combined with an
editorial process of determining what needed to be included and what could be safely left
out. This process may have saved money on inscribing an extensive document or may
have imposed a different lens upon a text that the state had intended to be read in a
particular way.
This editing and translation process is to be expected with the promulgation of a
document of this length, but there are certainly other processes that accompanied the
transmission of the Edict and other imperial laws. Local officials not only had to handle
the physical translation and editing of these documents but had to determine the best way
to present the law and their own relation to it. We have a single example, but a powerful
one, of an alternate means of presenting the Edict, from Aezani in Phrygia. In this city,
the Edict was left in Latin, but the preface was not inscribed. As noted above, this was
not unusual, but uncharacteristically the governor of the province of Phrygia-Caria,
Fulvius Asticus,243 appended a short statement in Greek to the end of the Edict. This

First published in Crawford and Reynolds, “The Publication of the Prices Edict”; emended text by
Oliver, “The Governor’s Edict at Aezani after the Edict of Prices”; with the preferred text being Lewis,
“The Governor’s Edict at Aizanoi.” The following text is emended for punctuation.
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document is a vital example of how imperial edicts were mediated through local agents of
the state.
Fulvius Asticus writes the following:
Φούλβιος Ἀστικὸς ὁ διασημοτατος ἡγεμων vac. λέγ[ει]·
κὰι τοῦτο τῆς θείας προμηθείας λέγον τῶν ἀηττήτων
καὶ πάντα ν̣εικών̣τω
̣ ̣ν δε̣σ̣π̣οτῶ̣ν ἡμῶν βα̣σ̣ι̣λ̣έω
̣ ̣ν̣ τ̣ε̣
καὶ Καισάρων εὐχέ̣ρ̣ειαν β̣ίου, ἱνα τῶν ὠνίων̣ [ca. 5]ρ̣ια
̣ ς κ̣α̣ταστάσης ἐν τειμαῖς δ̣ι[κ]αίαι̣ς̣ κα[ὶ] ῥ̣ητα̣ῖς̣ ̣ [ca. 7]α̣ι̣ς̣ τ̣ὸ̣ αὐτ̣ο̣ ἦ̣ ἀνθρώποις ἅ̣πασιν καὶ δι' ὑπερβάλλουσαν ὁ̣ρ̣μην καὶ φιλαργυρίαν
τινῶν ἀπορεῖν τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀνανκαίων μηδένα, ἁπάσης περικοπείσης ἐνθυμή̣σεως πανούργου, ἵσην καὶ ὡρισμ vac. ένην τὴ̣ν ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστοις τετάχθαι τειμήν. ὁπερ ἱνα παραφυλ vac. {λ}άττηται καὶ δι' ἁπαντος α<ἰ>ῶν{ν}ος μένῃ τῇ θειότητι
αὐτῶν προνενόε̣ιται, ἀλλ' ἵνα και ὑμαῖ{ι}ν δῆλον καταστῇ σὺν
{σ̣υ̣ν̣} ἐπιμελείᾳ{ς} πάσῃ τοῦ θείου δια̣τάγμα̣τος τοῦ ἐ̣πὶ τῆι τειμῇ
τῶν τε ὠνίων καὶ συναλλαγμάτων δοθώντος νόμου τὸ ἀντίγραθον μετὰ τοῦ προσήκοντος σεβάσματος τοῦδε μου τοῦ διατάγματος προτεταγμένον φαίνεται. Proponatur.
15
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Fulvius Asticus, the most eminent governor, declares:
This, too, is said to be the divine foresight of our invincible and all-conquering
lords, the Emperors and Caesars for the necessities of life:
In order that, with an [abund]ance of goods for sale established at fair, fixed
prices, (the cost) may be the same for all men and no one lack necessities because
of the excessive aggressiveness and greed of some, since all villainy will be
foiled, a fair and limited price has been set for every kind of thing.
In order that this is preserved and remain through all time, has been provided for
by their divinity, but in order that it become clear also to you with all care, a copy
of the divine edict of the law on the price of goods for sale and contracts appears,
displayed with the proper reverence above this edict of mine. [In Latin] Let it be
published.244
There are clear elements of the Edict’s preface included here. Asticus clearly read the full
document and knew enough to include references to the military might of the emperors
and to put emphasis on greed as a motivating factor for high prices. Interestingly absent
from the Edict, but present here, is the stress on the divinity of the emperors. Its phrasing

My translation, based on Oliver, “The Governor’s Edict at Aezani after the Edict of Prices.” and Lewis,
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hints at the other kinds of laws mentioned above and lends strength to the case of the
Edict being one of MacMullen’s “hortatory laws.” Asticus’ version asks for obedience to
the law through divine right. Thus, it participates in a long tradition of building state
unity through common religious practice and taps into different strains of imperial
propaganda. While it is an instance of creative license, Asticus is clearly in an active
position, helping to shape the view of the Empire in a way that would not have been
expected by the imperial center. For Asticus’ purposes, it is possible that he felt this
version provided a better motivation to the people than that chosen by the emperors.
What is vital here, however, is the particular way that the provisions of the edict
are reframed. Asticus states that the Edict is necessary because of the aggressiveness and
greed, ὁρμην καὶ φιλαργυρίαν, of certain men. The equivalence between φιλαργυρία and
avaritia is straightforward enough,245 but ὁρμη is without a parallel in the Edict. Its
inclusion suggests the Asticus had a practical conception of the consequences of high or
contested prices in the marketplace. Aggression or, perhaps more accurately, assault,246
would have been a pressing concern for an administrator, even more so than high prices
themselves, as is evident in the findings of Erdkamp and others.247
In examining the rioting attached to food shortages and high food prices,
Erdkamp has demonstrated that there were, at times, cases of life-threatening violence.
Rioters on several recorded instances took up stones against officials and those believed
to have power over the food supply. The case of Commodus’ price fixing, mentioned

Another option was πλεονεξία, but φιλαργυρία is the more common form. Lewis believes that this text
may be a translation from Fulvius’ own Latin edict, thus the link between avaritia and φιλαργυρία may
have been explicit.
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above, is recorded very simply and briefly in the Historia Augusta, but it is given more
detail in Herodian and Cassius Dio. In these versions, blame for the shortage is attributed
to an imperial freedman, Cleander, who was in control of the food supply and hoarded up
public grain. Herodian’s version is the most telling:
ἐπέσχε δὲ κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ λιμὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐξ αἰτίας τοιαύτης. Κλέανδρός τις ἦν, τὸ
μὲν γένος Φρύξ... ὑπὸ δὲ πλούτου καὶ τρυφῆς ἀνεπείσθη καὶ πρὸς βασιλείας
ἐπιθυμίαν. ἀθροίζων δὲ χρήματα καὶ πλεῖστον σῖτον συνωνούμενος καὶ
ἀποκλείων, ἤλπιζε<ν> ὑπάξεσθαι τόν τε δῆμον καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, εἰ πρῶτον ἐν
σπάνει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καταστήσας ἐπιδόσεσι λαμπραῖς ἁλόντας πόθῳ τοῦ
χρειώδους προσαγάγοιτο... οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι ἀπεχθῶς ἔχοντες πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν
δεινῶν τὰς αἰτίας ἐς ἐκεῖνον ἀναφέποντες μισοῦντές τε αὐτου- τὸ ἀκεόρεστον τῆς
τοῦ πλούτον ἐπιθυμίας, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐν θεάτροις συνιστάμενοι κατὰ πλήθη
κακῶς ἠγόρευον, καὶ τὸ τελειταῖον, διάγοντος ἐν προστείῳ τοῦ Κομόδου,
ἐπελθόντες πανδημεὶ ἐβόων καὶ τὸν Κλέανδρον ἐς θάνατον ᾔτουν.
For the same reasons, famine held the city at that time. It was a certain Cleander,
a Phrygian, who was responsible… he was misled by his wealth and extravagance
and a desire for power. And so, gathering money, he bought up most of the grain
and hoarded it. He hoped to lead the people and the army. If at the first sign of the
intentional scarcity he made a donation of grain, he would gain the support of the
people in their suffering from the shortage… But the Romans hated him and
traced the sources of their difficulties to him and especially hated his unceasing
desire for wealth. First, banding together in the theater, they harangued him
abusively, and later, going in a group to Commodus and shouting, they demanded
Cleander be put to death. 248
Herodian then describes how both the cavalry and infantry stationed around Rome took
sides in the ensuing conflict. Some defended Cleander while others sided with the mob.
Cleander’s execution was undertaken at Commodus’ order, though, according to
Herodian, the mob later killed Cleander’s family and all his friends on its own
initiative.249 Most interesting, however, is the interplay between Cleander’s attempted
coup, his bid for popularity and power, and his manipulation of the grain supply. His
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hoarding is not described as the typical greedy action of a wealthy man hoping to make a
profit by manipulating a market prices, but as a calculated ploy to claim favor by
manufacturing a crisis and then resolving it.
In Cassius Dio’s version of events it was actually the grain commissioner,
Papirius Dionysius, who manufactured the crisis to bring about the destruction of
Cleander, adding a potential layer to the story.250 Regardless, Commodus’ quickness in
punishing Cleander is striking. Herodian implies and Cassius Dio directly states that
Commodus acted out of fear in his execution of Cleander,251 that the unrest genuinely
worried him.252 We can imagine that the threat of this kind of violence was concerning to
all administrators, whose own personal safety was commonly on the line in such
situations. While Asticus’ concern about ορμή does not appear in Diocletian’ Edict,
which has an understandable interest in presenting the Empire as a generally peaceful
place because of the diligence of the emperors, Asticus’ view may reflect a more realistic
understanding of what could go wrong on ground in a province.
In particular, Asticus names excessive ορμή as a threat to peaceful society. This
qualifier, ὑπερβάλλουσαν, suggests something that Erdkamp has highlighted, that the
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conflicts regarding grain and its price were part of a moral economy that included a social
contract.253 Grain was supposed to be available at reasonable prices and rioting, unrest,
and civil disturbance was the natural and expected response to failure. Thus, a certain
amount of tension was acceptable, part of a warning system to the administration that
matters required their attention, as long as it was not taken to an “excessive” level and did
not turn truly violent, requiring the intervention of a more senior official or, in an extreme
case, action from the emperor and his military.
However, what is most interesting in these kinds of narratives is that the rioters
lay blame on officials and prominent men, and not, generally, on merchants.254 The Edict
is explicit that greedy merchants were responsible high for prices, yet it seems that
merchants were not generally the target of mob anger.255 Asticus is slightly cagier in his
framing of the problem, perhaps demonstrating that the Edict’s accusation was not a
universally held belief. He first attributes greed to τινῶν, certain people, and, though his
implication seems clear in light of the Edict, he merely goes on to call for an end to
πανούργος. This is a challenging term, meaning, perhaps most neutrally, “the willingness
to do anything,” but more accurately something like, “lack of proper scruples.” The
implication, in an economic setting, is men who are greedy to the point of immorality. 256
Asticus, however, does not name merchants explicitly. His goal may have been to avoid
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offending people he was charged to rule over and work with, but its effect captured some
of the Edict’s rhetoric without preserving its uncompromising stance against merchants.
Yet the most obvious difference between Asticus’ words and the Edict itself
regards the exact provision of the law. Scholarly attention has focused on this difference,
the line drawn between Diocletian’s “maximum price,” and Asticus’ “just” or “fixed
price.”257 Everyone who has worked on the Aezani copy of the Edict has noted it,258 with
some, like Bowman, stressing the inaccuracy of the just or fixed prices over any possible
intention.259 Two scholars together open up a way forward when considering why Asticus
would have deviated from the message of the preface so dramatically.
Lewis notes that the Edict stresses the importance of maximum prices too heavily
for it to have been possible for Asticus to miss it. While he continued on to insist that
Asticus’ choice of language, ὡρισμένος, should not be translated as “fixed” but rather
“limited,”260 it is not necessary to be worried by Asticus’ choice to deviate from imperial
will in this matter, or to draw such a firm line between these two translations. The reading
of “fixed” does not indicate stupidity on Asticus’ part or a sign that he had “gone rogue”
from the message of the state. Further, “limited” need not be a direct rendering of
Diocletian’s request for a maximum price. In fact, more telling is the repetition of the
binary pair in the text, first at line 5, δ̣ι[κ]αίαι̣ς̣ κα[ὶ] ῥ̣ητα̣ῖ̣ς,̣ and then at 8-9, ἵσην καὶ
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ὡ/ρισμ(vac.)ένην. Asticus’ repetition is more rhetorical than it is a clear rendering of
legal specifics. The language shows variatio and the stress is on fairness, a common
theme of discussions surrounding price,261 and on control, not on the application of the
law as a maximum or a mandated price.
In fact, Diocletian’s own language echoes Asticus’ binaries. Lines 108-111 of the
text specify that the Edict gives non pretia... sed modum, a modus, a measure or limit, not
a maximum. The specification of a maximum is never actually given in the preface. The
first, much reconstructed, line reads [Quae pr]etia [singularum specierum ex]cedere
nemini licitum sit, [i]nfra oste[nditur], “The prices of individual items which no one may
exceed are listed below,” and it is only here the use of the lists are clarified. The fragment
of the Edict from Aezani is broken in such a way that we cannot be certain if it contained
this clarifying line, however, Asticus was not deviating wildly from the preface in
presenting vague provisions. The Edict’s purpose and the intentions of the emperors
remain clear and uncontradicted.
Lewis, Crawford, and others have all recognized similarities between the Aezani
governor’s edict and a fragment of papyrus of the same period, a governor’s statement
attached to an imperial Edict from Egypt.262 That document also preserves an edited text,
not the exact words of the imperial edict on which it is based. It is clear that the governor,
Aristius Optatus, was working from a text that he was charged to publish along with his
own message. Asticus was in the same position. As Lewis argued, he knew the contents
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of the Edict’s preface, but we should not assume that he was without the ability to
interpret and reframe that text under his own agency, or that he was even required to be
exact in rendering its specifics.
Corcoran’s response to Fulvius Asticus’ edict provides us with the key to
understanding how and why a governor might deviate from the text of an imperial edict.
In his opinion, there are two impulses at play with the publication of secondary
gubernatorial edicts: first, these edicts had the power to encourage the wider
dissemination and publication of the imperial law, and second, and importantly clear in
the actions of Asticus, is the ability of the governor to mediate, interpret, and repackage
imperial commands.263
The greatest concentration of fragments of the Edict have been found in the
territory controlled by Asticus, and it is likely that, for whatever reason, Asticus was a
particularly keen supporter of this legislation.264 It is possible that the circumstances of
Phrygia-Caria were such that Asticus believed that the Edict was a useful tool. Asticus,
like other governors and even more local officials, had knowledge of how he could best
interact with his local population, or at least had access to this knowledge through his
staff, which was a standing force in the province that maintained continuity between
governors. Asticus’ edict is an enthusiastic endorsement of the Edict but uses a mode of
rhetoric more suitable for his territories. He stresses that the Edict was a product of the
goodwill of the divine emperors and carried out for the specific well-being of the people,
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a point also made in the Egyptian governor’s edict.265 While this message appears in a
roundabout way in the Edict itself,266 as Corcoran and others have noted, Asticus is more
enthusiastic and forceful in presenting the Edict as being for the benefit of the people. He
says it directly: the law was issued, “so that (the cost) may be the same for all men and
that no one lack necessities,”267 and he chooses not to name a specific culprit behind the
legislation to avoid alienating anyone.
In light of this kind of mediation of imperial rhetoric, the choice to express the
provisions of the Edict as fixed, rather than maximum prices makes more sense. If
Asticus chose to soften the blow that the Edict directed against merchants, then it is only
sensible to assume that he recognized, as other men of learning had already done, that
maximum prices would not solve the problems of supply and inflation.268 While fixed
prices were subject to the same kinds of economic problems that maximums faced,
Asticus’ phrasing hints that he understood that the prices would function as guidelines,
not upper limits. It seems that his edict envisions these prices operating as a starting
point, and that they could set the bar lower for the starting cost of goods and be a
reference that customers could point to in negotiations. This is evident in the absence of
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any mention of the punishment for exceeding these prices. In fact, punishment is wholly
absent from the extant copy of the Edict at Aezani as well Asticus’ personal statement.
Yet, for Asticus, this was not the central to what he wanted the Edict to do in his
territories. Rather, and thus far unremarked upon in scholarship, Asticus stresses one
important thing that he imagines that the Edict will achieve: prices that are τὸ αὐτὸ ἦ
ἀνθρώποις ἁπασιν.269 The text of Asticus’ inscription is corrupted just before this portion,
but no similar phrase appears in the Edict. In fact, the implication that all men should
have the same price for goods is demonstrably absent from market contexts in antiquity.
Though understudied, bargaining was a common, even ubiquitous practice in the Roman
Empire.270 Asticus’ reinterpretation of the Edict imagines that all prices will now be the
same, or at least similar, for everyone, that there will be a single market price that
everyone will have equal access to. In its own way, this statement is as great, or an even
greater intervention into market practice as the establishment of maximums for prices,
and Asticus’ choice to try to control this element of merchant activity is both ambitious
and, ultimately, unenforceable.
Yet, if all customers, regardless of status, could appeal to the prices of the Edict as
a common point of negotiation, then the Edict would have the effect of leveling the
playing field. While it might not set a single, fixed price that all would pay, it would have
a very real impact upon who had access to what prices. Negotiation, generally, had a
component of trickery, of outwitting one’s business partner for the best price, and
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removing that component had social implications.271 It seems that Asticus was suggesting
a more egalitarian model of exchange, one that moved beyond personal greed and market
pressures toward an even economic playing field. The Edict was unable to enforce such a
novel method and certainly could not undo centuries of commercial habits that were
integrated with social status, but, like the emperors, Asticus’ words seem to want to
control more than just prices.

Merchant Implications:
The report of Lactantius suggests that both Diocletian and Asticus misjudged
what they could actually enforce, and that the Edict, whether mediated by governors or
not, was received by merchants with violence and withdrawal from mainstream markets.
In short, Lactantius’ narrative claims that the Edict led to riots, strikes, and a thriving
black market. It is obvious that Lactantius had many reasons to exaggerate issues given
Diocletian’s persecution of the Christians, and, while he is a contemporary of the Edict,
there is no reason suppose that he was in a position to be an eyewitness to the effects of
the Edict, since no copies of the Edict have been found near Nicomedia, where Lactantius
was a teacher of rhetoric.272
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Nevertheless, given the, at times, different intentions that emperors and officials
had for the legislation, what was the actual effect of this legislation on merchants? Other
examples of price fixing, listed above, give us some means to corroborate Lactantius’
perspective, and judge the feasibility of a strike and black-market activity in the Roman
Empire. These are interrelated processes, and one does not negate the possibility of the
other, but it is important to note the distinction as well as question the possibility. On the
one hand, could merchants choose to hold onto their goods and hoard them until the
market settled, and on the other, could merchants form or find secondary, illegal markets
for their goods?
In the first case, we have the example of Commodus, and the claim that there was
a direct relationship between fixed prices and a growing scarcity of goods.273 Hoarding is
well-attested, and was certainly a problem for the state, but from a merchant perspective
there were benefits and risks to hoarding. While holding on to goods could potentially
secure a greater price, the most commonly hoarded material, according to our evidence,
was grain, a product that, while reasonably hardy if stored correctly, was nevertheless
under threat from moisture and heat, which caused spoiling.274 While water- and air-tight
containers could be used to protect the goods, merchants were nevertheless dealing in
perishables, so going on strike depends on the product as well as the merchant’s patience
in outlasting the demands of the state.
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Yet, the example of the Arles-Beirut inscription also makes the possibility of a
merchant strike appear plausible.275 If merchants could collectively bargain through the
threat of striking, then there is no reason that those same techniques could not be applied
to instances of price fixing. Even if the strike was not formally organized, or in some way
sponsored by an association, as long as enough merchants withdrew their goods from the
marketplace, or threatened to, there could be a corresponding demonstration by the
people of the city: vocal dissent, unrest, and even violence or riots.
On the other hand, Julian says that the goods he sent to supply Antioch were sold
on the black market, which suggests that merchants did not always feel the need to wait,
and that, where there was demand, an outlet for goods developed.276 This was clearly a
possible, if not necessarily typical, circumstance. Legislation appears from the reign of
Valentinian shows that furtiva negotiatio was still a threat to public revenue at that time:
Inter cetera, quibus perennitatis nostrae mansurum saeculis ordinamus imperium,
hoc quoque et aerarii nostri commoda tueri posse, salubri suggestione probamus,
quod maiestate nostrae sancimus oraculo, ne ulterius furtiva negotiatio et claris
urbibus rarum faciat mercatorem, et obscuris ac reconditis locis in damnum
publicae functionis lateat turba mercantum, Floriane, frater amantissime.
Idcirco illustris auctoritas tua pragmatici nostri tenore comperto sciat, iuxta
suggestionem suam omnes, qui declinatis urbibus per vicos portusque quamplures
possessionesque diversas exercent negotiationis officium, pro aerarii nostri
commoditate retinendos, ut secundum modum, quem iustitia suaserit, aurariam
functionem cogantur agnoscere: gravis mulctae condemnatio proposita his, qui
huius modi negotiatores in fiscale dispendium putaverint contuendos. Aequum
enim est, eum, qui praeceptis nostris crediderit obviandum, facultatum suarum
subire discrimen.
Among the other things by which we bring order to the empire of our eternity,
which is destined to remain for centuries, we approve this regulation also, we
deem that this (regulation) too, be a wholesome addition, is also able to protect
the needs of our treasury, and we sanction it by the oracle the oracle of our
majesty that no longer should secret business make the merchant rare in the
275
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outstanding cities and a crowd of traders hide in covert places to the detriment of
public revenue, Florianus, dearest brother.
Therefore, let your noble authority will learn the tenor of our decree and know,
according to its suggestion that all who have been avoiding the cities, practicing
the business of trade through the villages and many ports and various places, are
to be held liable to the interests of our treasury, so that according to the measure
which justice will persuade, they will be compelled to recognize the gold tax. The
condemnation of a heavy fine is imposed for those who think such traders should
be protected to the loss of the treasury. For it is just that he who believes that he
may oppose our commands undergoes a risk to his own property.277
The language of the law cannot disguise the fact that there was a real concern that
merchants were endangering the funds available to the state. Florianus, the count of the
imperial largesses, seems to have reported to the emperors that merchants were avoiding
the cities as a way of avoiding taxation and the emperors acted to demand the payment of
the tax. The second half of the law describes a fine applicable to any who attempt to
protect merchants from their tax duties, which suggests that there were individuals,
patrons or peers, who may have attempted to protect merchants from the state.278 This
kind of patronage requires further attention, but it is interesting that the emperors
anticipate this as a likely problem and plan ahead for how to punish those who would
intervene against its wishes.
However, one of the most revealing aspects of this law is its presentation of the
interconnectivity between state finances and urban settlements. Valentinian is concerned
that slow market activity in cities will lead to a reduction in tax income. He judges that
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trading in villages and smaller ports represents a desire to evade state control. Beyond
suggesting that the state lacked a firm hold on the countryside, which is in itself
interesting, the law suggests that merchants who typically plied their trade in urban
settings were perfectly able to relocate, if state intervention became too oppressive.
This seems to have been especially true of the later period, following Diocletian,
when Constantine’s lustral tax was levied against merchants. However, the attestation of
black-market activity at any point lends further plausibility to goods being pulled from
the market under Diocletian. The black market was a viable option, though, as with
hoarding, there were reasons for merchants to act with caution. The Edict punished
buyers who made purchases above the established prices, as well as sellers, which would
have acted as mutual insurance to black-market merchants that their buyer would not turn
them over, but there were still risks attached to illegal sales, such as fines or
confiscations. Furthermore, secret transactions that needed to take place outside of major
markets may have involved travel that, for reasons of finance or transportation, may not
have been feasible. Still, these sales took place, even if it meant relocating to the
countryside, as demonstrated by the law of Valentinian above.279
Again, we are faced with the very real possibility of merchant agency having
consequences for the state. Above we briefly mentioned that Julian took this into
account, when he called together farmers, manufacturers, and shopkeepers.280 In this
context, it seems that Julian wanted to appear to be including merchants in the dialogue
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regarding prices to prevent any of the common consequences. This is not to suggest that
Julian was actually willing to listen to the needs of merchants, or that this episode was
even of particular importance to his activities in Antioch, but he did recognize that the
obedience, and the appearance of cooperation and involvement, however staged, of
merchants would be useful in promulgating a successful price fixing law. Those he
singled out, likely a subset of wealthier merchants, could not have refused to meet with
the emperor, but it was also in their own interest to be seen as cooperative with efforts to
alleviate high prices. All those who were involved and appeared to be working toward a
solution managed to displace the blame for high prices onto others. In the end, Libanius’
account directs blame, not against those Julian met with, but rather against the members
of the city council, who opposed the measure and hoarded their own goods.281 By
participating in the dialogue, merchants managed to escape the kinds of accusations that
Diocletian had levelled against them.
Like Julian, Diocletian anticipated these possibilities, though in different ways.
The preface of the Edict concludes with the punishments to be inflicted on those who
break the law. It is commonly noted that capital punishment is used against those selling
at a price higher than those listed in the Edict, but less common is discussion of the
following two provisions: that anyone “conspiring” with the seller to buy at a higher price
than stipulated by the Edict, and anyone who withdraws goods from the market must also
die.282 The former is a somewhat blurred reference to a black-market sale, while the latter
criminalizes the withdrawal of goods from the market place, hoarding. In both cases, the
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Edict moralizes about the severity of these crimes. On the one hand the buyer
“conspires,” conparandi cupiditate, specifically with the greed, avaritia, of the
merchant,283 while on the other hand, the one who goes on strike is even more guilty
since he is inducing poverty, inferentis paenuriam, which is even worse than charging
more than he ought to.284
The Edict is explicit in forbidding these things and explicit about the penalties
that awaited those who broke the law. Yet Lactantius seems to suggest that all the things
that were feared by the Edict came to pass. The Edict says that the one who withdraws
goods from the market is the cause of poverty, while Lactantius reports that merchants
acted metu, from fear, by withholding goods.285 Lactantius reports bloodshed, too, which
may be interpreted one of two ways: either that the state followed through on its
threatened punishment, or the shortages led to conflicts in the marketplaces, or to riots.
The latter seems most likely, since Lactantius would have played up any repressive
violence from Diocletian, and it suggests that merchants were able to force matters to a
breaking point through their disobedience.
Whether or not Lactantius’ details are exact, it is clear that he felt that there was a
connection between the failure of the law and the emptying of the marketplaces, an action
that can only be attributed to the conscious action of Roman merchants. They were the
targets of this intervention, labelled by the state as greedy, self-interested monsters who
threatened the peace of the Empire, and the evidence suggests that they were able to
respond to these accusations. Furthermore, we can say that, in some cases at least, the
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state took into account that merchants were not without means to react to the intervention
of the state, whether by expressly forbidding the actions they were likely to take or by
including merchants in the conversation about price fixing.

Conclusions:
The discussion above has taken us seemingly a long way from the professed
intention of the chapter: market intervention and how it affected merchants. Yet this
extended case study has opened up possibilities. We may now say a great deal more
about both intervention and merchant agency than we could before. The evidence
presented above is clear that the state did intervene in the operation of the marketplace, at
least in major urban centers. These interventions were undertaken for a variety of
reasons, many of which were not directly economic. While hoarding and related riots
were an economic, political, and social threat to the state, legislation dealing with prices
rarely highlighted these dangers. Instead, Diocletian’s Edict on Maximum Prices,
following the example of a small, but influential, corpus of legislation, stresses the need
to protect the moral principles of the Empire. The legislation presents the emperor as the
guardian of mores and the punisher of those who would harm the Roman people.
The position is remarkable in and of itself, but its framing in the Prices Edict
immediately puts merchants at a disadvantage, which leads to a natural question of what
the consequences of that rhetoric might be for those citizens. Based on our evidence, in
many cases, this rhetoric was at least partially inaccessible, either through editorial
choices or through lack of translation. These and subsequent choices about the
publication and promulgation of interventions into the market were made by provincial
and local magistrates, who acted on their own initiative about what the most effective and
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important elements of these imperial documents were, even if it meant deviating from the
original and stated intentions.
These local decisions and local variations will continue to be stressed in the next
chapter, where we will see merchants directly engaging with these officials. However, in
this chapter, we have seen that, regardless of this mediation, merchants were not without
means to react to imperial intervention when it took place. They had a limited number of
choices, restricted in part by their own needs for profit and safety, but they exercised
what agency they had and retained the ability to affect real change. Even the emperor’s
voice, as shown in the case of Julian at Antioch, was only one among a group of others,
and while his is most clearly preserved, we are not without evidence to demonstrate that
other voices also had efficacy.
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CHAPTER 3: Tolls and Customs
The previous chapter has pointed out the key role of provincial and regional
officials as mediators between the imperial state and merchants. It has shown how
imperial legislation was interpreted and reinterpreted to fit into regional contexts and best
serve the population that was known better by those on the ground than it was by the
distant figure of the emperor. It remains to examine these dynamics at the truly local
level, between magistrates, appointed at the urban, or even market, level, and merchants
who operated in the same, small communities. It is at this level that we begin to access
the kinds of typical, “low commerce” that Horden and Purcell sought to illuminate, and at
which we can begin to access the lives of specific individuals and how they adjusted to
the challenges of working with, and even against, the agents of the Roman state.
In an effort to access local practices and simultaneously reflect experiences that
were shared across more than a single community, this chapter will undertake a thorough
examination of the most frequent point of contact between merchants and the state: the
extraction of customs duties at border crossings both within and at the fringes of the
empire. Physical meetings between merchants and local officials at customs houses and
in market places are well attested and provide us with concrete examples of how the state
engaged with individuals. Further, the evidence from such contexts demonstrates that the
imperial government held little practical control over such proceedings. This chapter will
show that these transactions were always local in character, that the forms of the
interaction arose, often, from micro-regional habits, and that the exact circumstances
were always dependent upon the personalities involved. Though the state produced
legislation regarding tolls and set, in some cases, affiliated officials to preside over their
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collection, the government remained largely separate from these practices, and was
content to retain rhetorical control over matters while allowing the expense and hassle of
collection to rest on others, often privately contracted collectors.
The details of customs duties will be examined in three sections. First, imperial
legislation will be analyzed, particularly with respect to its points of consistency and
inconsistency. This will ultimately reinforce the conclusion that, while scholarship has
attempted to produce a full system of law from the evidence we have, it is more likely
that the state acted in an ad hoc fashion with regard to customs, only potentially
developing a more coherent “policy” when the laws were codified under Theodosius and
Justinian.286 In the second section, local laws will be discussed, to demonstrate, even in
the event that the 5th and 6th century codes did represent an intended system for the
collection of tolls, that local practice in the 2nd through 4th centuries CE was diverse and
accepted as such by the state. Finally, this chapter will present an essential point with
regard to state-merchant, and generally state-citizen, interaction: the state was a
personalized entity for those who interacted with it. Namely, the agents of the state
constituted the state for most people, and, consequently, the actions of state agents, and
the relationships those individuals had with their local communities, were of central
importance to how the state was viewed and how its “economic policy” was applied.287
Together these points show that the state, at its most common point of contact
with merchants, had little direct control over the daily proceedings of toll collection, and
For a detailed argument about the “system” of Roman law, see chapter one.
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had, accordingly, relinquished a substantial amount of power over its economy to local
actors. The state continued to profit from tolls, but absented itself from the
responsibilities of collection, allowing local laws, habits, and negotiations, rather than
any centralized legislation, to organize and drive customs practices.

Imperial Customs Law:
The system of customs duties, as it has long been understood, was organized into
two main categories: tolls at external borders and tolls at internal borders. These crossing
points charged fees for goods in transit at different percentages, with the rates believed to
have been between 12.5 and 25% for external border crossings and between 2 and 5% for
internal border crossings.288 In all cases, for the majority of the period under
consideration, the state left the assessment and collection, not only of taxes, but also of
customs fees, in the hands of privately contracted agents, τελώναι or publicani,289 who
bid on the amount that they would collect and signed contracts that lasted for at least
three years at a time.290 They paid the state upfront and received permission to collect
what they could, within the bounds of the law.291 This was an ancient system, and one
which had been the source of complaint for a long time.292 Though attempts were made at
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various points to redress the injustice of the system, which encouraged officials to prey
upon Roman merchants,293 the system seems to have endured, with only slight variation,
from Republican times through to Late Antiquity.294
In practice, the state seems to have expected that, with few exceptions, tolls would
be paid by everyone crossing borders, and that travelers would accurately declare what
they carried to the authorities stationed at the crossing.295 Goods that were improperly
reported, or those that were not reported at all, were subject to confiscation, and the
legislation that we have regarding these provisions strongly suggests that, barring a
limited number of explicitly named exceptions,296 the system was meant to be generally
applicable to all individuals and all kinds of goods.
Yet the legal codes of Theodosius and Justinian perhaps present too neat a picture
of the process. Many of the laws that are quoted in these sources were not, and could not
have been, in effect at the same time. The laws of Constantine were not proposed, let
along enforced, until generations after those of the Severan emperors had been issued or
the opinions of the jurists had been given. Nevertheless, the codification of the texts
telescopes this chronological disparity. Though these contexts are often preserved, even
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in the edited texts, they are not highlighted often enough in the scholarship regarding
these matters, leading to a tendency to view these narrowly circumscribed texts as a
monolithic system. As discussed in the first chapter, to take these texts as a clear
systematic vision of the law is to impose a very particular and problematic rationale.297
At best, these laws can be read as a system generated in a particular 5th or 6th century
moment, but we cannot impose that reading on the earlier period.
In fact, when we examine these sources closely, we can see that, both internal to
the codifications and outside them, the supposed system was often little more than a
collection of attempts to resolve individual problems with the customs process. This is
most evident in the case of soldiers, who were, in theory, exempted from customs duties,
which was a valuable perk to service to the empire. Two letters of the mid-4th century
preserved in both the Theodosian and Justinianic Codes demonstrate one problem that
arose as part of an attempt to clarify this right. The emperors Valentinian and Valens
offered an exception for soldiers on tolls in 365 CE:298 Though the substance of the law
was not new, and a parallel rescript exists from the reign of Septimius Severus,299 their
wording was not thoroughly clear. The text referred to “militaria” which, in the late
empire, could refer equally to military personnel and those who held state positions more
generally. The next year this loophole was explicitly closed. No exception was to be
made for those in service of the state, nulla super hoc militarium personarum exceptione
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facienda.300 The passage of a year was a quick turnaround for the Roman authorities,
which was fitting for a potential loss of funds on this scale.
The codifications place these texts side by side and urge us to imagine that the
process of promulgation was seamless from one law to the next, or, if mistakes were
somehow made, that they would be soon and thoroughly corrected. However, it must be
stressed that this was not, even at the most generous reading, how these laws would have
been experienced by the majority of the citizens of the empire. Legal experts would have
sought access to copies of the Code after its promulgation, but few had the resources or
the need to access the law in that form. For most, their knowledge of the law would be
limited by their immediate needs, the laws that had the most direct bearing on their lives,
and their means to access the law, whether that be through oral transmission or through
reading and possibly copying down laws that were inscribed or temporarily posted in
central places. The Codes brought order to these texts, but it is unlikely that they reflected
the most common experience of the law.
In the case of the letters mentioned above, they were not even as easy to
categorize as the above reading has made them seem. The first letter was sent to the
imperial exchequer, the comes sacrarum largitionum, in Milan, as a statement about the
importance of giving specific breaks to those in imperial service. The second, though it
pairs nicely with the first and seems to correct its error, was sent to the count of the
orient, the comes orientis, in Beirut. The subject matter seems to address the same
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problem, but it is not clear if the second is necessarily responding to the first, which the
juxtaposition of the texts in the Justinianic Code suggests, or if this was meant to
represent two separate policies that were dictated by geography, the scale of the
transaction, or some other factor. The ancient editors of the Codes have removed much of
the context that would have explained the specific circumstances that caused the letters to
be written, and the format of the Code disguises the diversity of problems and responses
that evidently faced emperors within the same reign.
The main drive behind the legislation was that individual problems were being
raised and then responded to, and the state had a range of possible answers. In some
cases, the reply was simply that existing laws were sufficient to address particular
concerns, as with the soldier Ingenuus, who was effectively told to calm himself, since
his goods could not be confiscated.301 However, it is not clear, especially given the letters
discussed above, whether this was a legal right that he should have understood, or if this
was a particular benefaction being offered in a special case either to him personally, or to
soldiers generally, but within a timeframe that was limited in some way not appearing in
this text. Septimius Severus comments that he and his son Caracalla were in the habit of
looking after soldiers, omnibus militibus nostris prospeximus, so that they would not have
their property confiscated for failing to report it, ne ob omissas professiones poena
commissi tenerentur, but Ingenuus was apparently not aware of this fact, or, in all
likelihood, he would not have requested a rescript on the matter, suggesting that others
may have been equally ignorant of the law, or of this particular emperor’s opinion on the
matter.

301

CJ IV.61.3 (unprovenanced, possibly Septimius Severus and Caracalla).

142
While there is little reason to doubt that individuals were frequently in ignorance
of the law, it is best to view the situation in the latter light, with much depending on the
position of different emperors, and only interpreted, after the fact, by juristic writers and
the editors of the codifications. These opinions shifted from reign to reign, and, while
they often rested upon the decisions of earlier emperors, they were subject to change at
the discretion of the current ruler, and in light of the circumstances that had prompted the
issuance of the rescript or edict. Thus, whatever “policy” may be identified is likely to be
dependent upon an individual emperor and was subject to change when a new ruler
acceded. Nevertheless, it is clear that the state did develop some positions over time
regarding customs that it issued under various emperors in an attempt to influence
practice or at least to offer a resource to which its enforcers could appeal in instances of
conflict. The existence of this central, idealized law on the subject contributed to the
process of customs collection, though we lack evidence that these laws were ever
enforced exactly.
Direct imperial intervention is relatively difficult to spot in the Codes, where
letters and rescripts seem to have been primarily offered in response to requests for
judgment. Yet we do have sources of law that come to us without the mediation of the
editorial process. Intervention and responses to it have already been treated in the
previous chapter, but, though this chapter addresses local action more fully than imperial,
it must be stated that there were instances where the emperor did act to impose law over
the customs process. Hadrian is a particularly good example in this case. Though he
reigns early in our period, the testimony of the Historia Augusta seems to suggest that he
was a particularly avid proponent of administering justice, especially when it came to
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prosecuting the misdemeanors of his officials.302 Even if Hadrian was more willing to
intervene than his peers, we do not have evidence of him trying to overhaul large parts of
the economic system during his travels. Rather, it seems that his actions with regard to
customs, in particular, were directed very locally.
A law preserved from the Piraeus, probably originating from a letter from
Hadrian, though the first part of the inscription is lost, shows him intervening in a local
toll from Attica, providing fishermen at Eleusis with a special exemption.
[...]Λ[.]ει μετρη[ς...]
δὲ τὴν διοβελίαν [...] α μηδὲ [...τοῖς]
δὲ ἐν Ἐλευσεῖνι ἁλιεῦσιν ἀτέλειαν ἰχθύ[ων εἶναι ὅταν ἐν Ἐλευ-]
σεῖνι ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πιπράσκωσιν, ὡς μὲν ᾗ [εὐθηνία, τὸ δὲ διὰ τὰ]
εἰσαγώγια ὄφελος εἰς μέγα τι ἀπαντήσῃ· τ[οὺς δὲ καπήλους]
καὶ τοὺς παλινκαπηλεύοντας πεπαῦσθ[αι τῆς αἰσχροκερδίας]
βούλομαι ἢ ἔνδειξιν αὐτῶν γείνεσθαι πρ[ὸς τ]ὸν κή̣ρυκα τῆς ἐξ Ἀ
ρείου πάγου βουλῆς· τὸν δὲ εἰσάγειν εἰς το[ὺς Ἀ]ρεοπαγείτας, τοὺς δὲ
τειμᾶν ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι· πιπρασκέ[τω]σαν δὲ πάντα ἢ αὐτοὶ οἱ
κομίζοντες ἢ οἱ πρῶτοι παρ᾿ αὐτῶν ὠνού[με]νοι· τὸ δὲ καὶ τρίτους ὠ
νητὰς γεινομένους τῶν αὐτῶν ὠνίων με[τα]πιπράσκειν ἐπιτείνει
τὰς τειμάς. Ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστολὴν στήλῃ ἐ[ν]γράψαντες ἐν Πειραεῖ
στήσατε πρὸ τοῦ Δείγματος vacat Εὐτυχεῖτε
vacat
Ἐπιμελητεύοντος τῆς πόλεως Τ Ἰουλίου Ἡρωδιαν[οῦ] Κολλυτέως
…measure…
…the two-obol tax…
…but for the fisherman in Eleusis, whenever they sell in the market in Eleusis,
fish are to be tax-free, so that there may be abundance and the aid through the
import fees may amount to a lot; I wish the sellers and the retail sellers to have
ceased from their sordid profiteering or else an indictment be brought against
them in front of the herald of the Areopagus. I want him to present the matters to
the court of the Areopagites and they will assess what must be suffered or paid.
Let the suppliers themselves or the first vendors who buy from them make all the
sales, for when those third purchasers of the same goods sell them again it raises
the prices. Engrave this letter on a stele and set it up in the Piraeus in front of the
Deigma. Be well.
302
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The Epimelete of the city, Titus Julius Herodian of Kollytos. 303
The law has two main sections, and the second half, which is preserved more fully, has
drawn the majority of scholarly attention.304 The fragmentary letter first grants the
exemption: “but for the fisherman in Eleusis, whenever they sell in the market in Eleusis,
fish are to be tax-free,” The second half continues that the emperor is placing a ban on
middlemen, who are deemed superfluous to trade, serving only to increase the cost of
goods through intermediate traders making a profit. While this portion of the text is
interesting in its attack on mid-level traders, a trope we have already seen at work in the
Edict of Diocletian and will address again in chapter five, it is the first half that most
concerns us here.
The two-obol tax mentioned in the second line is a toll taken by Athens on
imported goods. The toll differs from that described by the Codes, first, in that it was
municipal toll, collected specifically by Athens for use by the city, and second, in that it
was a flat fee, rather than a percentage. The letter grants an exemption only for a small
portion of imports, though the preservation of this section is particularly poor.
Presumably its provisions applied only to fish in an attempt to keep supplies up in
Eleusis, while not unduly restricting the profits Athens would have received from
taxation. Oliver hypothesizes that this law was, in part, specifically designed to protect
the supplies of fish at Eleusis during the festival of the mysteries,305 which is consistent

303

IG II-III 1103 (sometimes written as IG II3 1103), text of Oliver, Greek Constitutions of Early Roman
Emperors from Inscriptions and Papyri. no. 77.
304
Silver, “In Dubious Battle: An Economic Analysis of Emperor Hadrian’s Fish and Olive Oil Laws,” 3–
7., also De Ligt, “The Nunidinae of L. Bellicius Sollers,” 250–51.
305
Oliver, Greek Constitutions of Early Roman Emperors from Inscriptions and Papyri, 195. “The epistle
both encouraged fishermen to take their fish directly to Eleusis at the time of the festival and warned off the
wholesale merchants from trying to get the business as middlemen. Otherwise, the wholesale merchants

145
with Hadrian’s involvement in the cult and favor toward Hellenic cultural and religious
activities more generally.
The inscription focuses on a single, local market, not on grand, sweeping gestures
toward all markets, all fishermen, or even all middlemen traders, though Hadrian’s
position is strongest toward the latter. Preserved inscriptions show that Hadrian was
involved in several similar local taxation issues, though not always tolls and customs, at
Delphi, Stratonicea-Hadrianopolis, and Pergamum.306 None of the inscriptions deal with
the same problem. Hadrian does not respond with any kind of discernable “policy,” and
none of the laws give any evidence of having any applicability beyond the limits of the
city in question.
The second half of the Eleusis inscription, however, has been read in the past as
more generally applicable. This is partly due to some of its subject material being echoed
in a quotation of Callistratus in the Digest. The Eleusis letter concludes that fish are to be
sold to no more than one person before they are sold to a customer in order to cut out the
profits of middlemen. The lines have been interpreted to mean that Hadrian had a firm
anti-middleman “policy,” vested in the belief that such figures were unproductive
profiteers who took advantage of the consumer, and that this was a position held more
generally in the ancient world.
There is some force to such an interpretation, but it is largely drawn from the
positions of elites looking down, and into, the world of trade and exchange. Merchants
are viewed as preying on producers, forcing them to bear extra costs so that wholesalers

who were their usual buyers may have worried the fishermen into letting them have all the supplies and so
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and retailers could earn greater profits.307 Perhaps naively, it is believed that producers,
farmers or men like the fishermen of Eleusis, would have done better to manage all the
steps of their business, from production through to sale.308 This seems to have been
Hadrian’s interpretation of matters, since he has rhetorically claimed to be the protector
of customers, defending them from profiteering. Yet Hadrian’s letter lacks any
understanding of the work done by middlemen in bearing transaction costs and allowing
producers to devote their attention to their harvests. For fishermen, time away from the
water attempting to sell their products was time that they were not catching more fish.
Furthermore, fishermen in many circumstances would have been limited in the markets
that they could reach as they attempted to maximize their profit, meaning that they might
only be able to sell in small, local markets, where prices would be lower. A middleman,
who bought in bulk, might be able to pay a fisherman more since he could bring more
fish a greater distance and could supply retailers who would in turn pay him more.
Callistratus, later in the reign of Septimius Severus, judged that the law should
adapt to this reality. In the passage preserved in Digest 50.11.2, he notes that fishermen
selling their own wares led to interruptions in supply for the consumer, since time was
lost in travel. While there is no way of linking this text with that of Hadrian’s letter, it
does demonstrate that there were some similar laws that were in force at the time, but the
efficacy of which was up for debate.309 It is not central to this argument whether any
emperor managed to enforce a positive change to the economy; what is interesting is that
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we do not see, even in the opinion of Callistratus, that the state had managed to enforce a
sweeping law about local tolls, the role of middlemen, or even the trading habits of
fishermen. Callistratus’ opinion is marginally broader in its scope than the law of
Hadrian, but it is also not a law. The actual legislation remains focused on the narrow
confines of particular problems in particular places. It is an admission of the state’s
limited interest and force in the realm of the economy, which was constituted and
regulated on the local scale, regardless of the state’s rhetorical position of power.
Furthermore, that rhetorical power is open to question. While the state seems to
have thoroughly accommodated local variation, both local laws and the codifications
show that there were frequent instances where individuals took advantage of tolls and
customs to enrich themselves rather than the state. Whether actively, through fraudulent
assessment or reporting of the value of cargo, the intervention of patrons, or smuggling,
or more passively, through interpersonal exceptions or misunderstandings about the legal
requirements, both toll collectors and merchants deviated from strict adherence to both
local and imperial law. The Roman state, particularly by entrusting the processes of toll
collection to private agents, avoided responsibility for the enforcement of their own laws.
Instead, the state periodically condemned those who acted against the law, reiterating the
positions of the laws that were already in force, and waited to respond to particularly
flagrant misdeeds.
While an emperor like Hadrian may have gained particular notoriety for seeking
out malefactors and administering justice, there was generally little action taken on the
part of the state to punish merchants who managed to evade tolls or collectors who
preyed upon travelers. The state commonly relied on reporting by victims of abuse, rather
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than undertaking a proactive hunt for those who failed to act fairly or intentionally
manipulated the system to their own benefit. Even in the letter mentioned above,
merchants were able to act largely unfettered, and it was left in the hands of those they
cheated to bring them before the herald of the Areopagus.310 The reports are relatively
common, coming from both merchants and officials, but it is also worth bearing in mind
that many who were involved in the customs process, like Ingenuus, mentioned above,
may have had inexact knowledge of what their rights and responsibilities were, or
understood them only in the local sense: what they had to do when crossing at a particular
place, rather than understanding what imperial law, in general, expected of them.
Furthermore, a soldier like Ingenuus, or other kinds of traveler, may have passed
through a variety of places where diverging local practice would have made it difficult to
anticipate what would be asked of him. While a person living in one place would, at least
eventually, become familiar with local tolls and customs, the traveler could not know
what local law might be when he ventured further abroad. The example of the Athenian
two-obol tax is illustrative: as a local tax it was probably not well known elsewhere, or at
least only within a certain radius of the city. Hadrian evidently believed that it would be
common knowledge at Eleusis and in the Piraeus, but we do not find references to the
law outside of Attica. Despite the size of Athens, the law was local and probably was not
known or anticipated by business travelers, who, even if they knew their rights under
imperial law, may not have known that there were additional fees or taxes in the place
they were visiting.
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The report of a guard at a customs station, named Pabous,311 who worked in
Egypt, is particularly interesting in this light. Pabous played the whistleblower and
reported his superiors to the epistrategos, a high level provincial administrator, on the
grounds that these superiors had allied among themselves to defraud the state.312
Ἰουλίωι Πετρωνιανῷ τῶι κρατ[ί]στῳ ἐπιστρατήγῳ
παρὰ Παβοῦτ[ο]ς τοῦ Στοτοήτεως Πανομιέως
ἱερέως ἀπὸ κώμης [Σ]οκνοπαίου Νήσου τῆς
Ἡρακλείδου μερίδος [τοῦ Ἀ]ρσ[ι]νοίτου νομοῦ
Ἀραβοτοξότου πύλη[ς] τῆς αὐτῆς Σοκνοπαίου Νήσου.
[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]ν̣ κατηγορ ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ἀ]λλὰ ὁρῶν τὸν φίσκον
περιγραφόμενον ὑπὸ Πολυδεύκους τετραετεῖ
ἤδη χρόνωι παρὰ τὰ ἀπειρημένα ἐπιτηροῦντὸς τὴν προκειμένην πύλην καὶ ὑπὸ
[Ἁρπαγ]άθ[ου το]ῦ̣ Ερο̣[ ̣ ̣]τ̣ακ
̣ ος ἐπέδωκα
τ[ο]ῖ̣ς̣ τῆς [νομαρχίας ἐπι]τηρητα[ῖ]ς ἀντί[γρα-]
φον ὧν εἶχ̣[ο]ν τοῦ Ἁρπαγάθου ἰδι[ογ]ραφιων(*)
ἀναγραφίων τῶν διὰ τῆς πύλης εἰσαχθέντων
[κ]αὶ ἐξαχθ[έντων, ἀ]ξ̣ιῶ
̣ ν̣ ̣ τὴν ἐξέτασιν αὐ̣[τ]ῶν
γ̣[ε]ν̣έσ̣[θαι εἰς] τὸ ἐ̣π̣[ιγ]ν̣ῶναι εἰ
προσετ̣έ̣[θησαν]313
αὐτῶν τά τέλη τῷ κυριακῶι λόγωι. καὶ
ἐπιγνοὺς ὁ Πολυδε[ύκ]ης ἐπελθών μοι
μεθʼ ἑτέρων ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα ἀγνοῶι(*)
πλείσ̣[τ]α̣[ι]ς̣
πληγαῖς με ᾐκίσατο, καὶ μὴ ἀρκεσθε[ὶ]ς
ἐπή[ν]εγκέ μοι Ἡρα[κλ]ᾶν τινα μαχαιροφόρων οὐσιακῶν καὶ ἀμφότεροι βίᾳ
βασ[τ]άξαντές με εἰσήνεγκαν εἰς τὸ λογ[ι]στήριον
τοῦ ἐπιτρόπου τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ ἐποίησάν με
̣[ ̣]κ[ ̣] ̣αι̣ ̣ον ὄντα μαστιγοῦσθαι εἰς τὸ ἀναδῶ-

To the most powerful epistrategos
Julius Petronianus, from Pabous, son of
Stotoetis, son of Panomieus, priest from
the village of Soknopaiou Nesos in the
Heraclides division of the Arsinoite
nome, Arab archer of the customs
house of that same Soknopaiou Nesos.
…(not) speaking against but because I
saw the fiscus being defrauded by
Polydeuces, who, against the
prohibition, has now for four years
been in charge of the aforementioned
customs house, and by Harpagathes,
son of Ero…, I gave the overseers of
the nomarchy a copy of Harpagathes’
signed records which I had of goods
entering and exiting the customs house,
requesting their close examination of
them to determine whether the taxes on
them had been handed over to the
treasury account. Polydeuces, having
discovered this, attacked me with other
people, whose names I do not know,
and tormented me with many blows,
and, not satisfied with me, set Heracles
on me, a guard of the domains, and
both, lifting me by force, took me to the
counting house of the overseer of the
domains and made me… being
whipped to give up the record of
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[ναί] μ̣ε α[ὐτοῖς] τὸ τοῦ [Ἁρπ]αγάθου ἀναγράφιον,
ὅπερ
φανερὸν τοῦτο ἐγένετ[ο] τοῖς τε τῆς νομαρχίας
ἐπιτηρητ[αῖς] καὶ τῷ ἐ[πὶ] τῶν τόπων τότε ὄντι
βεφιν[ι]κιαρίωι(*)
vacat 2 lines
[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ὅθεν] κ̣ατὰ τὸ ἀνα[γ]καῖ[ον ἐπιδίδ]ω̣μι̣
κ̣α̣ὶ̣ ἀ̣ξ̣ι̣[ῶ ἐὰ]ν̣ δ[ό]ξῃ σοι [πέ]μψαι [πρὸς σ]ὲ καὶ
τὸν Πολυδεύκην καὶ τὸν Ἁρπα[γάθην τὸ]ν̣
κ̣ρ̣άτ̣ισ
̣ ̣τον τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ προσεπίτροπο[ν(?)] ἵνα
δυνηθῶ τὴν ἀπόδιξιν(*) ἐπʼ αὐτοὺς
π̣[ο]ιησ̣[ά]μενο(ς)
τυχεῖν καὶ τῆς ἀ̣πὸ σοῦ εὐεργεσίας. διευτύχει.
ἔστι δὲ τ[ὸ] ἀντίγραφον τῶν ἰδιογράφων
τ[οῦ] Ἁρπαγάθο[υ] ἀναγρ[αφ]ίων·
β (ἔτους) Ἀντω[νί]νου Κ[αίσαρος τ]οῦ κ[υρίου]
Ἐπεὶφ
ζ.

Harpagathes, which became known to
the overseers of the nomarchy and then
to the beneficarii of the district.

…[vacat]…
Therefore, I am compelled to hand over
this and if it seems fitting to you to
send for Polydeuces and Harpagathes,
the principle source and administrator
of evil, so that I can produce the proof
against them and may obtain your
favor. Be well.
The copy of the record of
Harpagathes is the following:
Second year of Antonius Caesar,
the emperor Epiph. 7.314

In this document, Pabous is evidently reporting the misconduct of his superiors at
the customs house, a place where he himself works as an Arab archer, an official who
likely served as an attendant to some other magistrate. Pabous reports how the man in
charge of the tolls, Polydeuces, and another official, Harpagathes, were defrauding the
state, presumably by enriching themselves.315 Pabous’ case was probably not untypical,
in that we see complaints of fraud at customs houses raised by others, but we lack other
instances of an official informing against his superiors. Thus Pabous’ case is worthy of
further examination: why would one official report on another?
Pabous says that he comes forward, “(not) speaking against,” which is where we
must begin. He assures his reader that this is not a case of him playing the tattle-tale, but
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rather that is was a natural action for him to take since he saw that the treasury was being
defrauded. He can identify the culprit and is able to produce proof of this accusation in
the form of signed returns. He had attempted to go to the local nome authorities but was
violently prevented from being heard, so he now appeals to the epistrategos at the supranome level.
This appears to be a perfectly rational narrative, and Pabous is the hero of a story
that will, with luck, soon come to a satisfactory conclusion for the state and for his own,
personal complaints. Though Pabous has laid out a good case, it is clear his version of
events relates only one side of the story. In the first instance, it is clear that there is
something definitely off about the customs house of Soknopaiou Nesos. Its chief
magistrate, Polydeuces, had been serving for far longer than he should, he had assistants
who are doctoring the books, and he employed, or could call upon at short notice, a group
of individuals who could be called upon to seize and scourge his enemies.
These are all worrying signs, but it is the defrauding of the treasury that is at the
center of Pabous’ account. He presents himself as concerned for the wellbeing of the
treasury and as almost incensed at the daring of those who would steal from the state.
This is a common feature of such complaints. Both Grey and Bryen have noted that
petitioners often prefer to use the language of taxation, of patronage, and of status,
generally, to present their point of view.316 The purpose of such tactics is clear. It was a
means of inspiring interest on the part of the state in a matter of personal concern.317 The
epistrategos had no reason to care about the violence done to Pabous but was bound by
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his office to protect the treasury. If Pabous wanted the attack against him addressed, it
was in his best interest to connect it to a matter that was of interest to the epistrategos.318
Forty-six years later, he used a similar strategy in an appeal to the beneficarius of
Soknopaiou Nesos.319 Again, Pabous reports having been attacked, this time by an elder
in the community and “his men,” probably family members, but also potentially clients or
friends, for the sake of two of his relatives who appear to have been wanted men. Pabous
concludes his complaint, not with a demand for punishment or with any further
elaboration on his wounds or property damage, but by accusing his enemy, Sempronios,
with extortion, and particularly extortion from new recruits in the army. Though the
events are purely of local conflict, Pabous appeals through what he believes will be of
greatest concern to the state, rather than through the infringement of his “rights.”320
However, the violence done to Pabous is interesting. While, in general, violence
never seems to have been very far from the lives of individuals in Egypt in this period,321
what we know to be true of violence from this time does seem to suggest that Pabous
may be stretching matters somewhat, or at least inflecting his experience through a
particular lens. Most who complain of violence in this period state, when they can, what
remains of the physical evidence of their attack: scars, broken bones, bruises. Pabous
does not report any of these things, despite the fact that he claims to have been beaten and
then whipped. This record instead focuses on the existence, not so much of a witness, but
of a rumor about his attack that the beneficarius may have heard. He knows that the
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community knows about the attack, and relies on it to corroborate his story, even if his
account hints that the violence may not have been as great as he claims.322
Whatever the actual injury of this event, the choice to lean on evidence falls in
line with Pabous’ general preference to appeal to authority. In the first petition, he begins
by presenting his own status, his role as a priest and job at the customs house, as well as
his lineage which seems to ground him in this community as well as offer him
identification.323 He then demonstrates that his own local authorities are corrupt, that he
cannot reach the more regional powers, and that, now, he is addressing what, for him,
seems to be the next logical step up the ladder of authority. He emphasizes his physical
evidence, the ledger of the customs house, which is signed, and offers documentary proof
of the whole business. It is this that he uses as his culminating argument on the issue.
However, under all of this is a current of what is clearly a local dispute. Though
he does not detail his relationship with his superiors, it is clear that Pabous knows these
people. He knows Polydeuces, and he knows Sempronios, and he knows this little town
in the Fayyum well enough to identify its elders, and to know what bylaws of its customs
house are being broken. He expects that the grapevine will have reported the gossip of
this conflict and knows the name of the guard called upon to whip him. In both
complaints, we have every reason to suppose that the petition served as merely a single
boiling-over point of a conflict that had extended on for some time and had been dealt
with in different ways before the state was involved. Pabous’ first real statement of intent
explains this, he wishes to be clear that he is not just tattling, which suggests that just that
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dynamic was at play. Pabous was the first to report the matter to the higher-ups, which
may even mean that that he was aware of a counter claim that could be made against him,
prompting him to strike first.
Within and around these conflicts are numerous individuals who were implicated
in some way or another, but whose names do not occur in the papyri. The events that
Pabous relates cannot have been very secret. Polydeuces’ extended office-holding, at
least, must have been general knowledge to those aware of the rules of the customs house
and those who may have desired the job. Pabous’ account suggests that there was some
effort exerted to prevent the record books of the customs house from reaching any who
were not actively involved in the collusion. Furthermore, it is likely, if Polydeuces and
Harpagathes were skimming something off the top, that they were also unjustly valuing
the goods that were passing through in order to earn more money, more quickly.
If this were the case, local traders passing through the town were likely aware, to
some extent, of the circumstances at Soknopaiou Nesos. It is not necessary that they
know that they were being cheated in some way, but merely that they knew that, in this
particular place, there were specific customs house procedures. Indeed, it is plausible, as
we will discuss further below, that each customs house had its own rules, its own
differences, whether born of corruption, or of local practice, or even the size of the
customs house. A merchant may have been expected to navigate these variations, leaning
on his or her own experience.324 These institutional differences might even be
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complicated by the hyper-local consequences of interpersonal tensions. Merchants could
plausibly do some things to mediate the effects of such tensions by forming their own
relationships with customs officers, but also could get caught up in local conflicts through
the same mechanisms.
However, what is truly essential from the Pabous example is that, though these
were officials going about the work of the state, they were inextricably tied into their
local communities, which were full of diverse networks of familial ties, friendships,
enemies, and social relations of authority, obligation, and neutrality that inflected every
action taken. They might be agents of the state, but, in the terms of NIE, their
enforcement of formal institutions was only possible in so far as those institutions
conformed to the informal institutions of status, familial ties, and a host of other
considerations that Pabous, even if he only explicitly mentions the treasury and its needs,
was nevertheless extremely concerned with.

Local Customs Law:
The previous section has begun to demonstrate that, in the earlier period at least,
the law regarding customs was much more improvised and contingent upon local
circumstances. It was developed primarily in response to reported or perceived problems.
In this section, imperial law will be temporarily put to the side in favor of customs laws
that were established locally in the 2nd to 4th centuries CE. These texts can be connected
to specific archaeological contexts and present an opportunity to look at the law that
might have been in force in locations populated by other Pabouses and the merchants

not personally visited. This aligns well with the oral culture that surrounded merchant activity that is
discussed in chapter six.
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who had to work with them. Two local laws will be taken as case studies. They have
notable differences, not only from the system that seems to have been imagined by
imperial law, but also from each other.
The first law is an early third century inscription from Zarai, a customs house
between the provinces of Mauretania Sitifensis and Numidia.325 The law introduces itself
as a Lex portus post discessum coh(ortis) instituta, and proceeds to list the goods subject
to the toll under subsequent headings, each as leges, beginning with small animals, lex
capitualis,326 then listing garments, lex vestis peregrinae327, hides, and other goods and
exceptions, lex portus m(a)xim(a): pequaria: jument(a) immunia/ceteris rebus sicut ad
caput328, along with the amounts due in the toll for each item listed. The list is fairly
formulaic, but a representative section has the following form:
lex capitularis mancipia sin
gula |(denarii) I s equ(u)m equam |(denarii) I s
mulum mulam |(denarii) I s asinum
bovem s porcum |(sestertius) porcellu(m) |(dupondius)
ovem caprum |(sertertius) edum agnu(m) |(dupondius)
pecora in nundinium immunia... 329
The law of the poll tax
Slaves, each: 1.5 denarii
Horse, male or female: 1.5 denarii
Mule, male or female: 1.5 denarii
Donkey, ox: 1 quinarius
Pig: 1 sestertius
Piglet: 1 dupondius
325
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Sheep, goat: 1 sestertius
Kid, lamb: 1 dupondius
Animals for sale at the market: free of charge.
The inscription is particularly rich. Initially, the most striking feature, in light of
the system that the records of imperial law have sketched out, is that Zarai lists the
amounts due for customs in flat fees. There is no evidence here of a percentage tax, like
that proposed in the Justinianic Code, nor does it supply any possible flexibility based on
what a collector judged to be the value of the cargo. A sick animal is charged the same as
a healthy one, and better-quality goods are to be tolled at the same rate as poor quality,
though distinctions are made based on material. This lack of specificity would make
inspections of goods a relatively quick and cursory process. The law trails off into a
lacuna, but 28 items are listed with amounts ranging from 1.5 denarii to a dupondius. For
palms, for example, a hundred pounds are listed at a quinarius, a silver coin worth half a
denarius or equivalent to two sesterces. Animals and slaves are counted by head, while
goods are counted in recognizable, Roman measures: modii for volume, pounds for
weight.330
Despite its differences from imperial law, the inscription is an official, legal
document, just a local one. Its public display represents a commitment to transparency in
the customs process, which would reduce conflict and abuse as well as, at least
potentially, increase the speed of transactions. The text was probably a codification of
preexisting, habitual practice in the region, as evidenced by the immunitas granted to
330
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herds being moved on market days, pecora in nundinium immunia,331 and by the unusual
emphasis on hides, which are described by a number of distinct grades of quality.332
Vanacker has persuasively argued that, in part, this text may have been aimed to clarify
tolls for nomadic pastoralists who had to cross through Zarai.333 These pastoralists were
by no means new to the region in Roman times, so it can be inferred that, prior to the
inscription of this law, there had been some habitual practice to accommodate them at the
customs house. The inscription need not be an exact reflection of that previous practice,
but it does seem to include the kind of immunities that would be born out of habit, such
as the exception based on the regular market days. Public codification meant that these
immunities could not be taken away, and, as a result, represents a local habit becoming a
legal right.
The text is in a state of tension between its position within the imperial system
and local practices. The preface to the text states that it is the local cohort that is
responsible for the law. This, by itself, is a remarkable situation, and one that is not
clearly paralleled elsewhere.334 These collectors were not private tax farmers, the typical
agents of the state, which makes their willingness to commit to a flat fee slightly more
comprehensible, since they were not incentivized to collect more than what was due to
their superiors. These soldiers were paid regardless of how much they collected in tolls.
However, though these soldiers were paid to be agents of the state, it is likely that the
331
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soldiers here, whether legionaries or an auxiliary cohort,335 were enlisted from a local
population. Certainly, they were stationed among a population that they interacted with
closely, as is paralleled in the experiences of the soldiers at Vindolanda, for whom we
have much better records.336
Yet what they were doing with regard to the law is less than transparent. Clearly
there was some leeway permitted for local practices, but it is impossible to tell from the
text what exactly their relationship to those practices was. They may have simply adopted
an existing set of norms, turning them into written law and acting as the guarantor of their
continuation, effectively supporting an infrastructure that was already in place. The law
may have adapted those earlier practices, fitting them more firmly in line with a “Roman”
model to which we no longer have access. Alternately, they may have invented a new
system wholesale, based on choices that seemed to accommodate local needs. In either
case, the law is probably a claim to authority by the cohort, who now stood behind the
law. Whatever the existing systems of power had been before the law, the cohort now
asserted its control. The population, no doubt, had to adjust to that new reality.
However, the level of accommodation of local needs is striking. The cohort, as the
armed power in the region, had little incentive to take local needs into account since they
could easily have used force to incentivize obedience (or disincentivize disobedience).
Instead, they seem to have adopted a more cooperative stance, and based their law on at
least some knowledge of local circumstances and practices. Again, it seems likely that
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these soldiers were drawn from the local population or were at least able to work
reasonably closely with it. Yet, this is not a feature that is unique to North Africa.
Generally, there seems to have been an appreciation for diversity, and we see evidence of
local practices appearing in local law across the Mediterranean. Speaking for Egypt,
Bryen has sketched out the concept of legal pluralism as a central feature of Roman legal
administration.337 This model seems to fit well with what we see at Zarai and its unique
customs house. The law was different here, but the difference also derives from the
unique circumstances of social and interpersonal interactions, as seen at Soknopaiou
Nesos above.
Imperial appreciation of local variation makes some sense. It is a reflection of a
Roman government that managed, rather artfully, to have it both ways: they were able to
financially benefit from commerce, but never actually had to control it. The state is
present in the Zarai document, passively providing an infrastructure that extends from the
name of the year to the currency of payment, and perhaps exerting some pressure that
there should be law, rather than merely custom.
However, practically, there is minimal, if any, evidence of the imposition of state
authority on the law’s contents. Instead the state seems to be operating alongside this
local practice, either from tacit approval or from ignorance of the matter. Yet, in either
case, these local laws were far better equipped to judge the needs of a region or locality
than the distant arbiters of law in Rome, Constantinople, or even a provincial capital.338
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An inscription such as this one treads a fine line between being imperial and being local,
managing to have it both ways.
Though it is unknowable, there is a possibility that the army also was acting to
retain peace in the region. The codification of law is one means of assuring justice and
promoting swift, due process. There may have been a specific problem that sparked the
creation of this law, but its variance from imperial law is unlikely to be a reflection of
some unique local turmoil. Variation from imperial law is, in actuality, fairly typical.
Though no two of the extent local customs laws seems to be identical, each is similar in
that it provides for local needs before it concerns itself with agreeing with the details of
imperial law.
This is evident in a second customs law, which comes in the form of a fragment
of papyrus from Oxyrhynchus.339 The document consists of three columns and begins in
medias res with a list of goods and tolls. As with the law from Zarai, the structure of tolls
deviates from the percentages typically assumed to be the imperial fee system for the
internal movement of goods. The majority of the goods are listed as owing a specified
duty per talent,340 which does not always calculate to a clear percentage of value, and
others are listed at a rate per measurement of weight or volume, this time in local GrecoEgyptian units, or even by the more abstract, φορτίου, or “load.”341

339

P. Oxy. 1.36 (100-225 CE)
It is worth noting that the text has been edited and “talent” has been supplied throughout the first
section. The emendation is logical, based on other examples, but, since local variation is vitally important
in this case, there should be a caveat attached to this interpretation. It is possible that another weight system
might have been in use, and no reason to suppose that a talent in Oxyrhynchus would be the same as an
Attic, or even an Alexandrian, one.
341
lines 1,13; Again, local measures are a typical feature of such documents, and probably facilitated
transportation, in that goods did not need to be unloaded, investigated, and reloaded at every customs point
crossed. Samples of the product could be presented, but the majority of goods could remain in premeasured sacks. Melissa Bailey AIA/SCS 2016, “Reforming Measurement in the Roman East.”
340

162
We lack the beginning of the papyrus where we assume further items and their
tolls, as well as further context, would be listed, yet in the second column the papyrus
begins to provide a description of an interaction between merchants and tax collectors,
the process of inspecting a suspect load of goods:
Column 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -[ἐ]π̣εὶ(*) δὲ τῶ[ν ε ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣
μων πάντω[ν ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ὁ ἔμπο-]
ρος συντι[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ]̣
[ὁ] τελώνης [ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ]̣
πότερον τὸ τ[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]
φορον βούλετα[ι]. ἐ[ὰν] δὲ
<ὁ> τελώνης ἐκφορ[τισθ]ῆναι τὸ πλοῖον ἐπιζητήσῃ,
ὁ ἔμπορος ἐκφορτιζέ[τ]ω,
καὶ ἐὰν μὲν εὑρεθῇ τ[ι] ἕτερον ἢ ὃ ἀπεγράψατο, στερήσιμον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ εὑρεθῇ, ὁ τελώνης τ[ὴ]ν δαπάνην τῷ ἐμπό[ρ]ῳ τοῦ
ἐκφορτισμοῦ ἀποδ[ότ]ω.
Column 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐ[γλαβόντων]
τὰ τέλη χερογραφ[ίαν](*) [λαμβ]ανέτωσαν ἵνα εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἀσυκοφάντητοι
ὧσιν.

…but since…all…the
merchant…the tax
collector…whether… he wants
payment. But if the tax collector
wishes the ship to be unloaded, the
merchant will unload. And if
anything is found other than what
was declared, let it be liable to
confiscation, but if nothing is
found, the tax collector will repay
the cost of unloading to the
merchant.

And they will receive a written
declaration from those who collect
the taxes so that that they will not
be slandered in the future.342

The inspection comes, we are told, at the urging of the tax collector, the τελώνης,
who judged the necessity of the search. The text carefully does not say what is heavily
implied, that his cause was most likely something appearing to be suspicious about the
load or the report of its contents. It should not be assumed that searches were done for
every cargo being transported along the Nile. The quantity of goods being transported
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must have made a simple report sufficient much of the time. From imperial law we know
that it was the responsibility of the merchant to report his or her cargo to the tax collector,
and we have receipts showing that written records were kept of what was reported as well
as what was paid.343 The papyrus confirms both the imperial position and the
documentary evidence, claiming that the search would confiscate anything other than ὃ
ἀπεγράψατο, that which was declared.
Given the provisions for the protections of merchants from wrongful search,
which will be discussed shortly, it is likely that tax farmers acted from a position of some
certainty when they chose to search a given merchant’s position. There had to have been
a good reason to suspect that they had been provided with an inaccurate or fraudulent
manifest of the cargo. Yet this document does not state what kinds of justifications might
have been given to merchants. Nowhere does the papyrus list justifiable reasons for
search, and we are left to assume that, often, the “hunch” of a customs officer was a
sufficient reason in itself. This, of course, left merchants largely at the mercy of officials,
who, if they held a grudge or wished merely to display their power, could inconvenience
merchants significantly by exercising their right to search.344
Certainly, no justifications appear to have been given when we examine
discussions about the hindrance that searches posed to those traveling in the Roman
world. These descriptions tend not to come from the legal records, so, for comparison, we
must turn to literary references. Plutarch, in a brief passage from his De Curiositate,

E.g. P. Customs 466 (208 CE) Dionsias, Arsionites: an individual merchant’s receipt for transporting
camels and olives; P.Lond.III.1169 (2 nd-3rd century CE), a list of traders and their cargo from the customs
house of Soknopaiou Nesos.
344
Bang, The Roman Bazaar, 204–14.
343

164
describes the hassle and the imposition as it was felt on the other side of the customs
process:
καὶ γὰρ τοὺς τελώνας βαρυνόμεθα καὶ δυσχεραίνομεν, οὐχ ὅταν τὰ ἐμφανῆ τῶν
εἰσαγομένων ἐκλέγωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν τὰ κεκρυμμένα ζητοῦντες ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις
σκεύεσι καὶ φορτίοις ἀναστρέφωνται: καίτοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὁ νόμος δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς,
καὶ βλάπτονται μὴ ποιοῦντες.
For we are distressed and annoyed by customs officials, not when they levy tolls
on the things we are openly bringing in, but when, searching for concealed things,
they upset our baggage and cargoes. Although the law permits them to do this
with these things, and that would be cheated if they did not do it.345
Plutarch finds tax farmers annoying, not in the course of normal business, but
precisely at the moment mentioned in the papyrus, in the moment of search. He does not
provide any reason, real or putative, that a customs officer might have given to rationalize
his action and, as Plutarch himself seems an unlikely candidate for being a smuggler,
there is some reason to wonder why he, in particular, would have been searched.
However, Plutarch’s focus is on how a search feels invasive, and he uses this scene to
illustrate the actions of busybodies. While customs officers are acting justly, going about
the business they are paid to do, their actions remain annoying, δυσχερής. Plutarch
hastens to find some redeemable quality to the whole experience, that the τελώναι act
accordingly to the law, and are within their rights, but only goes so far to further the
contrast he is making with the busybody, who has no redeeming quality, and no right to
the information he seeks.
The emphasis on the law is critical to Plutarch’s case, as it is in the case of the
Oxyrhynchus papyrus. The right to search is guaranteed by law according to Plutarch,
and this guarantee is echoed in Pseudo-Quintilian, an author or collection of authors,
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writing, perhaps, in the 2nd century,346 who reports that, “The tax farmer has the right of
search. Undeclared items shall be confiscated.”347 It is not clear from what he derives this
conviction, since none of the codifications repeat this sentiment, but this papyrus
confirms that legal right, suggesting that this was common knowledge and practice, if not
part of more general legislation or an issue that had required an imperial rescript to
resolve.
The evidence for searches comes primarily from these sources, Pseudo-Quintilian,
Plutarch, and the Oxyrhynchus fragment, but also appears in one instance where abuse
was reported: another papyrus, now in keeping at Princeton University, where searches
seem to have been used as an excuse to delay merchants and extort payment for release
from them.348 This document states that officials were “laying hold of”, κρατεῖν,
merchants, and demanding fees for their release.349 It is not absolutely clear that searches
were being used, but they seem a more plausible tool to justify delays than arrests, since
there seems to have been some legal precedent for the former, but none for the latter. All
our sources suggest that confiscation was the standard punishment for smuggling or
inaccurate reporting, and searches were already time-consuming. If we follow the
implications of Plutarch’s irritation, this would make searches a reasonable excuse for
customs officials hoping to extort money from impatient traders.
While searches have some legal grounds in Egypt and in the greater empire, the
remainder of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus is without precedent. It seems to have been a
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provision specific to this customs house, a series of protections available to merchants to
prevent exactly the kind of abuse that the Princeton papyrus condemns. The Oxyrhynchus
papyrus states that customs officers were responsible for all unloading costs if they were
mistaken in their search.350 Specifically, the text says that they must give the costs back
to the merchant, revealing both a previously-unstated burden of searches and that there
was an element of direct recompense between toll collector and merchant, a payment that
was owed personally. This is continued in the third column of the document where the
tax farmer owes the merchant a handwritten, χερογραφίαν, document so that they would
not be subject to further searches.351
This document was a powerful concession to merchants, who generally had to
operate on their reputation alone.352 In this context a search was tantamount to an
accusation of fraud, even if officials were not required to make the accusation openly. For
a merchant this handwritten document was an admission of wrongful suspicion and ill
treatment from tax collectors. It was a testament to their honesty and could be used to
speed further transactions. With speed came lower transportation costs and other financial
benefits, and the document could also be used to bolster a merchant’s reputation at
subsequent customs points, both on this trip and in future.353
Bang claims that this protection was minimal next to the punishments doled out to
merchants who failed to disclose their cargo,354 but this papyrus offers protection from
wrongful search, may have dissuaded tax collectors from searching without good cause,
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and offers retribution to those who had been wronged, which cannot have been a small
matter when, from the evidence of imperial laws, the majority seem to prioritize the
protection of customers over merchants.355 Though this documentation had clear
economic benefits, it is likely that there was also personal value in seeing those who were
invasive and annoying, according to Plutarch, forced to publicly declare that they were
wrong and had acted on an unfounded suspicion. As we will see in the next section, this
kind of document would have been influential in the kinds of face-to-face relationships
that characterize many of the transactions at customs houses.
Though reputation is not always a zero-sum game, tax farmers lost face in this
circumstance, and a merchant gained as a result. Importantly, reputation is generally a
local tool, which benefits those who primarily interact frequently and at close quarters, a
topic that will be returned to in chapters four and five. The final provision of the papyrus
is aimed at serving just this kind of community, thus giving us not only a local law, but a
law that specifically aimed to resolve local problems that stretched beyond economic
matters and into the community that surrounded these economic activities.
These two laws are reflections of their local contexts. They operated under the
umbrella of imperial law, but their differences from those general provisions, and from
each other, reflect the differences that their communities required and implemented.
There is a clear nod in both the Zarai inscription and the Oxyrhynchus papyrus to Roman
authority, but the practical implementation of that authority placed emphasis on different
things. Zarai committed itself to a transparent and swift customs process, while
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Oxyrhynchus demonstrated a solution to annoyances that occurred during the normal, and
legal, searches that were necessary to curb smuggling. The texts are also different in their
materials, as an inscription and a papyrus. In the case of Oxyrhynchus, it is unclear what
the temporary nature of that material may have meant, and it opens up the possibility that
this was a personal copy of the law, kept by someone who expected to need it, possibly
even a trader. A parallel may even be drawn to the archive that seems to have been
maintained by the navicularii at Arles discussed in chapter one. Yet both the Zarai
inscription and the Oxyrhynchus fragment present themselves as law, and lay claim to the
status and the authority that that implies, in part by tapping into the same kinds of
language as that used by imperial law.
The differing emphases we see in the texts may have been the product of local
customs traditions, which had developed from individual needs over time, or were at least
solutions that were based on what seemed to be practical, convenient, and necessary for
collection by those who claimed the authority to regulate tolls and customs. The central
powers of the state had a loose handle on these processes, but there is no evidence to
indicate that they acted to correct or censure deviations from the system imagined by
imperial law. As long as local customs continued to bring in revenue for the state, local
authority was respected.
This tolerance of local variation, and regional decision-making, at least when it
came to tolls and customs, is treated as a benefaction from the state, particularly in the
Digest, where jurists note that this was a foundational element of imperial legal “policy.”
Paulus, writing as a jurist under Septimius Severus and later as a praetorian prefect under
Alexander Severus, states that, “in the case of all revenues, the custom of the
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neighborhood is generally considered, as is provided by the imperial constitutions.”356
The language used frames this as a kindness, and one that the state need not have
extended, but it seems likely that the state actually lacked the ability to enforce a more
tightly controlled system of tolls.
This is abundantly evident when we consider the state’s indifference to, or at least
inability to resolve, larger, more serious problems. For example, we have evidence of the
state praising local communities that resisted banditry,357 but it did nothing to combat that
lawlessness itself. “Police forces,” such as they were, were generally focused on keeping
unrest to a minimum and the military protected citizens from large-scale external threats,
but neither group protected them from robbers or even from rogue imperial agents.358
Since the Roman government was unable to resolve these violent problems, it is clear that
it lacked the structures and numbers that would have enabled the state to enforce its will
everywhere and evenly over every part of imperial administration. Tolls and customs,
though profitable, were a low priority, and one whose effective implementation was left
in the hands of local powers. The Roman government had to maintain minimal levels of
control, primarily through the might of the army and through its overarching legal
powers, but it chose to present itself rhetorically as magnanimous in being respectful of
local customs, regardless of the fact that it could not have changed them.
Instead, the state benefited financially, taking what tax farmers collected in tolls
and generally leaving local matters to tend to their own needs. For merchants, who
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operated, in many cases, exclusively at these local levels, it was less important to them
whether it was imperial or local law in action. For them, tolls and customs were collected,
and it mattered little where the money went once it left their possession. It was the
process, and the individual customs officers who they faced, that were essential, not the
distant fiscus or imperial agents at higher levels that were of concern. In the final section
of this chapter, we will turn to the consequences of the personalization of the customs
process, looking particularly at how face-to-face dynamics made already local law into a
hyper-local, interpersonal relationship that was dominated by personalities and
familiarities that could make the process either more, or dramatically less, simple than the
laws present.

At the Customs House:
The evidence for customs, particularly from Egypt, provides us with a somewhat
unique opportunity to examine the face-to-face interactions between merchants and the
state. While anecdotal evidence for the customs process is rarely available to us, a wealth
of documentation preserves a multitude of trips back, forth, and around the
Mediterranean. In this final section, customs receipts will be scrutinized as a particularly
revealing category of evidence. Since customs receipts were given each time tolls were
paid there is a rare opportunity to use them to track individuals over the span of a number
of years and to see how often they traveled through the same points, encountering the
same officials.
The interaction of customs officers and merchants has previously been understood
in the context of the unchecked authority that officials held over traders. Bang, in
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particular, has categorized this relationship as predatory, in which, for either state or
personal gain, officers acted to squeeze wealth from merchants who had relatively little
recourse in the process.359 Certainly, there is some evidence to support this, not only
specific cases, like that described in the Princeton papyrus, mentioned above, where
travelers could be illegally charged to secure their release and the release of their
property, but also institutionalized inequalities, like the tax-farming system, which
effectively prohibited any limit being placed on how much a customs officer could
collect. Bang notes that punishments for customs officials who over-charged seem lax
and unsystematic,360 which corroborates the hypothesis that it was anticipated that local
practices would police (or not) the actions of local officials.
While the point is well taken that some merchants were taken advantage of during
the course of the customs process, and that it is likely that customs officers acted outside
the parameters of imperial law in their pursuit of personal gain, it is possible to pair
Bang’s “predation” with plentiful examples of tolls being paid without complaint or fuss.
The majority of the evidence for customs comes in the form of dispassionate receipts,
recording names of traders and goods in motion. While it is possible to present examples
of these documents that clearly contain extra charges, fees that were “illegal” by imperial
standards, the evidence provided above of local legislation should demonstrate that law
itself was a varied category and that it is probably best to judge these documents by the
kind of practices they imply, rather than by their distance from imperial law.

359
360

Bang, The Roman Bazaar, 204–5.
Bang, 207–8, n. 19.

172
Practice certainly supports the idea that officers were taking advantage, as the
example of Pabous shows clearly, but also that officers and merchants were always
operating face-to-face, dealing with each other not only as figures within a legal tug of
war, but as personalities that either cooperated or clashed during the process of assessing
cargoes, paying fees, and receiving documents. Accessing these relationships can be
challenging, but customs records provide an excellent starting point. A long customs log
from Bacchias, probably recording duties from the harbor of Memphis,361 all in the same
hand, lists transactions from August 29th to September 27th, 114 CE and it provides an
excellent case study.362 The account lists traders, their goods, how much they paid, as
well as a total amount taken for the day, within a “system” that applied a flat fee based on
weight and type of good.
The document lists a number of the same traders who passed through the harbor
several times over the course of the month that the papyrus records. One trader, Horion,
passed through the customs house four times during this period, first on August 30th, and
then three times in September, on the 8th, 9th, and 22nd. Pieter Sijpesteijn notes that the
travel on the 8th and 9th would have been on an outbound and then a returning journey,
probably between Bacchias and Memphis, around 25 miles.363 The record shows that he
primarily exported fleeces and a reasonably large amount of produce, black beans, barley,
and vetch. He returned to the harbor with two jars of vinegar, presumably purchased with
the money of selling his fleeces, beans, and barley from the previous day. None of
Horion’s cargoes identify him as a particularly large dealer. He travels, at most, with
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three pack animals, which probably suggests that he had a slave or family member to help
him lead them, but the amounts in transit are consistent with a single, mid-range
producer’s yearly output.
Passing through the customs house four times in one month is, by itself,
suggestive that Horion would have known the customs officials stationed in Bacchias, but
the record also shows that twice, on his second and final tolls, Horion’s cargo underwent
special examination. As far as this document indicates, fleeces required inspection not
required by other kinds of cargo, so there was nothing untoward about the search. While
Bang would note that Horion was charged extra for this “service,” in this case the
document is more interesting because it demonstrates that Horion was put in close
proximity with the customs officers who needed to assess the number of fleeces and how
much wool the fleece actually produced. It is hardly likely that, having had his cargo
examined on the 8th, Horion was not remembered when he returned with his vinegar on
the 9th.
Horion’s interaction is not atypical, either for this document or for the larger body
of evidence.364 The well-attested site of Soknopaiou Nesos has provided us with a large
number of receipts,365 including several, all dated to the late second and early third
century, that come from a small transporter, or possibly a pair of small transporters,366 by
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the name of Sotas.367 The records show that Sotas was moving a small amount of grain or
vetch with his work animals, generally a donkey or a camel or two. One particularly
expansive example tells us that he was supplying the Oasis, by which the document most
likely means Lake Moeris which lay directly to the south of the customs point. Sotas was
a small-time trader or producer, moving even smaller distances than Horion. However,
the regularity with which Sotas traveled suggests that he, too, would have been known to
those at his local customs house. At one point in 190 CE we know that Sotas passed
through Soknopaiou Nesos twice in the same month,368 probably meeting and paying the
same officials each time.
The Bacchias record suggests even more strongly that these officials were aware
of how frequently they met with the same merchants. The record shows that officials
abbreviated names of traders with whom they were especially familiar. There are eight
abbreviations total, generally not on cargo that is in any way exceptional. One,
abbreviated just to Prot, traveled on the same day as Horion carrying the same cargo of
two jars of vinegar. Another trader, abbreviated as Diosc, passed through Bacchias on the
10th and again on the 18th of September, both times carrying a small amount of produce.
These abbreviations indicate familiarity, as does the general absence of patronymics.
Sijpesteijn calculated, in his survey of the customs receipts from Roman Egypt, that the
patronymics appear in only twelve cases, a minuscule number out of hundreds of known
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examples, but ones in which the traders were clearly less well known and required further
identification.369
The evidence suggests that, even if traders did not, for one reason or another, earn
an abbreviation or nickname, customs officials were nevertheless familiar with many of
the faces that crossed their borders. This would likely have been somewhat less true for
larger ports like Ostia or Alexandria, but most customs points would have been smaller
than these, sharing the dynamics of Bacchias and Soknopaiou Nesos. Of course, this level
of familiarity does not correspond immediately to friendly relations. Just because customs
officers recognized these traders does not mean that they liked them, or that the Horions
or Sotases of the Roman world were not irritated by the fees and searches that these
officials oversaw. The implication, however, is that this familiarity had a direct bearing
on how the process went, for better or for worse. Long-term familiarity and proximity
would lead to a collection of memories on both sides of how the process had gone, and
the people had behaved. They remembered what happened last time and the time before,
with direct bearing on how each side expected that future interactions would go.
Reputation, generally, had to have had a direct bearing on the process for both sides, as
some customs houses were known for being more or less fair and traders for being more
or less honest. Again, this is a topic to which we will return in more detail in the
following chapters.
These reputations were best known locally, tied to the immediate proximity in
which gossip would move fastest and penetrate most fully, a concept that Pabous, the
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Arab archer, understood intimately. For those who merited a positive reputation, this was
a boon, making them more attractive as business partners. Alternately, a negative
reputation could be harmful, and, at crossing points, it could lead to more antagonistic
meetings, or possibly even to increased levels of smuggling or more aggressive searches.
We can assume that local merchants had an advantage over outsiders, since they had
better access to this information, and were more likely to have a reputation of their own
that they could put to good use.
Evidence for this is relatively scarce, but it does seem to appear, to some extent,
in the codifications of imperial law. The letter from Valentinian and Valens to the
imperial exchequer mentioned above strongly denounces those who attempted to present
themselves, through rescripts, as exempted from tolls.370 The state’s position was clearly
that all private persons, with very limited exceptions, were subject to customs duties.
They specifically mention patronage as a tool that was used to avoid paying tolls. If a
merchant could get a letter or rescript claiming an exemption from a patron, particularly
one recognized as an authority by the customs house, this would have been an asset to
their business, though it directly undermined both the authority and the profits of the
state.
It is similarly plausible that other traders tried to use their familiarity with
customs officers to receive other or similar benefits, a technique that lacks a discernible
paper trail because it was infrequently reported or prosecuted. In this situation, we can
imagine a merchant asking, as a favor or as a friend, for an exemption or an extension
from a customs officer they “knew” at some level. Our sources cannot offer us evidence
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since the tactic either failed, and merchants paid their toll, or it succeeded, and officials
did not record it. They found other ways to profit from merchants, probably enriching
themselves personally rather than the state, as in the case of Pabous’ Polydeuces.
The state could do nothing about such local interactions and probably had little
awareness of them. There seem to have been no complaints put in writing about
favoritism in customs proceedings. Something like Pabous’ complaint about his superiors
may in fact cover up something of this nature, but the scale of this mutual backscratching was probably beneath the notice of the central Roman government. It was,
perhaps, even within the expected parameters for the system that some would act in this
way, manipulate the system to their own personal advantage, and assumed that social
systems would serve to limit any particular individual from benefiting too greatly at the
expense of others in their community.

Conclusions:
The state distanced itself from these matters, leaving the daily operation of
collecting tolls in the hands of locals, who were equipped to deal with the specifics and
who would be responsible for the cost of maintaining and regulating the systems of
customs. The state’s lack of intervention was born of a combination of necessity, having
too many responsibilities to make customs a priority, and genuine indifference, since the
state profited regardless of how collection was practiced. Nevertheless, the state’s
indifference was dressed up rhetorically as the actions of a benevolent, indulgent
government that permitted local practice to continue under its wise governance. As we
saw in the previous chapter, this self-fashioning, whether of the emperor, particular

178
officials, or the state more generally, did not necessitate a direct bearing on reality. It was
enough to make the claim, and to require only the consensus of the people, not even
demanding their perfect obedience.
This chapter has demonstrated how that imperfection played out on the ground,
with particular emphasis on Egypt, and the rare wealth of documentation it has preserved
for us. However, this chapter has also noted, in its focus on local relations, scaling down
to the interpersonal level, that even this wealth of documents cannot give us access to the
social dynamics and institutions that structured the practices of enforcing law. For that,
we require more information about the merchants themselves, and we must turn from the
perspective of the state entirely, to look more closely at how informal institutions
worked, how merchants held agency in their own economic performance, and how social
status inflected all economic activities.
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CHAPTER 4: The Reputation of Roman Merchants
The first half of this dissertation has argued that the evidence for, and the impact
of, the interventions of the Roman government offers us little in the way of analytical
tools for assessing the economy as a whole, or the social and economic lives of
merchants, in particular. The actions of the state were only directly felt by a few and
reached the majority of economic actors through regional mediation and highly variable
local enforcement. These chapters challenged the hypothesis of a strong Roman state that
was able to regulate the economy. Chapter three pushed beyond the state and began to
sketch the scene where economic activity generally occurred, in face-to-face
communities, where individuals, their social dynamics and cultural practices, had far
more comprehensive influence on the economy than institutions of the state. In these
local contexts, our evidence suggests that merchants actively leveraged their
interpersonal relationships to their economic advantage, and that, because these ties were
valuable, they invested substantial effort into cultivating and protecting them.
In the terms of New Institutional Economics, the first half of this project has
addressed the nature of the institutional environment of the Roman Empire. It has
examined the role of governance and the formal institution of law. Its conclusion has
been that these formal frameworks did not operate as the primary determinant of
economic activity since the state did not provide substantial stability to trade through law
or other formal institutions. While it does not deny the state some agency, particularly in
establishing an economic infrastructure that was expected to be in place, even if it would
later be ignored or modified, it has suggested that the economy of the Roman Empire was
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given its structure and stability by informal institutions, the social norms that served to
“shape human interaction.”371
In the second half of this project, we will begin to examine these informal
institutions and their effects on merchant behavior, with a particular eye to understanding
how they functioned as organizing principles in the Roman economy and Roman society.
In order to do so, we will first need to ask why informal institutions held such power in
the Roman context. We have already discussed the weaknesses of formal institutions.
However, since all societies have some culturally specific, informal institutions, but not
all are equally influenced by them, we need to establish why these held such power in the
Roman world.
These questions are not new, and reasons have been proposed ranging from
environmental constraints to fragmented markets and informational imbalances.372
Horden and Purcell have proposed, not for the first time, that the prevalence of informal
institutions, and particularly honor and shame, discussed more fully below, was a product
of a Mediterranean character, one that supersedes the typical periodization that has been
imposed on the classical world.373 At base, this nod to social anthropology demonstrates
an understanding of how the culture of a place shapes its historical, economic, and social
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trajectory. This is not wrong, and indeed, its influence can be seen throughout the
following chapters, but it does place the issue in the abstract, and risks an ahistorical
framework that would have been unrecognizable to a Roman trader.374
It will be useful to take a concrete example. The trader Sotas, whom we met in the
previous chapter, lived this instability in easily traceable ways.375 He regularly traveled
through the same customs house in Egypt. While his interactions with the officials there
may (or, indeed may not) have been similar each time, we can see from the official
records that he was always dealing in loads of agricultural product that varied in size,
content, or quality, the result either of differences in his own production or of the
availability of goods from his suppliers. In either case, his options were constrained by
factors outside his control, such as prices or weather, and in each case, he was forced to
work within his limited choices. In coming to the customs house, Sotas’ choices were
fairly clear cut: he could choose to pay the toll or not. This toll, generally 3% of the value
of the goods transported in the case of the toll house in Sotas’ Soknopaiou Nesos,376 was
not necessarily prohibitively expensive, but, particularly on a small quantity of low-value
goods, such a fee might eat considerably into one’s profit margin. In arriving at the
customs house, and traveling from his home, Sotas had, in all likelihood, made the
decision to pay the toll already. Yet the range of differences on each trip—how much he
had invested in these goods, the state of the market in which he had purchased and the
one where he would sell, or even the challenges of travel in a given season—demanded
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that he evaluate his choices based on what he believed to be the outcome of each
option.377
While speculation, it is reasonable to assume that Sotas, and certainly others like
him, put substantial thought into whether, and when, to go to market.378 However, traders
like Sotas had little opportunity to know what the outcome of their choices would be.
They operated with little knowledge of their broader economic circumstances and had
few opportunities to improve their information. Their best source of information was
their own experience, and beyond that, they knew only what they could glean from their
neighbors, from the collective memory of their community, or from sporadic contact
from more distant acquaintances or trading partners. They did not know, and could not
determine, what the best choice was. Nevertheless, they continued to operate in
uncertainty, unable to predict what the market would bear or what their fellow traders and
competitors might choose to do given their own uncertainties.379
The evidence for this kind of uncertainty is plentiful. In Apuleius’
Metamorphoses, Lucius meets a dealer in foodstuffs from Aegium, who recounts how he
traveled from his home to Thessaly in pursuit of a fine, but inexpensive, cheese that he
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had heard was on sale in the region. The merchant tells Lucius that he failed in his
endeavor, because a wholesale dealer, Lupus, had already “wolfed” up all the bargains. 380
The food dealer acted on the information he had, but was unable to test it either before he
went—to know if the cheese was really for sale—or to assess the claim once he arrived—
to hear the price or try the cheese for flavor or quality. Further, he had no way of
knowing what his competition would do, or, in all likelihood, to know who his
competitor was. There is nothing in the passage to suggest that the food dealer had
anything more than an account of Lupus from the cheesemaker or local cheese vendor,
and it seems likely that he never met the man.
Traders like Sotas and the food dealer in Apuleius’ imagination had limited
options for improving their information. Waiting to examine the market personally or
sending word to friends and requesting their opinions might, ultimately, be too costly or
time-consuming to be feasible.381 For dealers in perishable goods, time was money, and
for those living on the edge of subsistence with mouths to feed, any profit was preferable
to delaying the next meal by hunting for the best possible price. Furthermore, few could
readily, and correctly, predict the action that would maximize gain in either the short or
long term. Nearly everyone was in the same boat.

380

Apuleius, Met. 1.5, Sed ut prius noritis cuiatis sim; Aegiensis: audite et quo quaestu me teneam; melle
vel casco et huiuscemodi cauponiorum mercibus per Thessaliam Aetoliam Boeotiam ultro citro discurrens.
Comperto itaque Hypatae, quae civitas cunctae Thessaliae antepollet, caseum recens et sciti saporis
admodum commodo pretio distrahi, festinus adcucurri id omne praestinaturus. Sed, ut fieri assolet, sinistro
pede profectum me spes compendii frustrata est; omne enim pridie Lupus negotiator magnarius coemerat.
The pun is bilingual and almost certainly intentional on Apuleius’ part.
381
Records from Egypt suggest that merchants gave their agents the best advice they could on what and
when to buy, but that they also left these proxies a good deal of autonomy. See: Aubert, Business Managers
in Ancient Rome.

184
As has been argued in the previous chapters, the state did little that made the
trading world of a merchant like Sotas or the food dealer more stable or transparent. It
left him subject to the whims of its agents, who operated without substantial supervision
from above. The evidence of chapter three suggested that these agents had many
opportunities to prey upon merchants, but might, equally, choose not to, thereby
contributing to the general uncertainty. The law did little to favor the endeavors of the
petty traders of the Empire, and it is a matter of debate to what extent it was even an
accessible resource for a trader of this status.382 While a Sotas might operate within the
bounds of the law, paying his taxes and tolls, his real economic concerns, the price of
goods and the safety of his investments, were untouched by state institutions, whose
interventions were not interested in these issues.383
NIE explains that, in situations where uncertainty and information imbalances
readily occur, such as the Roman Empire, economic actors are likely to rely upon regular
patterns of behavior, and particularly those that act as limits for a majority of their peers,
thereby making exchanges more predictable.384 These patterns ossified over time and
were reified by the community into an institutional shape. The more people who
conformed to the pattern, the more powerful the institution became, thus strengthening
and reinforcing its place in society. In the Roman world, the most powerful institutions
were informal, socially constructed norms that indicated which choices would be met
with approval from the community. Formal institutions established by the state rarely
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attained the same level of influence in society, though, as we will see, merchants did
sometimes allude to these institutions as a way of augmenting their position within
society, laying claim to being a good citizen, as well as a good person.
As we will see in the chapters ahead, these informal institutions were frequently
associated with judgments of morality in the Roman world.385 Many of the limits they
enforced served to level the playing field for actors, and provide those who had less, or
faulty, information with a chance to make an economically advantageous choice. This is
not to say that the Roman marketplace was either structured or inclined to help the poor
or disadvantaged. Yet, informal institutions, as reflections of broad socio-cultural
tendencies, did not automatically benefit the privileged and were, to an extent, accessible
to all, since, in order for the institutions to function, it was expected that all, or at least
most, would operate within the same social and cultural frameworks. This was
particularly true when institutions were expressed in morally coded ways. Behaving in a
manner consistent with “goodness” was something that was believed to be available to,
and expected from, everyone, even if “goodness” was socially contingent, and meant
something different for the emperor, the slave, and all those living between those
extremes.
Everyone ultimately shouldered the costs that adhering to these norms
engendered. Institutions, by their very nature, constrain economic choices, and, at times,
prevent individuals from pursuing the most, or most immediately, profitable course of
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action. Institutions generally put some other goal before gain, whether it be prestige,
morality, or obedience to some higher religious, social, or political power. Instead, the
freedom to pursue maximal profit was exchanged for greater predictability, stability, and
security. This was valuable, enabling merchants to save time and money, and preventing
many instances of loss, like that experienced by Apuleius’ food dealer. Furthermore,
informal institutions provided merchants with the confidence to engage in deals with
others. It was more possible to be trusting when social norms dictated what a trading
partner’s most probable course of action would be. While this could not act as a substitute
for personal experiences that generated long-term trust, institutions could bridge the
difficult gap between strangers through the assumption that that most individuals would
be constrained by the same institutions. Those who deviated from those norms and
pursued gain without reference to these social constraints threatened not only the
interpersonal trust that the system created, but also the system itself, as institutions drew
their power and efficacy from the communal belief that it was the way things would be,
and had to be, done.
As a result, there were stringent social and economic consequences for deviating
from these standards of behavior. These consequences will be discussed in this and the
following chapters, but, at an extreme, merchants could force their peers to operate within
institutional limits by withholding the kinds of support that traders needed to thrive.
Customers, too, had mechanisms for punishing merchants who cheated, stole, or
otherwise contravened certain parameters. They were able to “vote with their wallets”
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and take business elsewhere,386 and also had tools for spreading their dissatisfaction to
others in the community, isolating the offender in social and business contexts.
Those who hoped to maximize their profits by ignoring informal institutions
risked a great deal and were well aware that punishment awaited any who were caught
violating these norms. Those who sought their own gain above all else are, in the terms of
NIE and game theory, known as “free riders” and it was in the interests of everyone to
limit their numbers, since the power of institutions could be weakened beyond any
efficacy, if free riders became too plentiful.387 As we will discuss in chapter five, social
or economic exclusion seems to have been the primary punishment for those who were
caught free-riding, though in some circumstances more formal social and economic
institutions, like collegia, economic, social, or religious guilds, held the power to impose
fines upon free-riding members, or to expel them from their membership.
Informal institutions thus contained both an incentive and a punishment to induce
conformity. The result was that merchants were able to act despite the uncertainties of
their supply and financial status—they had made the human element of their work a
stable factor that could be relied upon, at least most of the time, to conform to a set of
expectations.
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In the following chapters, we will look more closely at the informal institutions
that formed those expectations. In particular, our focus will be on the institution of
reputation, as it applied to the professional lives of merchants. In this chapter, we will
look at how merchants conceived of, shaped, spread, and protected their reputations, and
what benefit a good reputation was to an individual. In chapter five, we will examine
group reputations and the institutional limitations placed on merchants by the negative
stereotypes that circulated about them. Finally, in the sixth chapter we will turn to the
social mechanisms that spread the reputations of groups and individuals, and in particular
to the phenomena of gossip and letters of recommendation. As a whole, these chapters
will explore reputation as an institution that was central to the social and economic
success (or failure) of Roman merchants, who relied upon their reputation, and the
reputations of others, as a means to reduce volatility, increase predictability, and generate
opportunities in their professional lives.

Reputation Theory:
The choice to address reputation, among the many possible informal institutions
that might have been the focus of these chapters, was made on the basis of substantial
work already done attempting to identify the nature of the “Mediterranean character.”
While this largely a dated practice, founded on assumptions that have little bearing on
modern scholarship on the ancient world,388 the goal of these works: to find the social
structures that defined this place, or collection of places, parallels modern scholarship on
social and cultural history that is more sensitive to nuance and variation. For many, both
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historically and in current discourse, this characteristic has been honor, generally
accompanied by its counterpart, shame.389 These discussions have looked at the economic
world of the Mediterranean in fundamentally similar ways to that this dissertation
promotes. Peristiany said, “Honour and shame… are the constant preoccupation of
individuals in small-scale, exclusive societies where face to face personal, as opposed to
anonymous, relations are of paramount importance.”390 Horden and Purcell, explicitly
building on Peristiany’s perspective, have noted that these face-to-face communities are
found, just as commonly, within urban neighborhoods as in rural villages.391 These
scholars have conceived of Mediterranean communities as groups and individuals who
were deeply invested in each other, and judged each other along fundamentally similar
lines.392 These judgments, and the fear of such judgment, functioned as institutions,
encouraging certain kinds of behavior and sanctioning others. Further, the social
contingency of honor, which applies differently to different sorts of people, aligns well
with the kinds of institutional limitations seen in the lives of Roman merchants,
suggesting that these can be productive lines of thinking.
However, honor, with shame as its mirror image, encompasses only a portion of
the phenomena that this project hopes to address. Honor marks the moral and social
worth of an individual but does not account for the full range and variety of institutional
limitations imposed by the estimation of others. It is possible to be considered
dishonorable by one’s community, but still find oneself engaged in active trade, while,
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alternately, it is possible to be an honorable person with whom no one will deal. In the
former case, we might consider the case of sex workers, whose honor is compromised
according to Roman social values, but who still were able to maintain thriving
businesses. On the other hand, if an honorable man is known to charge too much for his
goods, he will still find himself without trading partners. The ways in which these
circumstances inflect social interactions is encompassed by reputation, not honor. It is
not, for example, a matter of honor or shame when a merchant drives a hard bargain in
the morning but eases up in the afternoon or sells the unsold bread from the day before at
a reduced rate. Such issues might, however, be a part of a tradesman’s reputation, and
would contribute to a good reputation or to a bad one, depending on how the viewer (or
listener) construed these details.
Furthermore, honor and shame do not account for the system of trust that informal
institutions create and foster. As Pitt-Rivers has noted, “on the field of honour might is
right,”393 with dangerous and powerful people being granted physical, visible badges of
honor that might not align with privately held opinions about his true honor, moral
rectitude, or character. Honor, therefore, cannot be used as a metric of trustworthiness,
and, while, institutionally, it is sensible to assume that individuals in the Roman world
would act in a way to protect their honor, we cover a broader range of behaviors, and can
tailor them more specifically to trade,394 when we consider the reputation of merchants,
rather than honor alone.

Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” 25.
This is not possible, for example, for shame, which carries, especially in Mediterranean contexts, a
heavily sexualized connotation that is not appropriate in (most) merchant contexts. To constrain the issue to
“merchant shame” would be to lose the majority of its force, which is not desirable, particularly, as we will
see, in the case of female merchants, for whom shame often cut both ways.
393
394

191
Like honor, reputation has been accepted as an essential value in Mediterranean
society, and it is increasingly recognized as a vital element in the institutional
environment of the Roman economy.395 As this chapter will demonstrate, reputation was
important among Roman merchants in particular, and in Roman society as generally
understood. Reputation, as a category, contains a number of characteristics under its
umbrella, including honor, shame, trust, as well as, importantly for merchants, honesty,
fairness, and the lack of avarice, sometimes stretching to generosity. In this chapter, and
those that follow, reputation will be defined as the opinion, or collection of opinions, held
about an individual's character or behavior based on available information, derived from
a variety of potential sources.396
As an institution, informal or otherwise, reputation is socially contingent, in that,
while we might say that an individual “has” a reputation, his or her hold on it is tenuous.
In fact, it may require substantial effort on his or her part to ascertain even what that
reputation is.397 One can be taken by surprise to discover that one’s reputation is better or
worse than anticipated, and, ultimately, reputation is a commodity “stored” outside of the
person who owns it. It resides in the judgment of his or her acquaintances and in the even
larger sphere of individuals who know of the person but are not known by him or her.398
One’s reputation spreads further the more famous, or notorious, one is, and individuals
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may receive information second or third hand, even without any personal interaction with
the reputed.
A direct consequence of this is that varying levels of acquaintance and
information imbalances will commonly, if not necessarily, lead to multiple reputations
existing for the same person at the same time. Those with more or less information about
the individual in question may hold that his or her reputation is slightly, or even widely,
different from another person’s assessment. In the case of overlapping communities, an
individual may have multiple reputations in different social circles or geographic
contexts. In these various settings, the deciding factor in the final shape of a reputation
may not only be differing information, but also be differing evaluations of that
information. After all, as with all “opinions,” there is a substantial element of judgment
attached to reputation, as what is “known” about an individual takes on a different cast
depending on the receiver, and, at a later stage, the transmitter, of the subjective “facts”
of reputation.399
Thus, it is vital that we bear in mind the fact that reputation is as much about
audience and reception as it is about the actual character and behavior of an individual. In
this chapter, we will look from the merchant perspective out to their audience, looking
first at the ways merchants attempted to shape their reputations, the way they were
perceived, and ultimately, the role they played in their communities. In the following
chapters, we will turn to this reception and consider how the merchant’s society acted,
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viewed, and interpreted the actions, appearance, and, importantly, the talk that circulated
about the individual.
Within an economic, and in this case professional, context, the institutional limits
of reputation are enforced by gossip, which will be central to the final chapter of this
dissertation. However, for the present, it is vital to bear in mind one core feature that is
particular to professional reputations:400 they operate to clarify economic choices by
serving as a proxy for concrete data about the best economic action to take, particularly in
the form of the correct choice of business partner.401 In cases where an actor has little or
no personal experience with a new trading partner, the general reputation of that
individual will be vital for determining whether the actor will choose to interact with that
partner, and under what conditions. Thus, the cultivation of a good reputation was an
investment on the part of a merchant, one that was likely to produce returns, at least in
the long run, as reputations are notoriously slow to build. It was also an incentive to avoid
certain kinds of profitable cheating, even when a merchant was unlikely to be discovered.
It was a serious thing to risk one’s reputation, which was built over years and could be
destroyed by one ill-considered action, or, worse, by a single, malicious rumor.

Accessing Roman Reputation:
Since this section of the dissertation largely leaves the perspective of the state to
the side, except in so far as it was a participant in informal institutions, the sources for
this chapter and those following necessarily become more diverse across time, genre, and
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context. Law generally becomes less useful in these chapters and is replaced with
anecdotal scenes drawn from novels or religious texts, epigraphic and papyrological
documents from private contexts, as well as images and archaeological sites. As ever,
these classes of evidence present challenges, but it will be the purpose of these chapters
to demonstrate that, despite their variety, these sources can be assembled to illuminate
patterns of behavior and strategies that are consistent with the challenges merchants faced
in making their social and economic choices.
In this and the subsequent chapters, it will be essential to use our source material
in such a way that it generates a set of plausible options that Roman merchants may have
had before them. This is critical given the fragmentary nature of most of the sources that
are produced by merchants, and the fact that most of the longer narratives we have about
merchants come to us from literary sources, and often novels, where the line between
fantasy and reality is difficult to tease out and comedic elements often make it difficult to
know when an author intends the reader to recognize something as unreality, or merely as
hyperbole. Fergus Millar has argued persuasively that these fantastical narratives, and in
particular Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, only thinly veil real social structures and details
about the Roman world, as part of the contract with the reader to help him suspend his
disbelief of the remarkable and outrageous plot points.402 Getting access to this layer of
reality is challenging, but in most cases a set of texts, put into conversation with one
another can reveal instances where non-literary texts inform our reading of literary ones,
and vice-versa. Further, we may consider moments when merchant express their own
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anxiety about their behavior and its reception. Through their worry, we can see moments
where they felt their actions pushed against barriers that we can no longer see. Together,
they enable us to develop a set of plausible scenarios and generate hints as to how
merchants and others reacted to particular sets of circumstances.
The other major challenge we face with the main sources of merchant reputation
is the high preponderance of funerary evidence. In the context of the study of merchant
reputation, there are three main problems with funerary inscriptions and art. First, while
these are invaluable attestations about the lives and experiences of merchants, the wider
audience for these objects is unclear. The loss of archaeological context for many
merchant inscriptions and reliefs is keenly felt here, but there is also evidence internal to
some of the objects that suggests a private, or semi-private context,403 where the only
viewers were likely to be those who had known the deceased personally. These friends
and family members would not necessarily be the ones most influenced by the claims
these objects make about reputation, as their own opinions were likely to be the most
fixed, supported by first-hand experiences. Accordingly, these objects complicate our
natural impulse to assume that, when the deceased made claims about his or her
reputation in an inscription or relief, that object was meant to propagate that message to
an audience whose opinion could be swayed.
Next, we have the second, and interrelated, problem. It is frequently impossible to
say whether a merchant's business, his or her trading partners, store or workshop, were
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inherited and operated by the succeeding generations of his or her family, or by an
apprentice. There has been a scholarly impulse to assume that some merchants hoped that
the erection of inscriptions or monuments would benefit the reputations of their
successors,404 but, while this is common sense, we often lack further evidence to
corroborate this assumption. There is limited amount of evidence to support the idea that
sons were in the habit of taking up the trades of their fathers,405 but we rarely, if ever, see
a business as an entity clearly transmitted from one generation to the next.406 Family
businesses seem to be common, with wives frequently assisting their husbands in work,
and presumably children helped as well, but it is not possible to see a family name used
metonymically for a business, or to see that name put to use by successive generations or
purchased to offer new owners the reputation of the old.407 Thus, it is unclear if, or when,
the reputation of a merchant served to benefit those he or she had left behind. As a result,
we are left to question why so many merchants put substantial effort into crafting their
posthumous reputation, and why they did so particularly in terms of their business or
profession.408
Third and finally, the potential heirs to these businesses are also often the people
who would have commissioned the funerary objects we now have. While some
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merchants certainly commissioned and designed their monuments and epitaphs while
they lived,409 others left this task to their family, friends, or even their freedmen. It is not
always possible to say who commissioned an object, and in many further cases it is
impossible to intuit the motivation that drove the commissioner. We often struggle to
tease out the emotions that lay behind the construction of a monument and to know how
the experience of grieving inflected the decisions that were made.410 Furthermore, the
reputation of the commissioner is implicated in such an undertaking, as their choice of
inscription or design relates information about their own character. Setting up funerary
markers on behalf of relations, friends, or former masters was a display of the
commissioner’s pietas, and it is often unclear to what extent comments about a
merchant’s business provided Roman readers with some information about the
commissioner, rather than merely the deceased. These objects always constituted an
interconnected collection of strategies, not least of which were the practical results of
commemoration: the presentation of family groups and status, as well as the curation of
memory and reputation.411
Posthumous reputation is under-theorized, particularly in contrast to the study of
reputation more generally.412 In philosophical terms, it is believed that the desire to craft
one’s posthumous reputation is based on a desire to demonstrate that one’s life had
meaning and value. The fear that life might, ultimately, be an exercise in futility and
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absurdity is combated by efforts to shape how one will be remembered, and for how long,
after death.413 The parameters for what constituted a meaningful and worthwhile life were
socially constructed, not to mention contested. As we will see below, many who lived
lives that, from the outside or from elite perspectives, would have been viewed as lowly
or meaningless, if not actually detriments to society as a whole,414 took great pride in
their achievements. For merchants in the Roman Empire, the claims made by funerary art
and inscriptions about the importance of work in their lives were both personal and
social. To represent one’s profession was a means of demonstrating something of
importance about one’s character that would, hopefully, live on and prove one’s value. It
added to the body of data constituting one’s reputation, but also made a statement about
the value of work to the community as a whole and the position that work should have in
society.415
More concretely, Kenneth Craik argues that posthumous reputation, and the desire
to shape it, arises from the knowledge that, post mortem, many of the social norms
regulating gossip, the discussion of an individual behind his or her back,416 are relaxed,
leading to open discussion of the deceased in a broad range of contexts. While those who
had known the deceased in life might restrain their discussion out of respect for living
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family and close friends, others will rapidly spread information about the deceased that
was previously withheld due to its negative, or even scandalous, nature. An individual,
anticipating this rapid revaluation of his or her life and concerned for the impact upon
surviving family and friends, might act to curate the evidence by which he or she would
be remembered.
At the highest levels of Roman society, this curation was done through the select
publication of letters or other works, the destruction of manuscripts, and the active
discussion of one’s legacy.417 However, all levels in Roman society invested time and
energy in funerary art and inscriptions. The overblown, but perhaps telling, example of
Petronius’ Trimalchio suggests that the composition of funerary inscriptions may have
been a long, and even semi-public process for some,418 while others carefully selected
what they would say for themselves from a set of socially acceptable claims,419 and still
others left these choices in the hands of others. Certainly, some of our inscriptions seem
to fit within standard, brief, formulae, while others, such as the long verse inscription of
Lucius Nerusius Mithres, discussed below, were clearly the result of someone’s creativity
and prolonged thought.420 Essentially, funerary monuments were designed to fit the needs
of their commissioner, whoever that may have been, and particularly, as we will see, they
strive to present the character of the deceased and spread his or her reputation.
However, it is difficult to tease out the connections between the strategies used by
merchants to shape their reputations upon their deaths and those which they used
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regularly in life. The latter are vital for understanding the institutional force of reputation,
but are, on the whole, less frequently attested and less clearly presented. This is a direct
consequence of the kinds of media merchants produced and the circumstances in which it
was socially acceptable for an individual to proclaim his or her own virtues, but it leaves
an additional hurdle to be overcome. In order to bridge the gap, and to view our evidence
outside the boundaries of single lifetimes, two further theoretical frameworks will be
utilized along with that provided by NIE.
The first will be an adapted form of the theory of what Henri Lefebvre calls
“representational space.” This theory exists at the intersection of space and memory,
encapsulating how space is experienced as a “lived” reality, through its association with
forms of meaning, importantly including reputation. Second, the lens offered to us by
scholars of popular culture will be applied, which gives us access to some of the oral
cultures of the Roman Empire, as well as new means of reading the extant written
sources.
“Representational space,” is one of three conceptions of space that Lefebvre
identifies in The Production of Space. In his view, there is, first, “spatial practice,” or
perceived space, which he relates to space in the context of social class and systems of
power. Second, he understands there to be “representations of space,” or conceived
space, which he defines as effectively equivalent to mathematical space, which exists in
the abstract and has bearing on reality only in so far as it is the basis of construction and,
to an extent, mapping. Finally, he has defined “representational space,” or lived space.
This is space as it interacts with human imagination, a force that overlays physical space
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and creates “more or less coherent systems of non-verbal signs and symbols.”421 As he
notes,422 these visions of space reinforce and complement each other, but it is in the latter
that this chapter finds a theoretical direction.
As we have discussed in previous chapters, this work is interested in the local and
small-scale trader. Theories of space aid our understanding of how places affect the lives
of those who lived and worked in them. Just as we have examined and will continue to
examine the impact of face-to-face interactions, we must set those interactions into a
landscape and understand how it was experienced by merchants. The landscape, whether
urban or rural, is created by the society, which physically builds its landmarks, paths, and
points of rest. In time, associations with these particular spaces take on the power to
shape human action, forcing not only physical movement to obey its confines (i.e. where
one can turn left) but also social movement (i.e. where two people can conduct business).
By using Lefebvre’s conception of representational space, we can understand that
those constraints are communicated to individuals through symbols and, at times, labels,
that are read or heard, understood, and communicated to others through everyday
discourse. Thus, it is clear to the community in question what “a” (or “the”) “market”
signifies.423 The word has not only a definition, but also a clear point of reference, so that
it is possible to consistently identify a market when one is experiencing it through sight,
sound, or other sensory inputs. Furthermore, there are social implications, not only to the
space itself, but also in the ability to interpret the symbols that denote that space’s limits
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and extent correctly.424 Some individuals will be more adept at this interpretation, while
others, either because of class or relationship to the community, may be less able to read
the symbols and divine their meaning correctly. Finally, those signs can provide
instructions for proper behavior and conduct, clarifying what is permitted and where, as
well as highlighting cases where those social constraints are still under negotiation.425
Representational space provides us with tools to read landscapes in multiple
layers, moving beyond the physical characteristics of the space and delving into the
meanings that a society attached to it, and was subsequently shaped by. This theory,
however, requires slight adaptation for the purposes of this chapter because, while it
recognizes the role that time may play in the process of overlaying these meanings, it
does not address, precisely, the value of memory and history in space. This appears,
however, in the work of several scholars who are also interested in the role of space in
social interaction. Michel de Certeau, for example, has a similar understanding of the
existence of something like “representational space.” For him, labels on places create
ideas of place that then become points to which specific meanings and values can be
attached.426 These can be read and interpreted only by those who have access to the keys
of understanding, which he calls “local authority.”427
De Certeau’s “places” reveal an ambiguity in the language surrounding this topic.
Space, place, and landscape are all terms that are used in this discourse, with a variety of
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meanings and inflections. Most particularly, there is significant dispute over the correct
definition of “space” and “place,” mostly concerning which is the general and which is
the specific. Lefebvre uses “space” in both senses but tends to assume that “space” or “a
space” is the specific, while “place” is more general. More commonly, as is the case for
de Certeau and Yi-Fu Tuan, the reverse is understood, that “space” is general, and
“place” is specific.428 In what follows, I will use the terms interchangeably, as in this
setting it will be more vital to identify what the space/place is, and to understand its
layers of meaning, than to have a hierarchy of terms. I will use landscape, as above, to
describe the general backdrop against and in which merchants operated, with the
understanding that that backdrop is filled with spaces, or places, that populate the area
and inflect it with meaning for those who have the ability to read it.
In line with this, de Certeau’s “local authority” dovetails nicely with a trend we
will see in the Roman experience: that it is at the local level, and in everyday experience,
that places and spaces take on meaning, and it is by locals that those meanings can be
interpreted. Outsiders frequently fail to understand the significance of spaces in the
Roman world, and understanding can function as a kind of litmus test to identify those
who belong in the community. An illuminating example comes from Dio Chrysostom,
who, though reporting his own benefaction to a community, a substantial portico in the
city of Prusa,429 displays his status as an outsider to the local, daily practices of that
neighborhood. Dio recounts that “some people” were complaining about the destruction
of τὸ χαλκεῖον τὸ τοῦ δεῖνος, the blacksmith shop of “so-and-so,” an artisan who receives
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no further identification.430 Dio speaks derisively, claiming that these voices of dissent
were few, though loud, and he mocks their reasoning, that the destruction of the smith's
place of work was a destruction of a place of memory for the community, the site of
happy events that ought to be preserved, εἰ μὴ μενεῖ ταῦτα τὰ ὑπομνήματα τῆς παλαιᾶς
εὐδαιμονίας. He continues jokingly, that it is not as if he were tearing down the Propylaea
or the Parthenon of Athens, and refuses to acknowledge the value, or memorial status, of
a blacksmith’s shop. He does not accept that the place has meaning, in large part because,
as an elite, he would not have had access to those meanings.
Similarly, scholars of space understand and define those meanings as being
inextricably bound to memory.431 Tuan notes, in particular, that many, if not most, places
acquire both meaning and memory slowly, from habitual practices and everyday
associations, rather than from single, momentous occasions, much like the slow
development of a person’s reputation.432 The symbols attached to representational space
are acquired gradually, rather than being constructed all at once. Memory also has
another vital component in representational space: it can create, or more properly
recreate, spaces that no longer exist, allowing levels of understanding to morph into
levels of local knowledge. Thus life-long inhabitants of a place can express relationships
between places by landmarks that no longer exist (i.e. turn left at the corner where the
store used to be), which not only expresses their relationship with the place, but can also
be a tool used against outsiders or those who would presume to claim that they have local
knowledge. De Certeau describes these same kinds of representational spaces as
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palimpsests of memory and space.433 He notes that locals tend to recognize that these
layers of meaning have value only within a short distance from the place, but Ingold and
Vergunst have expanded the thought, describing how they can nevertheless be leveraged
as a sign of belonging to a community.434
For reputation, and particularly for posthumous reputation, the memory of nonlonger-extant spaces provides reputation with, potentially, a long afterlife in the minds of
locals. Representational spaces can be particularly effective tools for merchants to
prolong the memory of their lives. As we will see in this chapter, merchants commonly
refer to the places they worked, generally with an implication of pride, not only in the
work itself, but in the space. Some even boast of continuity with particular spots, and
their general tone hints that, above all else, these named places functioned as proof for
merchants. If one doubted the claims being made about a merchant’s reputation, it was
possible to go to the spot he named and ask around. It was expected that someone at that
spot would remember the merchant and could offer the testimony that would vindicate
him.435
Finally, these representational spaces provided a shorthand for social interaction
that transcended immediate localities. Certain regions of the Roman world and
neighborhoods in Roman communities carried reputations of their own, which we access
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today through lingering toponyms and the occasional references to places as having
particular characters.436 Though significantly earlier than most of our source material, a
concrete example of how this might have been felt by merchants appears in a passage in
Plautus’ Curculio recounts how different parts of the city are filled with men of different
characters. The Choregus gives a comedic list of places and people, good and bad, but
prominent on the list are merchants, who are associated with particular areas. The
account places most merchants in the Velabrum,437 near the Forum Boarium, but
specifically mentions that the moneylenders operating behind the temple of Castor who
should not be trusted.438 His implication is that they are all cheats, a topic to which we
will return in the next chapter. However, the Choregus rattles off this list casually, to pass
the time, which means that these associations were immediately obvious to him, and to
the audience. If this knowledge was so commonplace as to be a point of comedic
connection, it is logical to assume that a merchant’s reputation could be harmed by
association with the wrong space and its defining, negative meanings.
The second tool, the theoretical models surrounding the study of popular culture,
offers us a different angle of approach to access the communities that surrounded
merchants and to better understand the kinds of “common knowledge” that shaped their
perceptions of themselves, their reputations, and their position within their communities.
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Popular culture as a conceptual tool has two major benefits to the present study: first, that
it automatically privileges and focuses our vision upon non-elite perspectives and,
second, it provides us with the means to apply untypical and generically complex sources
to the study of merchants without forcing them into service as socio-economic data, but
rather retaining their original valence as textual or visual products of a largely oral
culture.
Scholarship has grown in recent years and has developed a model for interpreting
the cultural setting of non-elite people.439 The work has pushed boundaries in a number
of directions, interweaving itself into debates about power and dominance, including
popular resistance to authority, and the ways in which “mass” culture might serve as a
dialectical partner for elite cultural forms. It has even become commonplace to consider
how popular culture might serve as a central nexus for the exchange of ideas across
religions, ethnic boundaries, and geographical divides. Rightly, the field recognizes that
popular culture was hardly a static, fixed entity, but one that evolved dynamically and
sporadically, and maintained exclusive pockets with their own, internal cultures that were
both inside of and removed from the general population. Yet, in its capacity as a common
cultural language, and one in which fluency was rewarded,440 popular culture can be
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utilized to speak about the frame of reference that a majority of the populace held and
used to communicate to one another.
For this study, it is of central importance that merchants were, at least in the main,
non-elite persons. While some might be financially or socially successful,441 they did not
have access to elite, and especially senatorial society. Furthermore, they were criticized
for their efforts to participate in the cultural forms that were adopted by that portion of
the population.442 Their relegation to non-elite status by Roman society is a matter more
fully covered in the next chapter when we address stereotypes,443 but here it is vital that
merchants operated among peers who were participants in and generators of popular
cultural forms. Thus, they themselves created, added to, altered, and influenced what was
considered popular culture, and their values, concerns, and principles are diffused
throughout the various sources this culture produced. Though it is, at times, hard to trace
as an overarching concept in merchant sources, which are, primarily, focused on the
reputation of the individual, not as a socio-cultural value, we see reputation plainly in
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popular culture, acting as an institutional limit in the way NIE predicts, encouraging
individuals to behave in some ways and to avoid others, especially in economic activities.
While reputation and its importance can be found in sources produced by elite
individuals, in popular culture these sources commonly take on a more economic bent,
rather than conceiving of reputation essentially as a means to secure personal fame and a
place in the annals of history. This aspiration was not necessarily beyond the rest of
Roman society, though scholarship still debates whether or not non-elites were primarily
copying their elite peers when they made such claims. Regardless, in general, popular
culture’s conceptions of reputation tend to prioritize the immediate, practical benefits of
being thought well of by one’s peers and in one’s community during one’s lifetime.
Finally, popular culture can be utilized as an effective organizing principle for
addressing several categories of evidence that otherwise, through their media, extent over
time and space, and, above all, their social and cultural status, would be challenging to
reconcile or interpret. Graffiti, the writings of various “pseudo” authors, popular sayings,
references to and excerpts from songs, and even Greek and Roman novels have all fallen,
at one point or another, into the category of “popular” cultural productions.444 These
sources can be immensely useful to the study of merchants but are difficult to put into
dialogue with one another without the framework of popular culture. Most particularly, as
we will see in this chapter, the sources of popular culture allow us to span large gaps in
chronological or geographical space to find moments of continuity of thought. Popular
sources are replete with phrasings and re-phrasings of thoughts that were pervasive in
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Roman culture, but which we struggle to understand as widespread based on the
attestation of a single account. In looking at reputation, we can see that it remained an
essential cultural value with institutional power across the Empire and across the
centuries. Through the media of popular culture, it is possible to trace reputation and to
assert its importance in Roman culture and as a practical tool of Roman merchants.

Roman Reputation:
Among the other informal institutions that gave structure to the Roman economy,
reputation stands out as a particularly powerful determinant of merchant behavior, not
only because of its universality and applicability to people at all levels of wealth and
status, but also because it was an acknowledged part of merchant life. Traders knew the
importance of their reputations as they related to their businesses. Individual merchants,
several of whom will be discussed in this chapter, openly state how their reputation
helped their work, and expressed their hope that those reputations would remain positive
for a long time, if not forever. Yet the same preoccupation with reputation that is visible
in particular cases is also available in the abstract, through the lens of popular culture,
where reputation also loomed large.
Within this class of evidence come several essential figures, who allow us to
contextualize the claims of our merchants within a broader social framework. One
prominent figure is that of Publilius Syrus,445 the author of a collection of late Republican
Sententiae. His pithy statements are eminently quotable, the sort of material that would
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have easily circulated orally as well as in written form, and the collection contains
numerous references to the importance, and financial benefits, of a good reputation.
Bona opinio hominum tutior pecunia est.446
The good opinion of men is safer than money.
Honestus rumor alterum est patrimonium.447
A good reputation is a second inheritance.
These examples present a good reputation as directly comparable to money, and,
in the former case, claim that a good reputation is, in fact, preferable, due to its being
“safer,” tutior. Other passages suggest the practical utility of a good name, suggesting its
assistance in getting credit, fides, was essential.448 Further, these sayings claim that the
loss of a good reputation was a truly unenviable position.449 In all cases, reputation,
whether presented as fama, opinio, rumor, or, occasionally, “speaking or hearing good or
bad things,” bene/male dicere/audire,450 is connected to economic consequences that
cannot be ignored, or are only ignored at great risk.
As a late Republican source, the circulation and longevity of these Sententiae is
immediately important for this project. Yet, our evidence does not suggest that they
moldered away in obscurity. Performances of Syrus’ mimes seem to have continued until
the reign of Nero,451 and references to Publilius, or imitations of his style, appear in
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Seneca the Elder, Petronius, and Aulus Gellius, who cites 14 examples of how quotable
and memorable Publilian Sententiae were.452
The continued circulation of these lines in the 2nd century CE is not necessarily
surprising, as they seem to have been part of an extensive and growing corpus of
Sententiae. These are commonly attributed to “Pseudo-Publilius,” and are joined, in the
manuscript tradition, with similar sayings of “Pseudo-Seneca,” as well as, in the Middle
Ages, excerpts from Seneca, Ausonius, and Lactantius.453 These later collections
continued to circulate similar passages about reputation, including:
Honesta fama melior pecunia est.454
A good reputation is better than money.
It is impossible to date this Pseudo-Publilian material, but it finds echoes both
prior to, and well-beyond, the Republican period. Similar thoughts appear in
disconnected corpora, including the book of Proverbs,455 and the 3rd or 4th century CE
collection known as the Disticha Catonis, a popular school book that was in continuous
use through late antiquity and the Middle Ages.456 Unlike Syrus, the Disticha were paired
hexameter lines, and allowed for slightly more elaborate sayings, but they retained an
interest in the intersection of reputation and commerce. Most have a moral tone that,
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while not absent in the Sententiae,457 was nevertheless underdeveloped in Syrus’ brief
observations. A typical example may be taken to illustrate:
Luxuriam fugito simul et vitare momento
Crimen avaritiae, nam sunt contraria famae.458
Avoid luxury and likewise remember to shun the crime of greed, for they are
contrary to a (good) reputation.
These moral concerns were central to the social and economic lives of merchants.
It was vital to them that they have, or present themselves as having, an honest life, free
from crime or other failings. Once again, greed looms large among the worries about
reputation, and it appears in several other examples.459 In the next chapter, we will
address more particularly why merchants were defensive about these issues but, in this
setting, we will examine a number of cases that suggest that this backdrop of concern
about the role of reputation in commerce during the later Roman Empire led merchants to
invest heavily in their reputations, even after death.

Merchant Agency in (Posthumous) Reputation:
The onus fell on merchants to discover, individually, what they could do to
achieve a reputation for honesty, fairness, and other, necessary virtues. As we have
mentioned, much of a merchant’s reputation lay outside of his or her control, influenced
by others and their perspectives. Nevertheless, merchants held some ability to shape their
reputations, and did so, in the main, by carefully regulating their behavior in business and
public life. A merchant’s choices in a given situation provided him with opportunities to
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create anecdotal evidence about his character and exemplify how he lived the reputation
that he had earned or aspired to. These stories circulated, spreading accounts about his
actions, with or without embellishment, and with them came judgments about intentions
and efficacy that eventually generated a reputation. Judgments, however, had the
potential to cut both ways, depending on the receiver, and merchants inevitable struggled
to shape the reputation that their actions created in the community around them. While
that reception will, to greater or less extents, be the subject of the next two chapters, in
this section we will look at evidence produced by merchants themselves as testimony for
what they thought, and wanted others to think, about themselves.
Since this body of evidence is heavily skewed in favor of monuments and
inscriptions, it will make sense to begin with some of these attestations. Many of the
issues that this chapter will address are visible in a pair of related objects: the
sarcophagus and loculusplatte of the wool-worker, Titus Aelius Evangelus. Both objects
combine image with epigraphy and describe the life, and particularly the working life, of
this merchant, as well as the funerary arrangements he made for himself and his family.
As is often the case with these objects, both pieces now lack any archaeological
context. This is all the more challenging in this case, since these are two funerary reliefs,
which must have come from different contexts, but both clearly relate to the same
merchant. As he cannot have been interred twice, having an excavated context would
explain a good deal about when and how Evangelus was put to rest. The front panel of
the sarcophagus, all that now survives since the loss of its side panels, is now in the Getty
collection, while the loculusplatte, a relief that once covered a niche for a funerary urn, is
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now in the collection of the Mediterranean Museum (Medelhavsmuseet) in Stockholm.460
The pair are likely to be Antonine in date, and their style is consistent with Italy in that
period.461
The sarcophagus panel [Fig.1], chronologically the first of the objects based on
the inscriptions, depicts Evangelus, a man with portrait features, reclining on a couch. He
is dressed in a short-sleeved tunic and mantle and holds a cup in his left hand, signifying
his resting at banquet, while he holds grapes in his right that he offers to a pet rooster. He
is surrounded by images alluding to his profession as a wool-worker and a collection of
symbols that signify his place in a peaceful afterlife. Tools of the wool trade appear to the
right of his couch, a scale and what is probably a weight, and the scene is bookended by
two seated figures working with wool at different stages of production. The figure to the
left is an older man who sits combing the wool. The figure at the right, a younger man,
rolls spun yarn into balls, ready for sale. Behind Evangelus’ head is a small scene which
seems to consist of a worker, leading a resisting horse through an archway, who turns to
look to the right at a dancing man and a woman who waves at the pair as she climbs a
small hill.462
Before Evangelus’ couch stands a woman, who is identified by the sarcophagus’
inscription as Gaudenia Nicene. She has been plausibly identified as Evangelus’ wife, or
at least his romantic partner, and she is almost certainly the mother of Evangelus’
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daughter.463 With her right hand, Gaudenia raises a cup to Evangelus. With her left hand,
she holds a garland, a common feature of funerary art. Beside Gaudenia stands a goat or a
sheep, plausibly an allusion to the raw materials used in Evangelus’ business and
probably a hint that, like the two workmen at the ends of the sarcophagus, Gaudenia was
involved in her partner’s working life, a topic to which we will return.464
In the loculusplatte [Fig. 2] Evangelus sits alone carding wool and, once again, he
is surrounded by his tools. Above him is another scale, along with weights, and there is a
container full of skeins of wool behind him. Though the space is amorphous, a ball of
wool seems to “hang” on an undefined wall, perhaps helping us to locate Evangelus in his
workshop. We do not see the public-facing side of this space, the counter area, or the
entrance for customers, but we see Evangelus actively plying his trade, generating the
product that he sells, either directly to customers or to a wholesaler or retailer.
Both the sarcophagus and the loculusplatte emphasize Evangelus as a tradesman.
While the sarcophagus displays him at rest, the image does not shy away from his work.
In fact, the choice of these motifs, the choice to present work in a funerary relief,
demonstrates that Evangelus took pride in his trade and that Evangelus felt he had
achieved a measure of success that was worth preserving in this form. The sarcophagus
displays an eclectic range of images, including Dionysiac imagery and representations of
his family and, perhaps, his staff in the form of the two workers. While this specific
arrangement of these subjects is unique, the elements: work, family, banqueting and the
afterlife, are all components seen in images that Clarke has termed the art of “ordinary
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Romans.”465 Among such commissioners, work is a prominent subject, and creating,
buying, and selling goods are commonly displayed. This is also apparent in the
loculusplatte, where the iconography stresses work, and the inscription relates the
importance of Evangelus’ family and social connections. Interestingly, Evangelus’
images show him and his employees engaged in commonplace work, the kinds of tasks
that would occupy them on a daily basis. Evangelus, it seems wanted to show himself in
his day to day life, rather than in some moment of extraordinary success.
As we will discuss, consistency is something that many merchants attempted to
convey, in what seems to be an effort to dispel any notion that their business practices
were capricious or irregular. This is present in Evangelus’ case, not only through the
scenes and kinds of work that his reliefs display, but also in the details of the scenes. In
particular, the inclusion of a set of scales on both objects seems a significant choice.
Scales, aside from their symbolic burden as a mark of balance and as the sign of the
astronomical sign of libra, were a necessary tool in many industries, including woolworking. In Evangelus’ business, they were likely used to measure out combed wool
before spinning. Measurement at this stage of production would enable Evangelus, or,
more likely, his workers, to standardize the amount of wool per ball or skein, ensuring
that customers could purchase wool in regular amounts. At the moment of sale, scales
could be used to demonstrate the veracity of a merchant’s claims. If he or she claimed
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that there was a pound of goods, it could be quickly tested. Evangelus also displays
weights, which would seem to make a claim about the fairness and probity of his
measures. He does not keep them away from the viewer, but, by implication, welcomes
their scrutiny, because he has nothing to hide.
In fact, most of his business is left open for examination. He shows himself and
employees combing out wool, a stage in the preparation of raw wool or hair that required
particular care and attention to detail.466 It was a task that separated one wool-worker
from another in terms of quality. Furthermore, Evangelus shows himself both as a worker
and as an employer, which demonstrates not only the he took personal responsibility for
the quality of goods that his workshop produced, but also that he was successful enough
to employ others.
These images are eloquent in themselves, but both objects carry inscriptions as
well, which offer us further insights into the life of Evangelus the wool-worker. At first
reading, the epigraphic record of these objects seems devoid of evidence for Evangelus’
relationship to his work and reputation, as both inscriptions are primarily concerned with
Evangelus’ family life, but this, too, has importance for the intersection of selfpresentation, work, and reputation. The sarcophagus inscription is divided into two parts,
beginning above and continuing below the scene, and reads:
FUERIT POST ME ET POST GAUDENIA NICENE VETO ALIUM; <MI ET
ILLEI FECI>, QUISQUIS HUNC TITULUM LEGERIT,
T(ito) AELIO EVANGELO, HOMINI PATIENTI, MERUM PROFUNDAT.467
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I forbid that there be, after me and after Gaudenia Nicene, any other person
(buried here); I made this for me and for her. Whoever reads this inscription, let
him pour out wine for Titus Aelius Evangelus, a hard-working man.
The inscription is concerned with issues that preoccupy many funerary
inscriptions in the Roman world,468 such as the protection of the tomb and the provision
of burial for Evangelus and Gaudenia Nicene. The importance of this relationship, which
looks like that of man and wife, whether or not the two were legally married, is
reinforced by the imagery, where the pair drink with each other in a permanent scene of
greeting (or perhaps farewell) and banquet. The inscription offers us little insight into the
object’s original context. We can imagine family and close friends would be likely to
attend the funerary banquet that is implied in Evangelus’ mention of pouring out wine,
merum profundat, but the inscription addresses a viewer, quisquis, an indefinite pronoun
which suggests that Evangelus himself may not have been able to exactly imagine who
his readers would be, whether acquaintances or strangers. Regardless of the intended
audience, Evangelus actually shares relatively little detail about himself beyond what can
be learned from the images, he uses only patienti to describe himself, a term that requires
further consideration and will be examined in detail below.
Moreover, Evangelus says nothing about his work as such. We identify his trade
through the iconography, and Evangelus provides little else from which we could infer
his biography. While we might have expected some reference to his business in the
inscription, following a set of images that so clearly place emphasis on labor, it is clear
that the imagery is doing different things from the text, including its display of Bacchic
revelry, numerous animals, and the feast that Evangelus and Gaudenia seem to be
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enjoying. This kind of eclectic object may have simply been a product of Evangelus’
taste, and his desire to reveal a little of everything, without repetition. As a specially
commissioned object, we must assume that the details are intentional, and not the product
of chance or generic conventions.469
Similarly, the loculusplatte was a specially commissioned object, though its small
size encourages a more direct, clear message in its imagery. Though the loculusplatte is a
more streamlined version of the imagery of the sarcophagus, the similarities between the
two suggest that Evangelus had a single vision of how he wanted to be remembered after
his death: as a merchant dedicated to both his trade and to his family. Like the inscription
on the sarcophagus, the loculusplatte stresses Evangelus’ interpersonal relationships over
other details. It recounts his connection to a woman who is either his second wife or his
first wife and second major significant other, a man who is either her relative or
collibertus, and Evangelus’ daughter, who seems to be the result of his relationship with
Gaudenia Nicene. The loculusplatte has nothing to say about Evangelus’ work and offers
nothing explicit about his character.
T(itus) AELIUS EVANGELUS CONPARAVIT SIBI ET ULPIAE
FORTUNATAE CONIUCI CARISSIMAE SU(a)E CONCESSUS IBIDEM
ULPIO TELESPHORO ITEM GAUDENIAE MARCELLINAE FILIAE
NATURALI CONCESSIT T(itus) AELIUS EVANGELUS LIIBERTIS QUII
LUBIIRTABU470
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Titus Aelius Evangelus prepared [this] for himself and for Ulpia Fortunata, his
dearest wife. The same place is granted to Ulpius Telesphorus. Also, Titus Aelius
Evangelus grants [this] to Gaudenia Marcellina, his natural daughter [and] to his
freedmen and freedwomen.471
In this case, Evangelus provides no description of himself but instead chooses to
let the image speak on his behalf. However, the inscription is not without meaning.
Evangelus again chooses to define himself in relation to his family and his generous
provision of a resting place for them. The inclusion of family in funerary art and
inscriptions is common in all forms of Roman funerary monuments and is by no means
out of place for someone in Evangelus’ social and economic position. Joshel, who has
analyzed a large corpus of inscriptions of working people, notes that freedmen commonly
refer to or include their colliberti, fellow freedmen from the same master, in their burial
arrangements. She associates this with the habit of freedmen to go into business with
their colliberti.472 While Evangelus does not exactly conform to this pattern, he does
choose to present himself as part of a family, complete with some messy complexities,
and he emphasizes that he has been successful enough to be able to provide them with a
resting place.
The desire to make this provision for one’s family is well-attested in Roman
funerary practice, and has long been associated, in the case of Roman freedmen, with a
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desire to establish legitimacy for families that were often kept apart by slavery. 473 This is
certainly the case for Evangelus, whose “natural daughter,” Gaudenia Marcellina, seems
to occupy a challenging position in the family, and perhaps also the Roman legal,
structure. She shares her mother’s name, rather than her father’s, a sign that she was born
outside the legal structure of the Roman family.474 Evangelus clearly recognized her as
his own, but his careful provision for her burial suggests that he may have had some
anxiety about her future, perhaps especially in light of his marriage to Ulpia Fortunata.
However, in as much as these are family ties, they are also likely to be business
ties. As Joshel has noted, freedmen often went into business with their colliberti, and
these connections often led to, or were themselves the product of, family ties that
developed while in slavery.475 Certainly Evangelus’ family relied on his financial
support. Evangelus was well enough off to be able to have slaves and freedmen and
women of his own, and it was his money that purchased this resting place. His family
were also connected explicitly to his trade through the imagery that decorated their tomb.
Ulpia Fortunata, Ulpius Telesphorus, who is either her relative, possibly a brother
or, alternately, merely her collibertus, and even Gaudenia Marcellina may also have been
assistants to Evangelus’ work in more concrete terms. We have already seen the example
of Gaudenia Nicene, there was a precedent for family to involve themselves in the trade
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of the main bread-winner. To be as successful as Evangelus seems to have been may have
required the help of family, and in particular of wives, who seem to have commonly
worked in their husband’s businesses.476
Of course, not all women were in such a position, particularly in the face of the
death of their husbands. It seems clear from the visual language of the sarcophagus that
Evangelus had expected to die before Gaudenia Nicene. The existence of the
loculusplatte demonstrates that this did not happen, as Evangelus could have had no use
for a second place to bury himself. It is unclear what happened to Gaudenia Nicene. She
may have died first, and been buried in the sarcophagus without Evangelus, or the pair
may have parted ways before either used the sarcophagus.
Whatever the case, Gaudenia is shown there as a woman who was fully capable of
taking over his business. Evangelus may well have intended her to do so, but our sources
suggest that it was often difficult for widows to maintain a business after the loss of a
husband. Lucian, in his Dialogue of the Courtesans, describes a blacksmith’s widow who
was forced to sell her husband’s anvil, hammer, and tongs to support herself and a
daughter. She tries to make ends meet by weaving, but eventually is forced to prostitute
herself and their daughter.477 The widow, Crobyle, tells her story with natural sadness,
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but even in a case of such misery, it was important to her to mention that her husband,
Philinus, was well-reputed, μέγα ὄνομα, in the Piraeus where he worked.478 She stresses
that Philinus was a man without equal, perhaps exculpating him from responsibility for
their poverty and disgrace, and herself from blame for being unable to keep his business
running.
Evangelus seems to have made a better provision for first Gaudenia, and later
Ulpia and his second family, than the fictional Philinus did for Crobyle and his daughter,
but reputation remains an essential component of both stories. In fact, it is directly
reflected, not only in the emphasis that Evangelus places on his work, both in his probity,
as evidenced by the detail of the scales on both objects, and his business success,
represented by the image of his employees and the growing number of people that
Evangelus provided burial places for, but also in the only description Evangelus offers of
himself: patienti. While the English cognate, patient, is often used to translate the term,479
the word probably ought to be translated to reflect its origin in the verb patior, which
implies both suffering and labor. Evangelus, most correctly, is describing himself as
something like “hard-working,” rather than boasting about his “patience.” Patiens is not a
common descriptor, but other merchants, and particularly freedmen and women, use
language with similar implications when describing their characters and reputations.
One particular phrase relating a similar idea of hard work, is ab asse quaesitum,
an idiom meaning something akin to, “coming up from nothing,”480 and literally referring
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to a fortune acquired from a single as.481 Hard work, toil, and success in the face of
adversity are common themes in merchant inscriptions and they helped merchants present
a reputation of diligence, determination, and success. A colorful example is the funerary
marker of Vibia Chresta, which says:
VIBIA L.L. CHRESTA MON(umentum)
FECIT SIBI ET SUIS ET C. RUSTIO
C.L. THALASSO FILIO E[t] VIBIAE
Ɔ.L. CALYBENI LIBERAE LENAE
AB ASSE QUASITUM LUCRO SUO SINE
FRAUDE ALIORUM. H(oc) M(onumentum) H(eredum) N(on) S(equetur).
Vibia Chresta, freedwoman of Lucius, made this monument for herself and her
family and for Gaius Rustius Thalassus, freedman of Gaius, her son, and for Vibia
Calybenis, a freedwoman of Gaia, procuress. (She did this), having earned it
starting with an as, with her own money and without fraud to others. This
monument does not pass to the heirs.482
The inscription is one of only a few that are explicitly set up by a woman on
behalf of others. Vibia Chresta, like Evangelus, has erected this inscription on her own
behalf and that of her family, including her son Thalassus and an unrelated freedwoman,
Vibia Calybenis.
Of the people commemorated in the inscription, only Vibia Calybenis is identified
by her work, specifically as a lena, a procuress or brothel-keeper. Though her profession
seems clear enough and was likely a profession filled with many other women, this is the
only attestation in an inscription of a merchant of this kind. However, Vibia Calybenis’
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relationship with Vibia Chresta is less clear. It has been hypothesized that Vibia
Calybenis was Vibia Chresta’s freedwoman, and that, Vibia Chresta may have owned the
brothel that Vibia Calybenis ran.483 The internal evidence of the inscription does not
contradict this theory, since the text shows that Vibia Calybenis was liberated from the
ownership of a woman, denoted by the inverted C,484 but the limited context does not
permit us to say much more.
What we can say about their relationship is that it was likely both economic and
social, given that Vibia Chresta chose not only to provide a burial for Vibia Calybenis,
but also felt that it was important to make a note of her profession in this inscription. It is
possible that Vibia Chresta was engaged in a similar business, or alternately, if Vibia
Calybenis was her freedwoman, that she was invested in this business, though, once again
we are restrained by the limitations of this brief piece of evidence. It is notable that the
inscription reports Vibia Calybenis’ profession without commentary, neither playing up
nor making efforts to disguise the sexual nature of this work. It was evidently important
to mention her work, but not critical to offer an excuse or explanation.
In fact, and perhaps naturally, Vibia Chresta is more interested in presenting her
own achievements than discussing Vibia Calybenis’ work. She is adamant throughout the
inscription about the scale of her achievement. She sees the inscription as a reflection of
her success as defined by her financial circumstances, and emphasizes the money was her
own, and acquired through her own effort. The final sentence of the inscription hammers
home this point. Vibia Chresta pays for the monument with her own money, suo lucro,
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which she built up from nothing, ab asse quaesitum, and earned sine fraude aliorum,
without fraud to others. This trio of claims gets to the heart of many of the issues
merchants faced, particularly in relation to their real or perceived social status. Whatever
Vibia Chresta’s profession was, her profits from it were simultaneously a point of pride
for her and something she felt some anxiety about.
On the one hand, Chresta is clearly proud of the achievement that this monument
represents, the ability to provide a burial place for her family and associates. Like,
perhaps, Evangelus, but certainly like many others, Chresta has risen from slavery, from
being property, to a position where she is able to provide for herself and others, and
possibly even to own, and free, other people. Her ab asse quaesitum stresses her rise from
nothing, a journey that doubtless included the kind of suffering and effort that Evangelus
refers to through his own patienti.485 Chresta’s assertion that it was her own money also
draws attention to her achievement, which was done without the assistance of others. Her
pride in her achievement is not without parallel. As we will discuss below, the goat-skin
merchant Mithres also boasts of his ability to provide a resting place for himself and his
heirs.486 He calls his ability to pay for his own burial and that of others an honor that was
greater than all others, honor potior quoque cunctis.487 He is clear that these burials were
not a selfish impulse designed to aggrandize himself, though his inscription certainly
does that, but were a result of his own generous nature and care for others.488 Chresta,
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though less expansive than Mithres, may have been drawing on some of these themes,
and certainly wished to celebrate the achievement made possible by her hard-won
financial security.
Yet wealth is also a subject of anxiety for Chresta, who felt compelled to
conclude her own funerary inscription with an explicit defense of her achievement, that
she had won it without deceit and fraud. As we will discuss more in chapter five, this
kind of negative formulation whereby a virtue, in this case honesty, is presented as the
absence of a vice, is common in merchant inscriptions, and seems to have been a product
of pervasive negative stereotypes about merchants. To put it briefly, merchants were
assumed to take advantage of others as a matter of course in their pursuit of gain. Vibia
Chresta seems to have been anticipating accusations of this sort and intended to head
them off in her own words, laying claim to honesty and fairness by disavowing cheating.
Though her comment is brief, it was a targeted claim to assure the reader of her upright
nature.
This may have been particularly critical for a person who was, either directly or
obliquely, associated with the sex trade, since those professions were subject to a greaterthan-average level of distrust from the general public.489 Despite the trust that was
implicit in the physical intimacy of this kind of work, sex workers were consciously and
continuously marginalized in Roman society, even more so than other merchants. It is
unclear to what extent Vibia Chresta felt the need to defend against this kind of bias for
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herself, or for Vibia Calybenis, but that Vibia Chresta would, in the same “breath,”
mention the profession of Vibia Calybenis and the absence of deceit in her acquisition of
a fortune may hint that she felt a need to clarify matters for her audience. The question
remains as to why Chresta would mention Vibia Calybenis’ work at all, but it was evident
that this was seen as important information, and a point that should not be glossed over.
Work was an important part of Calybenis’ identity, to the point that Vibia Chresta felt
that she could not leave it out. Yet, rather than stress the sexual nature of Vibia
Calybenis’ work, or even identify herself by her own (or her son’s) work, Vibia Chresta
chooses to express her own admirable successes and assure her audience that she had
done everything right.
As mentioned above, this is done, at least in part, through the condemnation of the
vices of others. Vibia Chresta acts without, sine, those characteristics that are assumed to
belong to those who, like her, achieve financial success. She hoped to share a reputation
that reflected her character as an able provider, who generously looked after others, and
dealt fairly and honestly with her business partners. These same claims are taken to an
extreme degree in the case of Lucius Nerusius Mithres, whose long funerary inscription is
emblematic of many of the elements at play in this chapter. He stresses many of the same
issues raised in the cases of Evangelus and Vibia Chresta, though he reflects more
explicitly than either on his own character as a man and as a merchant.
D.M.
IS CUIUS PER CAPITA VERSORUM NOMEN DECLARATUR,
FECIT SE VIBUS SIBI ET SUIS OMNIBUS
LIBERTIS LIBERTABUSQUE POSTERISQUE EORUM.
LIBER NUNC CURIS FUERIM QUI, RESPICE LECTOR.
NOTUS IN URBE SACRA VENDENDA PELLE CAPRINA,
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EXHIBUI MERCES POPULARIBUS USIBUS APTAS,
RARA FIDES CUIUS LAUDATA EST SEMPER UBIQUE.
VITA VEATA FUIT, STRUXI MIHI MARMORA. FECI
SECURE, SOLVI SEMPER FISCALIA MANCEPS,
IN CUNCTIS SIMPLEX CONTRACTIBUS, OMNIBUS AEQUUS
UT POTUI, NEC NON SUBVENI SAEPE PETENTI,
SEMPER HONORIFICUS, SEMPER COMMUNIS AMICIS.
MAIOR AD[HUC] HIC LAUDIS HONOR, POTIOR QUOQUE CUNCTIS,
IPSE MEIS QUOD CONSTITUI TUTAMINA MEMBRIS
TALIAQU[E] FECI NON TAM MIHI PROVIDUS UNI,
HEREDUM QUOQUE CURA FUIT. TENET OMNIA SECUM,
RE PROPRIA QUICUMQUE IACET. ME FAMA LOQUETUR:
EXEMPLUM LAUDIS VIXI DUM VITA MANEBAT,
SOLLICITUS MULTIS REQUIEM FECI QUOQUE MULTIS,
L. NERUSIUS MITHRES.
For the spirits. He whose name is declared by the first letter of the verses made
this for himself during his lifetime and all his freedmen and freedwomen and their
descendants.
Reader, consider who I, who am now free from cares, was. Known in the city for
selling sacred goat skins, I displayed goods suitable for popular uses, (I) whose
rare trustworthiness was always praised everywhere. My life was blessed, I built a
marble tomb for myself. I was untroubled, as a contractor I always paid my taxes,
I was straightforward in all my dealings, was fair to everyone as much as I was
able, and often helped those seeking my aid. I was always honorable, always
courteous with my friends. This honor of praise is still greater, even preferable to
all (others), that I myself put up a tomb for my limbs and I made it in this way not
so much looking after myself alone, it was also out of concern for my heirs. He
holds everything with him who lies in his own property. Fame will speak of me: I
lived as an example of praise while life remained, looking after many, I, Lucius
Nerusius Mithres, also made a resting place for many.490
Like that of Vibia Chresta and Evangelus, Mithres’ inscription notes the people
for whom he provided a burial place. He has established a tomb for himself and his
freedmen and women, a sizable number of people, if his omnibus is to be trusted, and he
has provided space for at least one further generation of their families. If accurate, this
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would be a significant gift, and an impressive marker of Mithres’ generosity. Mithres
himself calls the construction of this tomb the maior laudis honor, the greater honor of
praise, in that he not only was able to be buried with his own things about him, but also
because he was able to give a resting place to his heirs.
These heirs are interesting, because, unlike Evangelus and Vibia Chresta, Mithres
is not explicit about their identities. He does not define himself by a family that he is
providing for, and we are left to assume that Mithres was without a wife or children. He
may have left his estate to his freedmen and women, though we lack solid evidence.
Certainly, he seems to have had a desire to look after them, not unlike our other
examples. The inscription is too brief to determine if that was the result of some genuine
emotional connection, but it is clear that Mithres wanted the provision of these burial
sites to be viewed by others as a mark of his personal generosity to those under his
protection.
More than our other examples, Mithres is clear in his presentation of the persona
that he is adopting. That persona is at the very center of the inscription, both in the
acrostic that spells out his name and in the consistent use of the first person to lay claim
to agency and action. The Mithres of the inscription, whatever his relationship to the real
man, never shies away from his achievements and lacks humility, in both the best and
worse ways. He is adamant in his own value and contributions to society, and fully
believes that his reputation will live on. As he says it: me fama loquetur, fame will speak
of me.
The inscription makes a series of claims, perhaps most especially to a cultural and
literary standing that is out of the ordinary for most merchants. Mithres’ inscription is a
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carefully constructed piece of poetry, which eschews many of the traditional formulae
that are found in merchant inscriptions. It is evident that he put a great deal of thought
into the work, and that, perhaps like Petronius’ Trimalchio,491 he had been considering
the content of the inscription for a substantial period of time before his death. As a result,
we might consider this inscription to reflect something between Mithres’ posthumous and
living reputation. He composed it thinking of the former, but while being actively
engaged in the construction of the latter.
In terms of his reputation, Mithres is actually very explicit. Early on, he makes a
claim that he is notus, known in the city where he worked, and proceeds to lay out all the
characteristics that made up his reputation, the fama that will survive him, as well as the
exemplum he displayed for others to emulate. With the exception of a very limited
number of cases, the qualities that Mithres lists are directly related to his work as a
retailer of goat skins and other useful things, pelle caprina and merces popularibus
usibus aptas. His description of his own character is consistently tied to his work, so
when he claims to have been “fair to everyone,” the claim is intended to be read in the
specific context of Mithres’ dedication to simplicity in all his dealings. The absence of
family helps us to reach this conclusion, as he does not relate his non-business dealings
with others to us. Even the “friends” he mentions seem to be people with whom he has
connections based on business, in that he describes himself as honorificus, honorable, and
communis, courteous, rather than using more “personal” adjectives.492 Communis, in
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particular, highlights Mithres’ wish to be seen as a peer among equals.493 On the one
hand, he does not place himself ahead of his friends, while on the other this word choice
makes it more likely that these friends are business contacts, with whom Mithres worked
professionally and his reputation in life was most critical.
Given that these were his concerns, Mithres’ inscription can be read as a manual
for the ideal reputation for a Roman merchant. Mithres calls himself a man of rara fides,
rare trustworthiness, who was rewarded with a life that was blessed. Fides is a crucial
quality for merchants,494 one which we will see claimed again below in the case of the
retailer Onesimus, as it directly counters stereotypes of merchant’s deceitful nature, the
fraude that Vibia Chresta rejected. Mithres claims a remarkable level of this quality, and
credits it for the veata, blessed, life that he led. This adjective almost certainly claims
prosperity as well as more general good fortune, which is a common theme for merchant
inscriptions. While it is essential that merchants appear to have been good people, it is
also crucial that they have been successful people.
As noted above, Mithres claims to have been straightforward in his business
dealings, as well as good and helpful to others. He stresses that he did as much as he
could for those who sought his help and demonstrates that he was community-minded
through his claim to have paid his taxes. We will return to this characteristic more fully in
the following chapter, but it is a claim that was important to merchants, who were often
perceived to prey upon the community and to take advantage of the state, rather than
acting as good citizens by paying their fair share.
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However, the most essential feature that Mithres seems determined to convey to
his readers is his own consistency. Four times he stresses that he was always, semper,
doing these good things or behaving in these good ways, and we also see him often,
saepe, helping others. Continuing the totalizing trend, Mithres claims his fides was
praised always and everywhere, laudata est semper ubique. These claims are not just
simple hyperbole. By using this language, Mithres presents himself in a permanent and
totalizing state of goodness that lasted his whole life and will extend beyond it. This has
specific implications in relation to his reputation as a merchant.
Consistency, dependability, and predictability were vital to Roman business
practices, certainly, especially in markets that could feature volatile prices or capricious
officials, but the importance of these qualities extends beyond that in the matter of
reputation.495 Reputations could not be established overnight, and single actions rarely
had a sufficiently broad or long-lasting impact to be related, received, and integrated into
common knowledge. Though negative reports were likely to travel with speed and, given
the right circumstances, were highly effective in tearing down a long- and hard-won
reputation, good accounts generally lacked the sensational quality that led to rapid
dissemination in a community.496 Accordingly, a merchant could not rest on the laurels of
a single successful action, most built their good names slowly, from collections of simple,
positive, day-to-day acts. Other merchants claim that their businesses were built up over
many years, implying that their own reputations were the product of long-term,
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consistently positive actions.497 Mithres’ claim is that his good character was always
available to everyone, not just occasionally or for a select few.
For Mithres, this was particularly important because of what we know about his
business. His inscription was discovered at Magliano, in Latium,498 a site about 30 km
north of Rome, which is commonly believed to be the urbs of the inscription.499 Mithres
does not say whether he lived at Magliano, but the distance between the town and Rome
was not insurmountable, particularly for a merchant who might make a weekly or
monthly journey to the city to trade at a regularly scheduled market. Yet the distance was
great enough that Mithres probably maintained two distinct social and economic lives,
and with them, two distinct reputations. It was important to him that Magliano was aware
of his reputation in Rome, and that they recognized that his accomplishments were that
much greater because of his success in that larger market. This inscription connects the
two, and perhaps lends added force to Mithres’ assertion that he was praised
“everywhere.”
Though Mithres seems to have operated a business that was split between Rome
and its hinterland, he does not provide details of where he set up shop in either location,
though numerous merchant inscriptions do just this. Some specify, down to the street
level, where a merchant worked. Gaius Julius Epaphra, a fruit merchant, specifies that he
worked de Circo Maximo ante pulvinar,500 and the freedwoman Aurelia Nais, a fish
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merchant, sold de horreis Galbae.501 Similarly, the inscription in honor of Lucius Statius
Onesimus, a merchant of unknown goods, centered around his place of business. As in
the inscription of Evangelus, Onesimus’ wife is mentioned here. In this instance,
Crescentina was responsible for commissioning the inscription and, presumably, for this
version of her husband’s reputation:
D.M.
IN HOC TUMULO IACET CORPUS EXANIMIS
CUIUS SPIRITUS INTER DEOS RECEPTUS EST.
SIC ENIM MERUIT, L. STATIUS ONESIMUS
VIAE APPIAE MULTORUM ANNORUM NEGOTIA(n)S,
HOMO SUPER OMNES FIDELISSIMUS,
CUIUS FAMA IN AETERNO NOTA EST,
QUI VIXIT SINE MACULA AN(nos) P(lus) M(inusve) LXVIII
STATIA CRESCENTINA CO(n)IU(n)X
MARITO DIGNISSIMO ET MERITO
CUM QUO VISIT CUM BONA CONCORDIA
SINE ALTERITRUM ANIMI LESIONEM
BENE MERENTI FECIT.502
For the spirits.
In this tomb lies the body of the lifeless man, whose spirit has been welcomed
among the gods. For thus he, Lucius Statius Onesimus, deserved. Selling for
many years on the Appian Way, he was an exceptionally honest man beyond all
others, whose reputation is known in perpetuity, who lived without a stain for
roughly sixty-eight years. Statia Crescentina, wife to a most worthy and deserving
man, who lived with him with good harmony without any exchanged hurt
feelings, made this for him, for he was deserving
Onesimus’ inscription, like Mithres’, dedicates most of its text to establishing his
reputation, his fama. It stresses his extreme honesty, fidelissimus, and, like Vibia
Chresta’s inscription, it claims that he lived, sine macula, without any stain on his
character. These claims are reasonably common, shared by Onesimus, Mithres, Vibia
Chresta, and dozens of others. However, despite their ubiquity, they, “reflected a personal
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choice from a rich repertoire of widely available formulae,” as Mayer has persuasively
argued.503 The formulaic nature of the inscription makes the personal details of
Onesimus’ inscription, his age, his relationship with his wife, and his place of business,
all the more important. In fact, the inscription judges these details more important than
what exactly it was that Onesimus sold. It specifies only that he was selling, negotia(n)s,
but uses an entire line of text to explain that he sold along the Appian Way for many
years. In one line, both Onesimus’ consistency and his place of work are brought to the
reader’s attention.
But why was place so important? It is not immediately clear that Onesimus, any
more than Epaphra or Aurelia Nais, mentioned above, should be particularly proud of the
location in and of itself. Joshel has noted that the labelling of place is a particularly
common feature of merchant funerary inscriptions, and attributes this to an expression of
social relationships, often of connections formed in slavery. She bases this analysis on a
high number of colliberti who shared a single inscription and a single shop address.504
The numbers are less pronounced for those she is able to confidently identify as freeborn
but remain suggestive for merchants as a whole. Regardless of legal status, place is found
in a substantial proportion of all known examples, and, as a phenomenon, it is bound up
with reputation and social ties.
In fact, we should read these places as identifiers, not only to distinguish one
merchant from another, as physical descriptions found in papyri do, but also because
these places themselves contribute to a merchant's reputation and his social network.
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Places frequently held, in common knowledge of locals, positive or negative associations,
making them into “representational spaces.” Physical prominence at a good location
contributed to an overall impression that a merchant was important and successful,
particularly if the area was itself known for a cluster of members of the same trade.505 To
be the best among one’s peers was an additional, and particularly sought after, mark of
status, as Crobyle’s account of her late husband has already suggested. Furthermore, that
same location attested to the social group that would know a merchant best, his neighbors
and friends, competitors and customers. These individuals stored a merchant’s reputation
and were the best resources for corroborating stories about him.506
Of course, associations of this kind could cut both ways, with negative locations
transferring their own poor reputation to a merchant. Furthermore, the absence of location
experienced by traveling merchants was considered one of the most pitiable features of
their profession. Apollonius of Tyana, the merchant sailor turned philosopher, recounts
how his former profession was “not only inglorious but detestable… though of as much
value to humanity as that of a prince.” He says how pirates tempted him to betray his
cargo, so that he might finally be able to trade the sea for an estate.507 This trade would
not only offer a great jump in social status, from tradesman to landed gentleman, but also
a permanent home and a physical place where his reputation could be built upon literally
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solid foundations. Even though it was clearly appealing, Apollonius shuns this
temptation, refusing to compromise his reputation by dealing with pirates.508
For Onesimus and his spot on the Via Appia we lack sufficient context to identify
the exact nature of his claim. The location might suggest a certain prominence, since the
road was a major arterial route into and out of the city, but, in fact, his wife’s insistence
on his many years of trading there would seem to be the more powerful claim, since the
Via was used more for transportation than trade, in as far as our evidence allows us to
reconstruct its activity.509 Rather, his trading there over the years meant that he would
have developed a strong network of friends, partners, and acquaintances who knew him
and knew of him. Furthermore, constant trading at a single location supplied evidence of
a good reputation in and of itself, as it built up “common knowledge” that a trader was
dependable and followed consistent patterns of behavior. Continuity of place might very
well lead the community to infer that there was continuity of sales practices, an important
characteristic for a merchant operating in volatile markets.
These inscriptions, along with many others, provide us with remarkable accounts
of merchants’ lives. Their preoccupation with their reputation is clear in these texts, as, in
their funerary monuments, they attempt to give shape to their lasting fama. However,
their claims are generally reflective of the actions they had taken during their lifetimes to
deserve such a reputation. The pursuit of the actions taken in a merchant’s lifetime to
build and maintain a reputation are more challenging, since it is here that our evidence
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becomes spottier, and tends to come from the perspectives of non-merchants, whose
views are typically biased against trade as a profession.

Merchant Agency in (Living) Reputation:
Finding evidence produced by merchants during their lifetimes is challenging.
While we have substantial archaeological evidence of workshops and marketplaces, their
utilitarian purposes frequently leave us without the narratives that we would like to have
for individuals and their reputation strategies.510 Some exceptional visual evidence is
available to us because of the unique preservation of Pompeii.511 Here, as on funerary
monuments, it is reasonably commonplace to see images of work painted on exterior
walls. This is of chief interest to us, as such displays were obviously intended to be
viewed by the public. These decorations shaped the appearance of the neighborhood as a
whole, offered landmarks along crowded streets, and tended to make claims about a
merchant, his business, and his reputation.
An example from Pompeii offers us a rich case study. A Pompeian fuller,
Verecundus, decorated what seems to have been the exterior of his workshop in the Via
dell’Abbondanza.512 On one side [Fig. 3], we see workers in the shop overseen by a man
plausibly identified as the owner, Verecundus. On the other side [Fig. 4], we see the
interior of a shop, with a counter manned by a woman commonly identified as
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Verecundus’ wife.513 Even more than Gaudenia, this is a woman who is in control of her
economic agency; she displays goods in her hands and holds the attention of a customer
in a space she commands and operates by herself. The whole shop front is lavishly
decorated, but, importantly, a frieze at eye level for a traveler on the sidewalk shows
workers at various stages of the fulling, or felting, process.514 Around and on the image
his name has been scratched and painted three separate times, clearly in an effort to link
the image closely with the businessman.
From the perspective of the street view, the image was intended to be interesting
and arresting. Above the frieze, a large representation of Venus Pompeiana [Fig.3] is
painted standing in a chariot drawn by elephants. She was an important deity in the city,
and her presence, as well as that of the exotic animals, was meant to catch the viewer’s
eye from a distance, as her scale would make her easy to pick out from across the street
or perhaps even further way. Upon approach, the viewer could then linger over the
intricate details of the workshop scene at eye-level. These scenes show stages of work in
progress, as well as workers, and, in all likelihood, Verecundus himself, displaying
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finished, clean cloth at the far right of the scene.515 The details may have been interesting
to the outsider, to someone not working in the field,516 and communicated to everyone
that Verecundus took pride in his work. There is no reason to suppose that Verecundus
displayed anything less than his best efforts. Rather, he and his workers would be shown
as the best in their field and the painting would show the quality of the work done in the
shop.
As mentioned briefly above, the pillar opposite this scene was an image of the
interior of a store front, a counter manned by a woman commonly believed to be
Verecundus’ wife. She appears holding goods, surrounded by tables covered in other
wares, while she, presumably, speaks with a customer, who is seated on a bench to the
right. The shop appears to be a full space, relatively crowded in its composition, but the
provision of seating for customers suggests that this was a social, as well as commercial
space, one that welcomed the customer to linger, share news, and feel welcome. Such an
invitation to linger encouraged customers to get to know the merchants, and therefore
dispel any preconceptions or prejudices they might have brought into the shop.
Additionally, and perhaps most interesting in the context of reputation, the scenes
are both effectively advertisements for Verecundus. The images, along with the scanty
graffiti evidence that identifies the shop as his,517 identify the shop for both literate and
illiterate populations, while boasting of the shop’s quality. This advertisement is
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particularly clear in the context of the greater neighborhood in which this workshop was
located. Three fulleries are believed to have operated in this quarter, all with shop fronts
along the Via dell’Abbondanza.518 As we have already mentioned, merchants identified
themselves by their place of work in many of their funerary monuments. The fulleries of
Pompeii suggest that the funerary evidence was a continuation of practices from
merchants’ lifetimes, where place was also important. The evidence reinforces the
importance of location and neighborhood to merchants, both to enable customers to find
their businesses and to provide them with an opportunity to distinguish themselves from
their peers or neighbors.
For the former issue, the collection of similar businesses in the same quarter
provided customers with an easy means to track down the service they required. For
fulleries, whose work was notoriously dirty and smelly,519 there was probably a social
incentive to sticking together, and to set up shop in neighborhoods where their presence
would be tolerated. Wherever these businesses settled, locals would know what area to
head to when they needed clothes cleaned, and it would be easy to direct newcomers to
the right neighborhood, particularly in light of the large and highly visible elephant panel,
which would serve as an iconic landmark. For a population that mostly traveled on foot,
clusters of related shops also made running errands convenient. Pedestrian traffic,
facilitated by Pompeii’s architecture in the form of wide sidewalks,520 also meant that
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merchants with better locations, those on corners or with other advantages to casual
visibility, would do better than those tucked away out of sight. Verecundus’ colorful shop
front not only advertised the quality of his work, but also increased his profile on the
street, making him easier to spot, and encouraging people to use his shop, perhaps even
referring to it by his name, as a landmark.
This landmark could be used as an anchor to transmit reputation information
about specific merchants in the area. It would be possible to give directions by it and to
suggest that the best merchant, the one that a buyer ought to visit, was two doors down
from the Verecundus’ place, or around the corner from the elephants, et cetera. In an area
where more than one shop of the same type was gathered, direct comparisons of quality
and character were also facilitated, so reputations could be developed not only in light of
what a merchant did himself, but also in how he measured up against his peers. We have
already seen this phenomenon somewhat through the case of Lucian’s widow Crobyle,
who notes how her late husband, a blacksmith, was known within his neighborhood in the
Piraeus as a craftsman without equal. Though her account is understandably biased, it is
likely that merchants came to develop reputations among their peers in their
neighborhoods, and also among customers, who could directly compare the work done by
different members of the same profession just by observing the streetscape.
Beyond the visual, we have the account of Seneca the Younger, who complained
in a letter that he was unable to find any quiet in his urban lodging due to the noise
coming from merchants in the nearby baths, claiming:
Praeter istos, quorum, si nihil aliud, rectae voces sunt, alipilum cogita tenuem et
stridulam vocem, quo sit notabilior subinde exprimentem nec umquam tacentem…
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iam biberari varias exclamationes et botularium et crustularium et omnes
popinarum institores mercem sua quadam et insignita modulatione vendentis.
Beyond those whose voices, if nothing else, are all right, think on the barber
continuously emitting his weak and grating voice, so that he may be more
noticeable, and is never quiet… Then the various shouts of the drink seller and the
sausage seller and the cake seller and all the food vendors selling their goods, and
each with his own distinct call.521
These merchants, whether fairly or unfairly portrayed in this sketch, clearly
intended to be heard. Seneca stresses that they have an insignita modulatio, a distinctive
call, and seems to believe, even if it is only for literary effect, that he can recognize each
in turn. The passage reminds us of a feature, particularly of urban space, that is often lost
through our sources, that of the soundscape.522 Among tradesmen, sound was evidently a
tool in the arsenal, however irritating one’s neighbors might find it.
Irritating or not, it must be assumed that in busy commercial districts these cries
were effective means of helping customers find the goods they wanted, or even of
convincing them to buy things they did not need.523 An effective seller might be both
dealer and impresario, wooing his customers not only through tempting offers, but also
through jokes or more personal conversation with known figures.524 Seneca is clear: these
cries were an effort to advertise, and to present oneself and one’s goods as notabilior,
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more noticeable, than one’s peers. As Rimell argues, this is very much akin to fame, and
seeking a reputation.525 Being noticed involved not only the immediate possibility of a
sale for merchants, but also made a claim to the space, one’s position within it, and the
right one had to sell there. Furthermore, just as in Pompeii, Seneca’ account seems to
stress the similarity of businesses in the district he describes. His account mentions
primarily food-sellers,526 with the exception of the specialist barber.527
These merchants adopted clear strategies to be seen or heard, and to promote their
reputation as the best in their field, or at least the best choice for this buyer. Our evidence
for what exactly they said or did to achieve these aims is fairly slim. Again, reliefs offer
us some insights, a relief from Narbonne depicting a fruit seller preserves not only an
image of the seller [Fig. 5], who carried his wares in a sack on his back, but also an
inscription of his cry: mala, mulieres. mulieres meae. He clearly hoped to endear himself
to female customers, perhaps relying on being charming to help his sales.528 However,
more critically for reputation, this seller recognized, or perhaps hoped, that he would be
most clearly remembered into eternity for his iconic cry. It was, to him, as an essential
part of his character as his name and said something fundamental about the kind of
business he ran: a mobile trade in apples that appealed to women and which relied on his
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voice to reach his customers. Other reliefs and wall paintings depict the next steps after a
customer had been lured, including street vendors presenting their wares to customers.529
The careful examination shown in these scenes was likely to be a testing ground for
reputation, where a customer could see for themselves whether a merchant’s claims were
borne out in the goods they sold.
While such images give us useful insights into the intersection of the audio and
visual cues that motivated merchant-customer interaction, generally, the best evidence for
how merchants actually found their buyers and how reputation fit into those interactions
comes to us from anecdotal evidence, drawn from novels or other fictional settings. In
most cases, this evidence comes, not from merchants themselves, but from elite authors,
like Seneca, looking down and into a social and economic world that they did not
commonly participate in themselves.
The exception to this trend presents itself, surprisingly, in the work of a
remarkably prolific merchant author of the imperial period: a tentmaker, whose business
as an itinerant merchant funded his other, and more commonly known, work. The
Apostle Paul refers to his work as a traveling craftsman as a part of his Christian mission.
In his case, we are particularly well supported by evidence. Not only do we have the
seven letters commonly attributed to him, but we also have the pseudo-Pauline letters,
Acts, which speaks more expansively about his ministry, and finally the attestations,
discussions, and arguments about Paul’s life and work stretching in an almost continuous
line from antiquity to the present.
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With an author as comprehensively studied as Paul, it is unusual to find an aspect
of his life that has been so thoroughly marginalized as his profession. Even major
examinations of the social and economic world of early Christianity relegate Paul’s
profession to less than a single chapter in their discussions.530 While it is commonly
known that Paul was a tent maker, only one scholar has thus far made Paul’s profession a
central theme of his research.531 Hock’s 1980 monograph and a handful of preceding
articles on the subject constitute the core of this research and should be duly recognized
as a worthy attempt to grapple with Paul’s work in a Greco-Roman context.532
Additionally, some work has been done on the biblical view of work, which offers a
productive angle on Paul’s career.533 However, by and large, scholars have not viewed
Paul’s profession as a central influence on his ministry and have dedicated little time to
the possible implications of Paul as an itinerant tradesman.
Though scholarship has chosen to gloss over the issue, Paul himself mentions his
work several times in his writings. He never used it as a central component of his
preaching but it appears early in his letters and, like the merchants discussed above, he
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does not seem to be at all embarrassed by his work.534 In fact, in the abstract, it seems
that he views work as a necessary component of a good Christian life:
παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀδελφοί, περισσεύειν μᾶλλον, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι
ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν, καθῶς ὑμῖν
παρηγγείλαμεν, ἵνα περιπατῆτε εὐσχημόνως πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω καὶ μηδενὸς χρείαν
ἔχητε.
But we urge you, brothers, to excel more and more, and to strive to live a quiet
life and to attend to your private matters and to work with your hands, according
to what we have told you, so that you live with decency in the eyes of those
outside and so that you may not have need of anyone.535
This passage comes as part of a greater section in Paul’s letter on the importance
of brotherly love,536 and it is in this framework that Paul brings up working with your
hands. He stresses here that it has been his wish that new Christians be productive
workers and provides two clear motivations: on the one hand, so that outsiders, τοὺς ἔξω,
might see Christians as worthy of respect, perhaps, even, of brotherly love, and on the
other, so that they need not rely on the charity of others.
The two reasons say a great deal about Paul’s view of his own work, which has
been the central question in the small group of scholars interested in his tent-making.
Hock, in his monograph, argued that Paul had a somewhat aristocratic view of work and
that he felt defensive about his social position because of his trade. He summons up
evidence primarily from Cicero and Lucian, and believes that Paul maintained many of
the biases that thrived in the Roman world against those who worked.537 Meeks has
Paul’s position became more central in the opinions of later Church fathers, John Chrysostom in
particular, see Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation,
246–48. For Chrysostom, it was important the Paul be seen as uneducated, but divinely inspired.
Chrysostom believed that work placed Paul among the common people all his life and made him a man of
the people.
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characterized the relationship between Paul and his profession as, “wry pride,”538 while,
most recently, Still has reexamined Hock’s position, suggesting that Paul did not feel
particularly disdainful of work, nor did he come from a background that was likely to
have made him feel so.539
This wide array of positions reflects the fact that, while Paul clearly mentions his
work on several occasions, his writings lack the open boasting that many of the other
merchants discussed above were willing to undertake. Paul stresses his hard work and
relates its importance to his ministry but says nothing about its exact nature and makes no
explicit claims about his own skill or ability. Instead, Paul stresses the two points
mentioned above: that work is a means to help Christians integrate into their
communities, appearing as contributing members of society, and that work allows
Christians to be independent of outside financial help.
Both points are critical to the study of Paul’s professional reputation. In the first
instance, it is apparent that Paul was aware of the eyes of outsiders looking at him and his
Christian community. As we laid out at the start of this chapter, the process of reputation
formation, and later reputation maintenance, was a dialectical one that required not only
merchant action, but the external viewer, interpreter, and keeper of reputation.540 Paul is
aware of these outside viewers and is aware of how workers were viewed by others.
While the stereotypes that circulated, positive and negative, will be discussed in the next
chapter, along with the information networks that circulated reputation information,541 in
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this context it is important that Paul understood that part of his work, beyond the creation
of good tents, was a performance for those outside of his religious community, and that it
was critical to the work that he wanted to achieve that he, and they, appeared to the
outside world to be as socially acceptable as possible.
Elements of this seem to be present in many of the merchants this chapter has
discussed. The funerary monuments are all displays that craft reputation through
presentation, through directly addressing an audience that viewed and interpreted a
merchant’s display. While the monuments, and the wall art of Verecundus’ shop, all
communicate reputation, they are not literal examples of their owners’ wares, but rather a
series of claims that the goods themselves would need to corroborate. The performative
element of the merchant’s cries is apparent, but Paul extends this, in actuality, to the lives
of the Christians, who must live quietly and be productive members of their community.
He immediately presents this as the correct way to serve God, but this was also their
means to build their reputation as a group, and be viewed as good, honest men, who
happen to be Christians, as well. The same kind of strategy is echoed in the inscription of
Mithres, who, among his many claims, is careful to note that he paid his taxes and was
kind to everyone: a short-hand description for doing one’s duty to the community and
being a productive individual who caused no offense.542
Paul also stresses independence as a central reason to work with one’s hands. He
does so earlier in 1 Thessalonians:
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μνημονεύετε γάρ, ἀδελφοί, τὸν κόπον ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν μόχθον· νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας
ἐργαζόμενοι πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐπιβαρῆσαί τινα ὑμῶν ἐκηρύξαμεν εἰς ὑμᾶς τὸ
εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ.
For remember, brothers, our toil and our hardship. Working night and say not to
be a burden to any of you, we preached to you the gospel of God.543
Additionally, the theme recurs in Corinthians:

καὶ κοπιῶμεν ἐργαζόμενοι ταῖς ἰδίαις χερσίν·
And we toiled, working with our own hands.544
For Paul, as for many others in antiquity, self-sufficiency was the idealized goal
of their professional lives.545 We have already seen how this was the case for Vibia
Chresta, who wished to be clear that it was with her own money, and no one else’s, that
she was able to erect a funerary monument. For Paul, the claim suggests that his travels
and work far from home came under scrutiny,546 and that there was some question as to
the burden that his hosts bore on his behalf. According to Acts, one of Paul’s hosts was
hauled before the city authorities for harboring him. Though being arrested was
undoubtedly a burden, Paul’s letters sought to clarify the situation: by providing him with
lodging, his hosts were serving their faith and God, not to him personally, so anything
they suffered, they suffered for God, and not for him personally.547
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However, while Paul may have come under fire for staying with hosts and may
have had to stress his labor to demonstrate his innocence and industry, we must not
assume that he had any reservations about his work. Hock’s belief that Paul felt
embarrassment over working with his hands seems unlikely, particularly since he does
not, and would not, open himself up to criticism from the very people to whom he is
trying to bring his faith. In mentioning his work, Paul believed that he was silencing
critics, not providing fuel for new attacks. He is able to claim that he burdened no one,
and that his work was the part of his life that covered the practical needs of this world.
This did not mean that it was easy. Paul records that he toiled and suffered through his
work, though it unclear whether he is considering the physical labor of his artisanal
duties, or if it is important for him to communicate the lengths he has gone to for his
faith. Indeed, it is likely to have been some combination of the two, but it was critical for
Paul to communicate to his audience that he had gained a viable living from his work and
was able to avoid accepting charity as a result.
Additionally, within a Greco-Roman context, financial independence, regardless
of the source of the funds, was a sign of at least some success. Providing for oneself was
an uncertain proposition, even with hard work, but was, for many, impossible without it.
Though Paul’s feelings about women in general suggest that he would have rejected the
comparison, his perspective is consistent with that of Vibia Chresta and Vibia Calybenis,
who attained similar independence, in their cases literal freedom from slavery, through
their work. In fact, Vibia Chresta, Evangelus, and Mithres all define their success through
their ability to provide burials for themselves and others. Paul shifts this definition by
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considering that it was a success merely to not require others to provide for him.548 Paul
speaks with pride about his self-sufficiency through his profession, not directly about his
pride in the work itself. However, this does not mean that he is distasteful of work. In
fact, he was even willing to build professional labor into the functioning definition of
what it meant to be a good apostle and servant to god.
This is particularly true since Paul seems to have used his trade as a tool in his
ministry. His financial independence meant that he could afford to speak his truth,
without any accusation that he was spreading the agenda of his wealthy hosts and could
afford to move on when circumstances required that he leave one household or city and
being to work in another. In Acts, where we actually learn that Paul was a tent maker,
rather than another kind of laborer, we learn that he met and worked with other members
of his profession when he came to a new city.549 In Corinth, he even stayed with another
tentmaker and his wife. These kinds of connections are not unknown from other trades in
antiquity. As we will discuss in chapter six, merchants on the move often had to rely
upon social networks, and in particular letters of introduction and recommendation, to
find lodging and work when they came to a new place. Taking work with the tentmaker
Aquila, who was, himself, an itinerant craftsman, from Pontus and living in Rome before
he came Corinth, enabled Paul to lean on another person to help get business up and
running, to find commissions and find suppliers. It may even have allowed them,
548
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together, to take on more or better paying work, since single merchants would be unable
to keep up with sudden influxes of work or commissions requiring large scale production.
Certainly, Paul was able to lean on Aquila’s reputation in Corinth until he developed his
own. We see Paul send his greetings to Aquila and his wife at the end of Romans, which
seems to be part of a similar effort to improve each other's reputation through mutual
recommendation and the public extension of friendship.
This evidence of Paul is, in the main, from a period earlier than this project
intends to cover. Paul’s letters are all from first century and the social work he operates in
must be, to some extent, located within that context. Yet, later writers about Paul pick up
these same kinds of reputation strategies. In the fourth century Acts of Paul and Thecla,
we see Paul again traveling, and again associating with merchants, in this case an
untrustworthy coppersmith named Hermogenes.550 In this context it is clear that Paul is
the moral superior of his companions, but centuries on, it was still believed that this was
an appropriate social setting for Paul’s ministry. Not only does it suggest that Paul
continued to have a reputation as one who worked and taught among tradesmen, but also
it implies that the same kinds of traveling strategies we see in Paul’s letters were in use
and comprehensible to fourth-century Christian audiences.
Overall, Paul’s reputation as a tradesman is somewhat opaque. He does not loudly
proclaim that he was good or honest or fair in his business dealings, though we see him
claim success in business and that working with one’s hands is akin to loving one’s
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brothers and sisters. Paul does not provide us with an anecdote of himself at work, though
Hock and others have argued that it is likely that his preaching and his tent making
intersected in the physical space of his workshop.551 Nevertheless, while he does not say
it openly, it is clear from his writings that Paul is well aware of the importance of his
reputation. He wants, clearly, to be known primarily for his preaching, not his trade, but
he is not above using the latter to help him communicate the former.
His living reputation, then, is probably the most reflective of the utilitarian
approach that merchants in this chapter had toward their reputation: it was to be
cultivated in so far as it was useful. That use, for most merchants, was simply financial,
the ability to feed and provide for oneself and one’s family.

Conclusions:
This chapter has described strategies for reputation management undertaken by
merchants both dead and living. Though understanding the rationale for posthumous
reputation in individual cases is always challenging, we have found that there were
practical benefits to these actions, as a means to strengthen the business and social
position of friends and heirs. For those left behind, it was useful that the deceased was
both well thought of and not forgotten. Additionally, our evidence strongly suggests that
funerary reputation management acted as a continuation of the reputation strategies that
merchants had been accustomed to use in life.
Thematically, we have seen merchant's stress their hard work, financial
independence, contributions to society, and quality labor and products. Whether work
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was one’s primary motive, as in the case of Verecundus, or merely a necessary aid to
other endeavors, as with Paul, it seems clear that merchants sought to justify their
professions as honest, successful, and necessary to the community. Personally, they
wished to be viewed as morally upright, and stressed their virtuous characters and their
association with equally virtuous peers.
In many cases, this involved merchants locating themselves within the landscapes
of their business lives, as these places clearly retained meaning for them and fed back
into their reputations. Whether they merely referred to those locations, as in the funerary
inscriptions presented above, or actively curated the space in which they worked, as in
the case of Verecundus’ shop, it has been evident that it is necessary to think about
neighborhoods and spaces if we wish to get a better grasp on how and under what
circumstances merchants were able to build their reputations. Places with good
reputations aided merchants in developing their own, and places retained a character that
outlived individual merchants, leaving cities across the Empire with markets and
neighborhoods named for trades and characterized by specific kinds of commerce. We
must think, as well, about places with bad reputations, and about how association with
those places might harm the people who lived and worked there. Social orders are at
times enforced along physical lines that make it difficult to move from one space to
another. Being from the wrong neighborhood, having the wrong address, can attach a
stigma that is difficult to shake off.
That stigma arose from the society around Roman merchants, which, as Paul
noted, was always looking at merchants with a critical eye. In the next chapter, we will
look at the stereotypes that persisted about merchants and their work, and at some of the
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ways that merchant reputation strategies were received by their peers and customers. It is
in this context that we will see more clearly how reputation functioned as an institutional
limit, restricting merchant choices and making some actions more profitable for them
than others. Though these choices can seem counterintuitive, at times requiring
merchants to do things that did not maximize their profits in the short term, or may have
even been personally costly, they often had long-term benefits when merchants could call
upon the social capital that these actions earned them. Merchants tried their best to act in
ways that would foster the growth a good reputation, not because it was the most
immediately profitable decision, but because the slow accumulation of a reputation
provided them with security in times of crisis, winning them the benefit of the doubt
when things went wrong, and with a foundation of trustworthiness on which they could
base further growth by allying with other merchants to cooperate for greater gains.
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CHAPTER 5: Group Reputation and Merchant Stereotypes
In the previous chapter it was apparent that Roman merchants were highly
conscious of their personal reputation and took steps, both simple and sophisticated, to
protect and project their good name. Their efforts, as we have seen, placed their
businesses at the forefront of their public image, often with an emphasis on where they
worked and the communities into which they were embedded. These strategies were, in
the main, effective responses to the challenges that merchants faced, and shaped the
reputation that the individual bore though life and into death.
However, as we have defined reputation, it was dependent upon the opinions and
actions of outsiders. Reputation was both created by and stored among the acquaintances
of its subject, and, while we have demonstrated the ways that it could be influenced by
that subject, it was never completely under the control of any one person. It remained a
variable that could not be wholly predicted and might be influenced by factors that its
subject was even ignorant of, such as rumor and gossip. An individual’s reputation was
dependent upon society at a variety of levels, from broad conceptions of status to the
opinions of specific cliques of influential individuals. Merchants were subject to
judgment at each of these levels, and the strategies discussed in the previous chapter
operated better at some levels than others. In each case, their success depended on their
audience, which varied widely in size and in willingness to accept the portraits merchants
created of themselves.
As this chapter will discuss, while individual merchants were often able to
influence their reputation within their immediate community, they struggled to do so in
broader contexts. The proliferation of negative stereotypes about merchants, either
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connected to a single trade or more generally, provides a case in which individuals were
generally unable to effect change to their reputation, in that society as a whole continued
to hold a negative view of their profession and was resistant to changing its opinions.
While an individual merchant might strive, or even succeed, to differentiate himself from
stereotypes about his trade within his immediate community, his efforts did little to
disprove the stereotype. At best, he established himself as an exception to the same rule
that his friends, colleagues, and customers knew to be true of merchants generally. As a
result, a trader with a good reputation in one community often struggled to translate that
into business opportunities elsewhere. Furthermore, a single merchant who demonstrated
that he did not conform to the stereotype did nothing to benefit his peers and the wider
community of traders and craftsmen, who continued to be subject to the beliefs of society
at large.
Strategies for achieving larger-scale change in the public’s view of merchants
required additional supports, and, in many cases, merchants chose to work with groups of
their peers in order to present a united front against negative judgments and engage in
reputation strategies that they could not do alone. These groups, whether formally or
informally assembled, acted, for at least some extent of time, as a single, unified entity.
They developed and presented a collective image of themselves that could be leveraged
to provide the members of the group with specific benefits, either concrete, like the tax
breaks that the shippers discussed in chapter one enjoyed, or more amorphous, like social
capital and status. The strategies of these groups of merchants differed from those used
by individuals, as they needed to balance the needs and wants of the group with those of
each of its members.
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As this chapter will discuss, groups responded to external pressures, such as
stereotypes, and produced a reputation for the collective, but they also established
strategies that helped them to navigate intra-group dynamics. As we will see, they
frequently relied on social pressure to encourage members to adhere to certain codes of
conduct that would reflect well on the group and help it present itself to the community.
Membership in an association was commonly tied to certain behaviors, and failure to
uphold the standards of the group was often met with financial and social consequences.
Individual merchants determined the role that their personal interests and reputation
played within the context of the group carefully and weighed the benefits and the risks of
joining groups and participating in collective projects. Belonging to a group offered clear
benefits, but it also placed institutional limits on a merchant, who, if he wished to remain
a part of the association, had to adopt certain personal and business behaviors, while
avoiding others. Members restricted the number of their available choices, accepting
these parameters in return for a piece of the collective reputation that merchants
developed when they worked together.

Defining the Group:
As this chapter intends to focus on the strategies used by groups of merchants to
develop, present, and shape their collective reputation, it will be useful from the outset to
develop parameters for who and what constitutes a “group.” The definition of this term is
challenging, as there remains considerable debate within anthropological and sociological
circles about how best to understand the nature of a group. The primary division in this
field exists between those who prefer an individualistic approach, assessing the group as
a set of individual agents, and those who follow a holistic approach, seeing the group as a
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system of relationships, and an entity in its own right.552 There are benefits to both
theoretical frameworks.553 On the one hand, the individual model more aptly accounts for
group members having different or even contradictory goals and intentions, and reflects
the diversity within groups with greater accuracy.554 On the other hand, the holistic model
can more easily adapt to shifts in group membership, as an established group can
maintain its system even when new members join or old members leave. Furthermore, in
this model, the collective entity of the group is something which can have its own
character, identity, and force, and can therefore be recognized by non-members, even if
they do not know the precise membership of the group.
Both models have a place in the current discussion, as this chapter will argue that
reputation functioned at both levels simultaneously, as individuals strove to protect their
personal reputations, both within and external to the group, and the group acted as a
whole to project a common reputation that was received by those outside the group. In
practice, the chapter will begin with the holistic approach, presenting the group acting
corporately and engaging with the community of non-members as a singular entity,
before shifting to examine the group more individualistically, particularly in pursuit of
the nuance of intra-group dynamics and the institutional force of professional groups on
their members.
These models add clarity to the discussion, but do not, in themselves, define a
group, much less exactly what we mean by using the word in this context. Groups
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stubbornly resist definition, in that there is little consensus about whether a group can
exist without conscious recognition of its reality, what the role the sub-group might have
in a larger entity, and what amount of contact, proximity, or interrelation is necessary to
constitute the group. This chapter will begin with the definition proposed by Olmsted,
which, while now dated, provides a point from which we may extrapolate the specific
needs of working with groups of merchants in the Roman Empire.
Olmsted has defined the group as: “A plurality of individuals who are in contact
with one another, who take one another into account, and who are aware of some
significant commonality.”555 The three components of this definition serve us well in the
case of Roman merchants, though each requires slight adaptation, given their
development for a modern context. Contact is his initial prerequisite, in that a group
cannot be formed without communication. In the case of Roman merchant groups, this
contact was generally made in person, and in most cases, it was regular in terms of time
and/or place. Within the Roman world, it was relatively common for groups to hold
formalized meetings to discuss business or otherwise collectively participate in social or
cultural activities. This helped them to establish clear boundaries as to who was included
in or excluded from the group,556 as well as making their identity visible to the greater
community. In this chapter, we will see these boundaries shaped by particular
professions, as well as by proximity, which also facilitated communication among
members.
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Olmsted’s second factor is the group’s willingness to “take one another into
account.” This is the most individualistic element of his definition, as it assumes that
members will concede some of their independence in order to participate in the
collective, to consider its needs as an entity both to which they belong and separate from
themselves. In formal merchant associations, we see some of this consideration codified
into group charters. In these documents, the expectations for group membership are made
explicit and the proper treatment and accommodation of fellow members is a conspicuous
feature. However, as we will discuss, even informal groups of merchants had to be
conscious of the impact their personal actions would have on the dynamics between
members and the position of the group in society. Members who acted against the
interests of their groups, wronging their peers or placing their personal needs above the
whole, often struggled to maintain their position in the group, and, as this chapter argues,
consideration of others was often a decisive factor on a member’s position and reputation
within the group.
Finally, Olmsted notes that groups must have an, “awareness of some significant
commonality.” “Awareness” and its cognate “consciousness” are a highly debated
element in the study of groups, in that this feature is particularly difficult to assess from
the perspective of an outsider, looking in.557 Indeed, scholarship on groups contests the
appropriateness and necessity of insider knowledge when it comes to groups, believing,
on the one hand, that outsiders have a greater ability to be objective about group
dynamics, while, on the other hand, only an insider has access to all of the information
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about a group.558 In the Roman case, awareness of the group must be our starting point,
since we can only identify a professional group if it identified itself. We do this primarily
through the names that the groups adopted. These commonly identify either the purpose
of the group, its membership, or both. Names can be a deceptive indicator, of course, and
there may have been many groups of merchants that lacked names, but we naturally
struggle to see merchant groups of this type because they often lack a clear presence in
our records.
Olmsted’s “significant commonality” was a central element of early scholarship
on merchant groups in the Roman Empire. Research, particularly in the 19th century, was
invested in the categorization of these groups, and particularly of collegia. These were
formal associations that shared a range of central “commonalities,” including religious
worship, commensality, and professional affiliation. While this early scholarship
struggled to identify which groups were primarily religious, social, or professional, more
recent work has embraced the ambiguous and diverse roles that such groups played in
Roman society. Building on the work of Van Nijf,559 scholarship is increasingly
comfortable with groups that identified themselves in ways that straddle these categories,
such as the συμβίωσις τῶν χαλκέων, the gathering of blacksmiths,560 or fabri fratres,
craftsmen brothers,561 whose associations are simultaneously social and professional. In
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the terms of our definition, they share more than one “commonality,” and can therefore
be classified as groups.
Recent scholarship has increasingly embraced the socio-economic identities of
these organizations and has begun to grapple with the ways in which differing identities
can coexist within and across these groups.562 In the last 20 years, it has been argued that
collegia, and other, similar groups, offered their members beneficial tools for managing
their personal and corporate reputations. This field has grown rapidly since the late 1990s
and has produced a number of excellent works that have considered important aspects of
the social position of these groups.563 Scholars have examined the role of family ties in
formal organizations and their relationships to the apprenticeship system,564 the
institutional limits collegia imposed upon merchant behavior and the ways that moral and
professional standards were enforced by these groups,565 as well as the importance of
reputation, both of the group and its individual members, to the individuals involved and
their position in society.566 Though the latest work has pressed for a reassessment of the
power these groups wielded as collective entities, and has disputed the idea that collegia
and other groups had firm control over their membership,567 the field is reaching a
growing consensus that it is through the lens of social interactions that collegia, and
voluntary associations more generally, are best understood.
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Despite this productive scholarship, this chapter does not intend to make collegia
and similar, formal organizations its exclusive focus. When possible, it will examine
groups that did not label themselves in those ways for three primary reasons. First, as
scholars of this field have already noted, the categorization of collegia has been a largely
unproductive line of inquiry, both because these groups resist sharply defined categories
and because the categorization alone contributes little to our understanding of the social
dynamics experienced by groups of individuals united by their professions. Thus, a focus
on formal, explicitly labeled organizations is unlikely to bring greater clarity to these
matters than examining unlabeled ones. Further, as we will see, groups of merchants are
visible in other ways, attached to trading networks that, while they did not identify as
collegia, per se, or by any of the many related terms, nevertheless appear to have
operated with similar, albeit less formal, reputation dynamics and strategies. Many of
these are visible through webs of kin and apprenticeship relationships that we will discuss
more in the next chapter, and, while they lack the regulation and hierarchical structures
that are common in collegia, they share similar kinds of social norms and concerns for
reputation with more orderly groups.
Second, as we have already noted, non-professional associations, whether in the
form of collegia or not, often served economic purposes, and united merchants even
beyond the group’s stated purpose. As Harland has noted, there are few, if any, collegia
of tradesmen that were not also religious or burial associations.568 The converse also
holds true: that associations with explicitly non-economic purposes, Olmsted’s
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“commonality,” often provided economic opportunities to their members, from simply
introducing individuals with common trades to actively providing work for merchants.
The example of Paul the Apostle, discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrated that the
synagogue in Corinth could be used to introduce traders of the same profession.569 By
strictly confining this examination to the study of professional collegia, instances of
merchant groups of this kind would be excluded. The synagogue community was a group
that was concerned, at least nominally, with the religion, rather than the labor, of its
members, but members, and even visitors like Paul, understood that it was also a body
that could be utilized for building a social and economic network. Venticinque has
recently argued that all these elements, the economic, social, and religious, feed
constructively into one another, and it is functionally useless to assume that a group
focused on a particular collective action or identity was not also contributing to the social
and economic lives of its members.570 Thus, groups of all kinds will appear in this
chapter, though preference has been given to those that seem to have a professional focus,
since all these associations show us techniques that could be used to protect the
reputation of the group and its members.
Finally, it is important to note from the outset that this chapter will not solely
focus upon collegia because of the specific nature of the evidence around them. Whether
as a natural byproduct of historical preservation or as a reflection of ancient practice,
collegia appear overwhelmingly as an urban phenomenon. The formalized structures of
collegia work well in instances where a quorum of members of the same trade may be
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easily and regularly assembled, and it is possible that this model was not as easy to
institute in rural settings. Merchants in rural contexts also collaborated, and our evidence
shows that many kinds of less-formal groups and networks formed outside of cities, but it
is only from Egypt that we are beginning to see how rural organizations may have
developed and operated.571 Nevertheless, we cannot treat these examples as paradigmatic
for rural settings without more corroborating evidence any more than we can impose an
urban model upon the countryside without strong grounds.
It is only by presenting a wide range of groups gathered from many differing
contexts that we can begin to assemble a set of strategies that merchant groups could use
to project and present their reputations, and formal, urban collegia provide only one
model of professional organization. Merchant associations in the Roman Empire did not
exist in neat binary categories of formal-informal, urban-rural, or evanescent-enduring,
but each fell at points along numerous spectra, including size, social and financial capital,
among many other factors. Some were explicit about their purposes and organization
structures, while others leave us with the results of only a particular moment in their
history. Our evidence is such that it is often difficult to determine many details about a
particular group. We are faced, most often, with single, isolated attestations, and, while
each presents us with a point from which we may extrapolate and reveals something that
was possible in that particular context, it is only from the sum of these examples that we
can identify some general strategies that some groups employed.
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Group Reputation Strategies:
As with individuals, groups bore a reputation.572 In the same way as a person, a
group held a character and its collective actions, as well as those of its members,
generated a set of opinions that were held by individuals and the community more
broadly. The reputation of the group was as malleable as that of a single person but it
required the cooperation of at least a portion of its membership if it hoped to convey a
particular, and clear, portrait of itself. The group was, in some cases, restricted by its
dependence on the cooperation of its members, but it was also benefited by the resources,
both financial and social, that members could muster.
At base, the reputation of groups was often displayed in the name of the group. In
the case of professional associations, these labels generally identify the type of trade
members were engaged in, associated with some kind of collective label. These labels
often described the nature of the social relationships among the members, and it is from
this that we know some professional associations involved dining activities, leading
members to be called “feasters” or “drinkers,”573 while others styled themselves as
family, referring to themselves as “brothers.”574 Many referred to the friendship among
the members, to the extent that references to friends, amici, often seem to refer to
relationships that were given structure by group membership.575 As attestations of
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reputation, these names presented amicable relations, suggesting that members were kind,
responsible people who looked after each other. Feasters and drinkers presented
themselves as the kind of people you might want to grab a beer with after the work of the
day was done.
These names also share a feature examined in the previous chapter: they
commonly refer to the locality in which groups of merchants lived and worked. While an
individual might refer to his specific place of work, merchant groups are likely to be
known by their neighborhoods, often lending their name to particular districts.576 This
was especially true of artisans, whose work often required the cooperation and
collaboration that is clearly attested in our sources.577 Furthermore, as discussed in the
previous chapter, proximity among merchants of the same trade made it easier for
customers to locate the goods and services they needed within the city or settlement.
A clear example of this phenomenon comes from the city of Rome, where
retailers often congregated in the same areas over long periods of time. The Forum
Boarium, located along the Tiber between the Palatine and Capitoline Hills, gained its
name from the sale of cattle starting in at least the 3rd century BCE. The place retained
the same name, and, evidently, the same purpose, throughout antiquity, though we have
evidence for a wider range of uses than as a meat market alone.578
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The most obvious attestation of this variety of purposes is the so-called Arch of
the Argentarii [Fig. 6].579 Most correctly, the structure is not an arch, but a porta, a gate,
as it lacks the curvature of an arch, and was commissioned by a group of tradesmen that
included not only argentarii, bankers, auctioneers, or possibly silversmiths,580 but also of
cattle merchants, negotiantes boarii. The monument was erected at the entrance to the
Forum Boarium in 203/204 CE as an euergetic offering to the forum that honored the
imperial family of Septimius Severus.
The iconographic program of the arch is slightly complex, as the commissioners
clearly attempted to display many of the common themes in Severan imperial art, with its
images of the imperial house sacrificing, and it accommodated three instances of
damnatio memoriae that occurred in quick succession after its completion.581 The Arch of
the Argentarii’s main iconographic program is in honor of the imperial family and the
reliefs on the inner sides of the pilasters show Septimius Severus and Julia Domna
engaged in sacrifice on one side (originally with Geta), and Caracalla (originally with his
wife and father-in-law) on the other. The panels below the inner reliefs depict a bull
about to be sacrificed. Garlands are suspended by Victories above, and panels with
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religious objects below, surround these scenes of sacrifice, as well as the one extant panel
on the outside of the piers,582 which depicts Parthian captives led in triumph. On the
fronts of the piers and sides, which viewers approached first, more bulls and a scene of
cattle-herding are shown. The east-facing fronts of the extant pilaster depicts a figure,
now badly worn, in a short tunic, whose identity has been the subject of inconclusive
speculation.583 On the architrave, to either side of the inscription, discussed in full below,
are two small figures, one of Hercules, the presiding deity of the Forum Boarium and a
favorite patron of emperors, and the other of, perhaps, the emperor’s genius.
This collection of images is complicated enough, but the arch shows several signs
that pieces of its program may have been intentionally left in a rough state, while others
were crisply defined.584 Furthermore, it has commonly been read in scholarship as an
adoption or adaptation of imperial forms of representation by a non-elite audience.585 It is
often put into dialogue with the other, near-contemporaneous, Arch of Septimius Severus
in the Forum Romanum, and it is noted for the emphasis that it places on the imperial
family, rather than the military prowess of the emperor, despite the fact that the theme of
victory over the Parthians is shared between the monuments.
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Nevertheless, the iconography of Arch of the Argentarii highlights several
features that were of local significance. Immediately apparent is the representation of
cattle at the entrance to the cattle market, especially because the sacrificial procession
frieze would have been directly at eye level of passersby. For cattle merchants, this would
have been an obvious advertisement, and assertion of their role in the provision of sacred
animals, as well as those that were needed for food in the city. The arch itself stood on a
major route, straddling the vicus Jugarius, and ancient and major commercial
thoroughfare that connected the Forum Romanum, the Forum Holitorium, and the Forum
Boarium. Aside from its commercial role, the road also connected major religious centers
in the city, including the important Ara Maxima in the Forum Boarium, one of the city’s
oldest cult sites, which celebrated Hercules victory seizing the cattle of Cacus. This altar
to Hercules was still important in the Severan period, as attested by an inscription from a
Severan urban prefect,586 and the particular affinity that the Severan dynasty had with
Hercules.587 The relief of Hercules on the Arch itself cements the connections between
the imperial family, the arch, the Ara Maxima, and the Forum Boarium. While it is
unclear whether a member of the imperial family ever saw this arch, it is most likely that
they would have done so in relation to a sacrifice to Hercules, which makes the
iconography of the arch particularly apt.
For non-imperial viewers, the arch itself was a commanding topographical
statement that shaped the way that they engaged with the Forum Boarium and the city
beyond it. Whatever the state of the vicus Jugarius prior to the arch’s construction,
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following its completion travelers, tradesmen, locals, and passersby were all forced to
adjust their movements through the arch’s central passageway to take advantage of the
good road and avoid other potential obstacles. The arch constrained free travel, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to walk around or off the edge of the roadway. It also would
have structured the movement of carts and animals, as the width of the passage would
have forced everyone to file through in a semi-orderly fashion.588
While waiting to enter, or passing through the arch, travelers would be
encouraged to read the inscription on the lintel, which named the project’s patrons, as
well as to view the large panels of the imperial family, and smaller friezes of sacrificial
procession. In the latter case, their own procession with animals for sacrifice or sale
through the arch might have been pleasingly mirrored. At times when traffic was slower,
the arch would have provided a cover from rain or shade from the sun, and its decoration
would have been a welcome distraction for those waiting there. Furthermore, the arch
constrained and directed the view of the forum as people entered, and of the road and city
beyond as people left.589 The arch created a lens that revealed the space and gave the
merchants involved in its commission some power over, and claim to, the forum.
For all the energy invested in this monument’s design and placement, we know
very little about the group or groups that commissioned it. Though their monument is
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among the largest in Rome established by a group of private individuals, there is no other
attestation of the argentarii et negotiantes boarii acting together. The arch’s inscription
offers no insight about the nature of the group’s structure, nor does it necessarily point to
a substantial and regular alliance between these two professional groups. Though there is
no evidence either in favor or against, it is entirely possible that the collaboration on the
arch was the sole project undertaken by the group. However, the alterations and erasures
to the arch’s iconography do suggest that at least some members may have kept an eye on
the arch after its completion.590 This would have been simple enough, given the arch’s
important location and the regular business that these tradesmen had in the forum. It can
be assumed that they viewed the arch as they, too, came and went from the forum, and,
since all the changes to the arch seem to have been made within a decade or so of its
commission, it is likely that some of the original merchants were still active in the forum
when the last proclamation of damnatio memoriae was made.591 There is no evidence to
suggest that the alliance of argentarii and cattle merchants survived beyond this single
generation, nor, alternately, to suggest that they did not remain in league for centuries to
come, albeit very quietly in archaeological terms. Certainly, the Forum Boarium
remained a cattle market, so it is probable that both argentarii and negotiantes boarii
found reasons to work in the space, whether or not they constituted an association of any
kind.
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Of course, within the generation when they were visibly active, the group
achieved a great deal. Even on its own, the project of the arch would have required
substantial organization, both of men and resources, and, whatever the arrangement, the
members of this group were indisputably effective at executing their plans. They
successfully pooled financial resources, and rose to the challenge of commissioning,
hiring, and overseeing a project that likely took a considerable amount of time to
complete.
What little we know of their organization we know from the inscription they
commissioned for the arch. After five lines of imperial titles clarifying the members of
the Severan Dynasty to which the arch was offered, the merchants conclude with a short
note about themselves:
…ARGENTARI(i) • ET • NEGOTIANTES • BOARI(i) • HVIVS LOCI QVI
INVEHENT DEVOTI • NVMINI • EORUM.
…The bankers and cattle merchants of this place, those who will bring in (goods),
devoted (this) to their divinity.592
This line is slightly larger than the text before it, and it answers the critical
question of who built the monument and why. From the ground, this line would be the
most visible, simultaneously being closest to the viewer and having the largest text. This
is sensible, since the protracted lines above merely include information about the emperor
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that was likely to be common knowledge. Yet, as a description of the commissioning
party, this line of the inscription is odd. The first five words are large and clear, as are the
final three, but from LOCI through INVEHENT the words are crammed together and
even are placed on top of one another, with two rows of text forming in the middle of the
line. LOCI QVI rests atop INVEHENT. It is possible that this was a simple error. The
space is adequate to accommodate LOCI, which seems a logical choice for the passage,
while QVI INVEHENT, as a subordinate clause, seems unnecessary for the content. It is
likely to have been a later addition to the text, and the edit may have coincided with one
of the instances of damnatio memoriae. As a result, it seems that both the text and images
were carefully monitored by at least some members of the original association. While the
damnatio memoriae was probably encouraged, if not actively enforced, by the imperial
household, the emendation of the text of the inscription, as it referred to the
commissioners, was not of interest to an imperial authority, but only to the original group
itself.
However, the inclusion of QVI INVEHENT requires some further explanation. In
the first place, invehent is in the future tense, which has led to some consternation among
commentators. Generally, a present tense, invehunt, is substituted, and the vowel change
is attributed to a simple mix up. Andrea Giardina believes the future tense to have been
intentional, and interprets the phrase to be, “those who will import.”593 This reading is
tempting, as it suggests that the arch was not only a display of loyalty to the imperial
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house, but also functioned on the site as an advertisement for the bankers and cattle
merchants, or at least those who were willing and able to do the extra work of importing
goods for their customers. Whether or not we accept this view, the critical impact of these
two words is that they serve as a delimiter, identifying the group of merchants even more
specifically, while excluding those who did not contribute to the arch.
As it stands, the arch and its inscription are associated with a group of merchants
who seem to have been informally convened. They do not describe themselves as a
collegium, nor do they portray themselves as a group of brothers, friends, or some other
relation. Based on the location of the arch, at the edge of a major trading area, as well as
the words HVIVS LOCI, we infer that these were men who worked in the forum and who
encountered each other with some regularity there, if not in a formal meeting. More than
that, the location defines this group, who think of the space as their own and as one of the
most essential features of their businesses.
The commission and subsequent completion of the arch suggests that they had an
amicable relationship, particularly since the project required that they pool assets in order
to pay for materials and labor. We do not know how many traders were involved, but
their numbers were great enough that the monument does not list the names, instead
identifying the group, which consisted of members of two different professions. Still, the
commissioners did not feel that this was sufficient description to identify those who had
been involved. The first version of the inscription highlighted the topographical
connection, that it was the bankers and cattle dealers of this place, rather than those of the
whole city.
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Once again, we see space forming a central position in the construction and
presentation of identity. The argentarii and negotiantes boari who formed an alliance to
complete this project conceived of themselves and their organization as belonging to the
Forum Boarium, and their monument literally serves as a gate to denote which merchants
belonged in that space, and which ones did not. However, this is complicated by the
further description of qui invehent (or invehunt), which narrowed down the group still
further. It immediately implies that there were traders, qui non invehent, who would not
bring in (or perhaps import) their goods, and consequently that there was something
special about those who did or would. Within the space of the Forum Boarium, these
merchants intended to set themselves apart.
The argentarii and negotiantes boarii presumably hoped to use the arch as
concrete evidence for the important position they occupied in the forum and in the
economic activity of that place. After its completion, they would have been able to bring
in their goods through their gate, and to point to their monument as a sign of their
belonging in the place. Furthermore, they shaped the topography by establishing a new
landmark, a spot that would become a meeting place and locus for memory, both about
the imperial family, as the images were edited and changed, but also of the men who
were involved in the arch’s construction. A monument of this scale, and one that was also
along a major thoroughfare, would effectively attract this kind of position within the
neighborhood community, and would promote the commissioners of the arch at the same
time.
As a reputation strategy, the construction of a large monument is an effective and
dramatic statement, as well as one that had the ability to ground merchants in a
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community in a physically obvious way. As we will discuss further below, many
merchant groups were at risk for being seen as “foreign” or as “interlopers,” both because
of their mobility and because many were not landowners and did not conform to that
model of romanitas. The Arch of the Argentarii combated these kinds of accusations by
making a visible, expensive contribution to the forum and by using the visual language of
the imperial family. They physically claimed a place by the construction of the arch and
adopted a Roman visual language to express their allegiance to, and awareness of, the
Roman state.594
This strategy is seen at a variety of scales across the empire. Comparable with the
gate in the Forum Boarium is the dedication of the collegium centonariorum, the guild of
the textile workers, in Apulum in Dacia.595 This group, which seems to have been more
formally affiliated, set up a meeting hall, complete, as they boast, with a pediment, and
paid for with their own funds, pecunia sua, exclusively.596 This group also grew in power
and importance in the Severan period, and there seems to have been some relationship
between the guild and the military stationed in the region.597 The meeting hall has not yet
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been identified in excavation, but was probably a substantial structure, one that conveyed
the importance of the trade, almost certainly wool-working, in the town and the region.598
However, despite the similarities of a structure being erected privately to celebrate
and promote the work of merchants, the Dacian example demonstrates a slightly different
reputation strategy at work. Whereas the Arch of the Argentarii simply honors the
imperial family and then dedicates itself to giving credit to the commissioners, the Dacian
inscription also mentions a dedicator, Lucius Pomponius Liberalis, who was a former
consul and controlled the three Dacian provinces. Liu believes that he was governor of at
least one province at the time of the inscription, and he was undoubtedly an important
man in the region, probably for both civil and military reasons.599 The inscription states
that Liberalis was the dedicator, almost certainly of the building, with the inscription
established later to commemorate the event. He was a high-profile official to be involved
in such a project, and it seems clear that the collegium hoped to benefit from association
with such an important man. The exact nature of their relationship is unclear, however.
Apulum was an important military site, consisting of a large castrum, as well as a
settlement. Liberalis may well have used the site as a base during part of his tenure in the
province, and been available for a largely formulaic, impersonal dedication. On the other
hand, he may have had a serious relationship with the collegium, due to his need to
source woolen goods for his army.
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Whatever the nature of the relationship between Liberalis and the guild, it is clear
that it was in their interest to play up their relationship with the governor. The guild may
have hoped that honoring Liberalis in this inscription would translate itself into favors for
the organization or its members in the future. As we have seen in previous chapters, some
collegia secured tax exemptions and other benefits from the state.600 By asking Liberalis
to dedicate their building, but paying for the building themselves, the guild may have
hoped to convince him to offer them a similar arrangement. If nothing else, mentioning
Liberalis suggested that the guild held his approval, even if he had not specifically
offered it. Even tacitly, or, more deviously, by implication only, his approval was a
valuable commodity, as it established that the guild had strong ties to the imperial center
and suggested that they were endorsed by powerful and important people. Naming
Liberalis may have been intended as a strategy to encourage local or regional elites to
contract with the guild. If nothing else, it was a positive association that the guild could
build upon: they were not at odds with the Roman government and therefore were likely
to be good, upstanding people.
However, not all merchants could associate with important Roman officials, and
not all groups could afford the expense of constructing an entire building or a freestanding monument. The unique preservation of Pompeii, that gives us intact plaster on
the exterior walls of shops and other buildings, reveals some alternative means of
commemoration and displays reputation strategies that less-wealthy merchant groups
could undertake.
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A particularly fine example of these strategies is a large wall-painting [Fig. 7]
from a shop façade that shows a group of carpenters carrying a litter, known as a
ferculum, in a public procession.601 The litter seems to display a statue of Daedalus, the
master craftsman, standing over another figure, possible the body of an apprentice he
killed, as well as figures engaged in carpentry. The scene was painted on the exterior
walls of a workshop, along with another image of Daedalus, making the wooden cow for
Pasiphae, Minerva, and Mercury. This trio of divinities, along with the image of the
procession, corroborated the initial belief that the building was a carpenter’s workshop, as
all the gods can be interpreted as guardians of either commerce or artisanal work.602 The
wall-painting was located on a pilaster between two entrances, one to the workshop, the
other to a structure we call “the House of Tullius.”
The interior of the shop is a small space, consisting of a single room, linked to
other spaces within, which may have been populated by a single merchant, or perhaps
small collection of merchants.603 Yet the identification of the shop is of secondary
importance next to the information that this procession scene communicates. In it, we
have evidence of a different kind of reputation strategy intermingled with one that we
have already seen. Though on a different scale to, and in a different medium from, the
benefactions of the textile workers of Dacia and the merchants of the Forum Boarium, the
publicly available painting of artisans at work also provides a visible reminder of the
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presence of these tradesmen in a place, as well as advertising the work and contributions
of merchants to the city. As shown in the previous chapter, this is a reputation-building
strategy that contributed to the good name of individuals, in this case probably the owner
of the workshop above all, through its implicit claims to competence, quality, and
probity. In this case, however, the same tactic also promotes the group, as the image
shows a team of artisans who worked together to complete commissions from this
workshop, as well as the activities that they undertook together in society. Both the
individual and the group benefit from the existence of the image, though, in all
likelihood, the owner or leader of the group benefited more.
This strategy is clear, and has already been discussed, but this image shows
another ploy that a group of merchants might try to present themselves positively in their
community. The image records a plausible real-world occurrence: a procession through
the city with a religious purpose. It may have been a particular festival in honor of
Minerva, or a more general celebration of divine favor, but, whatever its exact reference,
it was clearly an activity in which at least these merchants took part with collaborators.
The scene shows a litter that was custom-made, designed to fit the particular profession
and needs of the group. At the center of the litter two figures appear sawing a board,
while, at the far left, under Minerva’s watchful eye,604 another figure works at a table
with a plane.605 At the right, and the front of the litter, Daedalus stands contemplating a
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body, sometimes interpreted as his nephew Perdix, another master craftsman whom
Daedalus killed out of envy.606
These carpenters were making a claim about their enviable skill, while
recognizing the primacy of Daedalus in their field. It is clear that these craftsmen
dedicated considerable effort to the creation of the litter, as real-world object, and that the
shop owner invested funds in recreating it in fresco. The construction of a litter this
elaborate, if the painting reflects some related reality, would require an investment of
funds and labor, and displayed some of the skills that the carpenters hoped to advertise.
The later commemoration, memorializing it in the fresco, though itself a further
expenditure, was another means of benefiting from the initial project, by preserving the
memory of the litter, exactly, or perhaps even slightly better, than it had really been. The
painting displays the litter’s pediment roof and shows how it was covered in elaborate
garlands and flowers, brought out in green and red in the painting. This effort is
supported, literally and figuratively, by the bodies of the four men who bear the litter.607
They lean heavily on canes to support the weight above them, and are clearly in motion
forward, following an unseen procession. In the real world, we can imagine these men
engaging with the crowd that watched them. We have evidence to suggest that many
religious processions were accompanied by music and singing, as well as by general
jocularity and socializing.608

Pausanias, Ἑλλάδος Περιήγησις, 1.21.4 recounts the story, calling the boy by the name “Κάλως,” Ovid,
Metamorphoses, 8.241 calls him Perdix, and explains that Minerva rescued him from death by transforming
him into a partridge. Minerva’s appearance on the litter may be mean to signify this version of the story.
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Three full men are visible, a fourth can be inferred from the hand holding a cane that extends from the
left edge of the image.
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Though the precise details are unknown and unknowable, we can imagine that the
carpenters called out about their identity or were addressed by friends and acquaintances
in the crowd. Whatever the exact events, the group was participating in an activity that
was visible to the whole community, and they participated specifically as carpenters, as
representatives of their workshop and profession. Across the city of Pompeii, another
image of a procession, this time in honor of Cybele, depicts something of the atmosphere
that such events might create [Fig. 8].609 This image, which decorated the right-hand side
of the entrance to a taberna,610 shows the cult statue of Cybele being carried in
procession, surrounded by a crowd of priests and worshippers, including some who carry
musical instruments.
Contributing their time and money to the event brought the carpenters and their
work to the attention of the neighborhood and associated them with the common feeling
of celebration. The carpenters bolstered their reputation by their commitment to the
event, which improved the experience of everyone there and also demonstrated their
dedication to their religion. The wall painting perpetuated the memory of the day’s events
and helped to prolong the good feelings and positive associations that the day
engendered.
Of course, a litter as decorative and complex as the one in the painting may have
been used on more than one occasion and may have been the work of more than one
workshop. It seems plausible that, having invested themselves in this project, the
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carpenters used the litter more than once, perhaps at a single annual event, or, more often,
on festival days for Minerva, or even other deities. Multiple workshops may have pooled
resources, money or labor, to construct the litter, with only one of the contributors
choosing the commemorate their contribution with this image. Whatever the case, it is
possible that the carpenters used the litter concurrently with the fresco-representation
appearing on the wall, making it into an echo of ongoing, real-world practices. If this
were the case, the litter may well have stood in as a kind of symbol for the group, and the
wall painting would be a means of connecting the workshop to the men who walked in
the procession. The intricacy of the litter would then be a true advertisement, and the
carpenters of at least this workshop could use the fresco as a landmark for directions,
since they worked in the shop that matched the litter they carried.
For those who attended these processions, the litter may have even been an
anticipated sight if it appeared often enough. The litter would have needed to be stored
when not in use, but it did not necessarily fade from the viewers’ minds in between. The
myth chosen by the carpenters certainly was a memorable one, particularly as it does not
seem to have been a common Pompeian image,611 and was probably intended to stick in
the mind. The carpenters may have been trying to associate themselves and their litter
with a particular myth and a particular event. With regular appearances, the audience may
have expected it to appear, and looked forward to revisiting its story and seeing how it
would be decorated with perishable flowers this time. For those who also lived near the
shop, the litter was also a painting they saw regularly come to life. At a stretch, such an
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object might come to represent a district or neighborhood and evoke pride not only for
the carpenters and their skill, but for the way these men represented the community.
Altogether, this tactic presented the carpenters of this shop in an excellent light.
The image and corresponding litter advertised the carpenters and their shop or shops, as
well as demonstrating some of their practical skills. By walking in a procession and
carrying icons of the gods, they made their piety a matter of public record, and in this
case, their religious devotion directly aligned with their economic interests.612 They were
able to honor their patron deities in both their actions and their commissioned art. In the
end, the painting commemorated their participation in, and dedication to, public life, in a
way that directly benefited their relationship both in the immediate neighborhood and the
wider community of Pompeii.
We have already seen a similar strategy put to use, but in still more humble
circumstances. The fullery of Verecundus has been examined in the previous chapter,
particularly in light of what Verecundus was claiming about his reputation and that of his
shop. However, he also carefully depicted his workers, the coactiliarii, in his imagery.
For Verecundus, this was a statement about his social and economic status: he could
employ others, either free men or slaves, and his business was correspondingly successful
and important. However, this same scene, showing the workers busily operating
Verecundus’ workshop, was marked by graffiti. Much of the scratching is merely
repetitions of Verecundus’ name, repeated over and over, but the longest text is a
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statement from, we assume, the very men shown in the image, by the coactiliarii, who
offered their support for a particular candidate for aedile.613
The aedile would have been the most important official that the fullery workers
were likely to encounter, as he was responsible for enforcing many of the day-to-day
regulations that the coactiliarii were beholden to. As we discussed in chapter three, the
connections between tradesmen and their local officials were often close ones, and this
inscription hints that those ties may have been forged even before an official was elected.
Despite the unofficial nature of the support they offered, it was not meaningless, and it is
conceivable that a prospective official might even court the approval of more influential
groups of merchants as well as accepting support from them. A particular group’s support
might well influence the opinion of others in their profession or convey a more general
sense of the community being behind a particular candidate, giving that person’s
campaign momentum.
Even if support of this kind did not directly contribute to winning the election, the
coactiliarii were publicly presenting themselves, first as a group that self-identified as
having a common interest in this candidate, and second as engaged members of their
community, who cared about the outcome of the election. Even carelessly scratched into
the wall, they were making a number of claims, including, perhaps, their eligibility to
vote, and therefore their status as free men. That they wrote on the painting that depicted
their work also helped to clarify that they were free workers and identified them just as
surely as the various repetitions of the name “Verecundus” did. Accordingly, the text

CIL IV 7838, VETTIUM FIRMUM | AED(ilem) QUACTILIAR(ii) ROG(ant), “quactiliarii” is a local
spelling variation on coactiliarii.
613
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seems to put words into the mouths of the figures shown, and re-inflects the scene,
perhaps even undermining the initial meaning that embellished the reputation of
Verecundus, by contributing to that of the workers.
While their statement may have reached a smaller audience than the larger and
more expensive strategies employed by other groups of merchants, their effort to shape
their reputation is the result of the same impulse to want to display themselves in the best
possible light. These coactiliarii seem to have been a small group, possibly consisting of
only the employees of Verecundus, but it is also possible that, particularly in this area,
which was home to a number of fulleries, the group included more members and the
message scratched into the fresco may not have originated among those employees alone.
Whoever the author, the graffito provides the coactiliarii with a voice that proclaimed
them to be a group of merchants who were employing their own reputation strategies,
separate from those of their employer.
These four cases offer us a range of group responses to the challenge of reputation
management. Each found a way to present a version of their collective identity, and, as
we have seen, most employed a tactic that helped to integrate them with the wider
community. This could be their immediate neighbors, the town or city, or even the
empire as a whole, but in each case, the reputation of merchant groups was linked to a
role in public life. These associations hoped to demonstrate that they belonged and
contributed, and this strategy sometimes had the added benefit of securing privileges or
good relations with local officials. Central to these efforts is the notion that these
merchants were successful in their professions, and that their work was of value to the
society in which they lived and worked.
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Reputation Reception and Stereotype Threat:
However, this claim, that merchants, particularly in groups, were valuable
contributors to society, flies in the face of much of the evidence preserved about
merchants. It also returns us to the question of how reputation strategies were received,
and by whom. We have already discussed this in two different, complementary ways:
first, that reputation is a dialectical process, that requires another to receive, store, and
communicate it, and second, that reputation strategies were performative, and required an
audience, one that might vary in size or other qualities, such as status, social influence,
or, importantly, willingness to accept the self-portraits that these strategies created and
promoted.
The audiences for the various reputation strategies discussed above were all
clearly different, and some merchant efforts were undoubtedly more widely received than
others. However, our evidence for the reception of merchant reputation strategies is rather
thin. We lack responses to specific merchant efforts, and our writings about merchants
generally come from elite authors who seem either to have rejected, or ignored entirely,
the work merchants did to improve their reputations. Instead, we have a number of
vitriolic attacks against merchants that conform to clear stereotypical typologies, casting
merchants as greedy, dishonest, anti-social, and predatory, despite their clear efforts to
represent themselves in more positive ways. We must assume, and indeed we can
sometimes see, that merchants found a more positive reception among some audiences,
particularly those further down the social scale and within their own communities.
However, “popular” statements about merchant reputations often share the biases that
characterize the elite sources.
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What these sources have in common is an external perception of merchants as a
“group” that shares common features. Like this study, they conceive of merchants,
tradesmen, and artisans as part of a single, overlapping category, and attribute particular
characteristics to those who fit within their parameters. However, this is not a group
according to our own definition, as this is not a collective that was aware of itself,
cooperated toward a particular goal, or took its membership into consideration before it
acted. Rather, what these sources have touched upon is a social category that was clearly
identifiable from the outside but would have been unrecognizable by those within it. As
we will discuss, this is a key factor in the development of stereotypes, which is precisely
what this kind of categorization perpetuates.
However, in the pursuit of the ways in which merchant reputation was received,
we must first look closely at sources that demonstrate some resistance to stereotypical
treatments, or which show hostility toward merchant groups acting with their reputation
in mind. These are, inevitably, rare texts, but we are fortunate to have two examples that
offer us some insight. First, there is the oration, already mentioned in the previous
chapter, of Dio Chrysostom, who ran into trouble when he attempted to embellish his
hometown of Prusa by building new colonnades on the site of a blacksmith’s shop.614
Though not involving a group of merchants, the destruction of the shop does offer us a
window into how a community might react to a merchant under threat and how Dio
himself conceptualized all merchants as functionally identical.
Dio recounts how the people rose up to defend this artisan’s shop, as if it were a
public monument of importance. He notes that some were even “violent in their
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protestations,” about his evictions and demolitions, and that this crowd was focused on
the defense of a particular shop, which was known by the name of the smith, whom Dio
refers to as “So-and-so,” τὸ τοῦ δεῖνος.615 We have already discussed how this passage
demonstrates the importance of place in merchant reputation, but in this context, it is the
reaction of the community that is most interesting. This blacksmith had, evidently, made
his place of work into a landmark of sorts, one that was particularly associated with
positive memories.616 Whatever his business practices, he and his shop inspired
considerable loyalty and held a good reputation. Dio implies strongly that it is
particularly among his peers that “So-and-so,” enjoyed a good name, and that it was
mostly these people who came to his aid.617
As we will discuss shortly, Dio presents all of this as some kind of terrible joke,
the actions of the worst of Prusa’s population who prevented the rest from ever rising to
their rightful heights. He is dismissive of the value of the smithy and describes the shops
and stalls as low, cramped, and crumbling. Dio is, ultimately, the audience that was least
convinced of the value of the smith, and refuses to recognize his reputation, an action that
had negative effects on Dio’s own good name, as he records, albeit dismissively, that he
was called “the sacker of cities and citadels,”618 and had been the subject of “unpleasant
talk,”619 as a result of his choice to proceed with the work.
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Dio is not the only hostile source we have for the reception of the reputation of
tradesmen. In fact, it is in these hostile sources that we often see the role of reputation
strategies most clearly. When they are contested, they become visible to us,620 and we can
examine when these strategies worked, and when they did not. The smiths and citizens of
Prusa were ultimately, if Dio is to be believed, unsuccessful in defending this site,
because their numbers were too few and Dio was too forceful. An example from Ephesus,
preserved in the Acts of the Apostles, demonstrates even more clearly how a reputation
strategy could be weaponized, and even show through the obfuscation of a source that
wished to disguise its success.
The case is that of Demetrius and the silversmiths of Ephesus.621 Acts reports that
members of professions related to icon-making, and particularly silversmiths, felt that
their businesses were being threatened by the increased interest in Christianity, prompted
by Paul’s teaching. They correspondingly “rioted.” The text recounts that Demetrius
called together his peers, convinced them of the threat, and led the group, accumulating
followers along the way, to the theater. The wording of Demetrius’ call to arms, however,
is telling:
Ἄνδρες, ἐπίστασθε ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἐργασίας ἡ εὐπορία ἡμῖν ἐστίν, καὶ θεωρεῖτε
καὶ ἀκούετε ὅτι οὐ μόνον Ἐφέσου ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν πάσης τῆς Ἀσίας ὁ Παῦλος οὗτος
πείσας μετέστησεν ἱκανὸν ὄχλον, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοὶ οἱ διὰ χειρῶν
γινόμενοι. οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦτο κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τὸ μέρος εἰς ἀπελεγμὸν ἐλθεῖν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς μεγάλης θεᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν εἰς οὐθὲν λογισθῆναι, μέλλειν τε
καὶ καθαιρεῖσθαι τῆς μεγαλειότητος αὐτῆς, ἣν ὅλη [ἡ] Ἀσία καὶ [ἡ] οἰκουμένη
σέβεται.
“Gentlemen, you know that we are prosperous from this work, and you see and
you hear that, not only in Ephesus, but practically in all Asia, this Paul has
persuaded a large crowd to convert, saying that gods made by human hands are
620
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not gods. And not only is it a danger that our business will come into disrepute,
but also that the temple of the great goddess Artemis will not be considered
important, and the temple will be deprived of her divine majesty, which the whole
of Asia and the world worships.”622
Demetrius is clear that the threat he perceives is both to his business and to the
honor of Artemis. He fears that his trade will “lose its good name,” and through that loss,
he and his peers will lose the income they have from their work. The explicit reference to
reputation is unusual, but it suggests that the response of this group, namely to march out
and seize Paul’s companions, was effectively a reputation strategy, designed to draw
attention to their work and the threat it was under.
Like the carpenters in Pompeii, these tradesmen link their profession with their
religion, at least from the point of view of the author of Acts, whose agenda colors the
whole episode. Yet, for the readers of Acts, this was a plausible strategy for the
silversmiths to have adopted. Whether or not the silversmiths were religious themselves,
by connecting their trade with the largest and most prominent cult in Ephesus, they were
able to motivate many in the community beyond their immediate circle. The chant of the
mob that gathers is in praise of Artemis, rather than relating to the silversmiths, and this
is the point of common feeling for the marchers, who, by the estimation of the author of
Acts, at least, had no real understanding of why they were there.623 While this might
imply that the crowd did not associate this action with Demetrius and the silversmiths,
the text is clear that some at least understood this. When the city clerk addressed the
crowd and asked them to disperse, he is clear that this march originated in a complaint by
Demetrius and the craftsmen.624 While his point is that they must go through formal
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channels to charge the Christians, the outcome ensures that everyone present knew that
these were the men who had rushed to defend Artemis.
The author of Acts attempts to convey that this was a disorganized, unruly mob
that failed to achieve anything, while the Christians made many converts. However, by
the author’s own admission, Paul was in serious danger and was forced to leave Ephesus
shortly after this demonstration.625 Thus, Demetrius and the craftsmen of Ephesus
secured the safety of their professional reputation and motivated others in their
community to make their perceived enemy, and another merchant, unwelcome. This is a
highly effective strategy, then, and one that found enough support to draw a crowd, and
to sustain it, as it appears, for several hours.626
Neither Dio nor the author of Acts was sympathetic to the position that these
merchants were in and hoped to maintain. Dio is convinced these are lowly, backward
people who are opposed to progress, while the author of Acts believes these are pagans
who are driven by their love of their idols, but especially by their love of profit. Both
bring us back to the stereotypes that generally surround merchants. Dio’s blacksmith is
anti-social, lowly, and a blight on the community, while the silversmiths of Acts are
greedy, self-serving, and immoral. These kinds of stereotypes appear consistently in our
literature, though they take on slightly different casts depending on the authors and the
profession in question. As we will argue, merchants were always aware of these
stereotypes, and of the disadvantage that they were at automatically because of these
common biases. Thus, as we have seen, merchant strategies often tried to signal their own
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differences from these stereotypes, either through generosity or through community
involvement.
However, before embarking on that argument, it is necessary to have an
understanding of what constitutes a stereotype and how the specific types of stereotypes
merchants faced were developed and maintained. Most modern definitions of stereotypes
are drawn from that of Gordon Allport, who states that a stereotype is an “exaggerated
belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in
relation to that category.”627 This definition fits well with what we have already covered.
Merchants, in this case, are the category, while greed, anti-social tendencies, predatory
nature, and numerous other features represent the exaggerated beliefs. Exaggerated, in
that some elements of these accusations may have been present in the behavior of some
merchants, but these characteristics cannot have accurately described all merchants or
any merchant as consistently as the sources we encounter have made them out to be. The
latter portion of Allport’s definition is also critical, in that the treatment of merchants was
justified by this rationale.
To take just one example, the jurist Ulpian justified a harsh restriction against
innkeepers, stable-keepers and shipmasters because he believed that these groups were
already commonly in league with bandits and stole from their guests. His belief in the
stereotype of the greedy, immoral merchant was explicitly his reasoning for the justice of
the legislation. The Digest preserves this:
ne quisquam putet graviter hoc adversus eos constitutum… nisi hoc esset
statutum, materia daretur cum furibus adversus eos quos recipiunt coeundi, cum
ne nunc quidem abstineant huiusmodi fraudibus.
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Lest anyone think that this constitution is harsh toward them …if this statute had
not been established, an opportunity would be given to them to cooperate with
thieves against those whom they receive as guests, since even now they do not
abstain from this kind of fraud.”628
This kind of belief was commonplace and appears at all levels of Roman society.629 As a
result, the treatment of merchants as a suspect, dishonest set, was commonplace, and
helped to reinforce the stereotype. When people saw others treat merchants with
suspicion, they became more inclined to do so themselves because it reinforced their
belief that merchants were trouble.630
This is a fundamental feature of stereotypes. Not only do they justify certain
behaviors, but, once they spread to a large enough portion of the population, they are
shared widely, at times almost universally, and hinder the social and economic mobility
of their subjects.631 Furthermore, stereotypes become fossilized, and seem to make
themselves the inevitable dictators of social interactions. As Stangor and Schaller have
argued, “stereotypes serve the status quo,” and, accordingly, stereotypes are frequently
repeated and reused across time and place.632 There is little reason to alter stereotypes, as
information that is contrary to their belief can be rejected as exceptional or anecdotal,
while the core belief is continually reinforced by social relationships that are often
circularly structured by the stereotype itself.
Stereotypes are a by-product of natural processes of categorization and social
stratification, as well as the result of inter-group dynamics. As we have discussed
throughout this chapter, these group dynamics often require the formulation and
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promotion of a group identity, in doing so, it becomes necessary to simultaneously
identify what one’s group is not. The central contention of much of the literature on
stereotypes is that stereotypes make it easier for individuals to distinguish themselves in
relation to others, who must be identified, categorized, and, often, cast as markedly
different from the individuals or groups at the center.633 In literature on stereotypes, this
what is known as “us/them dynamics.”634 Stereotypes require that the person or group
who held the stereotype, the “us,” developed a sense of what they were not, usually by
identifying those who were not “us,” but rather “them.”
This identification came through categorization, the recognition of some feature
that distinguished “them” from “us.” These categories could line up with groups,
according to our own definition, or not, and create collectives of people who would never
consider themselves as allied in any way. At times they included multiple, unaffiliated
groups, while at others they included no groups at all, merely a collection of individuals
united by some feature that was only externally recognizable. Social categories are, by
themselves, a perfectly natural means of bringing order to the world, and recognizing
shared features and patterns across segments of the population is common in most, if not
all, societies.635 Yet, the assignment of characteristics to those categories has the power to
transform observations into actionable beliefs, thereby creating stereotypes that a person
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can leverage against a category, and which can paint a group as disposed toward certain
kinds of behavior or morality.
Us/them dynamics allow us to explain why and how the content of merchant
stereotypes developed in the Roman world. After all, the stereotype surrounding
merchants could have been as simple and inoffensive as one of the ones that surrounded
Germans: that they were tall.636 In the study of merchant stereotypes, merchants, are, by
necessity, always “them.” They are consistently being judged as if they are outsiders by a
group or an individual that considers him-, her-, or themselves to be “us.” Once
merchants were firmly identified as “them,” it was possible to develop a conception of
what that category meant and what characteristics “that sort” of person might have.
The exaggerated beliefs surrounding merchants were ones that were based around
competition and a conception of trade as a zero-sum game. Publilius Syrus, whom we
encountered in the previous chapter, offers another useful sententia here: “Profits in trade
can be made only by another’s loss.”637 Even among groups that would not, on the face of
it, appear to be in competition with merchants, we get the sense that traders were seen as
a kind of threat. Ovid’s Fasti records a merchant’s prayer to Mercury, in which the trader
hoped that he might always have the joy of cheating a customer.638 While these are
stereotypical in tone, particularly the “joy,” gaudia, that Ovid believes merchants felt,
they demonstrate that there was a pervasive understanding that it was not possible for
merchants to do their work without taking advantage of others. Whether one was elite or
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impoverished, merchants could only do their work by profiting at another’s expense.639
Thus, every time someone bought something from such a person, he or she was, by
default, being cheated.640
Research on stereotype content has developed two metrics to predict what kinds
of stereotypes will develop about a group.641 The first is “warmth,” a measure of how
fond the “in-group,” or “us,” is of the “out-group,” or “them.” Because of the nature of
trade, and the competition that it necessitated, merchants were always judged “coolly,”
and never received the benefit of the doubt that others received. The second category is
“competence,” which is at least perceived, if not actual, and measures how successful the
“out-group” is seen to be at their area of expertise. In the case of merchants, with their
“low-warmth” metric, high levels of competence are generally met with envy and
accusations of devious cheating. Low levels of competence commonly produce contempt,
and we see accusations leveled against “incompetent” merchants that include taking
advantage of the kindness of others and laziness. Of course, competent and incompetent
rest at the ends of a spectrum, with many merchants falling somewhere in the middle.
The content of these stereotypes shows elements of these extremes or may be based on
other categories to which those particular merchants could be assigned. Greed is common
in many, if not most, cases of merchant stereotypes. At the extremes, this is because
competent merchants are seen to be voracious for gain, and incompetent merchants were
believed to want to get the most out of people while doing the least work.
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Philostratus offers us a clear indicator of both extremes of stereotype content in a
description that his Apollonius of Tyana gives of the business practices of ship captains:
“Ἀλλ᾿ ἐμπόρων τε καὶ ναυκλήρων κακοδαιμονέστερὸν τί ἐρεῖς ἔθνος; πρῶτον μὲν
περινοστοῦσι, ζητοῦντες ἀγορὰν κακῶς πράττουσαν, εἶτα προξένοις καὶ καπήλοις
ἀναμιχθέντες πωλοῦσί τε καὶ ὠνοῦνται, καὶ τόκοις ἀνοσίοις τὰς αὑτῶν κεφαλὰς
ὑποτιθέντες ἐς τὸ ἀρχαῖον σπεύδουσι, κἂν μὲν εὖ πράττωσιν, εὐπλοεῖ ἡ ναῦς καὶ
πολὺν ποιοῦνται λόγον τοῦ μήτε ἑκόντες ἀνατρέψαι μήτε ἄκοντες, εἰ δὲ ἡ
ἐμπορία πρὸς τὰ χρέα μὴ ἀναφέροιτο, μεταβάντες ἐς τὰ ἐφόλκια προσαράττουσι
τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὸν ἑτέρων [ναύτων] βίον, θεοῦ ἀνάγκην εἰπόντες, ἀθεώτατα καὶ
οὐδὲ ἄκοντες αὐτοὶ ἀφείλοντο.”642
“But can you name a more wretched tribe than merchants and shippers? First,
they roam the sea, seeking a market that is doing badly, then, mixing with guild
representatives and traders, they sell and buy, and, after using their own person as
surety for unholy interest rates, they hurry to get back to the original sum. And,
even if they do well, the ship has a good voyage and they make a big speech about
not having capsized the ship willingly or unwillingly, but if the sales do not match
their debts, crossing over to the lifeboats, they wreck the ship and the life of the
other sailors, claiming it was the will of god, and, most impiously, they rob others
not unwillingly.”
Philostratus begins with a statement that, again, reinforces our understanding that
merchants ought not be considered for “warm” stereotype content.643 He notes, in
particular, that shippers want to take advantage of depressed markets, and that they are
constantly on the lookout for personal gain. Neither factor is likely to endear merchants
to society more generally, but both are essential factors of the work that merchants did, at
least in the Roman understanding.644 Next, he first presents a shipper who “prospers,” a
proxy for our high-competency metric. Philostratus’ reaction to this person is wholly
negative. He believes such a captain to be, inevitably, a braggart, who makes a great
thing out of doing the ethical bare minimum: not destroying the ship or the cargo with
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which he has been entrusted. Philostratus’ comments do not quite approach the envy that
is the typical response to a competent merchant, but we see that reaction elsewhere,
where it is clear that skilled merchants are seen as enviable, or perhaps in possession of
some unjust advantage. In the Edict of Maximum Prices, merchants are accused of trying
to control the wind and weather, an occult advantage that threatens the natural orders of
the world by giving men the powers of gods.645
Philostratus demonstrates the second, contemptuous stereotype more clearly in
discussing the unsuccessful, incompetent merchant. His loathing for this kind of
individual is clear, as he describes how, if they fail to profit, their lust for gain will drive
them to wreck their ship, killing their crew, if necessary, in pursuit of gain. This captain
is greedy, immoral, and attempts to excuse his behavior with recourse to the divine.
Philostratus stresses that there is a human cost that merchants have disregarded, and
which makes such men tantamount to murderers who are still allowed to walk free in
society. Beneath this horror, the shipwreck scheme also demonstrates that incompetent
merchants took advantage of the systems that were designed to protect against accidents.
By wrecking ships, captains would profit from the insurance. Their cry of “divine
intervention” was not only a lie, but an excuse used to cheat others.
Greed lies at the heart of this stereotype, as does the predatory nature of
merchants who would voluntarily take up this exploitative business. Philostratus’
comments come as part of an attempt to dissuade a young, noble Spartan from taking up
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this trade, and they naturally take on a tone that highlights the moral differences between
merchants and other, perhaps “normal,” men. What is clear is that merchants, already the
out-group in these discussions, are being even more dramatically “othered,” cast as a
group that would willingly and consistently do things that the in-group, in this case
something abstract like “Romans,” or “good men,” would never dream of doing. This is a
consistent trope in passages that offer merchant stereotypes. Often, they describe
merchants in ways that make them out to be immoral or at least operating under a
different moral code, and associate that with physical distance from the community. At
an extreme, this even takes the form of assigning a foreign point of origin to merchants,
with all merchants, regardless of ethnicity, being potentially described as “Syrian” or
“Phoenician,” because of those regions’ historical association with trade.646
We see this play out at the local level in a passage of Apuleius, where a
moneylender is described by one of his neighbors. The moneylender, Milo, lives in a
small city in Thessaly. Within its community, his business practices are common
knowledge, as are his personal habits and some details about his family life.647 While
Milo does not seem to have been well-liked, he is undeniably a part of the community,
with neighbors and business associates recognizing him as one of the foremost citizens of
their town, in wealth, if not in social capital. Yet, when Lucius travels to the city, a local
innkeeper describes Milo as being removed from the community, as if he lives miles
away from everyone else. She stresses that he lives as far away from the town as possible,
turning Lucius’ claim that Milo is a prominent citizen, e primoribus, into a joke, ‘vere,’
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inquit, ‘primus istic perhibetur Milo, qui extra pomerium et urbem totam colit.’648 Thus,
though the innkeeper and Milo are effectively neighbors, living within sight of one
another,649 the innkeeper has chosen to describe Milo as an outsider. He is a trader, and,
by virtue of being a moneylender and accordingly persona non grata, is more a foreigner
who preys upon the residents of this community than a fellow citizen of the same small
town. The innkeeper highlights the pomerium, the boundary of Hypata, the “city,” urbs,
in which they live. Her words actually draw a line between herself and Milo, physically
delimiting those who are inside the in-group, and belong with “us”, and marking those
who must be outsiders, the dangerous, predatory “them.”
Figurative or literal distance is a marker of merchant stereotypes, and one which
is aided by the widespread belief that merchants are mostly a mobile population that
lacked ties to community and place. For some merchants this was certainly the literal
truth, as they traveled with their wares either by ship, traveling from port to port, or on
land, moving between marketplaces, but both ancient views and modern scholarship have
too readily accepted that merchants were dislocated from communities because of their
travel. More recently, scholarship is starting to move beyond this. Horden and Purcell
have stressed short-distance cabotage trading as normal in the Mediterranean, which
makes it more likely that shippers were regular visitors to the same places, season after
season, and traveled shorter distances overall.650 Frayn and de Ligt have both noted that
travel to fairs and markets was regular, and that the same merchants returned month after
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month to the same markets, thereby facilitating connections with multiple communities,
rather than making them outsiders in these places.651 Certainly the case of Mithres,
discussed in the previous chapter, supports the notion that a merchant could maintain a
positive and well-supported reputation in more than one place, as he was able to boast of
his recognition in Rome, while living in a small town outside of the city.652 Despite this
productive scholarship, and ample evidence to dismiss this hypothesis, the perception of
merchants as “disconnected,” “foreign,” and “other” has persisted as a common
stereotype that has helped to keep merchants distinct from other categories in Roman
society.
The mere existence of these stereotypes and their content is naturally of interest,
as they explain many of our sources about merchants, but, on their own, they get us no
closer to how merchants managed their reputations. However, we can note that merchants
were aware of these stereotypes and anxious to avoid any association with the kinds of
behavior that stereotypes predicted merchants would engage in. More than this, their
strategies often seem to be direct responses to the stereotypes that they faced.653 As we
have seen above, merchant groups attempted to correct for the common misconception of
merchant isolation and separation from the community by asserting their position in
society and commitment to the places where they lived and worked. Nevertheless, it will
be helpful to take a closer look at the anxiety that merchants had about stereotypes and at
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some ways that anxiety manifested itself in, and was combated by, merchant reputation
strategies.

Merchant Anxieties:
We have already seen some of the anxieties merchants had about stereotypes in
the previous chapter. In the cases examined there, we looked for reputation strategies, and
noted that merchants were quick to display their best qualities. Yet, many of the same
merchants seemed to anticipate that their actions and character were likely to be
misconstrued, related to others in the worst possible light, and even used against them.
Merchants were quick to assert that they lived blameless lives, contributed to society in
tangible ways, and were moral and good people at their core. These claims are standard
features of broadcasting one’s reputation, yet a large number of these merchants made
statements that explicitly framed their good character as a rejection of a negative
attribute. Onesimus’ wife claimed that he had lived sine macula, Vibia Chresta asserted
that she and her friends worked sine fraude, while Paul assured his followers that he had
not been a burden to others.654
We lack further evidence to know if these were accusations that these particular
merchants had faced in life, but the similarity of their anxieties to the standard features of
merchant stereotypes suggests that these were worries that may have transcended the
unique circumstances of a single merchant and his enemies. As we have noted,
stereotypes pervaded all levels of society. Graffiti perpetuates the same kinds of beliefs
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that we have already seen codified into legislation and used by elite authors.655
Accordingly, merchants felt this pressure, at least in the abstract, at all levels of Roman
society, and were as likely to find these beliefs among their local community members, as
they were when they came into contact with officials or their social betters.
Again, Apuleius’ Metamorphoses provides us with a testing ground. We have
already seen how Milo faced negative stereotypes that were perpetuated by his neighbor
and fellow merchant, the innkeeper who speaks to Lucius. Rather than finding an ally in
this woman, Milo’s reputation is being undermined, probably without his knowledge. We
will discuss this dynamic more in the following chapter, but, in this context, it is
important to note that Milo, when he finally meets Lucius, attempts to apologize for the
poverty of his house, attributing it to his fear of robbers, rather than to the miserly
character that the innkeeper tried to project on to him. The more elite application of
stereotypes appears shortly after this passage, when Lucius attempts to purchase a fish for
his dinner at the local market. He meets the town’s agoranomos, Pythias, who is offended
to learn the price that Lucius has paid for his meal. Pythias accosts the fishmonger,
accusing him of “marking up fish at such high prices, and reducing the flower of the land
of Thessaly to a deserted, barren cliff by the expensiveness of [his] wares.”656 His,
probably ineffective,657 attempts to publicly shame the man in the marketplace
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demonstrate that elites had some sense that stereotypes could be utilized to hurt the
reputation of tradesmen.
At every social level, this was a serious threat and individuals responded to this
pressure, at least in some cases, by explicitly rejecting the behaviors and characteristics
that conformed to the stereotypes. They were “not that way,” or they would never do
“that kind of thing.” Statements like that of Vibia Chresta, which are, of course, laden
with other societal implications, do this effectively, but her working sine fraude also
includes the implication that others would, or did, include deceit in their business
practices. Either explicitly or implicitly, these statements often put down others in the
merchant community by validating the one making the claim. The best that could be
hoped for was that individuals would be seen as exceptions to the rule, while the rule
itself was not questioned or undermined. In fact, these stereotypes were often bolstered
by these tacit admissions of its truth and grew stronger in the face of this kind of claim.
The stereotypes persisted, and were a powerful force acting on all merchants,
including merchant groups. However, in their case, anxieties about stereotypes took on a
slightly different cast. Rather than finding expression in claims framed in the negative,
we see merchant associations mobilizing their resources to preempt attacks on their
reputation, particularly by making public benefactions and otherwise demonstrating the
group’s loyalty to the community. Generosity, in particular, is a virtue these groups seem
to have wanted to display, as is evident in the large numbers of public events that groups
and their members sponsored, as well as the art, monuments, and building projects they
organized and funded. Generosity is clearly the antidote to greed, and while these groups
generally acted as if the stereotype did not exist, they were acting in a way that was still
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dictated by the framework of these societal biases. Furthermore, these strategies stressed
the unity, as well as the wealth, of the group, which may have bought them social capital
in the wider community. However, for groups that could not afford this kind of
euergetism, it was often easier to lean upon the reputations of individual members. Good
members offered a strong correlation to suggest that the group was similarly good. The
group could also contribute to this connection by demonstrating its own willingness to
police its ranks and promote its best members.
On the surface, this was a sensible strategy. The prominence of good members
reflected well on the associations they represented. Beneath this tactic, however, lay
anxieties about the relationship between individual members and the group as whole.
While a good member might improve the reputation of the group, a single, bad member
would detract as much, if not more, from the group’s collective reputation. As we will
discuss, a group that promoted good members incentivized good behavior, but the higher
it raised an individual and the more closely the group associated itself with that person,
the harder it would be if that person ultimately committed some public offense.
As a result, there were risks to this strategy. While this kind of promotion worked
well,658 and encouraged members to join groups and remain members, it was not without
its faults. Individuals were always weighing their personal reputations and their personal
profits against the costs of membership and might act against the interests of the group if
it meant sufficient personal advancement. As we discussed in our initial definition of
groups, one lens for approaching group dynamics is to view the group primarily as a
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collection of individuals. These individuals, complete with their own personal agendas,
constituted the group and determined its course. As a result, the interpersonal
relationships among them are of paramount importance. When a single member was
promoted, the balance of these relationships shifted, leaving the group potentially open to
internal friction, as well as to changes to their collective reputation. A concrete example
of this may be seen in an inscription from Perinthos-Herakleia and the implications it
raises:
ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ· Δρ[άκων ὁ καὶ(?)] | Χρῆστος Χρήστ[ου ἀνέ]|θηκεν συναγωγ̣ῇ
[ῥ̣]ωπο|πωλῶν τῶν περὶ Σωκρά|την Μενίσκου.
To good fortune. Drakon also [called?] … Chrestos, son of Chrestos, set this up
for the synagogue of small-wares dealers,659 who are around Sokrates, son of
Meniskos.660
The organization of this group is unclear and seems to have been quite
complicated. The inscription decorates a small, round altar that, by the inscription’s own
admission, was meant to serve the needs of a group, called a synagogue,661 of some kind
of merchants. The corruption of the inscription makes it difficult to know what exactly
they sold, but they are “gathered around,” or are “the ones who are around,” τῶν περὶ, a
certain Sokrates. He would seem to be the leader of the association, or perhaps a founder
of the group. Yet, Sokrates is not credited as either the builder or the instigator of the
altar project. Rather, he seems to be being given his due recognition here, while credit is
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to be assigned to Drakon/Chrestos, who appears to have managed the project and, quite
probably, paid for it as well. The inscription is brief, and we cannot know whether this
man was given approval from the group to build the altar, or whether this was an
independent idea that he had had and which he had designed as a gift to the synagogue. If
the former, it is possible that Drakon was a wealthy member of the group who was
encouraged to set up an altar, while, if the latter, it may have been a project designed to
improve this man’s standing within the group through a display of generosity and piety.
We must remember that individual reputations existed within these groups, and it may
have been necessary for members to compete for status among their peers as much as, or
more than, among their non-member competitors.
However it originated, the altar displays the piety of the group, yet, compared to
the relative anonymity displayed in the wall-painting of the carpenters, individual
motivations are far more visible in this case. As a result, the reputation of these individual
group members is far more prominently displayed than that of the group. That the group
needed, and could inspire its members to commission, an altar, is perhaps a good
indication of the group’s piety, but the inscription highlights individuals and places their
personal generosity and/or importance above other considerations. Credit will go to them
first, and to the group only as a secondary consideration.
The prominence of individual group members is commonplace in the epigraphic
record concerning associations of merchants, whether, as in the Perinthos-Herakleia
example, because individual members acted independently, but still on behalf of the
group, or because the group chose to honor a specific member. This is often the case in
instances of funerary rights, where the group will donate a funerary monument for a
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recently deceased member, as in the case of the sack-weaver, Ariston, whose grave was
set up by his συν<θ>ια|σείτῃ, his fellow society-members.662 Alternately, some
organizations maintained a system of honors that could be voted to, or occasionally be
purchased by, exceptional members. Still other groups had officials within their ranks
who held specific responsibilities for their term of office.663
Members utilized these offices and honors to build their personal reputations, as
in the case of Alexander Asklepeiodotos. His short funerary inscription stressed his
position within what was probably group of vegetable sellers:
Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀσσ<κ>λη|πειοδότου λαχανοπώ|λης, ἄρξας τῆς τέχνης, | τὸ μνημεῖον
ἐκ τῶν εἰδί||ων, ζήσας ἔτη λεʹ.
Alexandros Asklepeiodotos, vegetable dealer, having led the guild,664 [set up] this
memorial from his own resources, having lived 35 years.665
For this merchant, leadership among his peers was an essential part of his identity and a
particular point of pride.666 Like the traders of the previous chapter, identifying oneself
by one’s work, and asserting that one was successful in that field, was an important
means of presenting reputation. Within the context of group membership and leadership,
the successes of a man like Alexandros were the successes of the group, and it was in his
interests to boast that he reflected well on his fellow members.
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These impulses for self-promotion are understandable, as many of the
professional groups we have examined do not seem to have, at least exclusively,
contracted together. Individual members still conducted private business and needed to
secure their own reputation, as well as that of the group. Though groups often facilitated
business agreements among their own members, there was plenty of business outside the
group. Group members balanced business that involved both fellow group members and
their own private ties. Both inside and outside of these engagements, merchants had
personal wants and needs to meet. Thus, merchants were continuously balancing their
commitments to the group and to others with their own personal agendas, while the group
navigated the internal conflicts that these varied interests tended to create.
As a result, groups developed strategies for managing their members, particularly
to help the group navigate moments of conflict or individual members whose actions
reflected poorly on the collective. These strategies prioritized the reputation of the group
and used a combination of punishments and rewards to build an institutional framework
for merchant behavior within the context of group membership.

Institutional Limits and Private-Order Enforcement:
Though a group could not exist without members, the individuals who made up
the group generated a complex set of potentially warring needs, desires, and motivations.
Groups, in order to continue in their basic functions and to pursue common goals, needed
to retain some measure of control over their membership, and to have systems in place,
whether formal or informal, for when things went wrong. Hawkins has recently examined
the strategies that groups of merchants employed to mitigate the risks posed by individual
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merchants. His work has developed a useful typology of three primary ways in which
collegia, in particular, were able to enforce standards upon their members: membership
dues, reputation networks, and sanctions.667
In the context of formal groups, membership dues were a useful tool, as merchant
members were encouraged to follow the group’s code of conduct in order to protect the
investment they had made in the collective. However, smaller, informal groups often
lacked these payments, and could use money as a motivation only if members had
voluntarily contributed to some common project. Hawkins’ other categories are more
prevalent in evidence from all types of groups.
The first of these, Hawkins’ reputation networks, are envisioned as systems
through which reputation information about members could be spread. A group had it in
its power to send word about the reputation of a member to another group, thereby
facilitating or hindering that member’s dealings with the other group. The result of such a
system would be that individual members remained liable for their personal actions,
rather than masking their identity with the reputation of the group or allowing them to act
as the face of the group, representing all the other members. While Hawkins imagines
that this system worked mostly in the negative, with bad reputations spreading more than
good ones, our evidence for the spread of reputation, discussed fully in the next chapter,
shows that these systems could spread positive and neutral information as well as
negative.
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Despite the logic of Hawkins’ proposed typology, our evidence for reputation
networks being used between groups is actually relatively thin, though, as we will see in
the coming chapter, they are common among networks of individuals. The best
attestations come from Christian groups in our period, where it was commonplace for one
church to vouch for members when sending them abroad to another. Often, these
religious networks facilitated trade by organizing housing or allowing members of the
same profession to meet each other. Acts offers a good example in the case of Apollos, an
Alexandrian Jew, who traveled from Egypt to Ephesus, where he became involved with
the local Judeo-Christian community. The account of Acts tells us that he was educated,
presumably in the faith, by Priscilla and Aquila, Paul’s tent-making colleagues,668 and
then:
βουλομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ διελθεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν προτρεψάμενοι οἱ ἀδελφοὶ
ἔγραψαν τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀποδέξασθαι αὐτόν.
And when he wanted to go to Achaia, the brothers encouraged him and wrote to
the disciples [there] to welcome him.669
In terms of spreading reputation, this was clearly a case of sending positive
information, though the matter is slightly complicated by the exact nature of Christian
identity at this early stage of development. As a result, we struggle to know the exact
group(s) to which a man like Apollos belonged. His personal identity seems to straddle
the lines, if any existed, between Jewish and Christian groups, and it is difficult to know
how many others within the communities at Ephesus and Achaea were in a similar
position. Yet, without delving too deeply into complicated questions regarding ethnic and
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religious identities, we may say with confidence that the church in Ephesus, and its
counterpart in Achaea, conforms to the rough outline of “group,” as this chapter has
defined them. Harland has recently addressed them as such,670 and scholarship on early
Christianity has largely accepted his argument that groups of early Christians may be
considered as comparable to other groups and associations in the Roman world with
religious, social, and economic purposes. Furthermore, recent research has demonstrated
that, in the second century CE, at least, effort was being made to tie the foundation of
churches and the establishment of Christian groups to trade routes.671 By implication, the
travels of Apollos, or those of Priscilla and Aquila, may have reflected parallel business
connections, as we have seen in their relationship with Paul. Whatever the exact case, the
Christians of Ephesus were in a position to transmit some details about Apollos’
reputation to the Christians of Achaea. They were able to request that Apollos be made
welcome, and presumably could offer some information about the man that would endear
him to his future host(s). Apollos was therefore able to rely on the good name he had
developed in Ephesus, and possibly even in Alexandria, when he traveled, and had a
built-in incentive to be an upstanding member of the group, since a good reputation
among his peers in one place had the power to make his travels, and perhaps his business,
easier.
Reputation networks were doubtless more common and more commonly utilized
than the extant sources immediately suggest. In all likelihood, they are less visible to us
now because they relied on word-of-worth to spread the information that was most
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relevant. We will discuss this in the next chapter, when we examine the ways that
reputation was communicated among and around merchants. There, orality and
informality will be of central importance, and it will be evident that, while people may
not have been consistently writing about reputation, they were definitely talking about it.
Hawkins’ sanctions are more clearly apparent in our source material. The most
formal of these measures seem to have been commonly made a matter of public record as
a means of ensuring their enforcement.672 Sanctions, of course, could be both formal and
informal, and were applied by groups at both ends of that spectrum. Sanctions appear
written into charters and are discussed casually in other sources about groups. In their
most formal instantiations, sanctions often included a specified fine for small infractions,
or, for more extreme offenses, the terms for expulsion from the group. A majority of the
most extreme punishments seem to have always involved some form of social and/or
economic isolation and exclusion, something with could be informally enforced at the
other end of the spectrum for similarly serious crimes against the group.
Several charters preserved from Roman Egypt show groups that were explicit
about what they expected of their members, and they list the punishments that would be
levied for each kind of crime.673 A particularly clear example of this comes from a 1st
century CE charter of an association of sheep and cattle herders, who, along with their
pastoral duties, also presumably leveraged their collective power in the eventual sale of
their fleeces and livestock. However, rather than focusing on the economic advantages
that the group could provide to its members, or even discussing the structure of the group
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and its leadership, the document lists a number of potential crimes against the group that
a member might commit, along with the punishments deemed appropriate:
ἐὰν δέ τις ἐκπαροινήσῃ ζημιούσθωι ὃ ἐὰν τῶι κοινῶι δόξηι.
ἐ̣ὰν δέ τιν̣ι̣ ⟦ζ⟧ σύλλο̣[γ]ο̣ς παραγγελῆι καὶ μὴ παραγένηται, ζημιούσθωι
ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς κώμης δραχ(μὴν) μίαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς πόλεω(ς) δραχ(μὰς) τέσσαρας
…
ἐάν τις παρίδῃ τινὰ ἐν ἀηδίᾳ καὶ μὴ συνεπισχύσῃ ἐπὶ τωὶ συλλῦσαι
αὐτὸν τῆς ἀηδίας, δ[ό]τ̣ωι̣ ̣ (δραχμὰς) η̣. ὁ δʼ ἐν ταῖς εὐωχίας
κατὰ κλισίαν προαναπείπτων τοῦ ἑτέρου δότωι περισσότερον
τριώβολον τοῦ ἰδίου τόπου ἕκασ̣τ̣ο̣ς. ἐάν τις τοῦ ἑτέρου κατηγορήσῃ ἠ̣ι διαβολὴν ποιήσηται, ζημι(ούσθω δραχμὰς) η. ἐάν τις τὸν
ἕτερον ὑπονομεύσῃ ἠι οἰκοφθορήσῃ, ζημιο(ύσθω δραχμὰς) ξ.
And if anyone is drunk and disorderly, let him be fined whatever the group judges
to be appropriate. But if anyone is notified of a meeting and does not attend, let
him be fined one drachma in the country, but four drachmai in the city… If
anyone notices someone in distress and does not assist him to get out of his
distress, let him pay eight drachmai. Each one who sits himself down on the
couch before another member, let him pay an extra three obols for his own place.
If anyone prosecutes another member or slanders him, let him be fined eight
drachmai. If anyone plots against another member or corrupts his home, let him
pay sixty drachmai.674
The group has a clear set of behavioral standards that it wishes to uphold, ranging
from attendance policies to social conduct. All, to some degree or other, would have been
necessary to maintain order within the group, but some clearly extend beyond the narrow
confines of a peaceful meeting of the organization. While a serious matter that likely
reflects underlying conflicts within the group, pushing and shoving at a feast would have
little immediate impact outside of a group meeting. The punishment of a simple fine
seems to reflect the relatively commonplace nature of such social friction, but the fact
that that fine was assessed by the group on a case-to-case basis suggests that the group
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wanted to judge each conflict individually to determine which were accidents or
misunderstandings and which symptoms of greater problems.
Similarly, many of the issues proscribed in this charter seem to have been chosen
to prevent private grievances becoming matters of public record. The ruling against
prosecuting or slandering another member, with the latter being a chargeable offense
under Roman law, seems to be aimed at specifically keeping disputes in house, thereby
protecting the group from the public appearances internal conflict. The initial prohibition
against misconduct, with the proviso that the group must determine the appropriate fine,
may have been intended to give the group the right to arbitrate its own conflicts.675 In any
case, it suggests an awareness of the unpredictable nature of gathering a group of
potentially conflicting personalities, some of whom may have been social and economic
competitors in other contexts.
Furthermore, the provisions seem to have an overarching moral character,
culminating in the ban against plotting or corrupting the house of another member, with a
hefty fine attached. These acts, in particular, were likely to cause a public scandal for the
group, breed distrust among members, and make the normal business of the group
untenable as factional groups developed within the association. Slander and distrust, as
Venticinque has noted,676 had a way of spreading through the greater network of
interconnected tradesmen, even outside the bounds of the organization, particularly once
family and friends became involved. Ari Bryen has collected examples of disputes that
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eventually turned violent in Roman Egypt, and has noted that many involve family
members acting out their own visions of justice upon those who have wronged them and
their loved ones.677 Associations acted to prevent the chaotic and potentially harmful
effects of such events by preemptively stifling any claims that might threaten intra-group
trust, as well as the public reputation of both the group and its individual members.678
This fits well with Hawkins’ vision of sanctions, in that, again, the framework is
most applicable in cases where things go, or have already gone, wrong. However, it is
important to note that the same impulse that drove sanctions also motivated groups to get
prospective members. The standards established for admittance to a religious association
from Attica required that new members be “pure, pious, and good,” ἁ[γν]ὸς καὶ εὐσεβὴς
καὶ ἀγ|α[θ]ός.679 Members without this moral standing would not be admitted, so that, in
theory at least, the group would keep potential troublemakers out of the association from
the start.
Whether as a punishment or as a litmus test, these provisions established the
standards for trustworthy behavior and for what morality, in this setting, would look like.
Not only did these rules encourage peace within the group, but they also offered a public
record of what constituted acceptable behavior for this group. Whether collectively or
individually, members could claim that they adhered to these regulations and could use
them to bolster their personal claims to moral rectitude.680 We have numerous attestations
of formal groups establishing similar guidelines for members, and we have evidence that
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merchants felt considerable anxiety about breaching these conventions, just as they did
with stereotypes. Artemidorus’ Oneirocritica supposes that one might even have a dream
about behaving dishonorably in a club:
ἔδοξέ τις ἐν συμβιώσει καὶ φρατρίᾳ τοῖς συμβιώταις ἀναστειλάμενος ἑκάστῳ
προσουρεῖν. ἀπηλάθη τῆς φρατρίας ὡς ἄτιμος· εἰκὸς γὰρ τοὺς οὕτω παροινοῦντας
μισεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀπελαύνεσθαι.
A certain man dreamed that, in the presence of his companions in a club and
phratry, after lifting up his clothes, he urinated on each of them. He was removed
from the phratry for being dishonorable; for it is fitting for those who are drunk
and disorderly to be hated and removed.681
Being removed from the association is a natural consequence of these dreamed-up
actions, but Artemidorus says that the man was removed, not because he actually did
these things, but because the dream has revealed that he is dishonorable, ἄτιμος, and that
those who behave abusively will be both hated and removed from groups of their peers.
The word he uses is παροινεῖν, a term that reflects bad behavior and maltreatment of
others, particular when one is drunk, the whole passage suggests that the social and
festive elements of associations were a balancing act between appropriate sociability and
the maintenance of proper standards, since drunken abuse could have consequences far
beyond social friction. Merchants had to participate in these events, and, as we have seen,
could be fined for non-attendance, but they also needed to maintain control to protect
their interests and present themselves as honorable among their peers.682
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The passage imagines this experience as a kind of stress-dream, developed from
the worries of the dreamer. Fundamentally, it reveals that acceptance within a group was
of value to members and worth protecting, even from one’s own impulsivity. Whether
from social pressure of the terms of a group charter, members felt that it was worth
sacrificing some options to secure the benefits that membership offered. Group
membership imposed limitations on merchants, who accepted the terms as long as the
advantages outweighed the costs of the restrictions. In the case of the dream, this was an
easy choice to make: there was little financial or social benefit to urinating on one’s
colleagues, while membership, presumably, held concrete advantages, even if it meant
ceding this dubious right. However, in other cases, it is possible to imagine that the
choice was more difficult, and that merchants experienced difficulties making the choice
between, for example, large, short -term gains that threatened their standing in the group,
and smaller, long-term gains that allowed them to retain their position among their peers.
Our evidence shows that some members felt hampered by the limits that groups
imposed, and that some knowingly hedged their bets, risking their reputation within the
group in pursuit of quick gain, while hoping that they would not be caught. This was a
delicate undertaking, with potentially harmful outcomes, but also with great possibilities
for wealth. We have already seen individuals use the group for social advancement, but it
was also possible for an individual to take advantage of the limits the group imposed on
their peers, who, while they adhered to their agreements, opened themselves up to freeriders and those who would actively take advantage of them. A concrete example of this
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comes from the Midrash on Psalms 12.1,683 where a hypothetical band of merchants
planned to buy salt to supply their town. As the text says:
“It once happened that a certain town had no salt, and there was a band of
caravaneers who said: We will go to such and such a place and buy salt, and sell it
before others come. Now, they had a leader, [and] they said to him: Let us go to
this place… He answered them: I have to plough tomorrow, so wait until I have
done my ploughing, and afterwards we will go. They said to him: All right…
What did he do? He loaded a sack on his ass and went off alone, while his friends
slept till morning, [when] they called [him]. The neighbours asked: Whom do you
want? So and so already went off last night. So they set off in the morning and
found him on his way back. They said to him: Why did you act so? He replied to
them: Do you not know why? Had we all gone together, the [price] would
immediately have fallen to a low level. Now I have brought [salt, and] until you
get there mine will have been sold out, so that when you get [there] you can sell
yours at a good price.”684
The text is a common rabbinical form, known as a ma'aseh, a fictional, parablelike story created to illustrate a lesson, often with an eye to distinguishing the good, the
rabbis and pious Jews, from the bad, the goyim and impious. Our characters, as a result,
are caricatures, stereotypes, as well as allegories, and their circumstances are only
roughly sketched out, but they are founded upon an inherently plausible reality: one in
which there are good men and bad whose actions display clear exempla to be emulated or
avoided.
In this particular case, we see the dynamics of a group of merchants under strain.
The group, a chabora ()חבורה, is a fairly well-organized entity of caravaneers, or, more
literally, donkey-drivers, with an established leader. Based on the passage alone, the band
works together with a number of different sources of income. Their leader is both an
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agriculturalist, plowing his fields, and a merchant importing salt and, presumably, other
goods as needed. Their work and group arrangements seem sensible, designed to
maximize their gain, while maintaining their position in their community. This is evident
in the exchange between the merchants and their leader’s neighbors, who clearly know
him and maintain knowledge of his whereabouts and activities.
However, the leader is not an honest man. He embodies the stereotypical greedy
and untrustworthy merchant and deceives his peers by sneaking off without them to buy
salt. He breaks his word, a fitting crime for a passage commenting on a Psalm about
lying,685 and abandons the plans that the group had made. The text is explicit that the
leader did this to maximize the price he would be able to get for the salt in their town. In
order to do so, he took advantage of the limits the group had placed on itself, and that the
members had placed on each other, namely that they would buy salt together, or, as is
implied, not at all. The leader knew that he could trust his peers to uphold their end of
that implied promise, and exploited that characteristic, along with the respect and
deference that he evidently enjoyed as their leader.
When he is eventually challenged by his peers, his response demonstrates his
awareness of the delicate situation his actions have placed him in. He immediately
launches into a neat, if incomplete, explanation of the principles of supply and demand.
He spins the details of his action, presenting it as fundamentally, still being in the interest
of the group. He immediately rejects personal culpability and seems to expect that the
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group will eventually come around to his way of thinking. In particular, he hopes to
convince them that, though he did lie to them, he did not betray their collective interest.
This, he hopes, will convince them to maintain the status quo and not bring sanctions
against him.
Of course, his argument is incomplete. While he may have been in the right that
the price in town would have dropped, had they all returned with salt at the same time, he
does not point out that he bought at a lower cost than they will be able to do, or that he
will have met the worst of the demand before they can return. The story ends before we
can know how the caravaneers respond to his claims, or how much they realized he had
omitted, but it is evident the leader was attempting to convince his peers that his actions
were, at worst, annoying and disingenuous, rather than an offense that warranted
punishment of some kind.
However, the Midrash is clear that the leader has stepped over a moral line. The
passage is centered on the contention that the deceit of the leader is outrageous and the
whole section is framed with the question and response: “with what do the children of
men occupy themselves? With deceit and falseness.”686 Effectively, the leader has taken
up lying as his occupation, and we, the readers, are led to question the efficacy of such a
short-sighted professional choice. The leader may succeed in profiting from this venture,
but we must assume that he and others risked a great deal when they treated their peers in
this way. Lying materially damaged the trust that merchant groups required to function
and destabilized the social position of the liar. The leader, in future, might find that the
deference his peers automatically showed him came less readily, or was not offered at all,
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and we can imagine that, in the broader world, this episode might be talked about by
neighbors, as well as other traders. His fellow group members would be incentivized to
project their disapproval of his actions, and they might well spread word of his deceit,
though it was simultaneously in their interests not to publicize that they were too closely
linked with such a person. Having elevated him to the status of “leader,” his failings
might well reflect badly on them all, since they had followed him. As a result, if he was
allowed to remain a member, they might need to find a private way to shame him, rather
than exposing him and risk associating themselves with his moral failings.
In many ways the position of the individual and the group was always a balancing
act. Individual merchants had to weigh their potential gain against the potential costs of
accepting the group’s institutional limits. It might, at times, be easy to transgress group
norms without being caught, or it might be worth the fine to secure an advantage that the
group frowned upon. However, at other times, the cost might be too high, and include
social or economic sanctions that the merchant could not bear, leading a merchant to pass
up a profitable opportunity to protect the long-term benefits of membership. Similarly,
the group walked a fine line when it came to regulating its members. It wanted to
represent the group in its best possible light, which, at times, required that it be seen to
punish bad behavior in its members, but by making these disagreements public, it ran the
risk of damaging its reputation. Groups tried to promote their best members, but, in doing
so, became subject to the potential highs and lows that a single, personal reputation might
experience.
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Conclusions:
Merchant associations needed to protect the group’s reputation, which included
demonstrating their willingness to punish members who broke the rules, but they also
needed to project the image that the group, as a whole, was a collection of
overwhelmingly good people, whose personal goodness translated into their business and
social activities. As we have seen, groups attempted, from the outset, to protect their
reputations by preventing disreputable behaviors, both by vetting members and by
establishing group regulations to which members swore obedience. When that failed,
they generally attempted to keep their arbitration processes internal, as in the case of the
Egyptian sheep and cattle herders. It was in their interest to keep their disputes, frauds,
and other misdeeds quiet. In the event that these disputes became public, the group
attempted to make the best of the situation by making a display of punishing members,
and, at extremes, by excluding them from the group in the future.
Groups worried about these possibilities, as is evident in their charters. These
documents were often publicly voted on by the members, who then used them as a
touchstone for their business going forward. They functioned as a proof of good character
for members, who could lean on such documents to show that they had merited
membership in such a group, and had lived by the moral, social, and economic standards
that the association required. As we have seen, groups also bolstered their reputation by
actively promoting their best members, offering them opportunities for personal
advancement within their group, thus creating a disincentive to betray the promises they
had made to the association.
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These prominent individuals helped to improve and publicly broadcast the
reputation of the group. The group reputation was benefited by its association with the
reputation of the individual, and some groups even solicited prominent individuals in the
community to try to associate themselves with their reputations and with the patronage
that they could offer to the group. However, even without promoting individuals or
cultivating patrons, associations found ways to promote their reputations and demonstrate
their position in society through a variety of building and community projects. Merchant
groups endeavored to make their contributions last as long as possible, and thereby
maximize their investment in their reputations.
In this chapter, we have looked closely at how merchant groups, as well as
individual merchants, dealt with the threat that stereotypes posed to their reputation. In
doing so, we have looked at how stereotypes developed and how the same audiences that
received merchant reputation strategies, were the ones that accepted and perpetuated
stereotypes. Merchants strove to combat these exaggerated beliefs by presenting
themselves as exceptions to the rule, or, alternately, by embedding themselves deeply in
the community, so that they could not be viewed as outsiders. They tried to win over
public opinion and to present themselves as fixtures in their neighborhoods and towns.
We have seen cases of their success and failure, through the eyes of authors that rejected
the validity of their efforts.
We have already briefly addressed that the audience for reputation strategies was
an essential part of their eventual success or failure. In some cases, our evidence has
shown how hostile receivers can shape the interpretation of a merchant’s actions, turning
a positive or neutral action into something negative. Even in cases where the audience is
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more passive, like that in the Midrash passage above, it is clear that these viewers were in
powerful positions to receive, interpret, store, and pass on information about a merchant’s
reputation.
In the final chapter, we will examine the audience for reputation more closely,
along with the systems that transmitted reputation information. We will return to the
networks that Hawkins described, and see how they operated outside of the collegia
system, among neighbors and colleagues, family members and friends. In particular, we
will look at formal and informal ways in which reputation circulated, to see how
merchants spoke about one another, and how they were talked about in turn. We have
already encountered some of these techniques: the letter of recommendation and gossip,
or, more neutrally, “talk.” We will look at these more closely, and particularly at how
oral cultures of recommendation and condemnation surrounded the trading community,
as well as at how networks of kinship, friendship, and apprenticeship shaped how
reputations developed and spread. Ultimately, we will be tracing the reception of
reputation, and how, in the end, a merchant’s success or failure was predicated on his or
her ability not only to craft a reputation, but also to predict how it would be received.
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CHAPTER 6: Audience and Reputation Communicated
The previous chapter has made clear that merchants’ reputations were greatly
threatened by stereotypical beliefs about their work and their characters, whether they
acted alone or as members of professional groups. These stereotypes categorized
merchants, and attributed distinct, and generally negative, moral characteristics to those
who sold goods and services. Yet stereotypes were not an impersonal force, driven by
something that was simply “in the air.” Stereotypes were created and spread by people,
who acted, not even necessarily with malice, to perpetuate the sets of beliefs that painted
tradesmen as dishonest, greedy, and unscrupulous, and condemned those behaviors as
anti-social. In many cases, people transmitted these beliefs casually, without any
reflection on their impact, or on the cognitive dissonance that was required, in many
cases, to defame merchants while living and working beside them.
The last two chapters have focused on the responses and preemptive strategies
that traders and artisans developed to protect their reputations from stereotypes and from
specific, personal attacks on their good name. These strategies are varied, as was
necessary to combat the many ways in which a merchant’s reputation might be
threatened. We have seen why and how these reputation tools were used, but thus far we
have not directly addressed their efficacy and how they were received. In order to do so,
it will be necessary to step away from the merchants themselves to some extent. Already
we have noted that reputation is the result, and the ongoing process, of a dialectical
relationship between the subject and those around him or her. A reputation requires two
sides: on the one hand, a source, the person about whom there is an opinion or opinions,
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and on the other hand, an individual or group who develops, retains, and promulgates the
reputation, the personal or communal opinion, or opinions, about an individual.
As a result, the audience, which witnesses the character and behavior of the
merchant and then proceeds to manipulate the information they have about him or her, is
an essential component of the reputation-development process. In some cases, this
audience was made up of merchants, who examined the behavior of their peers with an
eye toward which behaviors should be emulated and which should be repudiated, but in
many cases, the audience consisted of individuals who had personal, rather than
professional, ties with the subject. In some instances, the audience was amorphous,
vague, or formed of mere acquaintances, while in others it consisted of family, friends,
and neighbors. These differences influenced the amount and the quality of the
information that the audience could use to develop the subject’s reputation, and often a
combination of the opinions of different audiences were required to sketch something
approaching a “complete” reputation, at least in a given moment.687 These different
audiences possessed different reputations for the individual in question, and some, in all
likelihood, were in a better position to develop opinions about some elements of a
merchant’s life and business than others.688
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In all cases, the disposition of the audience was an essential feature. Their
willingness to believe the persona that the merchant projected, or to interpret the
merchant’s actions and words in a positive way, had a dramatic impact on the way that
reputation developed and was spread. How details about reputation traveled, as well as
which details, was profoundly shaped by whether or not the audience was willing to
extend the benefit of the doubt. Thus, it was possible for a merchant to act in a way that
was, largely or entirely, neutral, but to be perceived and reputed in highly value-laden
ways.689
This was made more possible because of a phenomenon we have already
discussed briefly in chapter four: good reputations were slow to build,690 but bad
reputations might develop quickly and be based on single, egregious events. The
audience was liable to spread negative reports more quickly, and the effects of these
stories were more likely to linger.691 Though evidence suggests that audiences of
reputation were, to an extent, susceptible to confirmation bias, a willingness to believe
information that fit into their preconceived visions of individuals and their socioeconomic status,692 there was also a strong inclination toward lending credence to
negative information, particularly for merchants, given the stereotypes that shaped their
personal and collective reputations were already negative in nature.693
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Our access to these processes in the ancient world is limited. As discussed in the
previous chapter, it is rare to have a narrative that provides both a reputation strategy and
an audience’s response to it. Written testimonies about merchants are often
depersonalized, and amount to little more than stereotypes, while our access to the oral
culture and conversation that surrounded merchant lives is minimal. Nevertheless, we
have a handful of points of entry into this problem. This chapter will focus upon two
ways that reputation circulated that did not originate from the merchant him- or herself.
They are different in both form and content but provide something like a spectrum along
which we may plot other possible ways in which reputation traveled.
In the first instance, we will look at a formal, and formalized, means of
communicating reputation: letters of introduction and recommendation. In the Roman
world, these documents were a tool for expanding one’s social network, easing travel
arrangements, and securing advancement.694 Though it might be difficult to secure them,
or to get them from a source who had relevant contacts,695 merchants commonly sought
out and used letters to facilitate their business, particularly when coming to a new area.
Letters were written from one half of an established friend- or colleague-pair to the other
on behalf of a third person and offered a description of that person for the addressee.
These letters were sent ahead by courier or carried by their subject, but served, in either
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case, to smooth over initial meetings and to extend a network of friendship or business to
new members.696
Among merchants, letters helped to establish newcomers in a region with at least
some elements of their reputation from another place. These letters come largely from
peers, patrons, or family members, and are commonly only a reflection of the positive
elements of a merchant’s reputation, as fits their purpose as an aid to their subject. Yet
they do show us something concrete about how reputation could move, namely through
established networks of peers, friends, and family members, carried by messengers and
by the merchants themselves. Additionally, our extant examples of this genre show how
statements about reputation and character might be shaped by the author, and how that
framing might suggest readings and interpretations to the recipient, who otherwise had
little context for forming an opinion about an unfamiliar merchant.
Of course, letters themselves were rarely sufficient for an addressee to create a
full opinion of the letter’s subject. Aside from natural concerns that might occur about
forged letters or letters being intercepted, stolen, and carried by imposters, recipients also
could not rely upon the constraints of a short, formulaic letter to provide them with all the
information they might need, both about the letter’s subject and its sender. When our
evidence allows it, we see that letters were always supplemented by in person
conversation, either to transmit more sensitive information or to elaborate on issues
already mentioned in the document. These face-to-face interactions were essential and
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were presumably supplemented themselves as the letter’s recipient passed on the
newcomer’s reputation to those in the new community.
The second part of this chapter will build on this and look at ways in which
reputation was communicated orally, within diverse and overlapping communities. We
will, in general, refer to this as gossip, a term that will require substantial clarification,
given its negative, and often gendered, connotations in modern, everyday speech, and its
similar, though slightly different, set of associations in antiquity. Nevertheless, gossip is
an essential component of reputation dissemination in the Roman world. Casual
conversations about merchants and merchant behavior are difficult to find in our sources,
given that few, if any, such discussions were considered important enough to record, but
they must have been a standard feature of daily life, particularly in the densely-packed,
commercially active neighborhoods of Roman cities. In such settings, and indeed in small
communities across the Empire, discussions about one’s neighbors, friends, and peers
were an essential means of gaining and spreading information, including information
about the reputation of tradesmen one might encounter. The act of gossiping also
generated specific kinds of social bonds, linking those who spread and received gossip
through the display of trust that such communication often signaled. Gossip, which
includes information that may or may not be accurate, but which traveled through
communities rapidly and irregularly, was a form of social interaction that connected the
interlocutors, improving their relationship, while sharing points of interest that benefited
the participants in social and economic settings.
As part of this investigation, we will look into the processes and effects of rumors,
and how word of mouth communication influenced what information moved, as well as
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when, and how rapidly. The Roman world was highly anxious about rumors, and what
they might do to both society and to individuals.697 This examination will illuminate the
anxiety that merchants felt about losing or damaging their reputations, since sensational
stories, often including negative and morally-charged anecdotes, traveled and evolved
more quickly than standard, matter-of-fact accounts of personal and business behavior.
An outlandish, false story, or a true story with salacious details, could rapidly destroy a
reputation that had been years in the making. For the gossiper, these stories were a means
of displaying oneself as knowledgeable, as well as gaining and holding the attention of
one’s audience, and gossipers were incentivized to spread such stories. By contrast, there
was less social cachet to transmitting plain, factual information, and particularly positive
accounts that lacked a strong “hook” for the audience. Such information was often
considered “common knowledge” and had little cachet in conversation. This also explains
the tendency toward exaggeration that gossip displays, and further elucidates why we see
clear instances of gossip and conversation in our sources when they relate truly
remarkable stories.
Reputation transmission, on the whole, is largely constituted as story-telling, and,
often, like many stories, these carried strong moralizing messages. We will conclude this
undertaking by examining how reputation is functionally the story of the person about
whom it is told, as well as a tool that constructs, bounds, and reinforces the moral code of
the community and its members. For merchants, these stories were essential to the spread
and survival of their businesses, but the stories circulated largely outside the bounds of
their control, both among people with fixed agendas and among those for whom such
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narration was a casual, everyday activity. Where it is possible to reconstruct this story
telling, it is also possible to see how effective merchant reputation strategies were, and
the extent to which a good reputation was still a commodity that was unpredictable and
elusive. However, the evidence provides us with a clear record that merchant reputations
were a site of debate over what a community hoped to be, and where it set limits on the
behavior of its members.

Reputation Reception and Audience Receptivity:
Before we may look at the specific ways that reputation was spread, the actual
mechanics of communication, it will be sensible to consider more closely the processes
that created information about reputation. Specifically, we need to consider how it was
that an event, statement, or action, which was witnessed, read, or heard, became a
meaningful indicator of a merchant’s character, rather than a forgettable, passing
moment. In simplest terms, it is vital to understand which information contributes to
reputation, and which does not. This was, always, in the eye of the beholder, and is thus a
matter of reception.
Theoretically, much of this ground has already been covered, and by scholars of
reputation who have addressed the issue of reputation and its audience(s). Going back to
at least Frederick Bailey in his Gifts and Poison, the role of reception in reputation has
been an established feature of the field. In his understanding, the interpretation of actions,
words, texts, and events and their translation into evidence of reputation is a matter of
signaling. These signals may be consciously projected or may be the unconscious result
of everyday actions, but they are built into the things that individuals do or do not do in
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ways that are culturally encoded and specific.698 In fact, Bailey posits that the messages
the signals send “may well remain invisible to someone not familiar with the culture
concerned.”699 Thus, they are difficult to assess from the outside, and situations that may
appear to be neutral moments to an outsider may in fact be highly significant within the
community under observation. Within a culture, signals are related to categories, which,
in turn, are related to other categories, with the result that positive and negative
associations can develop for actions that, on their own, appear to have little to do with
reputation.700 These associations are made quickly, and often with reliance on previous
social or cultural knowledge. In many respects, they mimic the kinds of category
judgments that we discussed in relation to stereotypes in the previous chapter, though
they are applied less broadly, often to a particular behavior of a single merchant at a
given time.
The closer the receiver is to the merchant, the more points of social contact, and
the better information he or she will have. This makes it possible for the categories to
become increasingly specific and the associations with those categories to become ever
more detailed, allowing the eventual assessment of reputation at a high level of nuance.701
One may generally say, for example, that a specific merchant has a reputation for being
successful. It may be possible to assess this from his dress, the appearance of his home,
or a crowd of customers at his shop. For the merchant, these signals are “cheap” in that
Bailey, Gifts and Poison, 10. see also Smith and Bird, “Costly Signaling and Cooperative Behavior.”and
Emler, “A Social Psychology of Reputation”; Bromley, Reputation, Image and Impression Management.
these latter two use different vocabulary, but address the same conception of sending and receiving
information, which is then interpreted according to social norms and cultural reference points.
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they require little effort, though perhaps some monetary cost, to acquire. They can also be
sent easily, and to those who have little context about the merchant’s actual status.702
These signals do not require personal knowledge or private access to the merchant and
his affairs but can be “read” by a stranger on the street.
Consequently, they can be misleading. More personal knowledge might reveal
that these signals were a crafted mask, designed to project a reputation, but not a true
reflection of the merchant’s financial or social reality. Alternately, they may be the
byproduct of accidental circumstances, rather than intentional deception or projection.
This nuanced, and insider, knowledge is more “costly,” because it takes more time and
energy to collect, and it requires more effort from the merchant to broadcast.703 The
inscriptions, monuments, and wall-paintings we have examined over the last two chapters
fall into this category of broadcasting. At some point, and for certain people under
particular circumstances, such information might not have been worth the effort it took to
obtain or to project it. For the receiver, most information could be gathered along a
spectrum of effort, simply by being an observer within one’s community and
participating in simple methods of information gathering. However, gathering conscious
and unconscious signals sent by merchants and others could be beneficial to one’s own
reputation, as well as to one’s social and economic success. Therefore, there was a
possible pay off to participating in the kinds of reputation sharing techniques that this
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chapter will discuss, and to exert some effort to avoid relying on personal observation
alone, or by only examining those signals that merchants displayed themselves.
Essential to this is the understanding that both the creation and dissemination of
reputation information often happens highly informally, through the regular activity of
daily life. While the cases we have examined up to now have generally been the product
of intentional reputation strategies, developed by the merchant to influence his or her
standing in the community, these efforts are merely the ones that are most visible to us of
a continuous stream of data points, or signals, to which the community had access. Most
reputations, positive and negative, were not founded on these large displays, but rather
were built upon the slow, steady accretion of information that was the result of day-today life.704 We have already discussed this in chapter four, but regularity and
predictability were essential to this kind of reputation development. Particularly in small
communities, predictable face-to-face contact allowed receivers to witness both
conscious and unconscious displays of character, business practices, and social status,
and to assess how much of that was consciously performed and how much was a
reflection of the actor’s true character. Often, this data accumulated itself into something
like “common knowledge,” about the subject, which closely resembled, or was perhaps
even coterminous with, that person’s reputation.705
As a result, there are relatively few moments that are truly “forgettable,” or
“passing” when it comes to reputation. Even if a given situation was unworthy of
comment in the moment, significance may be read into a seemingly innocuous
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interaction, particularly in light of information that the receiver later learns. It is an easy
step to turn a simple, typical moment into a signal, laden with meaning. Again, continuity
was essential to ensuring that actions were not misinterpreted. Merchants strove to send
positive signals consistently, thereby building up a steady body of evidence for their
receivers.706 This consistency was intended to build a reputation over time, but also to
prevent the sudden reinterpretation of their behavior, so that a single off-day did not reinflect a moment from days, months, or years before, but remained an anomaly in the
mind of the viewer, who knew that the merchant was not “like that,” and did not assume
that the positive signals of the past were a performance covering some more sinister
“truth” about the merchant’s character.
In light of this framework, we must reassess what meaning might have been
derived from the signals that we have seen merchants intentionally sending in the
previous chapters. Each case is deeply influenced by context, and by a large number of
factors, personal, social, and economic, that we lack access to in many cases. Rather than
re-tread this ground with speculation, it will be useful to take a case study from the life of
a particularly well-attested merchant and populate some of his reputation strategies with
some of the responses that they may have engendered.
As we have noted, evidence of reputation reception is generally difficult to
discover. However, abundant archaeological context is available in the case of the
prominent garum manufacturer and retailer in Pompeii, Aulus Umbricius Scaurus.
Scaurus is among our best-attested merchants, and within the city of Pompeii, evidence
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suggests that he may have controlled somewhere in the region of twenty-eight percent of
the fish-sauce market, based on labeled transport vessels found throughout the city.707
The Umbricii, more generally, seem to have been a force in the fish-sauce industry in
Pompeii,708 with many others associated with the name, most of whom are understood to
have been slaves or freedmen of the same family.709 Beyond the bounds of the city,
vessels labeled as Scaurus products have been found in towns around the Bay of Naples,
and as far away as southern France,710 suggesting that this business was also engaged in
exporting fish products outside of Pompeii. It is unclear today where in the region
Scaurus manufactured his goods,711 but the evidence suggests that he not only produced
the garum and transported it,712 but also had some kind of retail or wholesale facility in
the city, that was known as the officina Scauri, Scaurus’ workshop, or perhaps just
shop.713
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The majority of this evidence714 comes to us from a large corpus of transport
vessels,715 a Pompeian form bearing a single handle and known as an urceus, that were
used to ship and sell fish sauce from Pompeii. The vessels are relatively crude,
appropriate for transportation and wholesale dealing, but they have been excavated in a
variety of contexts, including in domestic spaces, which suggests that they were, at least
in some cases, seen by their ultimate consumers, as well as by those along the chain of
production.716 Many urcei display painted labels, known as tituli picti, that confirm their
contents and usually the officina that produced them [Fig. 9].717 Many tituli picti also
include short descriptions of the goods, including some praise of the fish sauce within.718
The result is that tituli picti offer us not only a means of identifying the contents
and source of an urceus but also a claim about the quality of the product. As a reputation
strategy, this is not dissimilar to examples we have already encountered. While Roman
merchants seem to have often shied away from claiming that their goods were the best
and greatest, they did not hesitate to label them with their own names,719 and as we have
already seen the case of Mithres, who did not hesitate to proclaim himself as a man of
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rara fides cuius laudata est semper ubique, Roman merchants were willing to boast about
themselves, given the right circumstances.720 These labels fit somewhere between simple
shipping tags and the extended encomium that Mithres felt that he deserved, but they
offer both an identifier and a claim that the merchants hoped to spread to those who sold
or consumed their fish sauce.
Given the variety of audiences they had, the level of specificity in these labels and
the kinds of claims they make, are interesting. As Robert Curtis has demonstrated, a
number of the tituli picti include not only a descriptor that identifies the contents as one
of the four major types of fish sauce, garum, liquamen, muria, or hallex, but also an
adjective (or occasionally a noun) describing the quality.721 This is true of Scaurus’
products as well as that of others, who frequently describe their goods as flos, the flower
of its type, or as either optimum or primum. Curtis argues that these adjectives do not
refer to a particular type of product or stage in the process of production,722 because it is
only in rare instances where lower quality products are identified.723 Rather, unlike the
label of liquamen or hallex, these words were intended to be advertisements for the
quality of the sauce, and, by extension, for the competence and the business character of
the manufacturer who had produced it or the retailer who was selling it.724
This elision of personal reputation and that of the product is interesting and will
be important to bear in mind as we proceed. Merchants attempted to promote their
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reputations as sellers, as agents who made deals and interacted with others, but were also
driven to advertise the quality of their products or services. There was often slippage
between these two kinds of reputation, where “I am the best,” could easily be derived
from a statement of, “my products are the best,” or where the reverse, a claim of being
the best, might inform the communis opinio of the product or service. Ideally, a merchant
would have, or could convince others that he or she had, a good reputation in every
respect, but, as noted in chapter four, it was always possible for a merchant to have
different reputations, not only in different places, but for different things. Merchants
promoted themselves in every way and encouraged their audience to assume that good
products meant good service, and vice-versa, but whether they were convincing was
another matter entirely.
Yet our audience who received this advertisement is difficult to assess, and we
cannot easily determine how context, or the biases of the readers of such labels, might
inflect the experience of looking at these objects. To transporters, these labels were
directories, and their claims to quality were rarely of importance. More necessary was the
description of the contents, since, if a certain number of urcei of garum or liquamen were
expected to arrive at a certain destination, it would not do to deliver hallex instead. To the
recipients, local distributors or retailers, the claims to quality would be more pertinent
and, perhaps, useful. They could provide some, albeit biased, assurance that their
investment was worthwhile, and they may have served to generate a potential vocabulary
with which they could describe the product to buyers. Yet this last step requires that the
recipients accepted the claims made on the vessels they saw. These claims are very
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common and appear just as often on garum made by other producers as they do on the
sauces of Scaurus.725 How, then, did the audience react to these claims?
We have a few insights, each only obliquely accessible to us. While most tituli
picti include only the contents, origin, and descriptor, some not only identify Scaurus as
the producer, but also include a reference to a later stage in the retail process. Some even
seem to name the shop where the goods were sold. One label reads:
G(ari) F(los) SCOMBR(i)/ SCAURI/ EX OFFICINA AGATHOPI
The flower of garum, made of mackerel, (the product) of Scaurus, from the
(work)shop of Agathopus.726
Agathopus seems to have been one of Scaurus’ freedmen,727 and to have operated
one of the retail branches of Scaurus’ garum empire.728 Little more can be said about him
personally, as his name appears only on urcei, but the labels suggest that he embraced the
reputation strategy that Scaurus was already using.729 We know relatively little about the
process by which tituli picti were added to urcei, but in this case, we have some insight
into how it happened. The description of the garum and the attribution of the goods to
Scaurus were completed in one hand, while ex officina Agathopi was added in a second
hand. Thus, it is likely that these labels were updated as goods traveled. By adding his
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e.g. CIL IV 5681, 10270, 10276-7, Gari Flos Romulianum, which suggests not only a different
manufacturer, but possibly a unique recipe see Curtis, Garum and Salsamenta, 166.
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CIL IV 9403-4, ex officina Agathopi is written in a second hand.
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An urceus, CIL IV suppl. 7110 (see: Stefani, Pompei, Vecchi Scavi Sconosciuti, 68. , reads: liquamen
optimum saccatum ex officina Umbrici Agathopi, strongly suggesting that Agathopus was a freedman of
Scaurus’. Curtis, “Product Identification and Advertising on Roman Commercial Amphorae,” 92. assumes
that the Agathopus of this inscription is the same person identified in CIL IV 5712, discussed below, with
the Greek spelling Agathopode, this is corroborated by Stefani, Pompei, Vecchi Scavi Sconosciuti, 68–69.
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inscription is actually rendered AGATΠOI, see Stefani. 68. for a drawing of the titulus pictus.
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729
An alternate reading might suggest that Agathopus felt obliged to maintain his former master’s system.
Hawkins, “Manumission and the Supply of Labor” suggests that this might fit into the obligations that
masters could impose upon their freedmen. Agathopus may even have been operating a branch of Scaurus’
business and claimed only a portion of its profits for himself.
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name to the chain, Agathopus laid claim to being a distributor, or perhaps retailer, of
these quality goods, and thereby claimed to be a quality provider in turn. He also made
himself accountable to those any who wanted to check up on him and his business, yet
another testament to his confidence in his product and his work.
However, Agathopus did not just follow along quietly behind Scaurus’ example.
Another urceus has been excavated, labeled with Agathopus’ name, this time professing
to be, “the best liquamen, to Aulus Virnius Modestus from Agathopus.”730 In this case,
Agathopus has, seemingly, acted on his own, without attaching his former master’s name
to the product, but he continues to use the same type of claim to quality. This particular
urceus was recovered from a kitchen space in a home,731 and may well have been a
personal gift, given the short and seemingly personal titulus. In such a case, Agathopus’
claim of offering the “best,” optimum, sauce, is something akin to a personal favor to
Modestus, and makes the vessel’s label a marker of Agathopus’ generosity, as well as a
contribution to his reputation as a producer, retailer, and friend.732
These personal relations demonstrate that the claims on urcei could be employed
in highly varied contexts, and they drive home the point that Scaurus was just part of the
reputation networks that were at play in these cases. Agathopus was directly tied to his
former master but held some agency to act independently of Scaurus’ operations, to the
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CIL IV 5712, Liquamen Optimum A(ulo) Virnio Modesto ab Agathopode, see above, n. 37 on the
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hardly a reputation-neutral act.
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extent that he might choose to manufacture on his own or choose not to credit Scaurus’
production in his own private affairs. Furthermore, it was not necessary to be directly
connected with Scaurus to appreciate or utilize the advertising strategies he employed on
his fish products. Another urceus identifies itself as a Scaurus product, but was sold by an
imperial freedman, Martial, at an inn in the city.733 It is not clear that Martial sought out
Scaurus’ products, but he added his own name, and reputation, to this chain, without the
kind of debt of allegiance that Agathopus and others owed.734 Martial may have hoped to
burnish his own reputation by selling high-quality fish sauce, may have intended merely
to mark his ownership of the urceus, or may have been signaling his approval of Scaurus’
claims, but, whatever the case, he undoubtedly had his own reputation to worry about and
cultivate.735
Of course, the labels on these vessels are highly formulaic, but the longer the
statement, the more eye-catching they became.736 Another urceus of Scaurus, excavated
from a garden attached to a shop-house in Pompeii, repeats the formula in yet another
variation, bearing the label, GA SCOMBR(i) SCAURI EX OFFICINA SCAURI.737 In
this case Scaurus is both the producer and the retailer, and the vessel was discovered
along with other cooking implements, suggesting that it was utilized and, to some extent,
lived with, by its eventual owners, or by their staff. The titulus was highly visible,
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CIL IV 9406.
We lack an image of this particular vessel to know how many hands were present on the urceus, but
Curtis, Garum and Salsamenta, 197–200 (Appendix III). notes that tituli picti were commonly expanded
upon by subsequent owners, with paint appearing in different hands and different colors.
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commonly several inches high and painted in red,738 and the repetition, as well as the lack
of abbreviation, of Scaurus’ name made it clear that, if the label was read, the contents
ought to be immediately and exclusively associated with his business in all its forms.
Of course, there is little that could assure that these labels would be read or, if
read, that their claims to excellence would be believed. The literacy of retailers or buyers
could not be assured, though evidence at least for the former suggests that there was a
baseline of utilitarian reading and accounting.739 Furthermore, given the frequency of
claims about the quality of fish sauces it is likely that these statements were consistently
inflated for rhetorical effect, and we can hypothesize that they were known to be so. The
context, in particular, would inflect these claims, in that a potential customer or retailer
would most often encounter tituli picti in commercial settings, where the claims would
seem less genuine and more calculated. Our evidence suggests that customers were savvy
about their shopping, and were accustomed, at least in some circumstances, to haggle
with retailers to get a better price, regardless of the intrinsic quality of the goods.740
While we cannot immediately trace it, it is possible to imagine that the signals that
appeared on urcei would have been given more weight if they were shared in a different
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The form of the urceus is generally c. 45 cm high, tituli piciti are commonly 5cm tall and placed on the
neck of the vessel. See Curtis, “A Personalized Floor Mosaic from Pompeii,” 561 and pl. 74, fig. 5. for a
rough scale.
739
Verboven, “Currency and Credit in the Bay of Naples in the First Century AD.” discusses literacy in the
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setting, or came from a different source, such as a trusted friend, perhaps as in the case of
Agathopus and Modestus.
Essential to our understanding is the fact that context greatly changes the ways in
which signals were read. Scaurus’ case is unique, in that we not only see several
snapshots of the afterlife of his claims, in the multiple hands that created the tituli picti,
but also have the same claims repeated in a very different medium and setting. Scaurus’
home in Pompeii has been securely identified. The property is a large one, located north
of the Porta Marina,741 which has not been fully published [Fig. 10].742 Though little is
left of the building, we have the remains of the lower parts of the walls and the floors,
which show that the house was structured around an atrium with an impluvium decorated
with black and white mosaic floor. The mosaic consisted of a meander border around the
impluvium, and four urcei, which lay, diagonally, at each corner of the meander [Fig. 11].
These were white, rendered against a black background, and, at slightly larger than lifesize, each was decorated with black lettering, mimicking the tituli picti of real world
urcei [Fig. 12].743
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Regio VII.16.15/16. This house, together with the entrances at VII.16.12/13/14 have been read both as a
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Personalized Floor Mosaic from Pompeii.”
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Just as in the vessels described above, Scaurus’ name is prominent on these
specially commissioned mosaics, appearing on three of the four urcei. Two mention the
officina of Scaurus, and all describe the garum or liquamen imagined to lie within as
either flos or optimum.744 Though these are the same claims to product quality and
personal excellence, the context of these labeled images is very different from the objects
they represent. The atrium of Scaurus’ home was a completely different setting from his
shop fronts, and, while we ought not assume a wholly private audience, we can imagine
that these mosaics were visible to viewers who were not as immediately concerned with
the quality of Scaurus’ products as were business partners and customers. The atrium of a
Roman home was not a wholly private space, and was, at least at different times of day,
an area that would have been available for visitors of various kinds.745 Nevertheless, this
space was very different in form and context from the spaces where urcei were typically
moved, bought, and sold.746 Thus, while an unknowable number of people saw and
handled Scaurus’ urcei from the moment of production through to the final sale and use,
the atrium would have been a more select crowd, individuals who may have been

L'Année épigraphique (1992), 278a-d, (Presses Universitaires de France, “Italie,” 92.); Urceus A: G(ari)
F(los) SCO[M](bri)/ SCAURI/ EX OFFI[CI]/NA SCAU/RI; Urceus B: LIQUA(men) FLOS; Urceus C:
G(ari) F(los) SCOM(bri)/ SCAURI; Urceus D: LIQUAMEN/ OPTIMUM/ EX OFFICI[N]/A SCAURI;
Urceus D has been damaged and is now illegible. Its appearance and titulus are only available from
archival photos from the 1960s.
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Clarke, Art in the Lives of Ordinary Romans, chap. 9. or, more generally: Dwyer, “The Pompeian
Atrium House in Theory and in Practice”; Wallace-Hadrill, “The Social Structure of the Roman House.”
Scaurus’ house is a larger, finer example, but the blurred divisions between public, commercial, and private
space is comparable the house of the baker (Regio VII.3.3), which had a shopfront, which was connected to
the house’s atrium, blurring these lines even further.
746
Urcei have been found in both domestic and commercial contexts, see: Jashemski, “The Excavation of a
Shop-House Garden at Pompeii (I. XX. 5).” and CIL IV 9406, mentioned above, which was found at an
inn.
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involved in his business life, but also others who were connected with Scaurus and his
family in different ways.747
How these viewers reacted to these mosaics is difficult to predict. We can speak
with more confidence about what this evidence says about Scaurus, his life, and the
choices he was making about his reputation. These artworks demonstrate that Scaurus
wished to present his profession and the prosperity it had brought him. He brought clear
symbols of his work into his home and placed them in the location that was most likely to
be encountered by his guests. Curtis has argued that the particular, and unusual,
placement of these images, outside of the meander border that typically surrounded
images on Pompeian floors, was likely eye-catching, and intentionally so.748 While it is
probably too hopeful to imagine, as Curtis does, that a viewer would wander the space
and intentionally examine and read the mosaic floor with care, it was likely that visitors
in the space would notice them, or at least the urceus that was closest to them. This was
clearly Scaurus’ strategy. He hoped to remind his visitors, as well as those who we must
imagine living and working with these images, of his trade, and thereby achieve his
“primary goal: to advertise his business, his wealth, and most of all Scaurus himself.”749
How well this goal, or these interdependent goals, was met was a matter of the
reception of these signals. While a viewer of the urcei, the true commercially-available
product, might have recourse to assess Scaurus’ claims through testing or conversation

Scaurus’ son or grandson was elected duumvir of Pompeii (CIL X 1024), which suggests that the home
was probably used to host at least some political figures, not to mention the clients, friends, and family who
would have been more regular visitors.
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Curtis, “A Personalized Floor Mosaic from Pompeii,” 562–562, 565.
749
Curtis, 565. “Advertisement” is a fraught concept in the scholarship on merchants and trade in antiquity.
Advertising, as understood in modern times, is a 17 th century development, and it is seen as an
anachronistic imposition in Roman contexts. Here, advertisement is understood to be a physical
manifestation (including both objects and sounds) of a merchant’s, or group of merchants’, self promotion.
747
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with Scaurus or his agents, the visitor to the household decorations would have only the
evidence of Scaurus’ wealth as his or her proof, and need not have accepted the claims to
excellence passively. The individual disposition of these viewers would contribute
greatly to the impact of the mosaics, as would the novelty of the scene, which would
diminish in force with subsequent viewings. These images and their claims meant
something different to the first-time viewer than they did to the temporary or permanent
resident in the house and meant something else entirely to Scaurus himself. It is
impossible to determine from the images alone whether these mosaics inspired
conversation or particular attention, or whether they were deemed amusing, tasteless, or
some other descriptor buy one or more of its variable audiences.
We also cannot know what portion of the mosaics’ viewers had seen an example
of Scaurus’ urcei in real life, what relationship such people understood to exist between
his home and his business,750 or how seriously they took his claims to quality. It seems
likely that Scaurus hoped to convince some of his guests, and remind others, about the
importance and success of his business and its role in his social and economic life. The
mosaics were an expensive signal to send, far more that the real urcei they reflected.
They required that Scaurus specially commission artists. Nevertheless, they were
relatively accessible, both legible and straightforward in their interpretation.
Correspondingly, they might have been easily dismissed, particularly if Scaurus or his
products did not live up to the reputations that these images claimed. As we operate in
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ignorance of Scaurus’ ultimate audience for these mosaics, we cannot know if his
investment in his reputation was worth it in the end.

Sending Reputation:
As is the case for many of the merchants discussed in the previous chapters,
Scaurus’ reputation strategies appear to have been intended for an audience we can no
longer securely identify. This leaves us with little ability to firmly assess how his efforts
were received. We rely on the context of Pompeii, a unique asset, and on the numerous
attestations that have been left by the accident of preservation, to say anything at all about
whether Scaurus’ techniques were effective. Yet one set of evidence, by its very nature,
always gives us insight into a merchant’s reputation from multiple points of view, namely
letters of introduction and recommendation. These documents, usually sent by one party
to another, regarding a third person, offer us external perspectives on a given person’s
reputation, that of the author/sender and, in some cases, that of the reader/recipient as
well. Accordingly, they provide unique insight into what information was considered
relevant to reputation. Furthermore, we are often given insight into how personal ties,
including patronage, friendship, kinship, and apprenticeship, contributed to the growth of
reputation networks, which transmitted information about reputation after it had left the
control of the subject.
Within the context of merchant reputation, these documents were an essential part
of the strategies that merchants utilized to spread their good name. By means of letters, it
was possible to expand networks of traders to include people from disparate, and distant,
locations and to facilitate travel for business purposes. When traveling, merchants often
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carried letters of introduction with them. These were usually intended to secure them with
housing and hospitality from a friend of a friend, an acquaintance of an acquaintance, or a
trading partner of a trading partner. This hospitality, which was often reciprocal, provided
a foundation on which new friendships, acquaintances, and business relationships could
be built.
As a medium, letters have been studied extensively in their own right, and several
essential features of this genre have implications for the use of these materials as
evidence for reputation. First, aside from collections of letters that were formally
published, a type of letter that the present study will generally avoid, letters were not
regularly intended to be consumed by a large number of people. They were crafted by the
writer and intended, in the main, for a specific and limited audience, often a single
person. While we have letters that intentionally send greetings to individuals other than
the main addressee, most letters support a connection between two people. Often, this
connection operates with an implied, or explicit, need for secrecy that hopes that letters
will not fall into “the wrong hands.”751 Though it may be undercut by the presence of
letter carriers who may or may not be trustworthy, this secrecy allows for a certain
amount of honesty between the sender and recipient, who may discuss things, and,
particularly, the reputation of the third person, without substantial worry that their words
will be revealed to a more general audience, or, most threatening to honesty, to their
subject.
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Altman, Epistolarity, 47, 59ff.
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An example of this comes from the third Epistle of John, a strange and semipublic letter, to which we will return in due course.752 It is both a letter of
recommendation, praising and introducing a young man named Demetrius, as well as a
response to other letters of recommendation. It is addressed to a man named Gaius, who
has evidently sent men, carrying letters, to John, who was pleased to meet these new
Christian brothers.753 In his reply, John praises Gaius’ generosity and kindness, stresses
the importance of hospitality among Christians, and then describes an on-going conflict
that he is having with a man named Diotrephes, who seems to have been a rival of John’s
in his local church community. John writes that Diotrephes has slandered John and his
friends, and that, beyond that crime, he is not welcoming to travelers and shows them no
hospitality, unlike John and Gaius. After disparaging Diotrephes, John concludes:
Πολλὰ εἶχον γράψαι σοι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ θέλω διὰ μέλανος καὶ καλάμου σοι γράφειν:
ἐλπίζω σὲ εὐθέως δὲ ἰδεῖν, καὶ στόμα πρὸς στόμα λαλήσομεν.
I have many things to write to you, but I do not want to write these things with ink
and pen. I hope to see you soon, and we will chat face to face.754
John clearly has some reservations about conversing in perfect openness through
the medium of the letter. Despite his clear frustration with Diotrephes, it seems that John
felt some things must be said face to face, rather than being committed to paper, which,
in its more permanent medium, might be passed on to those who should not see it. It was
enough to name the faults of, and to refer to the dispute with, Diotrephes, but John placed
limits on what belonged in the letter. It is not clear how John might further incriminate
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Diotrephes, or what else he might need to share with Gaius, but he wanted to avoid those
words being intercepted in a letter and saved them for their next meeting.
Despite the diversity of purpose that John’s letter demonstrates, in that it can
bring both praise and censure, thank a friend and request a favor, all in a single
document, most letters of recommendation conform to a standard set of conventions,
which, while they did not prevent authors from deviation, nevertheless established
guidelines that many chose to adhere to. Within the ancient world, these guidelines were
even publicly available in books on letter writing, which outlined how one ought to
address, frame, and conclude letters of this type.755 Letters of recommendation are
understood to be the “commendatory” type of letter, which is aimed, in the main, at
praising its subject to the recipient.756 It serves as an introduction, but is commonly used
only in a positive sense, honoring the subject, rather than giving a comprehensive account
of his or her reputation.
Letter writers were well-aware of these features of letters of introduction and
recommendation. A 2nd century CE letter from Alexandria records the experiences of a
young man who seems to have been serving in a naval position in Egypt.757 After he
recounts a long list of what he has sent to, and received from, his father, the addressee of
the letter, Claudius Terentianus states his intention to seek alternative employment in a
cohort:
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...si deus
volueret spero ṃe frugaliter
[v]icịturum
et in cohortem
̣
[tra]ṇsferri hic a[ut]ẹm sene aer[e]
[ni]hil fiet neque epistulae comṃandaticiae nihil valunt nesi
si qui sibi aiutaveret.758

35

40

...if god is willing, I hope that I will live
frugally and be transferred to a cohort.
But here nothing may be done without
money, and letters of recommendation
are worth nothing unless a man helps
himself.

Like the authors of letter-writing guides, Terentianus is aware of the type of
letters that were commonly used by ambitious individuals, hoping to use their social
network for their personal advancement. As Cotton has argued, letters of
recommendation, Terentianus’ epistulae commendaticiae, were especially important to
the up-and-coming soldier, and our evidence shows numerous examples of letters of
recommendation that come from military contexts.759 Yet Terentianus knows that there
are limits to the impact letters could have on one’s reputation, and that, if he wanted to
advance, he must “help himself,” presumably by performing the reputation that a letter
merely recorded.
Perhaps in anticipation of this very problem, showing, not telling, is an essential
component of many of these letters. An example comes from another important letter of
recommendation from this period. Like Terentianus’ case, the letter comes from a
military context, and is sent by a beneficiarius, Aurelius Archelaus, to his military
tribune, Julius Domitius. Though the profession of the commendatus, Theon, is not clear,
the letter refers to his actum, which seems to mean some kind of work that Theon had
done before he came into Archelaus’ service, and which he had taken up again in
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Archelaus’ employ. It may have referred to some kind of protection, as Archelaus refers
to feelings of safety as a result of Theon’s actions, but its details are lost to us now.
Recto:
I[u]lio Domitio tribuno mil(itum) leg(ionis)
ab Aurelio Archelao benef(iciario) suo
salutem.
iam tibi et pristine commendaueram Theonem amicum
meum et mod[o qu]oque peto
domine ut eum ant<e> oculos
habeas tanquam me. est enim tales omo ut ametur
a te. reliquit enim su[o]s [e]t
rem suam et actum me
secutus est et per omnia me
secu[r]um fecit et ideo peto
a te ut habeat intr[o]itum
aṭ te et omnia tibi referere potest de actu[m] nostrum.
quitquit mi[hi d]ixit [i]l[lu]t et fact[…]…
amavi h[o]min[e]m [… …]
domin[e… …]
illum ut […]
upse […inter-]
cessoris u[t il]lum co[mmendarem].
estote felicissi[mi domine mul-]
tis annis cum [tuis omnibus] ben[e agentes.]
hanc epistulam ant oculos habeto domine puta[t]o
me tecum loqui.
uale.760

Recto:
To Julius Domitius, military tribune of the
legion, from Aurelius Archelaus, his aide,
greetings. Already on a previous occasion
I had commended my friend Theon to
you, and now also, sir, I beg you to hold
him before your eyes as you would me,
for he is just the sort of man that is loved
by you. For he left his family and his
property and business (and) followed me,
and through everything he kept me safe,
and therefore I beg you that he may have
an introduction to you, and he can report
everything to you concerning our
business. Whatever he told me… indeed
done…
I came to love the man… sir…
intermediary… so that I may recommend
him. Sir, may you be most happy for
many years, along with all your family,
doing well. Hold this letter before your
eyes, sir, and imagine that I am speaking
with you. Farewell.

The letter raises many essential points, but it clearly wants to stress not only
Theon’s character, as the “sort of man” that Domitius likes, but also his actions on
Archelaus’ behalf. It “shows” Domitius that Theon has sacrificed on Archelaus’ behalf,
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leaving his family, property, and personal business. Archelaus hopes to convince
Domitius to help and use Theon by describing how he has actively contributed to
Archelaus’ work, presumably on Domitius’ own behalf. Furthermore, Theon is named as
Archelaus’ friend, and Archelaus communicates how Theon has performed that
friendship in concrete ways.
This language of friendship is found throughout letters of recommendation, and
Koenraad Verboven has already argued that the language of friendship is an essential
component of both the ancient economy in general and letters of recommendation in
particular.761 Rather than arguing over the exact nature of that friendship, or how
“genuine” the emotional connection between the men might be, Verboven stresses that
the language of friendship is used liberally in the Roman context, and that one need not
have exclusively personal business with one’s amici in order for that friendship to be
“real.” In letters, he points out that the exact business in which the commendatus is
engaged is often left out, as their primary intention is introduction and the extension of
the network of amicitia. However, the closeness of the friendship is generally made
explicit, and purposefully stressed.762 This is visible most clearly in a 1st century letter
from Oxyrhynchus, discussed more fully below, where a different Theon writes to
introduce his brother, Heraclides, to Tyrannus, a local official.763 On top of asking for
another ill-defined favor, that Tyrannus “take [Heraclides] as a friend and help him
out,”764 Theon says that he is going to triangulate the acquaintance between Heraclides
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and Tyrannus via Tyrannus’ brother, Hermias, who also knows Heraclides.765 The letter
shows the social network coming full circle, so that everyone becomes amici with
everyone else, and the favors exchanged contribute to a friendship founded in mutual
utility.
Just as in Verboven’s model, Archelaus’ letter leaves out the actual work that
Theon might do on Domitius’ behalf, and it is also vague on what Archelaus hopes
Domitius will do for Theon. Instead, Archelaus only asks that Domitius grant Theon
access, so that the men could meet. This was likely to be the tip of the iceberg of benefits
that Archelaus hoped this introduction would bring to his friend, but, rather than spell out
those hopes, his words ask for the smallest of favors, just that Domitius consent to give
Theon an audience. The simplicity of this request is likely the product of the imbalanced
relationship between Archelaus and Domitius. Domitius is Archelaus’ superior, and is
referred to, throughout the letter, as dominus. Even though he is not asking for much,
Archelaus is clearly begging, and is actually repeating a previous request for this same
favor from Domitius, who was in a position to be a benefactor to both Archelaus and
Theon if he so chose.
Unlike many letter writers, Archelaus has little to offer in terms of reciprocal
benefits, though it is common to refer to these in letters of recommendation. Letter
writers generally attempt, as Archelaus has done, to present the commendatus as a worthy
acquaintance of the addressee, but, in general, they also recognize that they are asking for
a favor that requires repayment in kind.766 In contrast to Archelaus, Apollonius, writing in
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the early 1st century CE, tells Sarapion, the strategos and gymnasiarch that, if he helps the
third-party, Isidorus, Apollonius “will be indebted” to him, and “whatever [Sarapion]
wish[es] to signify, [Apollonius] will do without delay.”767 Instead of making a similar
offer, Archelaus leans on a personal appeal, asking Domitius to imagine that the two
stood face to face, in which case it would be, presumably, harder for Domitius to refuse
this request.
Again, as in John’s letter, there are some things that seem to be reserved for
conversations in person, or requests that are just easier to make face to face. Oral
communication will be considered in depth below, but in this context, it is important to
note that discussions about reputation seem to have occurred frequently in person, and it
was in that context that most negative accounts traveled. Our letters are at times
aggressively positive, or even to border on exaggerations that cannot reflect reality.
However, upon closer inspection, such statements seem to be fitting for the context in
which the letters were utilized. It is here, far more so than in the text of the letters
themselves, that we recognize that these documents would have been essential for
traveling merchants. This context is visible in John’s Third Epistle, discussed briefly
above. It is an unusual text for many reasons, but it is critical for our understanding of
how letters of recommendation were received. John’s letter lingers over the details of the
life of a faithful Christian, but the opening of his letter clarifies that this is not exclusively
a reflection on Christian theology, but was intended to be a particular, and utilitarian,
kind of response:
Ο ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΕΡΟΣ Γαίῳ τῷ ἀγαπητῷ, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀγαπῶ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ.
P. Merton 62, lines 9-12, το̣ῦτο δὲ̣ πό̣η̣σα
̣ ς̣ ̣/ ἔσῃ μοι κεχαρ̣[ισ]μένος. κα̣ὶ σ̣ὺ δὲ/ περὶ ὧν ἐάν αἵρῃ
σήμανον, καὶ/ ἀνόκνως πόη̣σωι.
767
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Ἀγαπητέ, περὶ πάντων εὔχομαί σε εὐοδοῦσθαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν, καθὼς εὐοδοῦταί
σου ἡ ψυχή. ἐχάρην γὰρ λίαν ἐρχομένων ἀδελφῶν καὶ μαρτυρούντων σου τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ, καθὼς σὺ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ περιπατεῖς.768
The elder, to dearest Gaius, whom I love in truth.
Dearest, I pray that you may prosper in all things and be healthy, even as your
soul prospers. For I was very happy when brothers came and testified about your
truth, even as you lead your life in truth.
Evidently John, the Elder, has recently received an unknown number of guests
who have been sent to him by Gaius. He refers to these men as brothers, ἀδελφῶν,
presumably because they are Christians and traveled specifically under religious
auspices. Though it remains unmentioned, it seems clear that the brothers had carried
some kind of correspondence with them, letters of recommendation and introduction
from Gaius. The text may have included news of Gaius’ work and ministry, but it is clear
that the brothers were in a position to report some details about Gaius to John orally as
they had witnessed, μαρτυρούντων, Gaius’ truth. John writes to express his pleasure at
having received the travelers, either in earnest enjoyment of having met them, or, as he
expresses to Gaius, because it was, in his mind, a vital service that Christians offered to
their brothers and sisters. It is a central element of John’s complaints against Diotrephes
that he did not offer similar hospitality to travelers who came to his congregation.
We have already seen in chapter four how traveling Christians relied on
hospitality such as John has offered, and that he asks of Gaius in return. Paul utilized it
when he came to Corinth, relying on the synagogue to secure an introduction to members
of his own trade, and he requests that it be offered to Phoebe, a member of the church at
Cenchreae, in his letter to the Romans.769 Paul urges the Roman church to help her
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however they can, since she will, apparently, soon be in Rome. This brief inclusion of a
recommendation in the longer letter comes just before Paul mentions the tent makers,
Priscilla and Aquila,770 with whom he worked and traveled.771 In the context of travel,
both Paul’s own journey and that which Phoebe intends to make, letters of introduction
would have been essential, as would social norms that encouraged fellow merchants to be
generous hosts.
An example from Heliodorus’ Æthiopica makes this explicit, and demonstrates,
once again, how reciprocity lay at the heart of the issue, that merchants hosted others so
that they might be hosted in turn. In the passage, an old man describes the hospitality that
his son has offered to Knemon, a young Athenian, who has arrived in Egypt:772
Βίος γὰρ, ὦ παῖ, κἀκείνῳ πλάνος καὶ ἔμπορος καὶ πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις, πολλῶν δ᾿
ἀνθρώπων ἤθη τε καὶ νοῦς εἰς πεῖραν ἤκουσιν· ὅθεν, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, ἄλλους τε κἀμὲ
οὐ πρὸ πολλῶν τῶνδ᾿ ἡμερῶν ἀλύοντα καὶ πλανώμενον, ὁμορόφιον ἐποιήσατο.
For he leads a wandering life, boy, and (works as) a merchant. Many cities and
the customs and minds of many men have reached his experience. On account of
this, as is reasonable, he shares his home with others and even me a few days ago
when I was lost and grieving.773
For this merchant, having a home that was open to guests was believed, at least, to
be a direct consequence of his work. He needed to display generosity and serve as a host,
so that his own traveling needs would be met. The passage does not explicitly mention
letters, but our evidence suggests that guests frequently arrived with letters of
recommendation in hand, since it was not always possible to send a letter in advance of
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one’s travels, and to be sure that the letter would arrive in time to be useful.774 Paul’s
recommendation of Phoebe is actually quite unusual in this respect, as it does not seem to
require that she be the courier of the letter, unlike in the case of Theon and Herakleides,
mentioned above.775
Again, in that instance, Theon writes a letter of introduction for Herakleides:
Θέων Τυράννωι τῶι τιμιωτάτωι
πλεῖστα χαίρειν.
Ἡρακλείδης ὁ ἀποδιδούς σοι τὴν
ἐπιστολὴν ἐστίν μου ἀδελφός·
διὸ παρακαλῶ σε μετὰ πάσης δυνά- 5
μεως ἔχειν αὐτὸν συνεσταμένον…

Many greetings from Theon to the worthiest
Tyrannus.
Herakleides, the courier delivering this letter,
is my brother. Therefore, I appeal to you as
much as I can to take him as your friend and
help him out...776

Herakleides is explicitly the traveler here, indeed he is the ἀποδιδούς, the courier.
Herakleides seems to have been a scribe by trade and have held an official position as a
basiliko-grammateus.777 In this letter, Theon neglects to mention Herakleides’ skills,
which may, perhaps have been irrelevant in this context. Nevertheless, it seems that
Herakleides traveled to Tyrannus with the specific intention of at least using him as a
host. Just as in the case of Paul and Phoebe, or John and Demetrius, Theon hoped to
secure Tyrannus’ hospitality for Herakleides, based on his preexisting relationship with
Tyrannus and, as mentioned above, with Tyrannus’ brother, Hermias. Theon does not
lean upon Tyrannus’ moral obligation to offer hospitality, or even really, on the language
of amicitia, which is so common in comparable letters from more elite contexts,778 but on
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an equitable exchange of favors, in which Tyrannus can expect recompense in due
course. The rhetoric of the letter is very straightforward, and Theon does not couch the
request in language of morality or even of status. Compared to the request of Archelaus,
this case appears to demonstrate how the letter of recommendation or introduction might
operate between peers,779 where status differences did not place one party at an
immediate disadvantage to the other. As a consequence, Theon is placing himself
voluntarily in a position of debt, but, interestingly, seems to anticipate that the social
institutions he shares with Tyrannus will be sufficient to help his brother.
We have already seen a case of this kind of hospitality offered as a favor to a
friend in the case of Lucius’ visit to Hypata in the Metamorphoses. In that case, Lucius
was in the same position as Herakleides, acting not only as a traveler, but as courier. He
was dependent upon this reputation network working properly to secure his housing,
though we later learn that he could have avoided this process by staying with a relative.780
The passage offers us the full details of Lucius’ experience of this kind of hospitality
networking, showing us at least one scenario in which a letter of introduction could be
put to work:
Assidebat pedes uxor et mensa vacua posita, cuius monstratu “En,” inquit,
“hospitium.” “Bene,” ego, et ilico ei litteras Demeae trado. Quibus properiter
lectis, “Amo,” inquit, “meum Demean, qui mihi tantum conciliavit hospitem.”
His wife was sitting at his feet and there was an empty table set up, to which he
pointed, and said, “Be welcome.” “Great,” I replied, and immediately I handed
No matter how “distinguished” Tyrannus might be as dioiketes, a financial official, he does not seem to
hold a particularly elevated social position. We know from P. Oxy. IV 746 (16 CE) that Herakleides, at one
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two nomes was unusual and suggests that Herakleides was himself a man of competence, and possibly
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over Demeas’ letter. Having read it quickly, he said, “I love my Demeas, who
introduced such an important guest to me.”781
Of course, Milo the moneylender, is not the ideal host. Lucius has already been
informed that Milo is a stingy old miser, whose hospitality will be, at best, lackluster.782
The empty table that he “offers” to Lucius is undoubtedly intended to cement this,
comically, in the mind of the reader, but the exchange of the letter here does seem, more
or less, to conform to a plausible scenario. Lucius leads with the document he carries,
handing it over ilico, immediately. He does not waste time trying to introduce himself or
justifying his reasons for coming. These, we are made to understand, will all be dealt with
in the letter. In fact, Lucius has already been short with Milo’s slave-girl, and has not
offered any real indication of his purpose before this moment. The reader knows that he
travels “on business,”783 but Milo knows only what he can glean from Lucius’
appearance, and, critically, what he will learn from the letter in his hands.
We can imagine a similar scenario for almost any of our addressees. None of
them would have had immediate recourse to external information from which they could
supplement their knowledge. Most arrivals were probably unexpected and they had few
other sources from which they could learn more about their guest. In the moment, they
would have to rely on the word of their correspondent and make a decision about
granting or withholding hospitality relatively quickly. Due to the nature of our sources,
we are frequently unable to say much about the relationship between the writer and the
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recipient. Milo certainly refers to Demeas with fondness, as meus, “my own” or perhaps
“my friend,” but we have seen men ask their social superiors for favors via letters of
introduction, which may or may not have been so favorably received. That seems to have
been the case for not only Archelaus, who had to ask, at least twice, for a favor from
Domitius, but also possibly for Diotrephes, who had apparently refused to offer
hospitality to travelers. We only have John’s word about Diotrephes’ motives, but he may
well have been justified in his refusal, if he was asked by someone to host strangers based
on too slight an acquaintance or if the guests arrived at an inconvenient time or at short
notice.
Nevertheless, there would have been some benefits to granting favors to one’s
social inferiors. In the first place, granting a request held the possibility to accrue a favor
that could be needed in the future. Even those of lower status could serve useful
purposes, either in social or business settings, given the right circumstances. Secondly, as
we have already seen in chapters four and five, displays of generosity to others were a
useful strategy for developing a good reputation. Favors were a recognized form of
generosity, and one which could provide an anecdotal case of one’s good character.784
Finally, the request itself was an acknowledgment of the superior position of the one
asked, and of the inferiority of the one asking. This dynamic seems to have been readily
understood by all those involved, and repeated requests for favor strengthened the
prestige of the one being asked. Granting those requests strengthened the bonds of
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dependency between the two parties, but also more firmly entrenched the social positions
of both.785
Of course, much would have depended on the letter itself, how it was written,
who it came from, who the guest was, and the manner in which it was delivered. Milo
reads the document Lucius carried quickly, properiter, but his subsequent conversation
with Lucius demonstrates that, while the very existence of the letter may have been
enough to vouch for Lucius, the details of Demeas’ description were not irrelevant. In
fact, it seems that Demeas offered a fairly extensive account of Lucius, including his
family history and some details about his education. Milo offers Lucius a compliment on
his appearance and good breeding and assures him that Lucius’ reputation will be
enhanced by graciously accepting the meager hospitality that Milo can offer.786 In Milo’s
mind, the letter has been established Lucius’ status as a young gentleman and Milo is
prepared to offer him hospitality.
Of course, the exact details of this document are unclear. In all likelihood,
Demeas, like our other letter writers, has introduced Lucius, given some defense of the
traveler’s character, and offered some favor in return for Milo’s hospitality, but we
cannot say for certain. We know nothing, really, about the relationship between Demeas
and Milo, which is thoroughly extraneous to the novel’s central plot, but our meagre
evidence suggests that Lucius has virtuously left the letter to Milo unread, thus preserving
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the secrecy of its contents. Demeas may have been relatively vague about Lucius or may
have gone into more detail. The heavy-handed praise of many of these documents
suggests that many letters talked up either subject, and there was, perhaps, an expectation
of hyperbole. Milo’s response seems calculated to flatter Lucius’ ego, but we cannot be
certain if this represents some idiosyncrasy of Milo’s, some comment of Demeas’, or a
standard politeness that was expected in this moment of hospitality. It may well be that
we are meant to see this as a humorous moment, since Lucius seems to be constantly
referred to in the Metamorphoses as a young gentleman, though his behavior and choices
show him to be rather impulsive and careless.
What seems more certain is that the letter does not contain much information
about Demeas himself, as Milo insists on grilling Lucius for this information that evening
before bed.787 Most of our extant letters neglect this kind of information and seem to
expect that the letter carrier would provide an oral account of the sender. We have
already seen it in the case of John’s letter, where the “brothers” provide him with an
update on Gaius’ wellbeing. These seem to have been more than simply the first and
safest point of common knowledge from which to being a conversation, but to have
actually been an important part of the process of concluding the introduction. Guests
were expected to confirm their identities by demonstrating that they actually knew the
person who had written the letter. For the nervous Milo, this was almost certainly a final
security measure, to make sure that Lucius was not secretly a robber who had stolen a
letter from Demeas’ real messenger.
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This was a real concern in the context of Roman travel. Letters, even if they were
sealed, might, conceivably, be forged or fall into the wrong hands. Criminals might take
advantage of the natural inclination, or moral imperative, in the case of John’s letter, to
offer hospitality and thereby gain access to homes that would otherwise be closed to
them. We know that thieves were a particular concern for Milo,788 but his worries, while
undoubtedly played up for comedic effect, are not without foundation. As a result, Milo
requests a full update on Demeas’ welfare from Lucius. Lucius resents the request, given
its timing, late at night, after a trying day, but it does not seem to have been an untypical
request for a host to make of a guest. Furthermore, these kinds of conversations must
have been essential components of building social and business ties. In the process of the
discussion that begins with Demeas’ wellbeing, Milo is able to learn the details of
Lucius’ business affairs, which would, plausibly, be an element in many of the
conversations that followed the exchange of letters of introduction.

Talk of the Town—Gossip and Merchant Business:
The first book of the Metamorphoses is full of conversations, many of which
involve business practices. We have already examined the conversation that Lucius had
with an innkeeper in Hypata just before he came to Milo’s house.789 This woman spreads
information about Milo behind his back, and places moral weight on the stories she tells
about his appearance, social status, and business. As we have argued,790 her own status is
implicated in the narrative that she tells about Milo, and it is possible that she hoped
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either to sway Lucius away from his decision to stay with this friend-of-a-friend, or to
present herself as a knowledgeable and authoritative member of the community to this
stranger, or both.
The innkeeper is a prototypical gossiper in many ways. Though Lucius prompts
her to tell him something about his prospective host, automatically inviting her to gossip,
the woman shares details that are well beyond the bounds of what he truly needed to
know, and their content borders on being inappropriate to tell a complete stranger. As
Chris Wickham has noted about a comparable case in the Medieval period, the innkeeper
here is a “megaphone,” rather than a knowledgeable person who is sensitive to the
situation at hand.791 She shares her information about Milo indiscriminately, and the
passage leaves us to assume that she would have been equally indiscreet with anyone else
who happened to visit. In Lucius’ case, she has not read Demeas’ letter and has never met
this traveler before, nevertheless, she immediately begins openly criticizing Milo to a
stranger who has just arrived. This may be a result of some personal animosity between
the innkeeper and Milo, but, based on our text, we are led to assume that this woman is
naturally gossipy, and would have been equally chatty if Lucius had come seeking
information about another of her neighbors.
Gossip, of course, is hardly a neutral term in common parlance. It carries negative
connotations that imply anything from pointless conversations born of boredom to
malicious attacks undertaken to dismantle someone’s good name. Rather than rehearse
the various uses of gossip, which have been duly noted throughout the extensive
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scholarship on the subject,792 it will be more useful to establish what is meant by gossip
in this setting. Wickham’s minimalist definition, “talking about other people behind their
backs,” will be used here, with a few provisos to cover a few elements of gossip that are
not under consideration here.793 Chief among these is the fact that we are not considering
published texts as a form of gossip in this study.794 The aim here will be to narrow our
focus to oral communication and to the informal ways that gossip spread reputation,
rather than presenting a more formal, curated version of that same, or similar,
information.
It is also worth noting that gossip is not understood to hold a particular, gendered
social position in this study, in that it is not exclusively the province of women,795 nor
will it be classified here into various levels of “seriousness” or “truthfulness.”796 These
metrics that have been used in the past in an attempt to manage the contradictory nature
of gossip as both a communication method that requires study, and an “idle” pastime that
is generally discussed in both modern and ancient sources as at least trivial, if not morally
suspect. Thus, the very subject of study seems determined to undermine attempts at
objective analysis, as in form and content gossip always seems to be subjective. Our
chosen definition has been intentionally selected to be neutral, to ensure that our net may
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be cast as wide as possible and capture the widest possible array of evidence. However,
our sources of and about gossip in the Roman Empire are clear that gossip was an
undertaking that was negative by nature. As soon as an action is identified by someone as
gossip, it was immediately classified as malicious, underhand, or a host of other morallycharged descriptors. The Roman understanding of gossip is important and informs how
many of our sources think about their own actions, which are generally “not-gossip,” and
about the actions of others, which are more likely to be “gossip” if they contradict the
beliefs or values of the source. However, by considering gossip primarily as a type of
conversation, we can witness gossip even when it has not been identified as such by our
source and may consider that speech both with and without the lens of moral judgments.
Gossiping, whether or not it was identified as such by Roman merchants, was a
tool, used by both merchants and the wider community to spread information that related
to specific business affairs, or, more commonly, to the actions, character, or words, in
short, the reputation, of the economic actors around them. Gossip was useful and
provided merchants with a source of information to which they may not otherwise have
had access.797 Gossiping transmits details, or, at times, more vague impressions, of events
that not everyone witnessed. Accordingly, it is an activity that saves at least one person in
the conversation, time and energy, in that they may substitute the content of the gossip
for personal observation.798
Of course, as we have discussed briefly above, “talk is cheap,” in that gossip is a
relatively low-cost method of spreading and receiving information, and, as a result, it is
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not always accurate. Again, the example of the Metamorphoses is instructive. When
Lucius meets the cheesemonger on the road to Hypata, the man informs Lucius that he
had been traveling in Thessaly because he had “learned… some fresh, tasty cheese was
being sold at an especially good price.”799 When he arrived, he discovered that the cheese
had already been sold. The exact means through which the cheesemonger “learned” about
this bargain are not expanded on. It is possible that he had received word from a
colleague, via a letter or a messenger. We have substantial evidence from Egypt of letters
being sent, particularly to agents operating remotely, 800 with details about what to buy,
when, from whom, and at what price, but nothing that might stand in as a proxy for such
correspondence in Greece. Alternately, the cheesemonger may have learned of this deal
in conversation with other tradesmen. The word choice of the passage offers us little
clarity, as the verb of “learning” in this case, comperio, reveals nothing about the
mechanics of the process, merely suggesting that the information was discovered by
some unknown means.801
However, this information was clearly spreading among traders in these goods.
The cheesemonger misses out on this purchase because the news of these goods had
traveled too quickly to another place, reaching someone who could buy up the cheese
before Lucius’ traveling companion could reach it. At some point in this sequence of
events, a conversation might be imagined between the cheesemonger and an informant,
one that shared details about where cheese was being offered for sale and who was
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selling it. The cheesemonger knows enough to be able to describe it as fresh and fineflavored, which suggests that price details were shared along with substantial amounts of
information about quality.802 Peter Bang has looked at the cheesemonger as evidence for
the volatility of ancient markets,803 but this same passage reveals not only the necessity
for local knowledge that we discussed in chapter three, but also for the relationships and
networks of communication that must have underwritten this kind of economic activity.
Gossip is central to these networks and relationships, as it spread information and formed
the bedrock of an oral culture we have only restricted access to now.804
We have already seen an example of this kind of information sharing, of gossip
functioning within pre-existing networks of friends and acquaintances. The story of the
salt merchants from the Midrash, which we explored at the end of the previous chapter,
provides a good example of information-sharing via gossip that is incidental to
preexisting relationships. In that case, when the lead merchant deceives his colleagues,
and travels to buy salt without them, his peers learn of his deception from his neighbors.
“What did he do? He loaded a sack on his ass and went off alone, while his
friends slept till morning, [when] they called [him]. The neighbours asked: Whom
do you want? So and so already went off last night. So they set off in the morning
and found him on his way back.”805
In the course of the passage, the words of these neighbors are a small point, but
they do more in this moment than merely move the plot along. From this moment we can
infer several points that are critical to our understanding of reputation and the means
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through which it traveled. First, it is evident that, whatever the imagined arrangement of
this settlement, these neighbors lived at close enough quarters with the lead merchant that
they were able to witness his comings and goings.806 We have already stressed the
importance of reputation in similar face-to-face communities, and this passage reinforces
the matter: the reputation of merchants was publicly available, not only because they
personally broadcast their character and practices, but also because communities in the
ancient world were closely monitored by their members.807 Neighbors watched each
other, observing patterns of behavior and noting anomalies. The result was, in cases such
as this one, that they were quickly able to see when a day-to-day action, like leaving the
house, became a moment that might define, or re-define, the reputation of their
acquaintance.
Second, these neighbors not only witnessed the actions of the lead merchant, they
also communicated what they had seen to others. “So and so already went off last night,”
is neutral information, but it is firmly gossip by our definition. The lead merchant is not
present, and though their statement seems strictly factual, they are conveying information
behind his back that he would not have spread himself or wanted to be spread by others.
It was his intention to keep this action private, to keep hidden a potentially reputationdamaging choice, but in this community, observation combined with gossip, had the
ability to reveal information that was intentionally concealed. We do not have the
subsequent conversation between the neighbors and the merchants, or any conversation
between the neighbors and others, but, given the willingness of the neighbors to share
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information with the merchants, we may suppose that this gossip would have spread
further, with the addition of the details that the neighbors had learned: how the lead
merchant had, evidently, deceived his peers, and that the testimony of the neighbors was
proof of it.
While this additional information does not make “so and so already went off last
night,” any more or less gossip, this context for the knowledge that the neighbors already
had may have made it more interesting, and therefore transformed it into information that
was more likely to travel, and travel quickly. As we have already noted, negative
reputation information had a tendency to spread more quickly than positive or neutral
information.808 The neighbors initially believed that they held the latter and were content
to spread it as such when an occasion prompted them to do so but would not have had
any incentive to spread the news of their neighbor’s journey without some outside factor
to encourage them. In the moment, there is no reason to suppose that they thought of their
speech as gossip, and it is likely that, to them, it was merely a conversation, sharing
neutral information, that was prompted by the appearance of the merchants outside the
house. However, upon learning more, it is likely that they would choose to share their
knowledge further, since the context made it into news, not just a bare fact.
In this case, gossip could transmit information about the lead merchant through
the network of, at least, the immediate neighborhood. These neighbors, having realized
that they held a piece of news worthy of sharing as a result of their meeting with the
merchants, now had the ability to reach out to others, spreading the story down the line.
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Those with whom they chose to share might be the result of coincidence or chance,
depending on who they happened to encounter, or might be a more conscious choice. In
the latter case, this information would promote one of the major social benefits that
gossip can offer: the creation and maintenance of social groups. Wickham has noted that
gossip, like reputation, is never spread uniformly across a society,809 and Whitfield has
argued that there are, of necessity, individuals who become local opinion-leaders in the
gossip community, and who are able to direct, to an extent, public opinion through their
own status.810 This was an enviable position, as it empowered certain, well-informed
people to leverage their ability to gossip into status for themselves, as, perhaps the
innkeeper of Hypata hoped to do. As a result, they could define who belonged within
their network, and who belonged outside of it, by choosing who to talk to, and who to
ignore. Again, Wickham has already identified this as a major component of gossip’s role
in society, that it “articulates and bounds identity, group memory, and legitimate group
social practice.”811 Through gossip it is possible to consciously include or exclude, as
well as to set and enforce moral parameters for the society.812
For the Midrash passage, this is essential. The passage itself a moralizing,
hortatory text, designed to encourage a specific set of approved behaviors and discourage
another, complementary set. It also displays, in the figures of the neighbors, or, more
specifically, the things the neighbors will tell others about the lead merchant, the
institutional power of gossip. The concerns merchants had about gossip and the spread of
information limited what merchants were willing to do publicly. There was, after all, a
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reason that the lead merchant had traveled without informing anyone: he hoped to escape
notice, and thereby escape the damage gossip might do to his reputation. Though his
deceit was sure to be uncovered by his peers, he may have hoped, as we discussed in the
last chapter, that concern for the group reputation would keep his peers from spreading
his behavior too widely. His neighbors have no concern for either his personal reputation
or that of the collective, and their network had the power make his misdemeanor into
common knowledge, at least among their social group.
Of course, gossip was not only a byproduct of these networks of communication,
and a tool used by them to share news, but was also a means of further developing
relationships that already existed, and particularly to encourage trust between friends.
This is difficult to spot in the Midrash text, due to its brevity, but we see sure signs of it
elsewhere. One of our great sources for opinions on gossip is Plutarch’s De Garrulitate.
While Plutarch is strongly opposed to gossip, for moral reasons we will return to shortly,
his discussion of how gossip spreads unfounded rumors demonstrates that trust, real or
perceived, lay at the heart of many of the communications that people made regarding
reputation.
εἰ δ᾽ ἀφεὶς ἐκ σεαυτοῦ κατέχεις ἐν ἑτέρῳ τἀπόρρητον, εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν πίστιν
καταπέφευγας τὴν σεαυτοῦ προέμενος. κἂν μὲν ἐκεῖνος ὅμοιός σοι γένηται,
δικαίως ἀπόλωλας· ἂν δὲ βελτίων, σῴζῃ παραλόγως ἕτερον εὑρὼν ὑπὲρ σεαυτὸν
πιστότερον. ἀλλὰ ‘φίλος οὗτος ἐμοί.’ τούτῳ δ᾽ ἕτερός τις, ᾧ πιστεύσει καὶ οὗτος
ὡς ἐγὼ τούτῳ: κἀκεῖνος ἄλλῳ πάλιν· εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἐπιγονὴν λαμβάνει καὶ
πολλαπλασιασμόν, εἰρομένης τῆς ἀκρασίας, ὁ λόγος.
But if, having let the secret slip from yourself, you want to contain it in other
another, you have taken refuge in another person’s trust after abandoning your
own. And if that man turns out to be the same as you, you are justly ruined, but if
he is better, you are unexpectedly saved, since you managed to find someone
more trustworthy on your behalf. But “this man is my friend.” This man,
however, has another friend, whom he will trust also, just as I trust him, and that
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one will trust another again. Thus, then, trusting receives an increase and a
multiplication when incontinence is being discussed.813
In this passage Plutarch derides those who, though unable to keep a secret
themselves, nevertheless will tell someone else, expecting them to be trustworthy. He
makes friendship the basis of this trust, presupposing that, among friends, there will be
very few secrets. He simultaneously recognizes that these networks of trusted friends
mean that nothing can be kept a secret for long. Everyone is equally incapable of keeping
a juicy bit of news to themselves, and that no one feels that they should exclude their
friend from the social group created by this gossip. Plutarch hopes that everyone will
eventually be “ruined” by their desire to gossip, since they are all “betraying” the trust
implicit or explicit in the original secret.
His treatment of the matter is, typically, moralizing in tone, yet, there is
something fundamentally true about gossip revealed in this passage. Plutarch’s friends
tell each other things not only because they cannot help themselves, and are unable to
keep a secret, but because they trust their friend. Telling a secret to a friend was a
demonstration of that trust, and an essential marker of the strength of the bond between
the two people. As Emler and Guastella have both put it, sharing reputational information
helps members of social networks, friends, neighbors, or family, understand whom they
ought to trust.814 This is not only because the information may warn a person away from
a potentially dangerous social or business partner, but because the very act of sharing the
information demonstrates that there is trust between the two speaking. Particularly in the
case of sensitive or particularly secret information, sharing creates an atmosphere of
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intimacy. The communicator tells his interlocutor that he is sharing this information
specifically with him or her, and that it is not for general consumption.815 The interlocutor
is made to feel special, important, and trustworthy, even if they will be unable to keep the
secret themselves.
Trust is difficult to manufacture in commercial settings,816 as we have seen, due to
the numerous stereotypes that painted merchants as dishonest and dishonorable. Gossip
was merely one tool, and an unreliable one at that, for developing trust. As the
cheesemonger learned, gossip did not have to be accurate, or could be accurate, but only
under specific, and time-sensitive conditions. Gianni Guastella has already noted that a
key issue with gossip, and its companion rumor, discussed by Hans-Joachim Neubauer in
similar terms,817 is that its veracity depends on someone being willing to vouch for it, and
for the speed with which it reaches a relevant ear.818 Most gossip is, at best, second hand
knowledge, and it comes with provisos about when and where it was heard, rather than
was witnessed. Thus, most gossipers are not able or willing to say if their gossip is true
and will preface their statements in ways that automatically hedge and prevaricate.
Furthermore, as with other kinds of information, old gossip is rarely useful, except in so
far as it reveals something about the present.
Plutarch’s treatise offers another useful case. He uses the example of the rumor of
the Athenian defeat in Sicily, and the barber who was called to relate the story he had
heard to the assembly:
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γενομένης δὲ ταραχῆς οἷον εἰκός, εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἀθροισθεὶς ὁ δῆμος ἐπὶ τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἐβάδιζε τῆς φήμης. ἤγετ᾽ οὖν ὁ κουρεὺς καὶ ἀνεκρίνετο, μηδὲ τοὔνομα τοῦ
φράσαντος εἰδὼς ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀνώνυμον καὶ ἄγνωστον ἀναφέρων τὴν ἀρχὴν
πρόσωπον. ὀργὴ δ᾽ οὖν καὶ βοὴ τοῦ θεάτρου: ‘βασάνιζε καὶ στρέβλου τὸν
ἀλάστορα· πέπλασται ταῦτα καὶ συντέθειται· τίς δ᾽ ἄλλος ἤκουσε; τίς δ᾽
ἐπίστευσεν;’ ἐκομίσθη τροχός, κατετάθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Since disorder arose, as was likely, the people gathering in the assembly
proceeded to the source of the rumor. So, the barber was brought forward and
interrogated, but he did not know the name of his informant but ascribed the
beginning to a nameless and unknown figure. Therefore, there was rage and a
shout from the spectators, “Torture and stretch the wretched man on the rack. He
fabricated these things and organized it himself. Who else heard it? Who believed
it?" The wheel was brought and the man was stretched.819
As a profession, barbers in the Greco-Roman world had a bad reputation for being
gossips.820 It was a stereotype that seems to have been borne out in practice, as
barbershops became gathering places for people to come and chat.821 The result,
however, seems to be that a barber might pick up a bit of news without being certain of
its source, or being wholly aware of its original context. The barber was unable to name
his informant when taken before the ekklesia, and was not only doubted, but tortured, for
having spread his true, but as-yet-unsubstantiated, news.
The case raises an interesting point about the intersection of gossip and truth, and,
more crucially, with the moral value placed on truth. Quite rightly, Romans were slow to
give gossip full credence. There was, potentially, a great advantage in circulating a
fabricated story,822 an action which might be done maliciously to damage the reputation
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of others, or to secure some benefit. Quintilian, arguing, at least in part, against the use of
gossip in the courtroom, is clear that gossip was something:
...quod nulli non etiam innocentissimo possit accidere fraude inimicorum falsa
vulgantium.
…which can even happen to anyone, even the most innocent person through the
deceit of enemies who spread false reports.823
We have already seen the cheesemonger, who followed rumors of cheap cheese
into Thessaly. While we lack exact details, we know that his journey was wasted. While
he seems to imply that he was simply too late, acting on out-of-date information, it is also
possible that a competitor might have intentionally fed him incorrect information, since
the trip cost the merchant valuable time and money that he might have spent improving
his business at home. Salvian, in the 5th century CE, reports that lying, to each other, but
especially to customers, was endemic among Syrian merchants.824 While the lies he
describes are not gossip in the strictest sense, it is clear that, at least from the outside, the
oral culture of merchants was believed to be full of deceit, treachery, and backstabbing.
Of course, merchants must have, in the normal course of business, have gossiped
about many things, but we do see a higher proportion of negative information being
shared via gossip than by other means of spreading reputation information, like the letters
of recommendation we examined above. In the previous chapter, we looked at how
merchant groups might institute sanctions against their rogue members in formal and
semi-formal associations. Gossip may fit into these means of constraining merchants as a
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means of policing the behavior of group members. Gossip may have provided the
community with a means to express its disapproval of an individual and his or her
actions, without requiring a formal airing of grievances or the imposition of sanctions.
Though not about a merchant, the famous case of the inscription of the so-called
Mactar Harvester concludes with a clear summary of the threat that gossip posed, and
hints at the kind of institutional force that gossip could have in practice. The inscription
has recently been reevaluated, and is likely to be a late 4th or early 5th century CE record
of the life of an itinerant harvester, turned local elite.825 While the unnamed Harvester’s
success comes from agriculture, it is important to note that he uses the same rhetorical
frame that we have seen in the cases of merchants throughout the period: that he lived a
blameless life, and did no harm to others in achieving his success:
VITAE PRO MERITIS CLAROS TRANSEGIMUS ANNOS
QUOS NULLO LINGUA CRIMINE LAEDIT ATROX
DISCITE MORTALES SINE CRIMINE DEGERE VITAM
SIC MERUIT VIXIT QUI SINE FRAUDE MORI.826
As I deserved, I spent the shining years of my life, years
which no savage tongue has harmed with reproach.
Learn, mortals, to pass life without wrongdoing.
Thus, he deserved to die, he who lived without deceit.
The Harvester is proud to have passed his life without reproach, a sentiment we
have already seen in the case of merchant inscriptions like those discussed in chapter
four.827 He uses the same language we are already familiar with, claiming that men ought
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to live sine crimine, and that he himself deserved his success having lived sine fraude. It
is no accident that this is, exactly, the language used by Vibia Chresta to note her own
success, which, like the Mactar Harvester, involved a substantial upward journey in terms
of social and economic status.828 As it was for the freedwoman, it was important for the
Harvester to display that his success did not come at the expense of others, and it
demonstrates, even more forcefully, the theme of the inscription: the Harvester’s own
hard work and achievement.
Importantly here, however, the Harvester escaped the work of the atrox lingua,
the bitter tongue, of gossipers. Though his tone is all positive here, as well as hortatory,
urging others to follow his own shining example,829 there is a strong sense that the
Harvester held some anxiety about what these voices might have said. He is aware that
their talk could have hurt him, laedit, literally something akin to wounding, and, in doing
so, could have materially damaged his reputation. The Harvester’s solution is for people,
mortales, to pass their lives in an upstanding manner, so there would never be an opening
for reproach.830 His conclusion, that those who are deceitful, and we may, presumably
include any number of other moral failings, deserve what they get suggests that the
Harvester had a firm set of beliefs about what the correct way to live was, namely the one
that would not make one’s reputation the subject of gossip.
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Gossip, Morality, and Reputation:
Clear instances of gossip are elusive in our sources, in part because of the
extensive evidence we have for the negative feelings that gossiping elicited within
Roman culture. We have already seen Plutarch’s objections to gossip, with his belief that
this kind of aimless chatting encourages people to be bad listeners,831 to put words before
actions,832 and to betray the trust of others by not keeping their confidence.833 Plutarch is
hardly alone in his disdain for gossip. Authors, and particularly early Christian authors,
present gossip as a gateway to lying, jealousy,834 and hypocrisy.835 Clement of Rome
urged Christians to avoid gossip, but to cultivate humility, self-restraint, and fidelity to
god.836 Their objections are hardly surprising, given the trouble that gossip posed for the
early Church Fathers, and for Paul in particular, whose theological mission seems to have
generated gossip and rumor in the communities that he visited.837 Ultimately, this gossip,
spread widely and turned into action, compelled Paul to abandon his mission in several
cities in the eastern Mediterranean. Though his letters and the record of Acts is not
interested in the details, it is also possible that this gossip forced Paul to abandon his
trade in some cases as well.
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We have already looked at the actions of Demetrius, the silversmith of Ephesus,
whose riot, or perhaps protest, against Paul is recorded in Acts. In the previous chapter,
we looked at how Demetrius was able to motivate members of his trade to protect their
collective interests and reputation, but the very beginning of the passage demonstrates
that gossip was also an important element in that case.
Δημήτριος γάρ τις ὀνόματι, ἀργυροκόπος, ποιῶν ναοὺς ἀργυροῦς Ἀρτέμιδος
παρείχετο τοῖς τεχνίταις οὐκ ὀλίγην ἐργασίαν, οὓς συναθροίσας καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἐργάτας εἶπεν, Ἄνδρες, ἐπίστασθε ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἐργασίας ἡ εὐπορία
ἡμῖν ἐστίν, καὶ θεωρεῖτε καὶ ἀκούετε ὅτι οὐ μόνον Ἐφέσου ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν πάσης
τῆς Ἀσίας ὁ Παῦλος οὗτος πείσας μετέστησεν ἱκανὸν ὄχλον, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν
θεοὶ οἱ διὰ χειρῶν γινόμενοι.
For a certain man, Demetrius by name, a silversmith, who made silver shrines to
Artemis, supplied not a little work to the craftsmen. Gathering these men together
and also those workers from similar trades, he said: “Gentlemen, you know that
we are prosperous from this work, and you see and you hear that, not only in
Ephesus, but practically in all Asia, this Paul has persuaded a large crowd to
convert, saying that gods made by human hands are not gods.”838
Demetrius and the silversmiths know of Paul and his teachings from autopsy,
from having seen it themselves, but they also have heard about his teachings, whether or
not they have physically listened to him themselves. The arrival of a new and
controversial teacher in Ephesus must have been a cause for gossip,839 and in Paul’s
particular case it seems that that those conversations may have taken on a negative tone
in at least some cases. In fact, Demetrius is, in this very passage, gossiping, according to
our definition, though, as we will discuss, it is unlikely that he would have classified his
actions as such.
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The objections of Paul and other early Christian authors to gossip make sense if
this was the kind of talk that circulated about them. Though the words of Demetrius could
not hurt Paul within the community of his followers, they and others like them made a
number of towns inhospitable places for Paul to stay and preach. Botha has argued
persuasively that gossip, combined with the kinds of stereotypes that already circulated
about tradesmen, made rumors about Paul particularly potent and likely to circulate.840
Paul, himself, objects strongly to gossip, railing against it in his second letter to the
Corinthians841 and in his letter to the Romans, where he lists gossip among the faults of,
“[men who] have become filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity.
They are full of envy, murder, strife, deceit and malice. They are gossips, slanderers,
haters of God, insolent, arrogant and boastful; they invent evil things; they disobey their
parents; they have no understanding, no fidelity, no love, no mercy.”842
All of these objections return, again and again, to the threat that gossip posed to
the morality of both the individual and the community. Gossip is the necessary tool to
spread Paul’s laundry list of sins and the passage is based on the fundamental assumption
that gossip will always hurt others. The central belief was that those who gossip are liars
who ruined the reputations of others in ways that Publilius Syrus has noted to be nearly
irrevocable:
Quem fama semel oppressit vix restituitur.

Botha, 282–85; Craik, Reputation, 50; Lupfer, Weeks, and Dupuis, “How Pervasive Is the Negativity
Bias in Judgments Based upon Character Appraisals?”; Skowronski and Carlston, “Negativity and
Extremity Bias in Impression Formation.”
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He whom gossip has once put down will be scarcely restored.”843
Yet, critically, in all these discussions, gossip is something that is either done by
bad people, or happens to unfortunate, but good people, or both. Good people, like our
authors, do not gossip, and, in the best-case scenario, do not get gossiped about. By the
Roman understanding, it requires true malice to gossip about a good person, a fact that is
preserved in both Paul and Quintilian, and it required substantial fabrication in the part of
the gossiper. The Mactar Harvester’s inscription is clear that, if a person lived a life
beyond reproach, it was possible to escape the atrox lingua of gossip. Paul supports this
idea in 1 Thessalonians, when he urges his brothers to live with decency so they would
avoid censure from others,844 but, as we have shown above, Paul clearly felt that the
majority of the blame for gossip belonged with the gossiper, and it was that person’s sin
that generated these lies.
Of course, by our definition, it is evident that even those who railed against gossip
were themselves doing it as a means to spread information that was important to their
work, whether theological or commercial. Paul can be seen doing it in his letter to the
Galatians, where he reports, with harsh judgment, the actions of Cephas behind the man’s
back to those who did not know Cephas themselves.845 As we have already seen, this is
also the dynamic that is at play in John’s letter, and his feelings about Diotrephes.846
Neither man would have accepted that their words constituted gossip, which, to their
minds, required a malicious intent. As this chapter has demonstrated, that was not always
true. Gossip could be, and often was, a neutral activity, but the moral perspective taken
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by ancient society does frame the conception of gossip and its place within the social
world of Roman merchants.
The impulse to gossip, even in these written forms, demonstrates that, even if it
was considered to be a moral ill, gossiping was common practice. As Publilius Syrus
records: Miserum est tacere cogi quod cupias loqui, “it is miserable to be forced to be
silent about that which you would like to speak.” Not only, as discussed above, was this
because it was difficult, and at times counterproductive, to keep gossip from one’s
friends, but also because conversations fairly naturally tend toward gossip.847 A human
subject is often more interesting than a non-human one, and, as we have noted throughout
this project, the Roman economic world was always focused on the various personalities
at play in trade. Social status was always connected to economic opportunities, and
gossip was always implicated in attempts to determine or redefine the status of others.
Gossip, along with letters and other means, was a necessary tool for spreading
reputation. For the people involved, it was useful, even if it was not always kind. In order
to develop, hone, and codify the reputation of those with whom they interacted, Roman
merchants needed to talk to one another, about one another. As we have noted, this was
not always malicious,848 but it generally did enforce certain codes of conduct, the
morality that has pervaded all the ways that merchants have talked about themselves, and,
in turn, been considered by others.
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A final case illustrates this, the epitaph of Gaius Atilius Euhodus from the Appian
Way. Euhodus was a freedman, and a pearl merchant who operated on the Via Sacra in
Rome. His tombstone calls out to passersby:
HOSPES RESISTE ET HOC AD GRUMUM AD LAEVAM ASPICE UBEI
CONTINENTUR OSSA HOMINIS BONI MISERICORDIS AMANTIS
PAUPERIS. ROGO TE VIATOR MONUMENTO HIC NI(hi)L MALE
FECERIS
C(aius) ATEILIUS SERRANI L(ibertus) EUHODUS MARGARITARIUS DE
SACRA
VIA IN HOC MONUMENTO CONDITUS EST VIATOR VALE
EX TESTAMENTO IN HOC MONUMENTO NEMINEM INFERRI NEQUE
CONDI LICET NIS{E}I EOS LIB(ertos) QUIBUS HOC TESTAMENTO DEDI
TRIBUIQUE.849
Stranger, stop and look to the mound on the left. The bones of a good, tenderhearted man, who loved the poor are held here. Traveler, I ask you to do no harm
to this monument.
Gaius Atilius Euhodus, freedman of Serranus, a pearl-merchant of Via Sacra, is
buried in this monument. Traveler, farewell.
By my will: it is not permitted for anyone to be brought into or buried in this
monument except those freedmen to whom I have given and granted this in my
will.
Euhodus is a good man, bonus, and he lists his good characteristics. He is loving
of the poor, a phrase perhaps meant to suggest his generosity, and he is compassionate,
misericordis. This is the reputation that Euhodus wanted for himself, the lasting memory
that he hoped would follow him into death. He lists his profession, his association with
his former master, but, like so many of his peers, gives us little evidence to describe the
specifics of his business or its practices. For Euhodus, just as for Scaurus and so many of
our other merchants, his business is wholly tied up in his character, the persona he has

849

CIL VI 9545.

395
carefully crafted. His description of himself is aggressively moralizing and designed to
present a reputation that placed personal goodness above wealth or status.
Erich Gruen has posited that the style of such inscriptions and the claims they
make was an affectation that had trickled down to lower socio-economic ranks from
elites, who actively presented their moral standing as part of a “fashion” in rhetoric.850 As
the previous chapters have argued, there can be little here that is a matter of fashion, as
this kind of self-presentation was necessary for the practical business that men like
Euhodus had to do. Just as much as elites needed to carefully craft a reputation and
protect it as it was shaped by those around them, merchants guarded their good name.
Morality was central, as their reputation, as a “good” man or a “bad” one, might mean the
difference between social and economic success, and failure.

Conclusions:
This chapter has looked at two means that were used to transmit the reputations of
merchants in the Roman Empire. Though they cannot possibly cover the full range of
ways in which reputation traveled, they have offered us windows into how people learned
about merchants, and how their opinions about them might be changed over time, either
from the arrival of new information, or from an impression of consistency. Combined
with the stereotypes that persisted around merchants, we have seen how and why
merchants might be anxious for their reputation, since letters of recommendation could
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only offer so much cover, and gossip had a tendency to circulate nasty rumors as easily
as, if not more easily than, the unvarnished truth.
On the one hand, letters of recommendation and introduction were a structured
tool, one that was given shape by letter writing guides, and by the expectations of
authors, recipients and, to an extent, the subject of the letters. These documents were
intended to ease merchant travels, and generally act as tools that bolstered the reputation
of the subject. We have seen that they are commonly positive and have noted how they
might come to be essential for someone traveling to a new place. Reputation spread via
letters through networks of friends, and amicitia was itself often structured around the
ability of all the friends involved to offer each other support and hospitality, as well as to
exchange favors both in the present and in the future.
On the other hand, gossip was specifically known for transmitting negative
accounts, and was believed to be, in many cases, the direct result of malicious intent on
the part of the speaker. This version of gossip is a highly limited perspective, given that
gossip also communicated vitally necessary information about the state of the economy
and the activities of merchant competition, but it reinforces the notion that it is in
morality that we can find the essential concerns that merchants had about their
reputations.
Reputation, which collects the opinions of both individuals and the community,
was the creation of these processes, and, though it is difficult to find suitably
summarized, it seems to be constituted in simple claims to goodness, honesty, and
generosity like those of Euhodus, Onesimus, and others. These claims are contextspecific and mean something different for the senator than they do for the slave, but a
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good merchant could frame his goodness within the context of merchant stereotypes, and
specifically as standing in direct opposition to them.
More than merely useful rhetoric for protecting one’s reputation, these claims
enforced institutional standards by marking out which behaviors were good, which bad,
and which held ambiguous positions in the moral infrastructure of Roman society. The
result was that even those merchants who were not constrained by obligations to
merchant organizations were subject to societal standards that everyone, merchant and
customer, was invested in protecting and promoting. The merchant community policed
itself, to prevent merchant stereotypes growing more negative, and through
demonstrations of the morality of individuals, while those who did not work in those
professions watched, commented, and passed on the behaviors that they saw to be
outliers: either remarkably good or remarkably bad. The carrot of praise and the stick of
censure built a moral structure that merchants could be expected to operate within, as
they hoped to protect their reputations and, through their reputations, their economic
opportunities.
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CONCLUSION:
In its analysis of the social and economic lives of merchants in the later Roman
Empire, this dissertation has collected a set of plausible strategies that merchants could
adopt to find success in overcoming their professional challenges. It has done so by
asking fundamental questions about what the major institutional factors were in the lives
of merchants, and by close examination of what merchants had to say for themselves.
Several conclusions may be drawn from the preceding chapters that have important
implications for the future study of the social and economic world of the later Roman
Empire.
The first and most essential conclusion, correcting the course of current
investigation into the Roman economy, is the relatively limited effect of formal, stategenerated institutions on the lives of merchants at every level of the socio-economic
ladder. Though the rhetoric of these institutions is particularly forceful, the analysis of
imperial legal pronouncements in this dissertation has shown that the intentions of the
state were never systematic, and that its efforts to control economic activity never went
unmediated by regional and local officials who had variable interest in transmitting and
enforcing Roman law. Within these mediated imperial structures were innumerable
smaller ones, including those that governed the interactions between individuals who
represented their own interests, on the one hand, and the interests of the state, on the
other. These local officials, tax and toll collectors, were the faces that that merchants put
to the state, and their actions represented that body’s will, even if they did not accurately
reflect the purposes of its imperial rulers.

399
Merchants operated within this context, balancing the demands of complex and, at
times, competing structures of imperial, regional, and local bureaucracy with what seems
to have been relative ease. Though it is clear that they operated under power imbalances
that made them susceptible to predation, merchants leaned upon their familiarity with the
personal, legal, financial, and social restrictions that governed their businesses, and upon
the information they could gather by working with, or at least observing, their peers.
They and their peers faced the same challenges: unpredictable and volatile markets,
limited information, power imbalances, and social stigma. Their response was to turn to
each other, and to leverage their community to maximize their chances of success. Theirs
was a face-to-face trading world, where it was possible to know, at least professionally,
all of the links in one’s economic chain, from supply through to final sale, including the
officials whose demeanor could alternately help or hinder economic success.
Yet, in a face-to-face world, it was not only the faces of state officials that
mattered, but also the faces of a host of other individuals who met and engaged with
traders. This level of social and economic interaction has not been central to previous
study, but there is much to be gained by shedding some light into the institutions that
motivated and regulated merchant actors. In this social and economic setting, reputation
served as one of the major institutions that provided structure to merchant experience and
limited merchant choice. As an economic tool, reputation was widely recognized as
essential. It was known that a good reputation in business, as an honest, honorable, and
good man, or as the purveyor of a superior product, or both, was valuable, both socially
and economically.
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As a result, merchants adopted a wide variety of strategies to develop and project
their good names. Though our sources privilege efforts to preserve and disseminate
posthumous reputations, we are nevertheless fortunate to have numerous examples of
merchants working to develop their reputation during their lifetimes. Often, this involved
demonstrating their dedication to their work and the quality of their goods, but merchants
are universally interested in showing their success through the ways in which their
prosperity helped others. It is common for merchants to try to make their generosity, to
their family, freedmen, or friends, apparent, or to otherwise publicize their contributions
to their neighborhood or community. Often, it was important to merchants to associate
themselves with a particular place, and to lean on the reputations of those places, as well
as the memories of the residents there, to bolster their own reputations.
Yet this investigation has noted the consistent trend of anxiety that is revealed in
these displays of merchant reputation. Merchants, concerned about the stereotypes that
circulated about their professions and their professional integrity, sought to assure their
audience that they did not embody the negative traits that were commonly attributed to
traders and retailers. Expressions of negation are common, as merchants were eager to
differentiate themselves from the stereotype. Often their efforts led to displays of
euergetism, which offered concrete evidence that they might point to in order to prove
their generosity and public-mindedness. In the latter case, merchants frequently worked
together, pooling resources to enable them to contribute more as a collective.
These collectives offered merchants benefits that they could not achieve alone,
but also enforced institutions to which independent merchants were not beholden.
Membership in a group came with responsibilities, codes of conduct that applied both
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among members and in the wider community. These groups helped merchants to present
a united front against negative stereotypes and provided merchants with a network of
useful social and business ties that, while they required maintenance, nevertheless
generated new opportunities. Whether formally or informally constituted, groups of
merchants working together benefited everyone involved, though the structure of these
groups, and concerns about the relationships between the reputations of individuals and
that of the collective, required that members of groups make some concessions to the
needs of the whole.
Groups helped merchants to disseminate information about themselves, either
through benefactions that the group sponsored or through the social and economic
network that the group helped to stabilize and strengthen. The group could vouch for its
members, just as individuals could, and our analysis has shown that they were
particularly suited to introducing members of the same trade to one another and to
facilitating travel arrangements. The latter was usually undertaken via group or individual
letters of recommendation and introduction, which were a powerful tool for spreading
reputation and easing the challenges of undertaking business away from home.
Letters were useful, but generally needed to supplemented by conversation. The
limitations of the epistolary genre encouraged both writers and the subjects of their letters
to communicate more detail when the subject and recipient were face to face. These
actions were a more structured version of an activity that happened daily throughout the
Roman world, gossiping. As we have argued, gossip was an essential means by which
reputation spread. Though gossip networks often transmitted information unevenly or at
irregular speeds, gossipers used the information they knew about the reputations of others
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as means to reinforce the mores of their community, to build and develop trust, and to
distance themselves and others from community members whose actions were deemed
socially inappropriate.
Gossip enabled the community to inform itself of basic, necessary social and
economic data, but also to enforce institutional limits, incentivizing some courses of
action and discouraging others. Conversations that contained information about
reputation served both purposes, and helped to develop narratives about merchants,
constructing what would be considered “common knowledge” about an individual,
constructing the reputation, or reputations, that individual would have. Merchants
contributed to these conversations but were also at the mercy of the talk that circulated
about them. Merchant were left them to monitor their reputation and to attempt to control
its shape in an ongoing process that did not end even at death.
Ultimately, merchants spent considerable effort on their reputations because it
was not a static thing, developed once and then set to the side; rather, reputation required
constant care and maintenance. However, a good reputation was not without economic
benefits that made these efforts worthwhile. The same merchants who proclaim their
good reputations are also the ones who were successful enough to make a public record
of their prosperity, and it is through their references to friends, family, and peers, as well
as their social status more generally, that we see the concrete benefits that a good name
could generate.
These findings have broad implications for future studies on both Roman society
and the economy, and this project has endeavored to demonstrate that it is impossible to
accurately reflect the one without the other. Society, and especially social norms acting as
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informal institutions, was essential for determining the course of the economy in the
Roman Empire. Economic actors were aware of, and invested in, their social standing,
and adjusted their business lives in the service of their status in the community. The
reverse, of course, was also true, that their social lives were enlisted in service to their
businesses, ultimately creating an indivisible whole in the way that many merchants
thought of their lives and work as inextricably connected. As with the study of collegia,
where it is now generally held that it is wasted effort to attempt to extricate the social
from the religious or the economic, we must accept that the economic labor of merchants
cannot be disentangled from their communities and social contexts.
This ties merchants ever closer to the general population and may even throw
their position as a separate social category into doubt. While their agency in trade
separates them from their customers, we have seen that merchants can easily slide into
and out of different economic roles, sometimes buying, sometimes selling, but always
keeping an eye on how their reputation was being spread and received. This ambiguity
and fluidity of categories is important and suggests that our understanding of economic
and social decision making, more broadly, requires closer examination and
reevaluation.851
Nevertheless, our study has demonstrated that merchants were considered, even if
they did not always consider themselves, to be a distinct and definable group within
Roman society. Stereotypes in the Roman world clearly segregated merchants, traders,
and artisans from at least a more elite, land-based demographic. Merchants, operating
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particular set of circumstances. As this dissertation has argued, we must get back to the fundamental
pressures that merchants were under if we hope to understand their social and economic lives.
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under these stereotypes conceived of themselves and their work in response to the
pervasive influence of these societal opinions. It will be necessary, going forward, to
conceive of the many layers of Roman society on the terms that they themselves laid out.
The merchants in this study occupy a broad spectrum of social positions that operated
parallel to, as well as among, traditional social divisions, and these have not yet been
fully explored, nor has this project been able to represent the full heterogeneity of Roman
merchant experiences.
One means of accessing this variety will be to consider more closely the ways that
region and period affected the kinds of techniques and materials that merchants used to
represent themselves and display their reputations. While the underlying motivation for
these displays remains stable across this period and these geographical boundaries, the
methods of expression do seem to have developed differently depending on where in the
Empire one was. Thus, merchant funerary inscriptions are more clearly an Italian
phenomenon, while merchant group charters are only available to us from Egypt and in
Gaul there are a large number of reliefs depicting merchant work in a local style. These
regional or local decisions are likely the result of the particularities of the social settings
in which these reputation strategies were adopted. Particular modes of expression
reflected what those communities felt was the best way to express personal achievements,
vent competitive tendencies, or broadcast reputation. This project has demonstrated that
concern about reputation was a common feature of merchant experience, but there
remains work to be done to refine the reasoning that made some strategies for projecting
reputation more common in different places at different moments.
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Furthermore, it is possible that the strategies that this project has identified can be
more broadly applied to the inhabitants of face-to-face communities from other temporal
and geographic areas. Since the formal institutions of the Roman Empire have been
demonstrated to have been of minimal concern to the merchants of the period, there is no
particular reason to assume that the circumstances of merchants in that time were unique,
nor that the borders of the Empire delineated some special zone where these institutions
applied, and outside of which, they did not. Future work will have to consider not just
what is true of the social and economic lives of merchants in the later Roman Empire, but
what continuities existed in the world beyond that time and place.
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FIGURES:
Fig. 1: Front Panel from the Sarcophagus of Titus Aelius Evangelus, about 180 C.E.,
Italy, J. Paul Getty Museum, 86.AA.701

Fig. 2: Loculusplatte of Titus Aelius Evangelus, mid-2nd century C.E., Italy,
Medelhavsmuseet: MM1997:001
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Fig. 3: Wall-painting from the Fullery of Verecundus, Venus Pompeiana and the Fullery
(Pompeii, Regio IX.7.6)
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Fig. 4: Wall-painting from the Fullery of Verecundus, Mercury and the Shopfront (Regio
IX.7.7), photo and postcard (c. 1910)

Fig. 5: Apple-seller Relief, Narbonne, Le Musée Archéologique de Narbonne
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Fig. 6: Arch of the Argentarii, photo: L'arco degli argentari, adossato alla chiesa di San
Giorgio al Velabro, photo by Eugène Constant, 1848–52 Metropolitan Museum of Art,
2005.100.799 (14)
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Fig. 7: Wall painting of the Procession of the Carpenters (Pompeii, Regio VI.7.8), Naples
Archaeological Museum. Inventory no. 8991

Fig. 8: Wall-painting of a Procession in Honor of Cybele, House of Venus and the Four
Gods (Regio IX.7.1)
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Fig. 9: Urceus of Aulus Umbricius Scaurus, from Bernal-Casasola et al. (2016).

Fig. 10: Plan of the House of Aulus Umbricius Scaurus (Regio VII.16.15/16), Atrium at
Room 2.
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Fig. 11: House of Aulus Umbricius Scaurus, plan of Atrium of Entrance 15, from Curtis
(1991)

Fig. 12(a-d): Details of Mosaics from the Atrium of the House of Scaurus (Regio
VII.16.15/16)
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